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Austerity is among contemporary public management’s defining features. Austerity 
management research traditionally focuses on the contents of budgetary changes and 
organisations’ broad strategies. While valuable, this high-level strategic lens comes at the 
expense of accounting for the austere situation’s turbulence and the grounded practices 
through which austerity is managed. 
Consequently, this thesis reconceptualises austerity management through Thévenot’s regimes 
of engagement (RE). This pragmatist lens better conceptualises actors’ situated dilemmas and 
consequent practices. Thévenot’s approach particularly suits austere environments, whose 
scarcity surfaces public organisations’ latent inter-goal conflicts: RE differentiates modes of 
action by the different goods people seek. 
To capture the national and organisational debate in whose context public managers operate, 
RE was combined with Critical Discourse Analysis. The resultant study focuses on a sector in 
which austerity management research is overdue: UK healthcare. It combines a case study of 
national policy with three organisational cases. Observations, interviews and documents are 
analysed discursively, processually and pragmatically. 
The resultant findings enable three theoretical contributions. The first emphasises the 
linguistic situating work we do to establish the nature of situations we encounter. It 
particularly emphasises its importance in shaping the national austerity situation. The second 
highlights an annual cycle of instability as organisations’ emphasis shifts between reporting 
acceptable financial plans and making those often highly optimistic numbers real. The third 
demonstrates that austerity destabilises the very coordination devices which people deploy to 
manage it.  
Together, these contributions conceptualise austerity management as a set of responses to a 
situation. It notes how austerity’s evaluative and situational instability undermine traditional 
ways of coordinating work despite uncertainty. This recasts austerity management as not only 
a set of financial choices but also a search for coordination. Such an approach is needed to do 
justice to the messy realities of austerity which public managers know so well.  
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Part 1 – Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Austerity and public administration 
If the public services of the 1980s were defined by New Public Management (NPM; Ferlie et al., 
1996; Hood, 1991) and the turn of the Twentieth Century by ‘digital’ or ‘network’ governance 
(Dunleavy et al., 2006; Newman, 2001), public administration since 2008 has been 
characterised by austerity. ‘Austerity’ denotes a policy of sustained financial contraction 
through spending cuts pursued by governments across Europe since 2008. While it lacks its 
predecessors’ conceptual distinctiveness, austerity has had a similarly profound impact on 
public organisations’ resources (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015; Lafond et al., 2016), 
staff (Bach, 2016; Lewis et al., 2017), structure and culture (Lodge and Hood, 2012; Pollitt, 
2010). Understanding contemporary public organisations means understanding organisations 
under austerity. 
Austerity represents an enormous financial challenge to European public sectors. Following a 
major banking crisis in 2007-08, governments spent extensively securing financial systems, 
precipitating substantial budgetary problems (Blyth, 2013; Morgan et al., 2011). 
Characteristically, they responded with public service spending contractions (Schäfer and 
Streeck, 2013). Yet while public organisations faced extreme pressure to reduce spending, it 
was often politically unacceptable to reduce service standards (Clarke and Newman, 2012; 
Pollitt, 2013). Simultaneously, the wider impacts of public sector contraction frequently 
increased need (Karanikolos et al., 2013, 2016). Austerity’s direct and indirect impacts made 
life extremely difficult for public organisations. 
Unsurprisingly, these imperatives precipitated significant organisational changes. Some 
quantitatively reduced divisional budgets (Hastings et al., 2013), others altered their structures 
and functions (Shaw, 2012). Others still attempted to resist changes (Dommett and Skelcher, 
2014). All this could involve significant macro-level strategic shifts (Cepiku et al., 2016); but 
also entailed ground-level ingenuity in staff’s ideas and practices (Lowndes and McCaughie, 
2013). Austerity wrought profound changes in what organisations did and how. 
These changes pervaded organisations. While approaches varied across states and 
organisations (Lodge and Hood, 2012), they shaped the volume and nature of staff’s work 
(Bach, 2016). They prompted restructures, including the abolition of services (Z. Morris, 2016) 
and invention of others (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015). Perhaps most importantly, 
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they shifted organisations’ tone and valence. NPM’s cost-cutting ethos and the 
‘transformational’ ambitions of ‘digital era governance’ remained but in much more 
pessimistic mode (Clarke and Newman, 2010). Where they might once have been routes to a 
better future, cost-cutting and transformation were increasingly cast as measures necessary to 
survival (Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013). 
Austerity hit many countries. Yet the UK was among its most willing adherents (Scharpf, 2013). 
Notwithstanding that the UK Government justified austerity as a solution to indebtedness 
(Fairclough and Fairclough, 2011), by 2017 the UK was among the OECD’s most indebted states 
(Schäfer and Streeck, 2013, pp.2–3). The UK thus faced sharp, lengthy austerity without this 
being complicated by the underlying fiscal crisis characterising states like Greece or Italy. 
While changes in funding to local government have rightly attracted extensive attention, UK 
austerity crossed sectors (Bailey et al., 2015; HM Treasury, 2010). With a breadth of 
Government departments asked to save, most services faced narrowing funding. This included 
the world’s fifth largest organisation (Hyde and Exworthy, 2016; Nuffield Trust, 2017b): the 
UK’s publicly funded National Health Service (NHS). Notwithstanding Government claims the 
NHS continued to receive just-about-increasing year-on-year funding, per capita funding 
substantially fell while per capita costs and need rose (Gainsbury, 2017; Lafond et al., 2014, 
2016). Where the NHS struggles, the consequences can be severe (Watkins et al., 2017). It was 
the largest, and among the most important, organisations to face austerity. How bodies like 
the NHS manage austerity is vital to understanding contemporary public administration. 
Studying austerity management 
The academic study of organisational life under austerity has been clustered under the banner 
of ‘cutback management’, latterly ‘austerity management’. This literature grew out of studies 
of government budgeting, informed by the private sector cutback management literature 
(Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980; Pandey, 2010). These heritages have suited the literature well, 
directing it towards detailed insights into how austerity alters budgeting processes, and the 
policy decisions organisations make towards bettering their bottom lines (Wildavsky, 1978; 
Levine, 1985). 
However, this heritage also constrains the literature’s empirical and conceptual focuses. 
Empirically, the literature’s history in government budgeting studies has created a sustained 
focus on national and local government cases. Studies of central government departments are 
increasingly popular (Dowling and Harvie, 2014; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; L. Morris, 2016). 
Meanwhile local governments remain dominant (e.g. Cepiku et al., 2016; Davidson and Ward, 
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2013; Hendrick, 1989; Maher and Deller, 2007; O’Brien, 2013; Overmans and Noordegraaf, 
2014), particularly within the UK (Bailey et al., 2015; Hastings et al., 2013; Hastings, Bailey, 
Gannon, et al., 2015; Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013; Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Meegan et 
al., 2014).  
While in a UK context the focus on local government is justified by austerity’s substantial 
impact there, its political leadership leaves it atypical of most public organisations. 
Managerially-led organisations have been comparatively neglected (Turnbull and Wass, 2015). 
Healthcare-based studies are rare, and often based on high-level quantitative data that 
provide little insight into healthcare organisations’ particular contingencies (Leider et al., 2014; 
Rondeau and Wagar, 2001). Where research has got closer to the ground, this has come at the 
expense of robustness: Kardakis et al’s (2014) analysis of a Swedish hospital savings 
programme is intriguing but the hospital’s involvement in sampling leaves readers doubting its 
reliability.  
This lack of focus comes despite the importance of austerity in areas like health care. The NHS 
was left seeking £20bn of savings (Charlesworth et al., 2016), jeopardising healthcare quality 
(Robertson et al., 2017). Yet organisational research on the so-called Quality, Innovation, 
Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) programme has been startlingly scant, limited to high-level 
policy accounts and interviews assessing organisations’ financial positions and plans (Ferlie et 
al., 2018; Exworthy et al., 2016; Appleby et al., 2014). The literature’s heritage in public 
budgeting leaves managerially-led organisations like healthcare bodies under-analysed. 
This budgetary starting point also precipitates a high-level perspective and emphasis on senior 
staff. The literature emphasises high-level concepts like the distinction between across-the-
board and targeted savings; or between ‘managerial’ and ‘strategic’ ways of exercising said 
targeting. Such categories make sense only in the boardroom. As soon as supposedly ‘across-
the-board’ savings are delegated, they are inevitably focused on more specific changes. 
Austerity management studies skew towards such high-level budgetary activity, leaving more 
poorly understood grounded roles like the cutback ‘envoy’ tasked with communicating with 
departments (Williams, 2015). Notwithstanding the value of high-level ideas and the 
importance of strategic actors, too much focus there leaves us less sure of the breadth of 
grounded activities by which people manage austerity. 
This focus on the budgetary and formal gives a misleadingly stable image of austerity 
management. Decisions about whether to make strategic, managerial or across-the-board 
savings are described as if made in environments of calm reflection (Levine, 1985). 
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Contemporary austerity’s frenetic pace and short timescales figure little as explanatory factors 
in understanding organisations’ behaviour. This is particularly striking given the rapid change 
(Cepiku et al., 2016; Raudla et al., 2013) and structural turbulence (e.g. Department of Health, 
2010a; Edwards, 2016) characterising today’s austerity. The ability to take and implement 
circumspect decisions should not be assumed. 
This is a vision of austerity management excessively focused around the content of budgetary 
decisions. The practice of deciding and the frequently more junior work of implementing 
receive comparatively scant attention. Similarly neglected are decisions without immediate 
budgetary consequence. Yet not all austerity management is fiscal. Managers might safeguard 
non-financial initiatives despite growing financial pressure. They might undertake 
developmental initiatives to enable recovery from austerity when it ends. Or they might simply 
try to stabilise their organisation in ways which do not deliver direct savings. The focus on 
budgets unnecessarily narrows the range of ways people might respond to austerity. 
Accordingly, this thesis departs from earlier conceptions of austerity management. The key 
questions of the austerity management literature have been ‘what has been saved, where and 
how?’. These have been answered by reference to specified ‘types’ of savings (Bailey et al., 
2015) and latterly broad ‘strategies’ of austerity management (Cepiku et al., 2016). While 
useful, these categories have narrowed the activity considered austerity management. This 
thesis therefore advocates a more common-sensical conception of austerity management: as a 
set of responses to a situation. 
Engaging with austerity 
This proposed conceptualisation leads this thesis towards pragmatism and Thévenot’s (2001b) 
‘regimes of engagement’ (RE). Pragmatism describes theories which locate the social in 
situated ‘practices’: constellations of action, things, knowhow, beliefs, discourses and so forth 
(Reckwitz, 2002). Falling under this broad label, RE stresses the normativity of all action and 
the search for coordination, befitting austerity’s turbulent, normatively contested 
environment (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, 2001a).  
Thévenot characterises social activity as a coordination problem resolved through the situated 
pursuit of some good or other. Coordination is difficult because we are uncertain how others 
(or the world itself) will behave. This is mitigated by gradually established understandings 
about how people behave in different situations. For Thévenot, it is therefore the ability to 
recognise situations and mitigate this uncertainty that enables us to coordinate. Without 
coordinating, it is hard to meaningfully act with agency, because the results of one’s action are 
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so unpredictable. Thévenot’s situated conception of action thus suits our desire to 
conceptualise austerity management in terms of responses to a situation. 
RE is especially well suited to austerity’s controversial context. Thévenot conceptualises all 
action as oriented to some good, which may be an abstract moral value or more intimate 
preference. Regardless, these goods shape how it makes sense to behave, and consequently 
the understandings one develops with others. When shared, or when compromises can be 
reached, such goods facilitate coordination. At others, disputes arise: these Thévenot theorises 
in detail (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). His framework is particularly apt to analyse situated 
organisational work occurring against backgrounds of normative dispute. 
Yet austerity is not only an abstract dispute. Quite apart from its concrete consequences for 
people (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015), it substantively changes organisational life. 
Important within this is that organisations become increasingly governed, subject to multiple 
new measures from anxious governments and senior managers (Oakes and Oakes, 2016). 
Thévenot’s framework emphasises such devices designed to judge whether one is achieving 
the good sought. Such devices enable us to tailor our actions to better achieve that good, and 
to coordinate with one another about the right approach to take. They are thus the pivot 
around which social life is built. The measurement devices proliferating under austerity are also 
central to Thévenot’s thought.  
Thévenot’s thinking is demonstrably suited to conceptualising austerity management in terms 
of responses to a situation. Better, it gives due precedence to the multiple normative 
commitments and associated measurement devices which austerity entails.  
However, austerity is a distinctive situation. It is a complex of macroeconomic, political, 
organisational and social circumstances. Even if we experience some directly, we learn about 
most verbally. Public managers understand their organisations’ austere situations through 
junior staff’s reports. This typifies many contemporary situations which are increasingly 
‘textually mediated’ (Fairclough, 2000, p.165). Indeed, discursive writers observe that 
‘situations’ are necessarily discursive constructions: selective collations of circumstances 
designated as interrelated and pressing (Grint, 2005). That austerity’s circumstances are so 
rarely directly observable only makes this discursive mediation more evident. 
This thesis therefore complements Thévenot’s perspective with Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA; Fairclough, 2015). A flexible analytic approach increasingly retreating from its left-wing 
origins, CDA offers multiple language-analytic tools (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). Already 
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deployed alongside Thévenot’s work, it is a suitable companion to his thinking (Chiapello and 
Fairclough, 2002; Diaz-Bone, 2011, 2017). Indeed, Thévenot himself has called for exactly the 
greater focus on linguistic detail CDA provides (Moody and Thévenot, 2000). 
‘Managing austerity’ is responding to a situation. This situation is value-laden, heavily 
governed and interlaced by national debate. This thesis operationalises this conception of 
austerity management, drawing on Thévenot alongside CDA. This substantially departs from a 
literature that relies excessively on high-level categorisations of budgetary choices. This 
becomes a central opportunity to advance the theory and better understand what people are 
doing when they are managing austerity. 
Introducing the thesis 
This thesis deploys its discursively inflected version of Thévenot’s approach through four case 
studies. Focusing on UK healthcare austerity, it valuably counterbalances a literature which 
heavily emphasises politically-led organisations. It also highlights a pluralistic sector (Denis et 
al., 2007) where otherwise backgrounded disputes and tensions become highly ‘observable’ 
(Pettigrew, 1990). 
To examine a multi-level phenomenon like austerity, this study focuses on four cases: one of 
the policy environment (2008-18) and three of organisations therein. Detailed observational, 
interview and documentary data were gathered from organisational sites over 14 months. 
These were then analysed through an innovative, multi-stage coding system designed to 
identify practices based on their manifestations, like ‘situations’, ‘objects’ and ‘actions’. This 
produced a methodological framework sympathetic to both the study’s empirical material and 
conceptual commitments. 
Doing so produced a more dynamic, grounded account of austerity management than 
otherwise available. It emphasises the austere situation’s uncertainty and the ambivalent 
effects of attempts to stabilise it. The rapid change austerity precipitates is cast as destabilising 
fragile agreements about the situation, the evaluative standards people should meet, and 
therefore how to coordinate work. This is developed into a multi-level model of austerity 
management focused not on the strategic responses chosen, but the organisational behaviours 
and practices precipitating them. This offers a more dynamic account of austerity than 
otherwise available, accounting for managers’ difficulties in following injunctions to improve 
their practice (Levine, 1985). It thus enables more meaningful recommendations for those 
designing governance and regulatory systems. 
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This thesis comes in six parts, of which this is the first. The subsections below describe the 
contents of the remaining five. Further information on the policy background against which 
this thesis is set is found in Appendix 3. 
Part 2 – Literature reviews 
In preparation for study of NHS austerity management, Part 2 analyses and evaluates relevant 
research. Chapter 2 analyses the austerity management literature. First it reviews that 
research’s history and structure. Developing the argument above, it characterises the 
literature as excessively based around high-level budgetary concepts. These, it argues, occlude 
the grounded financial and nonfinancial practices in which both senior managers and more 
junior staff engage when addressing austerity. This is attributed to the literature’s 
conceptualisation of austerity management in terms of choices between ‘cutbacks’ or 
narrowly-defined ‘savings strategies’. 
Chapter 3 therefore theorises austerity management as diverse responses to a situation. To do 
so, it turns to the literature on pragmatism, noting it emphasises situated action. Recognising 
the risk that such approaches become deterministic, it turns from traditional practice theory 
towards French pragmatism (or ‘convention theory’). Here, Thévenot’s thinking is found 
particularly apt to conceptualise austerity management, given his focus on situatedness and 
normative conflict. Yet the chapter notes a limitation in Thévenot’s work: the lack of integral 
tools to analyse linguistic detail. 
Chapter 4 addresses this limitation. First, it elaborates the above arguments for a partly 
discursive approach to austerity management. Highlighting existing austerity discourse 
research, it notes that it remains distinct from austerity management. Perversely, the Chapter 
realises, our analysis of the persuasive effects of austerity’s language fails to consider how that 
language affects those public managers pivotal to how austerity plays out. It thus seeks an 
appropriate discursive approach, advocating CDA. After analysing CDA’s compatibility with 
Thévenot, it concludes that the two combine powerfully. 
Part 3 – Methods 
The next Part develops methods to operationalise this theorisation of austerity management. 
Chapter 5 first focuses on the ontological, epistemological and other conceptual commitments 
this practice approach entails. The Chapter then zooms in and describes data collection before 
elaborating an innovative analytic approach to robustly identifying practices. This approach 
draws on theoretical lessons from practice theory, but I am unaware of such a method being 
described elsewhere in the literature. 
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Part 4 – Organisations under austerity 
With the methods established, this Part reports on the findings from the organisational cases. 
First, Chapter 6 introduces the practices identified across sites. The five core practices are 
described through sketches, definition and vignettes. Combined with Chapter 5, Chapter 6 
assures the reader the practices were robustly identified. The key practices identified – 
attaining tenuous futures, constructing possibility, reconfiguring quality, conducting and 
contesting financial tests and reshaping engagements – each describe processes of 
turbulence and change. Each is a key ingredient in the case reports and theorisations that 
follow. 
With these practices established, Chapter 7, Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 tell the stories of 
organisational cases. Drawing on a processual analysis technique deployed to understand the 
practices’ transformations across time, they divide events into periods, structuring their 
reports accordingly. Within each period, they highlight prominent practices, recalling Chapter 
6 as appropriate. They then interpret their case, offering early theoretical conjectures. 
These cases develop our understanding of the practices Chapter 6 reported. Accordingly, 
Chapter 10 presents a dynamic and comparative account of these practices across sites, which 
draws empirical material closer to theorisation. It culminates in a model of austerity 
management based on these five practices. It highlights their connections but also internal 
tensions: beneath these five core practices, their constituent elements’ dialectic relationships 
render each a site of tension. The Chapter ends by observing three theoretical puzzles 
remaining in the data, contextualising Part 5. 
Part 5 – Theorising austerity management 
This Part addresses these three theoretical puzzles: how do people discursively shape the 
situations they face; how are unstable austere situations stabilised; and how do continually 
shifting measurement approaches fare under austerity. First, Chapter 11 uses a processual 
account of the national austerity debate to characterise the discursive shaping of situations. 
This theorises the ‘situating work’ actors do to constitute a situation before test(s). It also 
highlights the specific techniques used in this crisis’ national discourse, setting the scene for 
later chapters. Its core contribution is to identify situating work as a core process within public 
controversies, making plausible its influence upon organisational actors. 
Chapter 12 then theorises those organisational actors’ roles when confronted by a turbulent 
situation. It highlights budgetary rules’ perverse impacts and an associated discourse of 
existential threat. These produce a distinct cycle over the course of the financial year as senior 
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attention shifts from submitting compliant budgetary submissions to making real savings. The 
chapter characterises this annual cycle as a pattern of opening and closing one’s eyes 
(Thévenot, 2009): or recognising and neglecting the arbitrariness of agreed plans. Arguing that 
different staff perceive such plans differently, it highlights resultant conflict. 
The situational instability Chapter 12 identifies sets the scene for a difficult management 
environment. This is worsened by the rapidly changing evaluative criteria austere 
organisations face and impose. Chapter 13 examines these combined dynamics. It 
characterises them as precipitating problems of coordination which only make it harder for 
organisations to manage. Efforts to correct for this are potentially damaging, often 
precipitating further instability. Eventually, such coordinative changes become so problematic 
as to risk a ‘triple crisis of coordination’: a time when coordination becomes problematic across 
Thévenot’s three regimes of planning, familiarity and justification. 
Part 6 – Conclusions  
These chapters cast austerity management as an effort to create stability in a deeply unstable 
situation. Chapter 14 collates this picture, highlighting the connections between Chapter 12’s 
temporal cycle, Chapter 13’s evaluative dilemmas, and how both are embedded within the 
multi-level discursive and policy processes on which Chapter 11 focuses. This produces a multi-
level, integrative model of austerity management. The chapter develops this to highlight 
challenges for the conventional austerity management literature, and supplementary 




Part 2 – Literature reviews 
Chapter 2: Austerity management 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 highlights the myriad challenges of managing austerity. It involves difficult decisions, 
challenging implementation and delicate governance dilemmas. These are difficult even in the 
abstract. But public servants lack the luxury of managing in the abstract. Instead, they operate 
from within austerity’s complex, unstable environment. Under austerity, acrimony and 
mistrust become commonplace (Schmidt et al., 2017); data become unreliable (Rubin, 1977); 
established routines decay (Ferlie and Judge, 1981); individuals bear extreme burdens 
(Turnbull and Wass, 2015; Clayton et al., 2015); and public organizations’ plural values conflict 
ever-more openly (Pandey, 2010). Bound up in this environment, managing austerity is all the 
harder. 
Yet the austerity management literature is generally oddly withdrawn from the situated 
difficulties austerity managers face. With strong debts to public budgeting and private sector 
cutback management literatures, it emphasises decisions about financial strategy. Such 
analysis foregrounds high-level, static concepts like the distinction between ‘incremental’ and 
‘targeted’ cuts (Levine, 1978; Raudla et al., 2015; Wildavsky, 1978). Similar typologies describe 
types of budgetary change, excluding from consideration nonbudgetary efforts involved in 
dealing with austerity. There result static images of savings which austerity’s instability renders 
dynamic and uncertain. High-level, static, budgetary concepts poorly describe the untidiness of 
savings under austerity. 
Such abstractions belie the untidy, messy, dynamic nature of austerity. Yet austerity is an 
unstable, fraught, dynamic situation (Ferlie and Judge, 1981; Meegan et al., 2014). It seems 
likely to interact with approaches to managing austerity, and to undermine the stability of 
purposive strategic action (Behn, 1980). Yet the literature conceptualises that situation merely 
as a contingency that managers should consider in rationally managing austerity (Levine, 1985) 
or a variable predicting certain approaches (Cepiku et al., 2016). These present an unduly 
static, un-situated perspective on austerity management. 
This static, high-level view makes it harder to understand the grounded practices by which 
savings are achieved. It focuses on the high-level strategic choices managers make (Cepiku et 
al., 2016; Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015; Hunter, 1979), not the practices involved in 
making them. It is unsurprising that Schmidt et al (2017, p.1539) conclude that the literature 
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has focused on ‘the effects of cutbacks…and on the content of cutback packages’ not ‘how 
public managers handle’ such savings efforts. The lens remains strategic and high-level, 
withdrawn from the substance of day-to-day austerity management action. 
This precipitates a limited account of austerity managers’ agency. Managers tend to be cast as 
rationalists operating upon their austere settings from outside to unwaveringly achieve their 
allotted targets (Schmidt et al., 2017) or maximise benefits. Else they are operators of abstract 
criteria determining the types of savings they will make (Sosin, 2012). Either way, they are 
rational actors with unitary preferences operating on austere situations from outside. This 
seems a strange account of conflictual environments in which managers themselves face 
multiple normative imperatives (Pandey, 2010). 
The argument above proceeds in four sections, concerning savings’ content, situation, 
practices and the agency involved therein. Following a historical overview of the literature, one 
subsection addresses each element. Given the limitations identified therein, this culminates in 
a call for a more situated, pragmatist analysis of austerity management.  
This need not reject the current literature, but rather enables us to better pursue its most 
intriguing insights. How are high-level savings strategies (Cepiku et al., 2016) mediated within 
turbulent organizations (Rubin, 1977)? Through what processes are certain accounts of the 
austere situation accepted (Behn, 1980) and certain prioritisation criteria selected (Meier and 
O’Toole, 2009)? What else occurs in the shadows of such formal approaches? Put simply: what 
do people do when they are managing austerity? 
Tracking the austerity management literature 
Subsequent sections present this review’s central argument; this section contextualises it by 
outlining the literature critiqued therein. Following Raudla et al (2015), I distinguish austerity 
management literature from general organizational decline writing and political literatures on 
government budgeting. Nevertheless, I highlight these and related literatures where gaps in 
the austerity management literature remain. 
The developing literature: 1970s & 1980s 
Austerity management research emerged to fill a compelling need. Conventional public 
administration theory has been largely developed in times of plenty. It presumed increasing or 
stable resources and counted expansionist or resource-neutral ‘change’ among its key 
problematics (Levine, 1978). Generic organizational decline writing (Whetten, 1980) was 
largely developed in private sector settings. Such bodies faced perhaps greater existential 
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threats than public sector organisations, but enjoyed more freedom in handling cutbacks. 
Neither literature effectively advised public organisations about the economic climate they 
encountered in the late 1970s and 1980s. Writers attempted to fill this void, drawing on public 
budgeting literature alongside private sector cutback management writing (Bozeman, 2010; 
Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980). 
Early austerity management research therefore centred on questions amenable to budgetary 
answers. One key early problematic was categorising the savings organisations made. While a 
range of budgetary categories were deployed (Dunsire and Hood, 1989), one became 
predominant: the opposition between ‘targeted’ and ‘across-the-board’ savings. These savings 
models and their corresponding ‘rational’ and ‘decrementalist’ philosophies provided the 
field’s early theoretical coherence (Levine, 1978; Wildavsky, 1978).  
This analysis often blurred the positive and normative. Authors analysed both the savings 
managers made and those they should make. Particularly writers supporting ‘targeted’ cuts 
tended to bemoan practitioners’ inability to take such ‘rational’ choices (Levine, 1985). Some 
early processual work supported this normative conversation by linking downstream problems 
to choices of ‘targeted’ or ‘across-the-board’ savings (Levine, 1984). Normatively as well as 
positively, the distinction between rationalism and incrementalism characterised the early 
literature. 
Given the literature’s strong normative bent, studies also sought lessons about how to 
coordinate austerity management. Writers debated centralisation (Behn, 1980), staff (Cayer, 
1986) and change management (Raudla et al., 2013). Early writing in this school tended to be 
prescriptive, but often offered detailed – if stylised – accounts of staff behaviours (Flynn, 
1991). 
The early literature considers two key questions. First, what sort of savings would (and should) 
organisations make? Second, how should such a process be designed to minimise problems? 
Their normative bent reflects the practical gap they addressed, and their focus on budgetary 
categories the budgeting theory they drew on. 
Re-awakening: the early 21st Century  
After the 1980s, spending rose again and interest in austerity management diminished. Only 
when the early 2000s saw further cuts, was the 1980s literature revisited. Yet public 
administration had changed since the 1980s. Writers remained interested in understanding 
what spending organisations were likely to cut. But they now wanted to do more than 
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categorise those cuts (Meier and O’Toole, 2009; Sosin, 2012). Where 1980s scholarship asked 
what savings were likely to be made, the early 21st Century literature asked how managers 
were reaching such conclusions. The chief problematic of this phase of literature was less what 
was cut than why such choices arose. 
Post-2008 studies 
Following 2008, a new tranche of austerity management writing emerged (McCann, 2010). It 
both recalled and reacted against its predecessors (Raudla et al., 2015; Williams, 2015). Those 
analysing which savings organisations would make departed from the simple dichotomy 
between ‘across-the-board’ and ‘targeted’ savings but introduced a new budgetary typology of 
their own. Particularly in local government writing, the distinction between ‘retrenchments’ 
(service reductions), ‘efficiencies’ (reducing operating costs while maintaining provision) and 
‘investments-to-save’ (financial outlays to reduce long-term costs) became dominant (Hastings 
et al., 2013). Like their predecessors, such analyses categorised and counted budgeted savings. 
In a greater departure from earlier studies, others attempted to characterise organisations’ 
broad savings approaches (Lodge and Hood, 2012). Characteristically deploying case studies, 
such studies described and categorised whole-organisational strategies, not individual savings 
(Cepiku et al., 2016). They thus differed in scale from analyses based on categorising individual 
savings; but shared their focus on organisation’s savings choices. 
Meanwhile, this period saw a revival of interest in the organisational changes associated with 
austerity. Earlier approaches to issues like centralisation and people-management had often 
been prescriptive. Conversely, these adopted a positive approach to the association between 
austerity and centralisation (Kickert, 2012) while analysing actors’ strategies for evading 
central control (Newman, 2014; Oakes and Oakes, 2016). Like their predecessors, however, 
such analyses tended to focus on high-level, often structural, changes (Ghin et al., 2018). 
The foregoing paragraphs provide a descriptive account of the austerity management 
literature’s main trends. Yet it may be evident that there is an argument to be made about the 
high-level focus of the literature. Such an argument would suggest that the price of so much 
high-level analysis of organisations’ savings approaches has been understanding the practices 
by which they select and operationalise them. The following sections develop this argument 
examining the literature’s conception of which savings are made, their context, the practices 
by which they are realised, and the agents involved. 
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The content: savings 
Much austerity management writing attempts to understand what savings organizations make. 
For clarity, I will call this ‘the content literature’, to distinguish it from analysis focused on how 
or why such savings are made. The content literature extensively utilises organisations’ own 
spending figures (e.g. Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015). 
Naturally, this means a focus on phenomena observable on balance sheets, like shifts in 
spending between budget lines (Levine, 1978). Such research theoretically and empirically 
shaped early cutback management research. While often using non-budgetary data, most 
research took as its empirical object the ‘cutbacks’ visible on balance sheets (Hendrick, 1989). 
These were often theorised through concepts like ‘rational’ and ‘decremental’ cuts developed 
through early budget analytic studies. This section traces the achievements and limitations of 
this dominant strand in the austerity management literature. 
The early content literature experimented with a variety of ways of categorising spending 
changes. Writers eager to predict austerity measures’ empirical consequences utilised 
concepts from the field, often operational or functional distinctions between areas of 
spending. They thus argued that savings hit the ‘middle’ of organisations more than the ‘base’ 
or ‘top’ (Dunsire and Hood, 1989); that easily-altered capital spending is vulnerable (Hood and 
Wright, 1981; Maher and Deller, 2007); and that hiring freezes are more common than 
wholesale layoffs (Raudla et al., 2013). 
‘Across-the-board’ and ‘targeted’ cuts 
Nevertheless, it was the distinction between ‘targeted’ and ‘across-the-board’ savings which 
rapidly became dominant (Ghin and Kristiansen, 2018; Levine, 1985; Raudla et al., 2015). 
‘Targeted’ savings are purposive, asymmetrical reductions in budgets or services. ‘Across-the-
board’ savings are proportionately equal reductions to all units. The debate intertwined 
positive and normative disputes over such cuts’ likelihood and desirability. 
For some, targeted cuts were desirable as they rationalised formerly wasteful organizations 
(Jimenez, 2014). Levine (1978, 1979, 1985) was a key proponent of this normative view. 
Following a strategic planning logic (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015), he cast cutbacks as an 
opportunity for rationalisation. Conversely, he feared that across-the-board cuts would 
prevent effective decision-making as resources drifted imperceptibly towards powerful 
departments. For Behn (1980), targeted cuts were apt unless only marginal savings were 
needed. For these writers, strategically targeted cuts were rational, though not necessarily 
likely (Levine, 1985). 
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Others pointed to the disruption such sweeping changes risked, arguing that across-the-board 
approaches were thus both desirable and likely. They characteristically drew on incrementalist 
budgetary theory, which explains budgets’ relative stability in terms of budgeters’ inability to 
holistically analyse expenditure, and aversion to disruption (e.g. Wildavsky and Caiden, 2003). 
Mirroring this, they argued that gradual reductions in all budgets (‘decrementalism’) could 
maintain stability (Ferlie and Judge, 1981), whereas large changes risked internal acrimony as 
departments jockeyed to avoid the worst cuts (Wildavsky, 1978). Accordingly, organizations 
would wisely choose decremental responses (Hendrick, 1989). 
Those challenging decrementalist predictions generally focused on circumstances promoting 
targeted responses. For some, targeted cuts were likely where fiscal restraint is severe (Kelly, 
1989), longstanding (Levine, 1979; Hood and Wright, 1981; Stipak and O’Toole, 1993) or 
sudden (Glassberg, 1978). Others noted that centralisation enabled targeted responses 
(Hendrick, 1989). Raudla et al’s (2013, p.9) review suggests that organisational level is key: 
they find that American studies identify few across-the-board approaches in local 
governments, but state-level studies find more. Suggestions that the types of cuts likely are 
circumstantially contingent are lent credence by the mixed empirical picture early studies 
present (Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Raudla et al., 2015). 
Some have deployed this strategic/across-the-board dichotomy to explain temporal changes in 
savings programmes. Most frequently, writers predict a gradual movement from across-the-
board to targeted savings over time (Hood and Wright, 1981; Jimenez, 2014, p.497; Kelly, 
1989; Levine, 1979, 1985; Pollitt, 2010; Troupin et al., 2013). Jørgensen distinguishes two 
varieties of ‘targeted’ cuts – ‘managerialist’ efficiencies and large-scale ‘strategic’ change. This 
is used in a three-stage process model in which across-the-board cuts become managerialist 
and then strategic savings (Dunsire and Hood, 1989, pp.170–178). Some suggest that such 
‘phases’ models understate inter-phase overlap (Dunsire and Hood, 1989) or that this linear 
movement is present only under certain circumstances (Cepiku et al., 2016). Yet such models 
generally predict linear progress from the across-the-board cuts these writers often decry to 
the ‘strategic’ approach they advocate (Levine, 1978, 1985). 
Beyond targeting and decrementailsm 
The distinction between across-the-board and targeted savings has thus been a valuable 
analytic resource to austerity management writing and offered the field an early theoretic 
anchor. But it characterises organisational responses to austerity only in terms of spending 
reductions. Behn (1980, p.614) makes explicit an assumption much early literature shares by 
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casting organisations as facing a choice between cuts and extinction. But ‘cuts’ are far from the 
only alternative to extinction. And even in organisations making them, cuts alone may be 
insufficient to address ‘austerity’. A literature analysing organisational responses to austerity 
must describe more activity than ‘cuts’ alone. 
Later authors recognised the greater breadth of viable approaches to managing austerity 
(Ferry et al., 2019). Local government studies often emphasise the trichotomy between 
‘retrenchments’, ‘efficiencies’ and ‘investments-to-save’ (see p.25; Bailey et al., 2015; Hastings 
et al., 2013; Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015; Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015). 
Others divide savings in terms of whether they represent specified ‘organisational’ changes or 
‘fiscal’ shifts (Overmans and Noordegraaf, 2014). The former entail specific reforms like re-
engineering initiatives or hiring freezes, the latter are merely financial measures (Cepiku et al., 
2016, p.6). Such approaches go beyond the ‘cuts’ which earlier typologies categorised. 
Yet they share something with such earlier approaches. Their objects of analysis remain 
individual, financially quantifiable ‘savings’ (including ‘investments-to-save’) visible on balance 
sheets. Such approaches are susceptible to two critiques. First, they treat savings as 
misleadingly static. Cataloguing, categorising and aggregating individual ‘savings’ treats each 
‘saving’ as a unitary object that remains stably in a category. Yet in fact writers note that 
supposed ‘efficiencies’ might end up ‘retrenching’ services (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 
2015; Fitzgerald and Lupton, 2015). Others note that savings ‘across-the-board’ at one 
hierarchical level may become ‘targeted’ as delegated through an organisation (Ghin and 
Kristiansen, 2018; Ongaro et al., 2015; Raudla et al., 2015). Going further, I observe that all 
‘across-the-board’ savings are necessarily ‘targeted’ once operationalised. 
Second, all these typologies still exclude certain responses to austerity from consideration. 
Early and contemporary categorisations alike focus on financial savings. Yet organisations also 
respond to austerity through nonfinancial measures. Some mitigate austerity’s consequences 
without changing spending (Clayton et al., 2015; Newman, 2012), or resist it altogether (Fuller 
and West, 2017). Yet to a literature originally based on analysing budgets and balance sheets, 
the presumption seems natural that all austerity management is fiscal. 
Beyond individual savings 
Perhaps aware of the need to give a broader picture of austerity management, some attempt 
to characterise whole austerity management programmes. Yet some such approaches still rely 
on categorising savings. Local government scholars examine the distribution of different types 
of cuts (Hastings et al., 2013; Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015; Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, 
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et al., 2015) to see whether councils fit Shaw’s (2012) ideal of the ‘resilient local authority’ (e.g. 
Fitzgerald and Lupton, 2015; Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013; Reid, 2018). They remain reliant 
on the savings typologies critiqued above. 
Another set of studies avoids aggregating individual savings. But they still rely on high-level 
categories derived from budget analysis. Many processual studies are framed as analyses of 
the consequences of strategic choices between ‘types’ of savings, like across-the-board and 
targeted cuts (Levine, 1984); or layoffs and attrition (Cayer, 1986; Nutt, 2007). Seen through 
such high-level static budgetary concepts, details of organisational life become simply 
functions of macro-strategic choices. 
Others look more widely to conceptualise organisational savings approaches. Some draw on 
categories drawn from political science. Flynn (1991) analyses a hospital’s savings approach in 
terms of whether it suggests professional or bureaucratic dominance. Lodge and Hood (2012) 
conjecture that states will choose between ‘directive’, ‘hollow’, ‘communitarian’ and ‘coping’ 
strategies in responding to austerity depending on the vulnerabilities they face. Cepiku et al 
(2016) draw on this framework in studying the responses of Italian local governments (Kim and 
Warner, 2016). Frameworks like this supplant the budgetary categories common to the 
budget-oriented literature with those drawn from higher-level political perspectives (Ghin et 
al., 2018). 
Beyond savings choices 
The content literature frames austerity management as a question of strategic financial 
choices. Given its debts to public budgeting and strategic management studies, this is 
unsurprising. Yet it frames our understanding of austerity management in terms of high-level 
static typologies, like the distinction between ‘targeted’ and ‘across-the-board’ cuts.  
Inevitably, such typologies focus our gaze selectively. Here, the focus on ‘savings’ neglects 
nonbudgetary changes. While many responses to austerity are probably visible on budget 
sheets, many will not be. Some will attempt to manage the instability and uncertainty – not 
necessarily the financial scarcity – austerity brings. Others will attempt to mitigate its impact 
on nonfinancial values. Still others may resist it outright. Responding to austerity cannot be 
reduced to budget-relevant changes. The content literature misses nonfinancial responses. 
The situation: austerity 
Yet perhaps a greater problem with the content literature comes from the dominance of its 
concepts in our wider understanding of austerity management. Most early writing focused on 
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the content of savings approaches or was strongly influenced by the content literature’s 
concepts. This shaped austerity management as a field, conceptualising austerity through a 
high-level, strategic lens (Levine et al., 1981; McTighe, 1979). 
Such lenses are analytically useful where purposive, strategic managerial action drives change: 
that is, where the underlying situation itself is relatively stable. But this is a poor 
characterisation of austerity. This section demonstrates austerity’s instability, thus developing 
an argument that suggests high-level strategic perspectives on austerity management are 
insufficient. 
Austerity’s instability 
Austere organisations present diverse, unstable, fraught situations (Meegan et al., 2014). 
Routines decay (Ferlie and Judge, 1981); normative compromises and cooperation destabilise 
(Pandey, 2010; Clayton et al., 2016); normal boundaries of working life are transgressed 
(Turnbull and Wass, 2015). Writers at the austerity management literature’s peripheries 
emphasise austerity’s conflictual (Newman, 2012, 2014; MacKillop, 2014), emotionally fraught 
nature (Clayton et al., 2015, 2016).  
Such features seem likely to shape and be shaped by austerity management work. Yet where 
represented in the literature they tend to be reduced to contexts which should influence the 
content of managers’ strategies (Hardy, 1987; Levine, 1978, 1985; Williams, 2015), or static 
variables predicting different approaches (Lodge and Hood, 2012; Cepiku et al., 2016). 
Refracted through the static, strategic lens the content literature deploys, these features 
become the background to purposive organisational action. This underplays the impact 
instability, uncertainty and conflict can have on managing austerity.  
This is particularly problematic for those swathes of austerity management research that rely 
on organisations’ own data. We know people may report conservative, ‘fudged’ or inaccurate 
data under austerity (Ferlie and Judge, 1981; Rubin, 1977; Schmidt et al., 2017; Davidson and 
Ward, 2013). Indeed, austerity promulgates wholly new types of measurement (Abdullah et 
al., 2018; Oakes and Oakes, 2016; Rubin, 1977), overlaid upon existing budgetary approaches 
(Wildavsky, 1978). Not all such means of measurement are neutral but may instead be bound 
up in organisational or ideological conflicts (Fuller, 2017, pp.752–756). Treating organisational 
figures as reliable research data casts austere situations as misleadingly stable and consensual.  
Much of this is implicit, springing from inattention to the situation’s vicissitudes. Austere 
situations which are analysed tend to be high-flown national or sectoral situations, distant 
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from the quotidian situations facing austerity managers (MacKillop, 2014). Without accounting 
for these, we cannot comprehend the contrasting situations savings schemes encounter as 
they flow from boardroom to operationalisation (Sørensen and Kristiansen, 2016). For a 
literature ultimately investigating how people respond to a situation (austerity), austerity 
management research is oddly un-situated. 
Shaping austerity 
This lack of situatedness is puzzling given how aware writers seem to be of the importance of 
how the situation is seen (Pollitt, 2010; Nutt, 2007). That austerity is particularly open to 
multiple representations and perceptions is a further complexity for which successful analysis 
must account (McCann, 2013). 
Many references to the situation’s importance come through normative advice to managers. 
Writers emphasise the need to convince others to see the situation your way (Pollitt, 2010; 
Nutt, 2007): that is, to believe cuts are necessary or inevitable (Behn, 1980; Schmidt et al., 
2017) because of a crisis (Dunsire and Hood, 1989). Kardakis et al (2014) cast the relative 
consensus about a savings programme’s causes as one of its successes. Critical writers 
emphasise the potential of such framings to paint austerity as an unavoidable ‘age…something 
beyond individual agency’ (Fuller, 2017), and to shape subsequent action (Hay, 1999; O’Neill, 
2012). Critical and managerialist writers seem to agree that austerity measures’ 
implementation depends significantly on how staff see the situation (Whetten, 1980). 
This observation implies a recognition that the ‘situation’ to which one can respond is not the 
situation ‘out there’ but the situation as one perceives it (Grint, 2005). Jick and Murray (1982) 
first formalised this realisation with a model of austerity management that differentiated 
‘objective’ from ‘perceived’ ‘crisis conditions’ (Jimenez, 2013). Since then, Maher and Deller 
(2007) have empirically confirmed the distinctiveness and importance of perceived fiscal 
stress. Their quantitative study found perceived fiscal stress a better predictor of public 
managers’ willingness to impose austerity measures than objective measures of fiscal stress. 
The perceived situation appears influential of austerity responses and distinct from the 
situation ‘out there’, supporting accounts of austerity decisions emphasising the diverse 
frames through which crises are seen (Di Mascio et al., 2013; Di Mascio and Natalini, 2015; 
McCann, 2013; McGivern et al., 2017; Whetten, 1980). 
Consequently, understanding austerity management entails understanding how austere 
situations are shaped. Yet the literature says little about the shaping of situations under 
austerity management. Even Jick and Murray (1982, p.146) say little about what causes given 
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‘interpretive paradigm[s]’ to be chosen. Accordingly, their model focuses on the influence of 
large-scale organizational and external conditions to explain how situations are perceived. 
Since then, a breadth of developments in interpretive and discursive research provide models 
and techniques to explain how situations become seen in certain ways (Van Dijk, 2003, 2009, 
2013, Fairclough, 2003, 2015). Interpretive and discursive writers have traced how texts and 
talk can influence perceptions of situations and challenges (e.g. Jones and Exworthy, 2015; 
Vaara et al., 2010). There are good reasons to think discourse shapes perceived situations in a 
manner susceptible to study (Fairclough et al., 2002). 
Some align themselves with such traditions to consider how austerity is represented in 
organisations. They characteristically adopt critical standpoints to determine how austerity 
discourse coerces workers (Fuller, 2017; Fuller and West, 2017) and how they might resist or 
mitigate such policy (Newman, 2014). Else they might analyse particular elements of a 
situation’s interpretation, like how accountancy helps make sense of austerity and how this 
relates to accountability (Hayne, 2015). Such approaches reaffirm the importance of how 
austerity is represented. But their focus is not on how this forms part of austerity management 
writ large. 
Conversely, the core austerity management literature remains yet to take advantage of these 
advances to analyse how people perceive austere situations. This is no trivial gap: the 
processes interceding between objective contextual conditions and perceived situations are an 
analytically unavoidable mediating step in any explanation of how people act under austerity. 
Situating austerity 
This section argues that the literature under-situates austerity management. Its high-level 
strategic lens makes sense only alongside an environmental stability austerity lacks. Both 
austerity’s material context and the way austere situations are presented leave perceived 
situations fissile. This highlights the complexities of organisational austerity and commends a 
more situated approach. Pragmatist approaches, which base themselves on analysis of 
situated action, already seem promising, particularly as they can accommodate analysis of 
discursive practices (Bourdieu, 1977; Vaara et al., 2004). The next section examines how the 
practices of austerity management are currently conceptualised. 
The practice: managing austerity 
Failing to adequately conceptualise the austere situation is itself a limitation. But it also entails 
further problems. Without accommodating austerity’s complexities and conflicts, we cannot 
-33- 
 
understand people’s work to address them. Without acknowledging unreliable data, conflict or 
emotional distress, one cannot identify the practices causing or mitigating them. Because the 
high-level strategic lens adopted by research on austerity programmes’ contents 
misrepresents austerity’s complex situations, it cannot accommodate the breadth of practices 
involved in managing them. 
This limits our understanding of all responses to austerity – even the budgetary changes 
traditional typologies capture. The literature’s high-level strategic lens interprets austerity 
management in terms of purposive, strategic action at the expense of understanding the 
practices by which those strategies are selected and pursued (Levine, 1984). Where studies 
empirically catalogue more micro-level dynamics, these dynamics receive scant theoretical 
focus (Flynn, 1991). This limitation is particularly important under austerity – a turbulent 
situation in which one cannot assume the nature of day-to-day work remains stable (Barley 
and Kunda, 2001). 
Were this simply a limitation of the austerity content literature, this may not be a problem: 
other studies could interrogate these important dynamics. Yet this section demonstrates that 
such analyses are lacking. So important were the content literature’s high-level, static concepts 
that they came to dominate later writing. This section investigates varied writing with 
implications for how people do austerity management, demonstrating that this lens still limits 
our appreciation of the austerity management’s grounded practices (Bozeman, 2010). 
Austerity processes 
Without aiming to describe the processes by which savings were made (Van der Voet and 
Vermeeren, 2017; Maher and Deller, 2007), early studies carried implicit models thereof. Behn 
(1980) imagines managers deciding between cuts and extinction; Raudla et al (2015, p.434) 
focus their review on ‘decisions that are made after the decision has been made…to use 
expenditure cuts’. Nor are they alone: studies often treat organizations as if they make 
decisions by gradually narrowing down their options according to academics’ abstract 
budgetary typologies. 
Yet there is little evidence such a rational path is followed. Organisational decisions are 
considerably messier than such trajectories imply (Langley et al., 1995). Decisions may be 
between concrete options, not abstract savings categories. Organisations may ask not ‘shall we 
use across-the-board or targeted savings?’ but simply ‘where can we save?’. Raudla et al’s 
timepoint when an organisation has committed to ‘expenditure cuts’ but not yet specified 
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savings may not exist. The content literature presents a misleadingly rationalistic picture of the 
austerity management process. 
Austerity and organisational life 
Some aim more deliberately to describe changes in organisational life under austerity. They 
adopt three focuses: i) governance and centralisation, ii) staff and performance management 
and iii) restructuring and change (Raudla et al., 2013; Ghin and Kristiansen, 2018). That these 
are the areas they choose is already telling: echoing the content literature’s high-level strategic 
lens, they concern structure and where strategic decisions are made. 
First, the most developed consideration of organisational change under austerity focuses on 
governance (Barker and Mone, 1998; Hardy, 1987). Many argue that austerity promotes 
centralisation as senior staff grapple harder for budgetary control (Oakes and Oakes, 2016; 
Schmidt et al., 2017) to enable major changes (Levine et al., 1981). Centralisation occurs intra-
organisationally (Raudla et al., 2013) and inter-organisationally (Clayton et al., 2016). Others 
have identified more decentralised approaches under certain crisis conditions (Kickert, 2012; 
Boin et al., 2009). Even following formal centralisation, staff may resist central control 
(Dommett and Skelcher, 2014; Schmidt et al., 2017; Levine, 1978, 1979). There is a mixed 
picture over how levels of central control change. 
But this picture is less puzzling than it seems. As Ghin and Kristiansen (2018) observe, some 
things can be centralised while others are decentralised. When one looks across levels in a 
system, one might note centralisation of decisions about aggregate savings alongside 
decentralisation of choices about how to achieve them. Only the austerity management 
literature’s static, strategic lens makes the two seem dichotomous. Understanding how 
centralisation and decentralisation interweave requires closer attention to austerity 
management practices. 
Second, writers investigate staff and performance management. As observed above, these 
often emphasise the stories they should tell staff about the austere situation (Behn, 1980; 
Kardakis et al., 2014). Beyond this, they consider the necessity for communication, and the 
relative benefits of layoffs and attrition (Cayer, 1986; Levine, 1984; Rondeau and Wagar, 
2001). While often insightful, such writing tends to focus on high-level structural changes. 
Indeed, the purpose of staff interactions often seems to be retaining the ability to make 
preferred strategic changes without resistance (McTighe, 1979). Conversely, we learn 
comparatively little about the grounded interactions managers have with staff (Lodge and 
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Hood, 2012). It is thus that key austerity actors, like the austerity ‘envoy’, remain so poorly 
understood (Williams, 2015). 
Finally, some consider prospects of restructuring and change under austerity. One major 
debate asks whether austerity promotes or deters major change. Many are pessimistic, noting 
that time and resources for major changes are short (Cayer, 1986; Raudla et al., 2013). Barker 
and Mone (1998) note that becoming increasingly mechanistic – as austere organisations tend 
to – inhibits strategic change. Others note potential obstacles, such as the risk leaders offer 
insufficient attention (Cayer, 1986), or avoid potential conflict (Levine, 1984). There are 
insights here, but they tend to focus on structures, strategies and senior managers. The more 
grounded activities associated with staff interactions under austerity remain elusive. 
Both the choice of areas on which this writing focuses and how it does so emphasise the 
continued high-level strategic perspective they adopt. There remains a pressing need to 
understand the grounded practices by which organisations manage austerity (Bracci et al., 
2015). Some studies towards the austerity management literature’s peripheries align 
theoretically with pragmatism. Yet their focus often remains on the content of organisational 
policy (Fuller, 2017). Lowndes and McCaughie’s (2013) ‘exploratory’ study relates their site’s 
policy choices under austerity to older policy ideas, thus concluding that a process of 
‘institutional bricolage’ was at work. Yet its analysis of which policy options are selected cannot 
realise the potential of such approaches to explain how such decisions are made, maintained 
and implemented. Even those analyses of organisational life theoretically indebted to practice 
theory omit the detail of organisational life under austerity. 
Agency: austerity managers 
This perspective simplifies the decision-making processes occurring within organisations. The 
literature’s strategic focus tends to treat organisations as if they were single actors making 
decisions. Yet as Pandey (2010) observes, resource scarcity surfaces such conflicts in 
organisations with plural goals. Studies identify many conflicting motivations to explain 
managerial priorities (Leider et al., 2014; Maher and Deller, 2007; Meier and O’Toole, 2009; 
Sosin, 2012). Yet the literature’s implicit and explicit models of agency do little to 
accommodate conflict between such multiple priorities. 
Interests and preferences 
Much of the literature treats people as fundamentally rational actors pursuing their interests. 
Particularly earlier writers tended to cast individuals’ behaviour as questions of self-interest 
(Glassberg, 1978; Levine, 1978; Kelly, 1989; Dunsire and Hood, 1989). Glennerster (1980, 
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p.368) reacts against this dominant unitary rationalist account, instead identifying plural 
groups’ ‘different kinds of rationality’ and the conflict they precipitate. Yet closer examination 
reveals that the core model of self-interest rationality remains intact: rather than truly 
different rationalities, Glennerster describes groups with different interests and information 
applying similar rationalistic calculi to determine their action. Martinez’s (1994) critique of the 
preceding literature as highly rationalistic remains apt. 
In this narrative, organisational choices about which savings to make can be explained by 
reference to individual rational preferences, or the intersection of competing self-interested 
actors. This obscures the other motivations people might have for their priorities. Literature 
describes people advocating ‘the “fair shares” principle’ for distributing savings responsibilities 
equally across-the-board (Kelly, 1989, pp.192–193; Raudla et al., 2015, p.437). When they do, 
they cast advocating ‘fair shares’ as a prudential, self-interested step: a concept departments 
invoke to minimise savings responsibilities. The assumption here is that ‘fairness’ is not a 
motivation to be taken seriously. Principles like ‘fairness’ are reduced to expressions of 
presumed underlying self-interest. 
Values, pluralism and conflict 
Yet evidence suggests that public servants are engaged in value-laden work in which normative 
pressures are important (Degeling et al., 2006; Ongaro et al., 2015). Recent years have seen 
public organisations given more decision-making responsibility while being further 
responsibilised to reconcile competing objectives (Bailey et al., 2015; Newman, 2001, 2014). 
Studies outside the austerity management literature emphasise the additional, even ‘extreme’ 
work public servants do to protect clients and maintain values (Clayton et al., 2015; Turnbull 
and Wass, 2015). Civic duty and ‘togetherness’ are deployed to motivate this (Clayton et al., 
2016; Fuller, 2017; Turnbull and Wass, 2015). In public sectors under austerity, values 
influence how people manage. 
These values probably conflict. Public organisations have plural goals (Pandey, 2010; 
Glennerster, 1980; Hood, 1991). Scarce resources surface inter-goal conflicts which remained 
submerged in times of plenty. Governments struggle to reconcile fiscal and political objectives 
(Pollitt, 2010); organisations find quality and cost challenging to simultaneously maintain 
(Ongaro et al., 2015).  
A comparatively slim literature attempts to deduce the relative prioritisation public 
organisations give to competing values. Dunsire and Hood (1989) suggest that civil servants 
avoid cutting whatever they perceive as the ‘core’ of their services. Meier and O’Toole (2009) 
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test this contention through a study of American school managers. They found that managers 
did indeed protect their ‘core’ – understood as standardised test scores – while cutting other 
areas of expenditure. Meanwhile, Sosin’s (2012) analysis of American substance abuse services 
finds that those which are harder hit by austerity are more likely to mimic federal priorities, as 
opposed to protecting the neediest. Conversely, Leider et al (2014) suggest that public health 
staff focus funds towards this greatest need. Meanwhile, Maher and Deller’s survey (2007, 
p.1567) paint a picture of public servants eager to preserve the basic existence of each service 
except when ‘facing significant levels of fiscal stress’. Many motivations for savings choices 
appear present. 
Yet the quantitative studies dominating such work give a reductive picture of values. While 
some measure values through survey responses (Leider et al., 2014; Maher and Deller, 2007), 
Overmans and Noordegraaf (2014) warn that espoused and actual responses to austerity 
differ. Others measure values through the proxy of the outcomes of organisational decisions 
(Meier and O’Toole, 2009; Sosin, 2012). However, they inevitably struggle to find 
organisational outcomes with unambiguous antecedent values: why should we conceptualise 
Meier and O’Toole’s (2009) standardised test scores, to be protecting one’s ‘core’ work not 
following institutional pressures (Sosin, 2012) or safeguarding one’s reputation? Most 
importantly, however one measures the variables of values, converting values to variables 
represents them as artificially clear and unitary. What one’s ‘core work’ is may itself become 
disputed. Understanding the dynamic operation of values in organizations requires closer 
attention to values and valuation than converting them to quantitative variables can achieve.  
Treating values as distinct variables also obscures public organisations’ plurality of values 
(Pandey, 2010; Hood, 1991). From this pluralist perspective, it is unsurprising that the studies 
above find many motivators for organisational decisions. Yet the literature frames these 
multiple motivators not as complementary, interacting values, but as competing explanations 
for unitary organisational actors’ behaviour. Rather than seeking the ‘right’ motivator to 
explain decisions under austerity, a more productive account would accept the pluralism of 
complex, professionalised organizations and interrogate the social processes through which 
given values become influential in context. This could explain the complex, pluralistic valuation 
processes within austerity management. 
Conceptualising austerity management 
The existing austerity management literature stresses high-level accounts of savings at the 
expense of detailed understanding of the practices involved. This makes it harder to explain 
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such decisions, and leaves such accounts distant from, and less useful to, public managers. Too 
frequently, one finds oneself turning to studies at the periphery of the austerity management 
literature for detailed description of austere organisational life (e.g. Clayton et al., 2015; Fuller, 
2017). 
Nor is this coincidental. This literature conceptualises itself as the study of cuts and savings 
schemes. Inevitably, it emphasises identifying and categorising chosen schemes, and explains 
organisational dynamics in terms of those high-level strategic choices. It is thus unsurprising 
that it offers limited insights into the messy processes generating ideas (Langley et al., 1995), 
operationalising and resisting savings. Those responses to austerity not visible to balance 
sheets remain among the most side-lined. A more grounded perspective is needed. 
Others have observed such limitations. Responding to a perceived lack of focus on the process 
of making planned savings, writers have suggested a ‘change management’ approach to 
austerity management (Kardakis et al., 2014; Schmidt et al., 2017; van der Voet and 
Vermeeren, 2017). This would valuably return focus to the work of turning strategic choices 
into changes. In one sense, it provides a more detailed account of austerity management work. 
Yet in another sense, it takes us full circle. The austerity management literature arose precisely 
because conventional public management theory made assumptions based on times of plenty 
which situations of decline belied. Change management epitomises such theory. In Schmidt et 
al’s model, ‘context’ is an independent variable, which affects, but is not affected by, the 
changes actors pursue. Yet as is highlighted above, austerity’s situations are not so stable. 
They are continually altered by people’s responses to austerity; and are repeatedly reframed 
by the new information and structures austere organisations see. Austerity’s ‘context’ is too 
dynamic and unstable to model this way. 
Equally, change management mirrors assumptions from the studies it criticises. As the cutback 
management literature is guilty of assuming all responses to austerity are ‘cutbacks’, so 
‘change management’ assumes all responses will be ‘changes’. In fact, facing austerity’s radical 
dynamism, maintaining stability may sometimes be one’s object. Equally, Schmidt et al (2017, 
pp.1539–1540) are misguided to presuppose that managers necessarily support cutbacks; they 
may instead resist or be ambivalent towards them (Newman, 2014). Characterising austerity 
management as change management continues assumptions built in more prosperous times. 
This review suggests an alternative conceptualisation of austerity management. This would 
necessarily avoid static typologies of savings approaches. Conceptualising austerity 
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management in terms of ‘cutbacks’, ‘changes’ or set ‘austerity measures’, one starts from 
presumptions about the type of work austerity management must involve. With our theory 
and our intuitions alike built during times of plenty, such assumptions are risky.  
Instead, our approach must reflect in detail organisations’ breadth of work in managing 
austerity. We cannot know that people manage austerity exclusively through cutbacks, 
changes or anything else. All we can know is that our object of interest is how people respond 
to austerity. It thus makes sense to conceptualise austerity management in those terms: as 
responses to a situation. This suggests detailed attention to that situation, and to the situated 
action of austerity management. Such a conceptualisation would have several intuitive 
advantages. It is common-sensical and minimises our ingoing assumptions. It would offer 
insights to as-yet neglected actors such as austerity ‘envoys’ and more junior staff (Williams, 
2015). 
Most importantly, it would resolve the core deficits in the current approach. The foregoing 
sections demonstrate that an insufficiently situated analysis inhibits our understanding of 
austerity managers’ detailed activity. In turn, this obscures the elements of austerity 
management outside standard financial typologies and obscures the complexities of agency 
and conflict. Conceptualising austerity as responding to a situation would promote a more 
situated analysis that highlighted both grounded and nonfinancial activities including 
normative conflict. In so doing, it would answer a core question of the austerity management 
literature (Medir et al., 2017, p.624): through what practices do public organizations ‘react…to 
these stressing situations’ of austerity? 
Such an approach would require careful theorisation. Its focus on situated action suggests a 
pragmatist analysis. Chapter 3 develops this suggestion, identifying an appropriate pragmatist 
framework for grounded analysis of austerity’s uncertain, conflictual activities. Yet 
appreciating practices per se is insufficient. Chapter 4 recalls discursive work’s importance to 
austerity, advocating close attention to language within our pragmatist frame. These 
contextualise the following Parts which operationalise this proposed conception of austerity 




Chapter 3: Conceptualising austerity management: the regimes of engagement 
Introduction 
The previous chapter concluded by calling for a situated approach to austerity management. It 
hoped not just for any situated approach, but one with three further characteristics. First, it 
should address public organisations’ normative pluralism, which austerity surfaces (Bozeman, 
2010; Pandey, 2010). Second, it should recognise not only the importance of situated analysis 
per se, but also the instability and unpredictability characterising austere situations (Ferlie and 
Judge, 1981; Rubin, 1977). Third, it should recognise the importance of both language and 
materiality in shaping how such situations are perceived and equip us to analyse it. Such an 
approach would substantially advance our understanding of what managing austerity involves. 
This chapter answers that call through an approach drawn from French pragmatist sociology. 
Thévenot (2001b) characterises situated action in terms of one’s normative aims (goods). He 
contends that differing goods lead us to see the world differently, prompting different forms of 
agency – or ways of engaging with the world. These span the most personal and intimate to 
the most public action (Thévenot, 2007). Based on this distinction between the particular and 
the general, Thévenot divides engagements with the world into three regimes, each driven by 
the form of good to which it orients. Each regime offers a different way of acting and 
coordinating. These regimes of engagement form the crux of Thévenot’s thinking. 
Thévenot’s framework addresses Chapter 2’s threefold call. First, it is intrinsically pluralistic. 
Each regime entails a different type of good; and even within a regime, the specific goods 
people pursue will differ. While pursuit of a shared good enables coordination, clashes 
between goods remains possible. Boltanski and Thévenot’s On Justification (2006) analyses 
disputes within justification (the regime dealing with publicly acceptable values). It has become 
central to attempts to understand normative organisational disputes, and is repeatedly 
recommended when addressing contentious situations, like austerity (Cloutier and Langley, 
2013; Denis et al., 2007). To these clashes of common values, Thévenot (2014b) adds tensions 
between such principles and more proximate, intimate concerns. Austerity sees exactly such 
conflicts between abstract organisational goals and commitments to particular cared-for 
people (Clayton et al., 2015). 
Second, Thévenot tracks this plurality of goods and associated patterns of action to situations’ 
own inherent uncertainty. We constantly receive a startling array of sensory signals; 
simultaneously, we are unsure how the world – including other people – will respond to our 
actions. We gain confidence in this only through familiarity with an environment – like our 
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homes – or by learning the ‘conventions’ describing appropriate action in given situation types 
(Biggart and Beamish, 2003; Diaz-Bone, 2017). Such increased predictability mitigates the 
world’s otherwise debilitating uncertainty, facilitating coordination. 
Third, as his focus on goods and justification imply, Thévenot captures organisational 
austerity’s turbulent normative pluralism. This befits a vision of austerity management in 
which erstwhile stable ways of seeing and measuring the world face increasing pressure 
(Rubin, 1977); and plural normativities compete (Patriotta et al., 2011) and compromise 
(Oldenhof et al., 2014). It enables a situated account of managing austere situations. 
This review first explores traditional avenues for those seeking situated accounts of social 
phenomena, finding their limitations unacceptable. Second, it outlines RE. Three further 
sections develop the arguments above, while considering RE literature’s implications for 
austerity management. Finally, it identifies remaining weaknesses within RE, highlighting the 
need for a more thoroughgoing theorisation of discourse to capture organisational austerity. 
Theorising situated action 
Practice theory 
Chapter 2 argues that a successful conception of austerity management will be more situated 
than earlier accounts. It will better account for austere situations’ instability, normative 
pluralism, and the intertwined relevance of discursive and material features in shaping them. 
Practice theory is an obvious starting point when seeking situated analysis. Strongly associated 
with Bourdieu (1977), practice theory refuses to reduce the social to one core structure, like 
cognition, discourse or materiality. Instead, it emphasises the patterned confluence of diverse 
elements, including bodily performances, mental activity, understandings, discourse, emotions 
and circumstances (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Nicolini, 2009b; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2010). 
Organisational writers have deployed it to illuminate topics as diverse as strategy (Whittington, 
1996), management consultancy (Heusinkveld and Visscher, 2012) and hybridity (Denis et al., 
2015). 
Theories of practice offer many features this study seeks. They epitomise situated 
perspectives, acknowledging that local, situated work matters (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011). 
While practice theorists focus on micro-level action, identifying ‘practices’ can demonstrate 
patterns present across settings (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Nicolini, 2009b). Going further, 
some explain identified practices in terms of higher-level social structures (Seidl and 
Whittington, 2014). Pragmatist approaches are necessary to identifying the grounded austerity 
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management work this study seeks; and can do so in manners amenable to linking national to 
organisational austerity. 
Yet there are pitfalls to avoid. First, many pragmatist theories excessively emphasise routine 
(Reckwitz, 2002). Bourdieu heavily emphasises the ‘habitus’ or ‘sense of the game’ (Wacquant, 
1989) which explains people’s situated action in terms of socially acquired habits which shape 
cognition. This is a strong, coercive concept which sees individuals enmeshed in networks of 
relationships in which ‘agents lastingly “bind” each other’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p.196). Such 
emphasis is ill-suited to situations of severe austerity, which destabilise such routines (Ferlie 
and Judge, 1981). Second, notwithstanding the diverse elements pragmatists theorise as 
comprising practices (e.g. Reckwitz, 2002), few adequately theorise their normative content. In 
addressing the pluralistic, high-profile struggles of austerity, such values will be vital. 
Conventionalism, and the limitations of practice theory 
Consequently, I turn to the work of Laurent Thévenot, one of several French pragmatists who 
shared these objections to traditional practice theory. Originally Bourdieu’s close colleagues, 
they latterly felt that the habitus’ deterministic overtones poorly accounted for people’s 
capacity to approach different situations differently. It homogenised human action, ‘short-
circuit[ing]’ accounts of stability and insufficiently explaining change (Thévenot, 2001b). 
Relatedly, they contended that mainstream social science tended to reduce values to ‘social 
norms’, treating them more-or-less as mere habits. This erases their moral content and treats 
them as monolithic, ignoring the co-presence of multiple values (Boltanski and Thévenot, 
2006). 
Instead, such ‘conventionalist’ thinkers explained patterns in behaviour in terms of a plurality 
of shared agreements about how to conduct oneself (‘conventions’) in given situations. Unlike 
the unitary ‘habitus’, these were emphatically plural. People in a situation could choose 
between several conventions. Unlike those directed by the ‘habitus’, therefore, such people 
continually express agency through choices about which of several conventions to activate. If 
Bourdieu’s subjects possess a ‘sense of the game’ (Wacquant, 1989, p.42), conventionalist 
agents have a sense of the games. 
This alternative account emerged from a detailed focus on individual situations. Thévenot and 
colleagues rejected Bourdieu’s increasing focus on totalising concepts like the ‘habitus’ or 
‘field’. Yet they share his reaction against aggressively individualistic disciplines like traditional 
economics. Consequently, they took the situation as their unit of analysis. Doing so helps avoid 
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starting from either individuals or totalising concepts (Diaz-Bone, 2017). This ‘pragmatist 
situationalism’ (Diaz-Bone, 2011, p.44) is central to conventionalist thought. 
Conventionalism is mainly known to organisational scholars through Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
On Justification (2006), and Boltanski and Chiapello’s subsequent New Spirit of Capitalism 
(2005). The former developed the economies of worth (EW), a framework to analyse 
justification, the process by which people attribute moral worth to people or things by 
invoking the ‘common good’. The latter operationalised this, arguing capitalism increasingly 
emphasised forms of worth associated with the so-called ‘network society’ (Stark, 2011). The 
framework has been used in domains relevant to austerity management, like public 
management (du Gay, 2013; West and Davis, 2011), insecurity (Ekman, 2013) and strategy 
(Gond et al., 2015; Gond, 2017). 
It improves on approaches otherwise dominating analyses of organisational normativity. The 
institutional logics approach has long been a popular account of organisational values 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). It asserts that institutions are built around ‘logics’ which describe 
appropriate action therein. Logics are therefore both produced by and constitutive of those 
institutions. The explanation is thus a meso-level one, based around a ‘logic’ associated with 
the institution itself. Conversely, EW explains normativity through micro-level situations in 
which actors invoke macro-level socially acceptable values. It has thus been credited with both 
better explaining normative disagreements’ micro-processes and their relations to wider 
principles (Biggart and Beamish, 2003; Cloutier and Langley, 2013; Dansou and Langley, 2012). 
Thévenot’s subsequent work (2001b, 2007, 2009, 2013, 2014b, 2014a, forthcoming) has 
expanded on the justification analysed with Boltanski to consider wider social activity. Where 
justification is EW’s sole focus, Thévenot’s recent work places it within a wider framework: 
justification becomes one of several regimes of engagement. It is this encompassing 
framework this review examines. 
This review argues that RE suits this study by analysing the key dimensions that Chapter 2 
highlighted. First, further exposition of RE is required; the next section provides this. The 
following three advocate its appropriateness to this study by considering the issues Chapter 2 
highlights: moral pluralism; situational uncertainty; materiality and discourse. 
Regimes of engagement 
Thévenot’s (2001b) core model of social action rests on a dual realisation: i) action always 
pursues some aim, or good; but ii) that action’s actual outcomes are necessarily uncertain. We 
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know what we’re aiming for, but not how things will turn out. Consequently, argues Thévenot, 
our efforts are characterised by an ongoing tension between our aimed-for goods and the 
realities we encounter after acting. Accordingly, life adopts the character of a series of tests: 
we act, see how the world responds, compare it to the good sought and tweak our actions 
accordingly. Doing so tests our engagement with the world against the good that engagement 
sought. This framing can equally well describe our refining a welfare system to protect social 
equity and our rearranging the furniture to make ourselves comfortable in a new home. 
However, there are clear differences between these two examples, not least the type of good 
sought. One pursues the common good, an aim most third parties would recognise as 
worthwhile. The other relates to creating personal comfort based on idiosyncratic preferences 
which strangers would struggle to truly understand. Both examples describe people engaging 
with the world seeking a good and testing their results. But they seek clearly contrasting 
goods. 
Accordingly, Thévenot (2007) differentiates these contrasting ways of ‘engaging with the 
world’ by describing three ‘regimes of engagement’. These he differentiates based on the type 
of good sought, and the corresponding action: is it public and general, like social equity, 
private and intimate, like homely comfort or somewhere therebetween, like a company’s 
restructuring plans? The most general goods involve principles which appeal to the ‘common 
good’; they are found in the regime of justification. Less general and abstract, the regime of 
planning seeks the satisfaction of a completed plan. More particular still, those seeking 
personal ease and habitual comfort operate in the regime of familiarity. 
These goods do not exist in isolation. Instead, the good one pursues affects how one sees the 
world: we pick out what matters to that aim at the expense of that which does not (c.f. 
Goodwin, 1994). Pursuing different goods means using different objects and seeking different 
information about our surroundings. Between the way we see the situation, the objects and 
information formats we use, we ‘format’ the situation differently depending on our aims. This 
alters further the reality we perceive. The good we pursue affects the reality we encounter.  
This relationship is dialectical: certain environments more readily accommodate the pursuit of 
certain goods. When surrounded by project plans, it is easier to pursue success in a plan than 
create a sense of home comfort. Accordingly, certain goods, ways of accessing reality and ways 
of acting mutually cohere. These comprise Thévenot’s regimes, and entail contrasting styles of 
action, driven by ‘an orientation to some kind of good [and] a mode of access to reality’ 
(Thévenot, 2001b). The following section examines each regime in more detail. 
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Planning, justification and familiarity 
The regime of planning corresponds most closely to what is often considered the standard 
model of rational action. The good people pursue is fulfilling a ‘plan’. This includes formalised 
plans favoured by professional project managers but also much smaller changes, like 
assembling a bookcase. Either way, pursuing a plan leads one to focus on elements of one’s 
environment designed to help: the Gantt chart structuring one’s project, or the screwdriver 
which assembles that bookcase. Accordingly, pursuing such aims is likely to involve 
surrounding ourselves with tools we use for their designed purpose. 
Where others are also engaged in our plan, planning facilitates coordination. Planning appeals 
to goals which are ‘conventionalised’ in that they would be explicable to others. Action 
pursuing these goals follows shared ‘rules of the game’, or ‘conventions’ (Thévenot, 2002a, 
p.2), enabling coordination with others. Planning deploys objects as ‘functional instruments’ 
according to their intended functional use, which others therefore understand. Because we 
use our Gantt charts as intended, suitably trained others could use them too. Consequently, 
where others share our aims, planning helps us see the world through similar eyes, facilitating 
coordination (Duymedjian and Rüling, 2010). 
Nevertheless, people sometimes disagree about the right plan. To resolve such coordinative 
problems, one can appeal to something broader. Justification links things with the most 
legitimate and conventionalised good. Through association with principles conventionally 
associated with the ‘common good’, one can demonstrate something’s value in a manner that 
transcends any one plan (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). These socially accepted principles are 
so firmly conventionalised as to be suitable to appeal to an abstract ‘public’. While clashes 
between conflicting principles are possible (p.50), justification supports coordination through 
appeal to the most conventionalised goods. 
Justification does not entail argument alone, but measurement using appropriate objects. 
‘Efficiency’ is one accepted principle. Demonstrating something’s worth through its ‘efficiency’ 
necessitates a socially authorised device to measure efficiency: say, a process map. Like the 
principles they measure, these objects support coordination by being sufficiently 
conventionalised to justify something’s worth to an abstract ‘public’. 
The regime of familiarity moves in the opposite direction. It presents a mode of action 
oriented towards one’s habitual ease and convenience (Thévenot, 2009, p.803). Seeking this, 
one engages with one’s environment not as a series of tools to accomplish plans, or devices to 
measure public worth, but as ‘lived-in’ surroundings amenable to one’s comfort. Objects are 
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not used as designed but refashioned through personal use: this is what differentiates a 
tarmacked road from a path worn by repeated journeys off the beaten track (Thévenot, 
2002b). 
Familiar activity is coordinated not through plans or other conventional devices but intimate, 
personal habits and associations. These might be wholly personal or shared with one’s 
intimates. Either way, one can coordinate one’s activities through practiced, situated 
behaviours one finds convenient. Notwithstanding this regime’s more particular, esoteric aims, 
Thévenot (2001b) insists that one still seeks a good. That good enables coordination with one’s 
surroundings and ‘entourage’. 
Each regime pursues a different type of good. Accordingly, it involves seeing one’s 
surroundings differently, deploying different objects and exercising a different agency. Table 
3.1 catalogues and elaborates the characteristics of the regimes observed so far. 
Table 3.1 – Regimes of engagement 
Adapted from Thévenot (2001b, p.15) 
An illustration 
As I write this, I sit in an open-plan office for doctoral students. I see desks adorned with 
decorations, family pictures, posters and stuffed animals. Students have ensured favoured 
food and drink are to hand. Their desks feel ‘lived-in’ and others are reluctant to use them, not 
because doing so would be logistically problematic, but because it would feel intrusive. These 
spaces are not formatted as mere functional objects, but as these students’ familiar ‘homes’ in 
the office. 
Yet formally, such behaviour breaches the rules. Computers and desks are to be ‘hotdesking 
workstations’ for temporary use, not personal occupation. A standard procedure and usage 
 Familiarity Planning Justification 
Which good is engaged? 
With what evaluation? 
Personal and local 





conventions of the 
common good 
Which reality is engaged? 
With what capacity? 
Usual and used 
surroundings providing a 
distributed capacity 
Functional instrument ‘Qualified’ object 
What is the format of 
relevant information? 
Local and idiosyncratic 
perceptual clue 
Ordinary semantics of 
action 
Codification 
Which kind of agency is 
construed 
A personality attached to 
his or her entourage 
Planner ‘Qualified’ person 
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rules prescribe that one should occupy spaces only when working on a task and remove one’s 
possessions when leaving for a few hours. Computers and desks are functional tools to help 
complete work plans, and some treat them thus. 
Others vacate their desks on leaving, but not because of any rules: doing so is a longstanding 
point of principle. They might not treat the computers they use as merely functional and may 
not follow the letter of formal rules, but feel it is a collegial way to treat shared resources. 
Solidarity requires one share such resources. To these students, one’s vacant desk is a measure 
of that solidarity. The state of one’s desk becomes a question of what is just. 
This illustration and the foregoing description of the regimes highlights the centrality to them 
of goods and corresponding measurement objects. The remainder of this exposition develops 
this observation, highlighting the goods involved in justification. 
Objects and goods 
The regimes are characterised by the type of good one seeks. Within justification, the identified 
principles describe the specific goods sought. Depending on our preferred regime and good, 
different elements of reality seem salient, and we see the same elements differently. For 
justification, a political tract is an emancipatory device; under familiarity we repurpose it as a 
doorstop. The good we seek shapes how we see the objects we encounter. 
In turn, these objects influence our encounters with reality. They format our immediate 
environments, structuring how we see them. Gradually, objects become associated with the 
regimes and principles which they routinely support. Accordingly, environments full of 
‘functional instruments’ become suggestive of the plans they help one pursue, while one’s 
personal effects make a space feel ‘homely’, befitting personal ease. Objects in our environment 
shape how we see the situation, and consequently the good it feels appropriate to pursue. The 
good one seeks shapes how one uses objects; but equally, objects shape the goods one might 
pursue. 
This process is particularly pronounced for justification. Demonstrating someone or 
something’s worth in terms of a given principle requires evidence that they fulfil it. This 
requires an object capable of measuring this worthy characteristic. Such objects must be 
‘qualified’ as accepted measurement devices (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, 1984). 
Because objects must be so established, the link between them and their associated principles 
becomes particularly strong.  
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This means that given principles and sets of qualified objects ‘go together’ particularly clearly. 
When those objects are present, one can easily measure the corresponding worth, and that 
worth feels situationally pertinent. Put simply, it starts to feel appropriate to evaluate things 
based on efficiency in a factory, but due process in a courtroom. These tightly associated 
constellations of objects and principles are known as worlds (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). 
Table 3.2 describes seven such worlds. On Justification identified six worlds, based on 
extensive textual and field research. Since then, EW writers have frequently sought to identify 
new ones (Bernard-Rau et al., 2017; Jagd, 2011). Most credibly, Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) 
conjectured a ‘connectionist’ world characterising the ‘network’ society; and Thévenot and 
colleagues (2000; Moody and Thévenot, 2000) suggested a ‘green’ world based on 
environmental concerns. While both claims are plausible, this study encounters few 
environmental concerns, so only the ‘connectionist’ world is added to Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s (2006) original six. 
Table 3.2 – Economies of worth 
World Market Industrial Civic Domestic Inspired Fame Connectionist* 
























































Source: Adapted from Gond et al (2015); originally developed from Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), *Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) 
These justificatory principles represent one regime of engagement. While often analysed 
alone, this thesis emphasises their embeddedness within RE more widely. Figure 3.1 illustrates 






Figure 3.1 – Regimes of engagement (incorporating economies of worth) 
Two types of moral pluralism 
The previous section outlined RE to facilitate the argument that follows. While continuing to 
review RE literature, the following three sections argue that RE fits the bill Chapter 2 
described. It facilitates analysis of moral pluralism, situational uncertainty and accommodates 
materiality alongside discourse. 
The multiple worlds highlighted above emphasise one way conventionalists like Thévenot 
(2001a) deviate from their predecessors: replacing totalising concepts with plural conventions. 
Such conventions’ coexistence assures agency by opening choices between several viable 
modes of coordination. Accordingly, multiple conventions commonly coexist, compete and 
combine (Cloutier et al., 2017). This led Denis et al (2007, p.181) to recommend 
conventionalist analysis to those studying normatively pluralistic organisations ‘such as 
hospitals’. Since their suggestion, austerity has only made this pluralism more important, 
casting professional and managerial-financial evaluations into greater conflict. This section 




















Moral disputes are most obvious in the regime of justification. It hosts plural principles 
associated with the common good. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) theorise disputes between 
these worlds. Such disputes arise when a test of worth occurs: when someone or something’s 
moral value is to be determined. Justifications avow or decry that worth by linking the object 
of valuation with the common good via socially authorised principles and associated ‘qualified 
objects’. 
Management consultants might evaluate a hospital department’s worth by assessing its 
efficiency (industrial principle) using ‘statistical process control’ (SPC) charts. This would be 
possible if consultants were recognised as authoritative evaluators of efficiency, and SPC 
charts appropriate devices to measure it. In EW’s terms, qualified subjects (the consultants) 
would be testing the department (the assessment) using qualified objects (the charts). 
Different subjects and objects fit different principles: our consultants are less apt to test 
compliance with civic social justice. 
Such tests can face two types of critique. First, they may be criticised because the right test 
was misapplied. In preparing their charts, our consultants may have made calculation errors or 
considered factors irrelevant to efficiency. Second, tests may be attacked for invoking the 
‘wrong’ world: a nurse might argue the department’s worth should never have been tested 
based on efficiency. Such critiques sometimes succeed, but not always. 
Recent EW research has focused on how people increase their chances of prevailing during 
such disputes. In suggesting this focus, Jagd (2011) labelled such activities ‘justification work’. 
Writers have investigated how disputants mix justifications from several worlds to craft 
(Patriotta et al., 2011; Demers and Gond, 2019; McInerney, 2008; Moody and Thévenot, 2000) 
or maintain justifications (Dansou and Langley, 2012; Oldenhof et al., 2014). More recently, 
writers have emphasised disputes’ processuality, observing how different worlds are invoked 
at different times (Cloutier and Langley, 2013; Dionne et al., 2019; Gilbert et al., 2017; Nyberg 
et al., 2017) and how such efforts interact with power (Gond et al., 2016). 
Compromise  
Nevertheless, disputes may not be resolved by one side prevailing. Instead, Boltanski and 
Thévenot describe ‘compromises’ formed by combining otherwise contradictory principles to 
evaluate someone or something. Our nurse and management consultants might agree the 
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department should be evaluated according to both efficiency and attention to individual 
patient care.  
However, principles are ultimately mutually inconsistent. Specifying a compromise too 
precisely risks surfacing such internal contradictions, making it collapse. Conversely, 
compromises gain robustness when materialised in objects (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; 
Thévenot, 1984), making them comparatively stable. Using a ‘balanced scorecard’ might help 
stabilise our nurse and consultants’ compromise. Thévenot (2001a) characterises organisations 
themselves as compromises between industrial and market values. 
‘Justification work’ scholars often focus on how compromises are made and altered. Some 
examine the ‘negotiation’-like processes forming them (Patriotta et al., 2011), and the 
techniques which maintain them, like rhetorically re-emphasising a given world (Oldenhof et 
al., 2014). Others ask why compromises fail to materialise (Huault and Rainelli-Weiss, 2011); or 
why they change (Anesa et al., 2017). Within a given policy area, multiple such compromises 
are formed and adjusted (Lemasson, 2017). 
Others investigate the varied relations between plural values within compromises (Thacher 
and Rein, 2004). Nyberg and Wright’s (2012) typology differentiates compromises based on 
the number and type of practices justified, and whether one world clearly predominates. 
Reinecke et al (2017) take a broader view, focusing on the diverse ways values are combined. 
Most originally, they identify ‘niche legitimacy’, the practice of crafting agreement between 
people with differing principles by defining against a third principle both reject. Such research 
demonstrates EW’s promise in examining pluralistic values. 
Plural regimes 
This EW literature considers only justification. Important as conflicts between justification’s 
abstract goods remain, Thévenot recognises that they are only one type of normative conflict. 
Because plural regimes govern behaviour, tensions can also exist between them (Thévenot, 
2007). Such tensions contrast goods of different levels of generality pursued by different 
regimes. In healthcare organisations, these tensions are as important as justificatory ones: as 
finances tighten, conflicts between generalised goods (financial plans) and particular ones (my 
patient) become obvious. 
The organisational literature attends to such conflicts much less than their justificatory 
counterparts. Nevertheless, many dynamics found among worlds are also identified between 
regimes. As Patriotta et al (2011) find ‘negotiation’ among worlds, so Gajdoš and Rapošová 
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(2018) see negotiation between regimes. As Thévenot casts the organisation as a market-
industrial compromise, so Pohler (forthcoming; Pohler and Van Elk, 2018) explores 
organisations’ compromises between the general and particular. 
Alongside tracing such disputes’ dynamics, writers investigate coercive mechanisms by which 
regimes gain precedence. They often draw on Thévenot’s more recent work (2013, 2014b) 
which investigates how people understand the value of plans or familiar affinities they do not 
share. Meilvang et al (2018), Meriluoto (2018) and Thévenot (forthcoming) analyse the 
mechanisms used in public participation events. Each identifies how such participants become 
interpellated into a mode of engagement associated with planning, obstructing variously 
familiar concerns rooted in personal affinities, and those seeking justice (c.f. Breviglieri, 2018). 
Notwithstanding this literature’s lesser development than EW in organisation studies, it is 
prescient for organisations facing austerity. Thévenot’s framework theorises not only conflicts 
between general principles but also those between abstract plans or principles and familiar, 
locally rooted concerns. It enables the analysis of normative plurality which Chapter 2 
demands. 
Situations, uncertainty and crisis 
It also appreciates the situational uncertainty characterising austerity. Indeed, Thévenot 
attributes the plurality of regimes and conventions to situations’ radical uncertainty. As 
explained above, our lack of knowledge about how one another or our environments will 
respond to our actions creates a ‘natural uncertainty’ (Thévenot, 2002a). Thévenot’s regimes 
each attempt to reduce this uncertainty: familiarity through esoteric, local arrangements 
facilitating one’s ease; other regimes through conventional agreements that support 
coordination. 
These regimes help narrow the world’s complexity by selecting which features thereof are 
most relevant. With particular engagements associated with particular situations, sensory 
clues about our situation help us determine the types of interventions likely to receive useful 
responses from the world. During planning and justification, which both involve conventional 
action, the fact such conventions are shared also makes predicting others’ action easier. Seeing 
our situation, and knowing what conventions are usually deemed appropriate thereto, we 
know others are probably similarly guided by those conventions. Their responses to us become 
more predictable, reducing our uncertainty (Biggart and Beamish, 2003; Thévenot, 2002a). 
Action through Thévenot’s regimes aims to manage uncertainty. 
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Accordingly, they are what stand between us and uncertainty’s return. Dissensus on the 
convention to use during coordination risks what Thévenot (2002a; c.f. Boltanski, 2013) calls 
‘critical uncertainty’. Coordination becomes impossible, and the situation is thrown into 
question. 
Austerity and crisis 
Thévenot thus enables us to theorise coordinative problems caused by the decay of 
conventional understandings of a situation, and a lack of reliable expectations about how 
others will act. Regrettably, such an account is apt when considering austerity. The budgeting 
routines Ferlie and Judge (1981) cast as destabilised are conventions coming under strain. In a 
time of uncertainty (Rubin, 1977) and dissensus (McCann, 2013), Thévenot’s analysis is 
prescient. 
While Thévenot’s writing has not been brought into conversation with austerity management 
literature, conventionalists have investigated scarcity and comparable crises. Some 
conceptualise the 2008 financial crash of and governments’ responses as a ‘crisis in valuation’ 
(Boltanski et al., 2015, p.76) which challenges capitalism’s justificatory infrastructure (Davies, 
2014; du Gay and Morgan, 2013), enabling revised conventions. For these writers, such crises 
represent moments of potential critique (Boland, 2013). This account might expect 
organisational austerity to feature opportunities to replace erstwhile stable organisational 
conventions. 
Conversely, others observe that crises can suppress critique. Organisations facing crises 
experience existential uncertainty, thus requiring more guarantees in the form of data 
(Breviglieri, 2018). This entrenches the ways of seeing themselves that such data formats 
encode (Espeland and Stevens, 1998), curtailing critique (Breviglieri, 2018). Fuller (2017, p.754) 
describes a council’s leadership creating ‘new discursive institutions’ to justify austerity and 
‘subordinate’ opposition. Livne’s (2014) account of an American hospice facing austerity 
similarly notes that economically-driven decisions became cast as moral choices in patients’ 
best interests. These cases suggest crisis prompts not fresh critique, but new conventions to 
satisfy dominant interests. 
RE’s situated theorisation of organisational life accounts for austerity’s uncertainty and 
instability. Existing research suggests tentative expectations about austere organisations. 
While the paragraphs above point variously toward new critiques and entrenchments of 
dominant practices, they share an observation: in crises, existing conventions no longer seem 
to suffice. RE seems insightful when analysing austerity’s uncertain situation. 
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Materiality and discourse 
Accounting for moral pluralism and situational uncertainty, RE fulfils two of Chapter 2’s 
criteria. The third required a framework accommodating both materiality and discourse. 
Writers often note that RE/EW emphasise materiality (Cloutier and Langley, 2013). Thévenot 
(2007) stress that our interactions with the world depend on our material surroundings’ 
responses. Moreover, we frequently use objects to format those surroundings (Thévenot, 
2002b) and measure those engagements’ success. Their materiality enables this by making 
them seem reliable and enduring (1984, 2002a, forthcoming). Material objects are central to 
engagements and their evaluation. 
A study of healthcare austerity should welcome this emphasis. As austerity management 
writers observe, austerity often sees new measurement objects to monitor financial 
performance (Levine, 1978). Meanwhile, healthcare deals with bodies whose insistent 
physicality can transcend administrative concerns (Williams, 2006). A focus on objects – 
documentary and corporeal – supports this work. 
Yet RE and EW’s emphasis on materiality has precipitated an excessive reluctance to consider 
discourse. Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) implementation of EW utilised a form of content 
analysis based around ‘dictionaries’ of words associated with each world. While comparable 
methods inspire some important works (Patriotta et al., 2011; Richards et al., 2017), they also 
precipitated an excessive focus in early organisational EW on identifying the worlds in passages 
of text at the expense of EW’s wider theory. Such approaches have given linguistically focused 
EW a bad name, with key figures cautioning against excessively ‘rhetorical’ approaches (Gond 
et al., 2015) that forget materiality. Yet such warranted warnings should not rule out linguistic 
analysis altogether. Dialogue is vital to RE/EW (Gond and Leca, 2012, pp.30–33). Yet readers of 
today’s organisational literature could be forgiven for getting the impression that Thévenot 
and Boltanski disavowed language altogether. 
In fact, Boltanski and Thévenot are far from hostile to detailed language analysis. The project 
initiating this stream of Thévenot’s work (1984) analysed objects alongside how they were 
‘defined’ and ‘codified’. In analysing tests’ outcomes, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) highlight 
the importance of how situations are ‘report[ed]’, even casting the idea of a ‘pure’ situation 
distinct from any report as incoherent. Indeed, Thévenot explicitly demands greater detailed 




Both Thévenot (2001b, 2007, 2014a) and Boltanski (2011) have theorised how differing 
regimes influence one’s language. For Thévenot, justification entails abstract language suited 
to its high generality. The more quotidian planning accordingly draws on more ‘everyday’ 
language. But even everyday terms rely on categories too general for familiarity’s esoteric 
referents: instead, indexical language and gestures become common (Gajdoš and Rapošová, 
2018). 
Nevertheless, linguistic EW/RE analysis remains scant (Cloutier et al., 2017). Where writers do 
focus on language, discursive methods’ sometime tendency to cast society as discursively 
determined (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2000b) and Boltanski’s emphasis on social ‘domination’ 
have proved a heady mix. Discursive analysis characteristically locates itself in a Boltanskian 
EW (e.g. Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002), and emphasises macro-social contexts, 
institutionalisation and ‘domination’ (Boltanski, 2011, 2013; Boltanski et al., 2015; Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005). Such accounts interpret situations as echoes of wider social structures or 
‘neoliberal political regime[s]’ (Nyberg et al., 2017; Fuller, 2017). This threatens to return to 
the totalising ‘macro-social skeleton’ (Thévenot, 2014a; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2000) from 
which conventionalism fled (Diaz-Bone, 2017). 
Where such pitfalls are avoided, language analysis remains limited in its scope. Some offer 
approaches which categorise extracts of talk in terms of the regimes or worlds they invoke 
(Diaz-Bone, 2013; Gajdoš and Rapošová, 2018; Ylä-Anttila and Luhtakallio, 2016). Such 
approaches can be valuable but say little about how selected regimes/worlds are activated, 
and less about how language shapes the situations hosting such disputes. Not even those 
espousing interest in discursive practices tend to analyse language in detail (Taupin, 2012). 
Others delve deeper, investigating the discursive construction of worlds. Diaz-Bone (2017) 
suggests a Foucauldian approach to understand worlds’ latent categories. Meanwhile, 
Chiapello and Fairclough (2002) deploy CDA to explore how a management text constructs the 
‘connectionist’ world (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). While insightful, such work emphasises 
the construction of worlds themselves, not situations. 
RE’s emphasis on materiality, and particularly objects’ role in measurement, suits this study 
well. Yet the study’s interest in discourse is far from ruled out, Thévenot himself calling for 
detailed linguistic analysis. That RE/EW’s theorisation of language remains limited is not a 
theoretical problem, but an opportunity to theoretically develop the framework. With RE open 
to further linguistic analysis, combining it with an appropriate discursive approach is a viable 




We began this chapter seeking an analytic framework which enabled a situated account of 
austerity management that adequately attended to the situation’s uncertainty and normative 
pluralism while theorising both discursive and material influences. We end this chapter having 
almost found it.  
RE broadly befits the goals Chapter 2 described. First, it accounts for healthcare austerity’s 
normative pluralism (Denis et al., 2007). RE is peculiarly aware of the normativity of all action, 
and the multiple goods people seek are central to its theorisation. This will facilitate analysis of 
both justificatory and wider disagreements within organisations. 
Second, RE addresses austerity’s uncertain, unstable situation. It has been cast as a ‘pragmatic 
situationalism’ (Diaz-Bone, 2011, p.44; emphasis original) because it takes the ‘situation’ as its 
unit of analysis. Regimes exist to address the world’s ‘natural uncertainty’. Familiar, planned or 
justificatory engagements can temporarily allay this uncertainty, but its return always remains 
a risk. This is an apt theorisation for a situation in which disruption threatens conventional 
routines (Ferlie and Judge, 1981). 
Third, RE offers a detailed infrastructure to analyse the objects important under austerity and 
is compatible with detailed language analysis. It focuses on measurement devices of the sort 
which austerity proliferates (Oakes and Oakes, 2016; Power, 1999). Yet simultaneously it 
asserts language’s importance through the ‘reports’ it highlights and its interest in linguistic 
differences between regimes. It enables the material and discursive analysis this study 
requires. 
The suggestion here is not that RE is perfect. Some might worry its being conceptually based 
on the situation makes it difficult to uncover anything important; though works like The New 
Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2006) should mitigate such attacks. More 
substantively, RE leaves a lot to do to adequately theorise language. But this work is merited if 
it enables such language-analytic resources to be used alongside a framework otherwise so 
well adapted to this study. RE offers the normative pluralism, sensitivity to uncertainty and 
analysis of materiality Chapter 2 demands, while remaining open to linguistic analysis. 
Nevertheless, the RE and austerity management literatures are yet to be brought into 
conversation. Livne’s (2014) study considers financial scarcity but is rooted solely in RE. Writers 
at the edge of the austerity management literature have invoked RE, but do so to identify and 
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critique methods of subordination, not analyse austerity management writ large (Fuller, 2017; 
Fuller and West, 2017). This thesis will provide the first such rounded analysis. 





Chapter 4: Discourse and the management of austerity 
Introduction 
The previous chapter concluded that this study would benefit from a framework for discursive 
analysis compatible with RE. This requirement was motivated by discourse’ importance for 
austerity management, and particularly for how austere situations are shaped. This chapter 
elaborates discourse’s importance and assesses the right discursive approach for this study.  
Language matters to organisational life. From texts (Cooren, 2004; Vaara et al., 2010) to 
strategies (Kaplan, 2008, 2011) and policy decisions (Tonkiss and Skelcher, 2015), studies 
repeatedly highlight how language shapes organisations. Studies of institutional change 
frequently emphasise its linguistic components (e.g. Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Maguire 
and Hardy, 2009; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). ‘Discourse’– or meaning-making – has only 
grown more important, communicators becoming increasingly adept at using language 
purposively (Fairclough, 1995). Empirical studies demonstrate how linguistic choices affect 
organisational and national policy processes and outcomes (Jones and Exworthy, 2015; Z. 
Morris, 2016). Discourse is pertinent to studying organisational phenomena. 
Yet if discourse usually matters, it is central under austerity. Contrasting representations of the 
austere situation help austerity’s supporters and opponents advocate different policy 
responses (McCann, 2013). These attribute blame for the ‘crisis’ (O’Flynn et al., 2014) and are 
interwoven with discourses which entrench austerity’s economistic logics (O’Brien, 2013; 
Dowling and Harvie, 2014). Austerity represents an intense, contested discursive environment. 
This has direct implications for public managers. They are among those official discourses 
blame for the financial crash (Bach, 2016; McCann, 2013). Public and political rhetoric plays 
into resource allocation (Oberlander et al., 2012), and legitimates other organisational policies 
(Fuller, 2017). There are good reasons to think austerity’s discursive environment affects 
managers. 
Nevertheless, discursive research on austerity habitually remains above the organisational 
level. That which does delve down into organisations (e.g. Davies and Thompson, 2016; Fuller 
and West, 2017) avoids the complexities surrounding how discourse intertwines with austerity 
management more widely. When discussing the actions of austerity’s managers, such accounts 
underexplore the discursive and material constraints such managers face. We are left guessing 
how austerity discourse plays into austerity management. 
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Consequently, this chapter seeks an appropriate discursive approach to analyse austerity 
management alongside RE. Based on prior efforts’ limitations, the nature of austerity and RE’s 
theoretical commitments, it develops three criteria for a useful discursive approach: it should 
integrate discourse with materiality in a practice-based framework (Thévenot, 2001b); provide 
insight into how language shapes RE’s ‘situations’ (Diaz-Bone, 2011) and recognise both 
austerity managers’ agency and the constraints they face.  
To answer these requirements, this chapter turns to CDA. This approach conceptualises 
discourse as one social practice among many (Fairclough, 2015), integrating materiality and 
discourse. Its dialectical model of situational and textual interpretation explains how language 
shapes situations. Its account of competent agents drawing on plural discourses mirrors RE’s 
model of plural regimes and conventions (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002). It thus meets our 
three requirements. 
This chapter reviews arguments for a discursive approach, first generally, then under austerity. 
The latter reveals a paucity of appropriate research on organisational austerity discourse, 
reinforcing the need for this study’s discursive approach. Accordingly, the penultimate section 
introduces and advocates CDA. The chapter concludes by uniting RE and CDA in a pragmatic 
approach. 
The need for a discursive approach 
Analysts increasingly recognise language’s importance to organisations. Studies highlight its 
influence from individual presentations (Berglund and Werr, 2000) to organisational and 
national policy (Jones and Exworthy, 2015; Z. Morris, 2016; Tonkiss and Skelcher, 2015). Some 
even attribute agency to texts themselves (Cooren, 2004). Regardless whether one accepts 
that contention, organisational texts and talk are certainly influential (Bloomfield and Danieli, 
1995; Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1994; Fayard and Metiu, 2012; Vaara et al., 2010). Discourse 
remains important across organisational contexts (Fairclough, 2015, pp.7–8). 
There is evidence discourse is influential in contexts comparable to austerity. For instance, 
austerity constitutes a major change (Schmidt et al., 2017), and studies indicate linguistic work 
can legitimate major changes (Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy and Maguire, 2010; Newman and 
Vidler, 2006; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Vaara and Tienari, 2008). Austerity can reshape 
institutions (Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013), while studies often explain institutional change 
using linguistic methods (Green et al., 2009; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Maguire and Hardy, 
2009). Linguistic methods have proved productive in contexts similar to austerity. 
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Discourse analytic techniques have also grown important to studies of strategic dilemmas like 
those austerity poses (Knights and Morgan, 1991; Phillips et al., 2007). Vaara and colleagues 
describe the discursive techniques deployed within strategy processes (Vaara and Tienari, 
2004, 2008, Vaara et al., 2004, 2006). For instance, Vaara et al (2010) describe the influence of 
a strategy text on a city’s strategising, while Mantere and Vaara (2008) identify the discursive 
practices which promote and prevent participation in strategy. Others emphasise how 
strategic texts and discussions influence perceptions of the situation and therefore strategic 
outcomes (Bloomfield and Danieli, 1995; Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1994; Jones and 
Exworthy, 2015; Kaplan, 2008, 2011). Strategic dilemmas like austerity may be discursively 
shaped. 
This importance of discourse continues to grow. Towards the turn of the century, Fairclough 
(1995) described ‘the technologisation of discourse’: actors’ increasing expertise about 
discourse enabled them to use it as a tool of influence,. Since then, this trend has increased. 
Pollitt’s (2013, p.915) study of four decades of UK Government management reform 
documents sees them turn progressively more promotional: ‘glossier’, ‘sometimes almost 
evangelical’. Policy documents are increasingly written and designed to achieve persuasive 
goals. This is affirmed by differences in how policy actors explain their platforms to different 
audiences (O’Neill, 2012; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2011, 2012). As discursive work becomes 
increasingly deliberate, its analysis grows ever-more prescient. 
Austerity makes this growing importance patent. Zachary Morris (2016) argues that it is 
difficult to explain international differences in austerity policies without considering the 
discursive drivers legitimating those changes (Clarke and Newman, 2012). Meanwhile, while 
one might experience some consequences of austerity oneself, it is an immense, sprawling 
situation with myriad local, global, social and macroeconomic dimensions. Thus ‘austerity’, 
understood holistically is a primarily ‘textually mediated’ situation: one understood through 
texts. This leaves austerity managers relying on discursive cues to understand their 
organisations’ situation (Jick and Murray, 1982); and citizens liable to persuasion by competing 
‘frames’ of austerity (McCann, 2013; Tonkiss and Skelcher, 2015). Austerity emerges as i) a 
landscape of intense, discursive conflict; and ii) a situation in which managers rely heavily on 
discursive cues to understand their situations. Understanding austerity management entails 




Austerity discourse is a fruitful and consequently well-trodden research avenue. Research has 
focused on justificatory discourses associated with the financial crash (Riaz et al., 2011; Whittle 
and Mueller, 2012) and debates about the formation and legitimation of subsequent policy (L. 
Morris, 2016). Austerity discourse’s organisational implications (Fuller and West, 2017) have 
been analysed much less. This section analyses first the national then the more limited 
organisational austerity discourse literatures. 
National austerity discourse 
Studies of national austerity discourse emphasise the ways the financial crisis was represented 
and explained (Dinerstein et al., 2014; McCann, 2013). ‘Official’ discourse emanating from 
governmental and allied sources has been characterised as protecting government from blame 
(Hood et al., 2016; Masters and ‘T Hart, 2012) while holding supposedly profligate societies 
and individuals responsible (Bramall, 2013, p.105; De Benedictis, 2012; Mitrea and Jackson, 
2015; O’Flynn et al., 2014). Some even argue that conceiving of the period as a financial ‘crisis’ 
is ideologically loaded because ‘crises’ legitimise severe responses, like austerity (Clarke, 2010; 
Clarke and Newman, 2010, 2012) while constructing disciplining, precarious environments for 
public servants (Doogan, 2011). Writing thus critiques national austerity discourse in how it 
presents the ‘financial crisis’. 
National discourse also shapes the situation of austerity itself. Financial scarcity can be 
constructed in multiple ways, of which ‘austerity’ is only one (Light and Hughes, 2001). 
Bramall’s (2013, pp.7–15) detailed history of ‘austerity’ tracks it from its early anti-
consumption environmentalist use to its fiscal deployment. Bramall notes that the term retains 
its earlier incarnation’s anti-consumerist appeal (pp.26-31) while legitimating narratives of self-
reliance by invoking post-war ‘austerity’, (Bramall, 2013, pp.101-04; L. Morris, 2016). 
Nevertheless, observes Bramall, austerity’s opponents rapidly reclaimed the term for critique, 
even appropriating its wartime aesthetic through protests like ‘anti-austerity street parties’. 
Changing decision-making styles accompanied these altered pictures of austerity and the 
crash. Studies frequently emphasise the increasingly economistic decisions which austerity 
discourses enable (Newman and Clarke, 2014). O’Brien (2013) describes how this type of 
economism shaped post-crisis public spending decisions about sport. Dowling and Harvie 
(2014) cast economistic policy instruments as legitimised as remedies for a financial crisis. 
While such values have long histories (Blyth, 2013; Lakoff, 2013), evidence suggests that 
representations of the crisis helped make them seem appropriate to the present. 
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Nations, individuals and organisations 
This literature has four implications for public servants and organisations. First, public servants 
remain members of the polity which national austerity discourse targets. This increasingly 
pervasive political discourse (Fairclough, 1995) may successfully influence resource allocation 
decisions (Oberlander et al., 2012). Alternatively, a polity which Clarke (2010, p.351) argues 
offers only ‘grudging’ or ‘disaffected’ consent may be less favourably influenced. The 
outcomes of this discursive struggle will shape austerity management. 
Second, public organisations facing uncertainty seek signals about future policy, including in 
policy discourse (Bacchi, 2000). Public organisations try to anticipate otherwise overwhelming 
timetables by foreseeing government demands or emphases. Through this channel they may 
be affected even by political rhetoric with which they vehemently disagree. 
Third, public servants and organisations are often austerity discourse’s topic. Governments 
have blamed public sector workers for the crisis (Clarke and Newman, 2012; Fuller and West, 
2017), while materially ‘deprivileg[ing]’ them (Bach, 2016). Such logics may bleed into 
organisations, precipitating decreasing support for staff (Glaser, 2014; Lewis et al., 2017). 
Alternatively, public servants may engage in blame-limitation, even perpetuating ‘crisis’ 
narratives to excuse poor performance (Bar-Lev and Vitner, 2012). Either way, public servants 
are implicated in austerity discourse. 
Finally, public services support those ‘dependency’ austerity discourse vilifies. Patients (Mitrea 
and Jackson, 2015) and other service users (De Benedictis, 2012; Dinerstein et al., 2014; L. 
Morris, 2016; O’Flynn et al., 2014) are cast as responsible for excessive public spending, 
supposedly causing the crisis. If austerity discourse successfully casts such people as 
undeserving, this may shape public servants’ formal or frontline rationing (Griffiths, 2001). 
Chapter 2 argued that discourse is pertinent to austerity management (p.31). The foregoing 
paragraphs add four reasons to believe that national austerity discourse matters when 
studying organisational austerity. One might therefore expect to find a breadth of studies 
considering how discourse shapes organisational austerity management. 
Austerity and organisational discourse 
Yet little literature engages with austerity discourse within public organisations. Those who do 
describe narratives of inevitability (Davies and Thompson, 2016), alongside disputes (Newman, 
2014) and the local mobilisation of national discourses (Fuller and West, 2017). Yet these 
insights are framed outside the wider austerity management literature. Some treat ‘austerity’ 
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as simply one of several discourses drawn upon in cases analysed through another lens 
(MacKillop, 2014). Others focus on how opponents may successfully resist austerity (Newman, 
2012, 2013, 2014) or heavily stress austerity’s discursive dimension (Fuller, 2017). None 
balance their focus on discourse with an equally robust emplacement in the austerity 
management literature. 
One might be tempted to simply conduct a study like those cited above but more closely 
engaged with austerity management. This would be a mistake. The lack of attention to non-
discursive elements of austerity management springs from their generally poststructuralist 
outlook. This entails a ‘muscular’ vision of discourse (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2000b): one in 
which discourse starts to encompass other elements of the social like reality and cognition. 
They represent the philosophically-minded tradition Grant and Iedema (2005) call 
‘organizational discourse studies’ (ODS) to signal its pre-empirical commitment to discourse’s 
importance. This explains the under-emphasis on austerity’s real, material constraints found in 
the papers cited above (Davies and Thompson, 2016; Fuller, 2017). Their limitation is not 
simply down to their focus: but springs from the theoretical assumptions they make. 
The first, most obvious problem here is that such approaches limit our understanding of 
materiality. Yet two further problems follow. Second, such approaches also limit our insight 
into how situations are discursively constructed. Because they take discourse as so all-
encompassing, less analysis seems necessary to demonstrate how language influences beliefs 
or situations. This produces analyses with less nuanced accounts of how and why such 
influence occurs and produces less supporting linguistic evidence. In a discursively complex 
situation like austerity, our approach must better enable detailed linguistic analysis of how 
situations are formed. 
Third, such analyses impoverish people’s agency. Their ‘muscularity’ leaves little space 
between discursive ‘logics’ and people’s cognition, presupposing that one shapes the other 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2000b, pp.1130–1131). But empirically assessing whether austerity’s 
discourses do shape beliefs necessitates clearly distinguishing the two. Without doing so, 
poststructuralist accounts tend to present some agents as free to select their discursive ‘logics’ 
and others as curtailed by them, without accounting for the difference. This often produces an 
account in which organisational managers become potent villains, able to reject national 
‘austerian realism’ should they only try, while their subordinates are in thrall to their 
managerialist logics. To avoid this, we need a discursive approach that adequately 
accommodates agency while recognising the potential for persuasion. 
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The foregoing paragraphs imply three criteria for an appropriate discursive approach. A 
discourse analysis compatible with Thévenot will fit them. One compatible with his materialist 
pragmatism will necessarily integrate discourse with materiality. One engaged with ‘pragmatic 
situationalism’ (Diaz-Bone, 2011, p.44) should enable discursive analysis of situation 
construction. And one coherent with conventionalists’ competent, pluralist actors must enable 
nuanced analysis of agency (Dansou and Langley, 2012). A discursive approach compatible 
with Thévenot is a discursive approach suited to analysing austerity. 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
Accordingly, we need further analysis of austerity discourse in organisations, through a more 
productive framework. Chapter 3 noted discursive accounts’ rarity within conventionalist 
writing. This section briefly reviews those which have been developed, using them as a 
springboard to advocate CDA. 
Conventionalist writers adopt two broad approaches to discourse analysis. Diaz-Bone (2013, 
2017) develops a Foucauldian conventionalism, justifying this by associating ‘conventions’ 
themselves with the deep structures of meaning Foucault investigated. While this is 
compelling, Diaz-Bone (2013, p.49) himself observes that Foucault’s conceptual infrastructure 
can be too grand for conventionalism’s situated perspective. This is manageable when 
investigating the deep structures of macro-level ‘worlds’ themselves (Diaz-Bone, 2017) but 
becomes more problematic when wishing to analyse specific organisational situations. 
Meanwhile, Chiapello and Fairclough (2002) recommend combining CDA with EW, analysing a 
single text to demonstrate the combination. They ask how the connectionist world is textually 
constructed, consequently emphasising microlinguistic detail. More recently, Nyberg and 
colleagues (Nyberg and Wright, 2012; Nyberg et al., 2017) use a higher-level CDA. Eschewing 
microlinguistic analyses, they take people’s meanings more-or-less as given and consider their 
implications for relations between values or for the ‘neoliberal regime’.  
CDA comes in many forms. This study does not seek to demonstrate how a world is ‘made’, so 
Chiapello and Fairclough’s consistently microlinguistic approach is unnecessary; yet Nyberg 
and colleagues’ high-level application risks omitting what makes CDA incisive (Antaki et al., 
2003). Neither form of CDA suits this study. 
Nevertheless, CDA’s compatibility with RE is established, and it enables detailed linguistic 
analysis within a wider multi-level social science framework (Fairclough, 2015; Merkl-Davies 
and Koller, 2012; Vaara and Tienari, 2008). While this study needs a different version of CDA, it 
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is a promising discourse analytic framework. The following three sections test CDA against the 
three criteria the previous subsection derives. 
Practice, materiality and discourse 
This study needs an account of discourse whose compatibility with Thévenot’s material 
pragmatism enables it to account for materiality (Phillips and Oswick, 2012). CDA is practice-
oriented and well established within organisational discourse analysis (Mautner, 2016; Brookes 
and Harvey, 2016). Norman Fairclough (2000, 2015) – perhaps CDA’s key advocate – 
characterises it as a theory of social practice, in which discursive practices relate dialectically to 
other practices (Fairclough et al., 2002). Unlike some discourse analytic approaches, CDA 
neither ‘swallows’ nor side-lines materiality. 
Materiality is integrated into CDA through a moderately ‘muscular’ (Alvesson and Kärreman, 
2000b) account of discourse in which discourse is distinct from but interwoven with other 
social activity. CDA makes no presumption that language uncomplicatedly constructs reality. 
Rather, it couples a realist ontology with an awareness that we often perceive that real world 
partially or entirely through language (Hardy and Clegg, 2006, pp.765–766). Consequently, 
discursive representation matters without possessing innate constitutive power. Speech-acts 
affect the world through mechanisms comparable to other acts’: they persuade, inform, or 
offer reasons for action (Fairclough et al., 2002). Put differently, discursive practices, like 
material ones, interrelate with, support and undermine other practices (Hellgren et al., 2002; 
Thomas and Hewitt, 2011; Vaara and Tienari, 2004). Language matters without diminishing 
materiality. 
CDA is not committed to any one linguistic approach but to critically understanding language’s 
social role. While traditionally associated with Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday and 
Matthiessen, 2013), it has been used alongside theories of rhetoric (Zanoni and Janssens, 
2004), framing (Leask and Chapman, 2002), argumentation (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2011, 
2012), corpus linguistics (Learmonth and Mautner, 2016; Mautner, 2009, 2015) and 
multimodal approaches (Brookes and Harvey, 2016; Thompson, 2012). Across approaches, it 
aims to understand how language constructs meanings and makes them compelling (Merkl-
Davies and Koller, 2012; Reisgl and Wodak, 2009; Vaara and Tienari, 2008). CDA offers the 
detailed attention to language Thévenot demands while appreciating materiality’s importance 




Our second criterion for a useful discursive approach was that it should enable us to analyse 
how situations are represented and perceived.  
CDA theorises in detail the relationship between discourse and the material circumstances it 
describes. Early CDA extensively used an idea from the education literature. Bernstein’s (2000) 
‘recontextualization’ emphasised how pedagogical discourse re-presented social practice for 
schoolroom use. Drawing thereon, analysts conceptualise discourse more widely as the 
recontextualisation of social practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Thomas, 2003), 
developing frameworks to analyse its transformations in transit (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 
1999). The transformation of a lived ‘test’ into the ‘report’ Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) 
emphasise exemplifies ‘recontextualisation’. CDA has a longstanding interest in how situations 
and discourses relate. 
Going beyond ‘recontextualisation’, writers increasingly emphasise how people apprehend 
situations. Just as conventionalists’ situations are ‘not restricted to face-to-face situations’, but 
include far-reaching social disputes (Diaz-Bone, 2011, p.49; e.g. Patriotta et al., 2011), so CDA 
analyses proximal situations as readily as social disputes (Mantere and Vaara, 2008; Fairclough, 
2016). These may therefore be apprehended directly or through language. Van Dijk (2003, 
pp.95–96, 2013; Johnstone, 2018) describes a ‘situation model’ or ‘context model’: a mental 
construct which aggregates reports one hears with one’s direct experience. Through such 
constructs, CDA attends closely to how situations are understood through sensory and 
linguistic cues. 
Fairclough deepens our accounts of how people understand situations and related linguistic 
cues. Like Thévenot, he starts by recognising the radical uncertainty people face: their 
understanding of both situations and texts remain incomplete. People fill in the blanks with 
whatever information they can. Initially, situations and texts can be used to help interpret one 
another. In interpreting texts, we consider what we know of the situations they refer to. 
Simultaneously, those texts help us learn more about the situations they describe. 
Consequently, when reading a text we constantly update our ‘situation model’ while using that 
model to interpret texts. These processes – situations helping interpret texts and texts helping 
interpret situations – are simultaneous and interwoven. This dialectic between experience and 
discourse theoretically justifies our interest in how language shapes people’s impressions of 
situations like austerity. 
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This reasoning develops Chapter 2’s argument that perceptions of austere situations are 
textually mediated. The logic by which it does so is based on the inevitable uncertainty 
presented by imperfectly known situations and texts subject to interpretation (Empson, 2004). 
Emphasising uncertainty unites RE and CDA; and befits the investigation of austerity. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Interpretation. Adapted from Fairclough (2015, p.156 elaborated based on pp.67-71) 
Figure 4.1’s two leftmost columns illustrate this relationship between situational and textual 
interpretation. Fairclough observes that the dialectic between our interpretation of situations 
and texts is echoed by similar dialectics between interpreting those whole texts and smaller 
elements thereof. We progressively alter our interpretation of whole texts based on our 
interpretation of individual sentences; and contextualise our understanding of individual 
sentences based on our developing understanding of the whole text.  
Fairclough elaborates this point into four dialectically related linguistic categories; the left-
hand column describes the range from a text’s overall ‘point’ (its gist) to its ‘surface’ (the basic 
linguistic elements which must be interpreted to form words and sentences). In brackets, I add 
the levels of a text where such considerations might be most relevant: these are illustrative, 
not definitional, and intend to elucidate the scalar relationships implied by otherwise opaque 
linguistics terminology. These relations dialectically link interpretation of smaller linguistic 
units to that of larger ones.  
There thus exists a chain of dialectic relationships between these units. It links our 
understanding of the situation to the smallest textual units in speech or documents describing 
Objects of interpretation Cognitive resources 
Situational/intertextual context 
Text structure & ‘point’ (whole) 
Local coherence (paragraph) 
Utterance meaning (sentence) 
Surface of utterance (word) 
Text genres 
Rules of cohesion (e.g.) 
Semantics/pragmatics 
Grammar, vocabulary etc. 




it. This explains and justifies CDA’s interest in patterns of micro-level textual detail. Apparently 
trivial microlinguistic patterns become entangled with our understanding of situations through 
a structure of dialectic relations. CDA offers a mechanism and theoretical warrant for detailed 
discursive analysis of situations’ construction. 
Agency and pluralism 
The third requirement of our discursive approach was a balanced account of agency that 
distinguished discourse from cognition. This was important to maintain the freedom of 
Thévenot’s agents, and to adequately account for the complex position of autonomous public 
managers facing austerity’s substantial constraints. 
Like RE, CDA imagines competent actors who are capable of changing their circumstances, but 
at a point in time face structural limitations (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 
2005). As speakers, people can draw on a plurality of discourses (Thomas and Hewitt, 2011). 
However, just as Thévenot’s agents can only effectively utilise conventions others will 
recognise (Eranti, 2018), so Fairclough’s speakers must choose comprehensible discourses 
should they wish to be understood (Vaara and Tienari, 2008, p.987). CDA thus mirrors RE: 
agency is enabled and constrained by socially shared structures. 
CDA also theorises people’s role as interpreters of discourse in a manner mirroring RE. The 
section above begins to outline this by describing Figure 4.1’s two leftmost columns. It 
describes how we build cognitive models of situations or texts based on information from that 
text or directly pertinent to that situation. However, we interpret this information not in 
isolation but given pre-existing ideas about the ‘types’ of situation or text we might be 
encountering. We know how to read a novel; or how to do a job interview; this helps orient us 
to subsequent interviews or novels. In Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006, p.146) terms, people 
understand their situation by making a ‘coherent association…a relation…to something more 
general’. Fairclough calls this ‘something more general’ a ‘situation type’, ‘text type’ or ‘genre’. 
CDA and RE alike characterise people as interpreting texts and situations in relation to one 
another and to more general types thereof. 
Figure 4.1 thus represents the (horizontal) relationship between situations or texts and our 
ideas of the ‘types’ of situation or text available alongside the (vertical) relations between 
parts of texts and situations. At a finer-grained level, it notices similar horizontal relations 
between parts of texts and rules about how paragraphs fit together (‘cohesion’), what words 
mean and how they are used in context (‘semantics’ and ‘pragmatics’) and how the basics of 
our language are assembled (grammar, vocabulary). 
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This horizonal relationship is two-way (Fairclough, 2015, pp.67–71). RE and CDA alike 
emphasise that, just as our wider ideas of the types of situation, text or sentence available 
shape our understanding of a situation, so those ‘types’ are shaped by our accreted 
experience. Our interpretation of today’s situations and texts are thus shaped by how we have 
heard things described before. Repeatedly reading about ‘NHS austerity’ situations might 
shape how a hospital manager interprets a comparable situation in their own organisation.  
Superficially, acknowledging this influence could be seen as erasing people’s agency through 
powerful discourses they cannot resist (Keller, 2011). But like Thévenot’s conventions, 
discourses are plural. Consequently, we are exposed to multiple ways of interpreting the 
situations and texts we encounter. Accordingly, we can – to varying extents (Fairclough, 2010; 
Gond and Leca, 2012) – reflect critically on how situations are represented and how to 
approach them. Thus we engage our agency in using sensory and discursive resources to 
understand and act in our situations. That these resources are finite makes doing so no less 
agential. Instead, there is an analogy here with Thévenot’s account of situated agency. People 
act freely but consider their experience and surroundings. CDA merely emphasises that this 
experience and those surroundings may be understood through discourse alongside sensory 
perception. 
Conclusion: a discursive pragmatism 
CDA is a promising adjunct to RE. It maintains its practice orientation, emphasis on materiality 
alongside language, and the pluralism that guarantees its subjects’ agency. To this it adds a 
detailed language-analytic infrastructure which helps better explain how situations are 
formatted and apprehended. This conclusion does not reiterate this analysis but 
operationalises this combination in two ways: first by relating core concepts from CDA and RE; 
second by clarifying my normative orientation. 
Regimes and discourses 
In combining CDA and RE, we must be clear about how their concepts relate. Chiapello and 
Fairclough’s (2002) integration of CDA with EW associates discourses with the non-material 
aspects of worlds. This is theoretically coherent; discourses are important to justificatory 
frameworks, but not their totality. I accept this characterisation; but it is not alone sufficient 
here: this study is interested in more than EW’s justification.  
Consequently, I combine Chiapello and Fairclough’s approach with Thévenot’s (2001b) 
observations about language’s varying role across regimes. Justification’s conventional appeals 
to the common good are likely characterised by certain recurring discourses (Chiapello and 
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Fairclough, 2002). Conversely, the language of familiarity may be indexical or gestural: while a 
given familiar context may entail semiotic patterns, these are unlikely to characterise wider 
discourse. Meanwhile, planning entails discourses more public than familiarity but more 
‘everyday’ than justification: correspondences between discourses and conventions are looser, 
and discursive patterns more elusive because they appear quotidian. Regimes entail, but are 
irreducible to, discursive patterns. 
Normativity 
Notwithstanding its fruitfulness, some might balk at the combination of an apparently ‘critical’ 
approach (CDA) with one which reacted against ‘critical sociology’ (RE). Yet Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s (2006) objection was not to normativity but to what critical sociology had become. 
Suspicious of approaches that ‘treat power as a general equivalent’ (Boltanski and Thévenot, 
2006), their effort was not to ignore the possibility of criticism, but ‘to be more precise about 
the mechanisms that contribute to both empowerment and domination’ (Luhtakallio and 
Thévenot, 2018). Conventionalists are open to critical analyses; they merely wish to avoid the 
simplification characterising certain normative approaches. Since On Justification, both authors 
have developed frameworks conceptualising ‘domination’ (Boltanski, 2011; Thévenot, 2014b). 
Meanwhile, CDA was undergoing the opposite journey. While Fairclough’s earlier writing (e.g. 
1995) wore its normativity on its sleeve, he has increasingly distanced CDA from these ‘left-
wing’ origins. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) advocate an approach centred only on a 
normative espousal of ‘universal human rights’. Put differently, they accept many different 
models of what is good, but within certain constraints. This pluralism within basic humanistic 
constraints is compatible with Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006, p.77) pluralism and 
requirement a ‘justifiable’ world recognises a common good, common dignity and humanity. If 
CDA and RE might once have appeared in tension, they are now a surprisingly apt combination. 
That said, this study is not strongly normative. Boltanski and Thévenot focused On Justification 
on simply understanding justification before The New Spirit of Capitalism’s greater normativity. 
While CDA implies normatively selecting a ‘social problem’ to investigate, risks to quality 
(Robertson et al., 2017) can be problematised without condemning austerity per se. From 
there, Fairclough observes that ‘explanatory critique’ precedes normatively investigating 
solutions (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). Without excessive normativity, we can 





As a large macro-level literature demonstrates, discourse is central to austerity. Writers 
suggest it shapes how people see the crisis (e.g. De Benedictis, 2012; O’Flynn et al., 2014), the 
subsequent situation (e.g. Bramall, 2013; Z. Morris, 2016) and consequent policy choices (e.g. 
Dowling and Harvie, 2014; O’Brien, 2013). When macro-level austerity is studied, discourse is 
frequently emphasised. 
This review demonstrated that austerity managers are likely to find this discourse influential. 
Discourse can shape policy and organisational choices (Jones and Exworthy, 2015; Z. Morris, 
2016; Tonkiss and Skelcher, 2015). And public managers are part of the polity official 
discourses address. Indeed, they and their clients are among those such discourses blame for 
the crisis (Clarke and Newman, 2012; Mitrea and Jackson, 2015). Public organisations are likely 
to focus on government discourse to identify future policy trends (Bacchi, 2000). This leaves 
austerity managers among the most likely to be shaped by austerity discourse. 
This review thus expected to find a breadth of empirical studies investigating how discourse 
shaped organisational austerity management. It found none. What analysis of organisational 
austerity discourse was available was outside the austerity management literature (e.g. 
MacKillop, 2014). Such studies generally came from poststructuralist perspectives poorly 
suited to capture austerity managers' material constraints; to provide detailed linguistic 
analysis of situations; or to address complex balances of agency. 
However, these three criticisms were used as a springboard from which to identify a more 
fitting approach. Remembering my commitment to RE, I first considered discursive approaches 
demonstrably compatible with it. This identified CDA as a leading candidate. Further analysis 
demonstrated CDA’s suitability to integrating discourse and materiality, conducting detailed 
linguistic analysis and mirroring RE’s nuanced treatment of situated agency (Fairclough, 2000). 
It was identified as an appropriate discourse analytic approach. 
This chapter fills the gap Chapter 3 identified in the RE framework by identifying a compatible 
discourse analytic approach. RE and CDA enable us to answer the question Chapter 2 
identified: through what practices do organisations respond to situations of austerity? The 
following chapter develops a methodology for such a study informed by RE and CDA. 
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Part 3 – Methods 
Chapter 5: Methods 
Introduction 
The foregoing chapters demonstrate the need for a pragmatist, discursive investigation of 
austerity management practices. This chapter develops a method for such a study. 
This research connects RE with CDA. This is enabled by their both locating the social in 
‘practices’: constellations of situations, actions, objects, discourses and values activated by 
situated agents. This shared pragmatism shapes the study: the rich data it requires; its analysis; 
and its development of theory by tracking said practices across time and contexts. 
Research proceeds as a comparative, processual case study. Its cases include three English 
healthcare organisations facing austerity. The national policy environment surrounding 
healthcare austerity contextualises them while being itself a fourth case. Observational, 
interview and documentary data enable the detailed focus on situated activity which practice 
analysis demands. The comparative case design helps develop theory about austerity 
management practices which transcends any one organisation. The study’s processual lens 
recognises that austerity pressures vary across time. 
As befits its theoretical and ontological commitments, this study combines pragmatic, 
discursive and processual analyses. Based around a novel approach to robustly identifying 
practices, its analysis treats discourses as one element of wider practices. Discourses are thus 
identified alongside other features of practices (actions, objects). Analysis of how these 
manifestations intertwine identify situated practices. Processual analysis connects these 
situations (Langley, 1999), capturing how practices change over time. Comparing processual 
practice narratives across sites then helps develop generalisable theory. 
The remainder of this chapter comes in five sections. First, it considers the study’s theoretical, 
philosophical and methodological commitments. Subsequent sections address the study’s 
design, data gathering, analysis and theory development. Methods chapters sometimes 
separate out ethical considerations or passages on researcher reflectiveness into discrete 
subsections. This one integrates them throughout the chapter to describe their consequences 
for research design. 
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Theoretical and philosophical commitments 
This study investigates the discursive and material practices characterising austerity 
management, conceptualising these practices through RE and CDA. This section considers this 
approach’s ontological and epistemic commitments. Because they are interrelated (Whitley, 
1984), I do not structurally separate ontology and epistemology. Instead, a first subsection 
addresses practice, a second language and a third normativity. 
Conceptualising practice 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 commit this study to two theories integrated by their common 
pragmatism. RE describes the social as a series of practices of interacting with the world.1 As 
Chapter 4 demonstrates, CDA’s focus on ‘discursive practices’ alongside material ones renders 
it compatible with RE (Vaara et al., 2004). This subsection develops this, considering RE’s 
ontological and epistemological implications. 
Pragmatism should imply a practice ontology (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011). While many 
invocations of practice theories constitute little more than a focus on detail (Nicolini, 2012, 
p.2), a thoroughgoing pragmatism locates the social within practices themselves. For Thévenot 
(2001b), such practices are constellations of actions, objects, persons, values, language and 
situation. Other pragmatists emphasise knowledge and emotions (Bourdieu, 1977; Reckwitz, 
2002; Schatzki, 2010). Notwithstanding the particular phenomena theorists highlight, 
pragmatism’s defining feature is that no one such element is ‘omnipotent’ (Reckwitz, 2002, 
p.254). The social instead lodges irreducibly in the practices of which such phenomena form 
parts. 
This generally implies belief in real material things external from the observer (Blaikie, 2007; 
Guba and Lincoln, 1994). This belief is apt to practice theories which tend to emphasise 
materiality. Adequately theorising materiality’s role requires the premise that such material 
objects genuinely exist. Thévenot’s (2002b) perspective is paradigmatic here: it aims in part to 
remind even pragmatists of materiality’s centrality. Practice ontologies entail belief in a real 
external world. 
Notwithstanding this shared belief, practice ontologies vary. Some risk ‘micro-isolationism’ in 
their attempts to explain local events only through local circumstances. For Seidl and 
Whittington (2014), one remedy involves ‘taller’ ontologies. These make micro-level activity 
important by explaining it as a consequence of higher-level structures (Knights and Morgan, 
 
1 Thévenot uses ‘engagements’ not ‘practices’ when highlighting this interactivity is important. Like 
Thévenot, this thesis uses both, but generally prefers ‘practices’ for clarity. 
-74- 
 
1991). Alternatively, ‘flatter’ ontologies enlarge their perspective through networks of 
interlinked practices stretching beyond the local (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000). Both bring 
limitations. Tall ontologies risk curtailing local agency; flat ontologies obscure relationships 
between senior actors (like governments) and their subordinates (Phillips et al., 2007). 
Thévenot evades this dichotomy by acknowledging the macro-level structures ‘flatter’ 
ontologies deny but emphasising that such structures are plural. As Chapter 3 elaborates, his 
focus on the situation as a context in which multiple conventions and regimes are available 
avoids ‘tall’ ontologies’ totalising explanations and flat ontologies’ denial of wider structures 
(Diaz-Bone, 2011). It acknowledges macro-level forces which shape local situations; yet it 
simultaneously insists that which wider forces are activated remains a question of situated 
agency. Avoiding the flat/tall dichotomy, Thévenot offers a ‘plural’ ontology which relates the 
micro to multiple macro-level structures without having those structures determine agents’ 
choices. This combines the best of both ‘flat’ and ‘tall’ ontologies. 
Yet it creates an epistemic problem. Researchers cannot directly observe conventions, the 
practices they partly constitute or the interconnections between practices. Instead, we can 
learn about them only by observing individual situated instantiations of practice (Jarzabkowski 
et al., 2007). A mechanism is needed to identify empirical objects not susceptible to direct 
observation. 
Fortunately, I am not alone in facing such a challenge. Writers in other schools facing 
comparable problems often recommend retroduction as an analytic approach (e.g. Bhaskar, 
2008; Blaikie, 2007). Retroduction involves generating hypotheses which would make 
observed phenomena uncomplicatedly explicable (Ragin and Amoroso, 2010; Ragin, 2014; c.f. 
Becker, 1958). In practice, retroductive processes normally begin with inductive analyses of 
what is observed. These are then followed by an abductive conversation between data and 
theoretical hypotheses which is iterated until observed phenomena are adequately theorised. 
A retroductive strategy can allow this study to identify underlying practices and relationships 
based on what can be seen of people’s engagements with the world (see p.87). 
In identifying such formations, this study remembers Thévenot’s distinctive conception of 
practices as ‘engagements’ with the world. As Chapter 3 elaborates, Thévenot conceptualises 
action as series of ‘tests’: we act in pursuit of some aimed-for good, examine the ‘resistant’ 
world’s response thereto, and refine our approach to better achieve that good. Consequently, 




Alongside this conception of practice as ‘engagement’, Thévenot’s approach was apt partly 
because it emphasises, and distinguishes, the ‘goods’ which people pursue. Accordingly, this 
study must attend to actors’ aims during analysis to enable theorisation to conceptualise them 
in terms of Thévenot’s regimes and worlds. 
Thévenot’s outlook shapes this study’s design. It advocates rich data to identify practices. It 
requires analysis of practices as ‘engagements’ between multiple actors, involving not only 
material actions and situations but multiple goods. And through regimes and worlds, it enables 
rich theorisation. 
Conceptualising language 
As Chapter 4 describes, this study has a strong interest in language as discourse. That chapter 
lays out the epistemic and ontological issues surrounding discourse analysis, how discourse is 
conceptualised within Thévenot’s framework and the types of analysis which Fairclough’s 
version of CDA warrants. This ground is not retrodden here. 
However, this study uses its data to find out not only about participants’ words, but also their 
meanings and extra-linguistic practices (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2000a). Discursive studies are 
atypically talk-heavy, so this research will rely extensively on analysis of talk. Treating language 
as discourse also highlights the distance between people’s words and meanings; and between 
their meanings and the events they describe. This section thus addresses oft-neglected issues 
with treating participants’ words as evidence of extra-linguistic phenomena. 
Alvesson and Kärreman (2000a) highlight two epistemic criticisms associated with such uses of 
language data. They only partly accept these arguments, but counsel extensive caution in using 
participants’ utterances as evidence of non-linguistic phenomena. First, they observe that 
doing so requires a leap of faith: we must take our participants at their word. People mislead 
and misremember. Interviewees may experience pressure to provide ‘right answers’. This 
represents a good reason to use judgement about what people can remember, to beware 
storytelling effects and to assess reliability through triangulation (Becker, 1958).  
However, there are good reasons to trust participants’ words. The academic endeavour is 
founded on trust. We believe each other’s writing not because we independently verify 
authors’ or reviewers’ assertions; but because starting with trust makes academia functional. 
Assuming that we are entitled to a baseline trust our participants are not would be hubristic. 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) theoretical project started from a premise of trusting 
participants. It has produced successful theory: that which explains not only what it directly 
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observed, but what was yet to come (Geertz, 1973). Trust seems to work. We should start 
from a defeasible presumption of trust towards participants. 
Alvesson and Kärreman secondly note that attributing meanings to participants’ words 
requires a leap of interpretation; determining what language data mean brings attendant risks 
of subjectivity and misconstrual (c.f. Fairclough et al., 2002, p.4). Yet language data are in good 
company; all data must be interpreted to be accorded meaning (Becker, 1996). Singling out 
judgements about language as ‘speculative’ in the way Alvesson and Kärreman suggest is 
unwarranted and implicitly overstates the certainty we can have about non-linguistic data. 
However, Chapter 4 argues that language shapes our perceptions of that which it describes. 
Going from this premise, I must concede that my perceptions as a researcher may be similarly 
shaped. Superficially, a discursive approach which contends that language shapes perception is 
problematic for a study relying on participants’ words to understand real phenomena. 
This is certainly a tension, but attributing it to my discursive approach is misguided. Whether 
or not I acknowledge it, language inevitably shapes others’ and my perceptions. The best 
response is not to deny this, but acknowledge and understand language’s influence. Far from 
this discursive approach creating an epistemic problem, closely analysing language is our best 
opportunity to mitigate its impact. Understanding how language shapes perception mitigates 
that influence (Fairclough, 2010). 
Epistemic certainty was never possible with linguistic data; nor with data of any sort. Critical 
awareness of language best equips us to understand and account for such influences. This 
study’s discourse analysis therefore both enables discursive conclusions and strengthens its 
interpretation of language as evidence of social practice. 
Normativity 
In asking which practices are involved in austerity management, this study poses an analytic-
descriptive, not evaluative, question. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, CDA and RE are compatible 
with more overtly normative research. But both start investigating a social domain with 
analysis, not evaluation. Austerity management practices remain poorly understood, making 
evaluative work difficult. Following Pettigrew’s (1987, p.655) injunction not to ‘rush into 
prescriptive writing before description and analysis’, this study thus adopts analytic-descriptive 
goals. 
Nevertheless, research cannot avoid normativity. My beliefs about what matters shape my 
decision to research austerity. Notwithstanding supervisory support, I remain this study’s sole 
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data collection device, analyst and ultimate theorist. Unable to erase such influences, I should 
instead be open about them: I am a left-leaning former healthcare manager. Before this study, 
I did not claim to understand austerity’s economics enough to know whether fiscal 
consolidation was desirable, but deeply regretted how its burdens were allocated. 
Nevertheless, I felt sympathy for public servants tasked with implementing it.  
Without claiming to erase such influences, I aimed to ensure my data shaped me more than I 
shaped them (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp.546–547). I remained reflective: initially formalising this 
through a research journal, later integrating reflection organically into my research practice. I 
tried to integrate other influences into this study, offering interview participants the 
opportunity to affect the agenda and consulting participants informally on topics ranging from 
interview questions to methods of invitation. These efforts aimed to ensure my findings said 
more about my data than about my preconceptions. 
Research design 
The above framework recommends an approach which captures high levels of contextual 
detail and allows the mapping of relations between practices across organisational domains. 
Such data cannot be gained by studying isolated events but requires wider, deeply understood 
contexts. Case studies enable such in-depth understanding (Burawoy, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Case-based projects focus on one or more cases, often nesting sub-cases therein (Yin, 2013). 
They are excellent ways to develop theory in relatively uncharted areas, like austerity 
management as practice. And they continually confront researchers with data: this helped 
challenge any preconceptions my background has given me (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp.546–547). 
The plural ontology adopted above allows local settings to relate to multiple wider structures. 
It is thus alive to changes in individual practices and their interconnections with other 
proximate practices (Nicolini, 2009b) and higher-level change (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2006). 
Under austerity, this is just as well. Changing lateral (Clayton et al., 2016) and hierarchical 
(Clarke and Newman, 2012) influences likely affect organisations’ local situations. Those local 
situations are equally unstable and dynamic (see Chapter 2), emphasising practices’ reliance 
on reproduction for their continued existence (Schatzki, 2010). Austerity’s dynamic, 
interrelated practices exemplify the unstable situations which this ‘plural’ practice ontology 
suits. 
Consequently, this study must track the development of practices across time and 
organisational domains. This means looking across organisational levels with their ‘own 
properties, processes, and relationships’ (Pettigrew, 1987, p.657; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005). 
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Given austerity’s instability, ‘tracking the interactions between levels through time’ will be 
important. This is processual case studies’ focus: they track phenomenon chronologically, 
using prospective and retrospective data to generate rich contextual detail (Pettigrew, 1990, 
p.271, 1992, 2013). Processual case studies suit this project. 
Case studies rely clear, appropriate selection of cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). This study selected four sites. Three were English healthcare organisations 
facing austerity; they were studied during 2017-18, though with an interest in their longer 
histories. The fourth was the national policy context surrounding UK healthcare austerity from 
2008 (the crash) to 2018 (a significant policy change in NHS funding). Each case was treated 
separately, but the national case provided valuable context for organisational ones. One could 
conceptualise each organisational case as a subcase of the national case. However, as their 
very different markets presented different contexts, they are better seen as distinct cases 
(Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the cases to explain how they were selected (for detailed 
case descriptions, see Chapter 1 and Chapter 6 to Chapter 9). ‘Dryas’ is a large multi-site 
mental health trust. Like most mental health organisations, its funding had not kept pace with 
acute hospitals; nevertheless, it had generally maintained financial balance in the years leading 
up to the study (King’s Fund, 2018a). ‘Thyme’ is a large multi-site acute hospital. It had a 
significantly larger budget than Dryas and was better off. ‘Aloe’ is a small, young, private sector 
organisation which sold support services to an NHS hospital under extreme financial pressure. 
Until recently, it had been a department of that hospital, but had been spun out into a so-
called Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS). Its financial pressures were significant. 
Table 5.1 – The four cases 
Site Sector Market Location Size Austerity pressures 
Dryas NHS provider Mental health Urban Medium Moderate 
Thyme NHS provider Acute health Urban Large Minor 
Aloe Private, NHS-owned Support services Urban Small Major 
National Government N/A National N/A Mixed 
 
Sites were selected to represent contrasting markets, sizes and financial pressures (Eisenhardt, 
1989, pp.536–537). It is regrettable not to have represented a hospital (as opposed to a WOS) 
in the most severe financial distress. However, at a time even the Care Quality Commission 
(CQC) deemed they could not routinely request such hospitals’ time (Behan, 2018), convincing 
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them to spend time on this project was a pipe dream. Yet if the hospitals included here are 
atypically under-affected by austerity, this need not be a disadvantage (Pettigrew and Hendry, 
1986, p.7). First, because contemporary austerity management literature focuses heavily on 
local government’s atypically strong pressures. Second, because investigating austerity 
management practices beyond the most challenged organisations tells us how far such 
pressures reach. 
Gathering data 
The three field sites were approached via gatekeepers and access permissions gained through 
formal approach letters. Such approaches began an ongoing liaison with gatekeepers and 
those involved in data gathering (meeting chairs, interviewees). This was no small undertaking: 
in total, more than 3,900 emails went to-and-fro. 
Ethical clearance was gained from the King’s College, London Education & Management 
Research Ethics Panel under the low-risk process (reference LRS-15/16-3365). Because this 
study involved staff only, NHS ethical approval was unnecessary (Department of Health 
Research and Development Directorate (England) et al., 2011). In NHS sites, governance 
approval was gained from Research and Development departments. This represented the 
start, not the end, of ethical reflection which continued throughout the study (British 
Sociological Association, 2002). 
Data collection periods in different sites were overlapping but non-coterminous, collectively 
spanning early 2017 to mid-2018. Data gathered included nonparticipant observations, 
interviews and documents. This breadth supported triangulation between data types 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, pp.537–538) and helped identify the breadth of phenomena involved in 
retroductively identifying practices. Table 5.2 catalogues the data gathered. 
Table 5.2 – Data gathered 
Site Fieldwork duration Observations Interviews Documents 
Aloe 11 months 18 8 40 
Dryas 9 months 49 20 92 
Thyme 8 months 43 15 87 
National - - - 727 




Sampling – general considerations 
Common considerations guided sampling across data sources. Sampling was purposive and 
aimed to expand the range of environments and perspectives found (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Without seeking a ‘representative’ sample, it sought observations and interviewees 
representing varying levels of seniority, professional and demographic backgrounds. 
Simultaneously, I followed stories or practices as they moved between environments and 
individuals. Sometimes these became more substantial ‘tracer issues’ that exemplified 
austerity management across organisational domains and levels.  
Sampling was continually refined by analysis and theoretical reflection. Following this study’s 
retroductive approach, I sought interviewees, observations and texts which could disconfirm 
my developing theories. Similarly, I remained open to ‘mysteries’ unexplained by existing 
literature (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007). Focusing on such theoretically unexplained issues 
and attempting to disconfirm my developing explanations thereof shaped the data sought.  
Sampling in each site followed a similar chronology. Early on, I would seek from gatekeepers 
an informal understanding of organisations and lists of staff and meetings involved in pertinent 
activities. In practice, this usually yielded introductions to comparatively central, senior teams, 
often managing explicit savings programmes. Through chains of introductions, I then radiated 
outwards, expanding the range of groups available for sampling. Finally, I would zoom in on 
service departments involved in relevant ‘stories’. 
Whether gathering interview or observational data, I required individual consent. Aware of the 
power position a researcher adopts (Burawoy, 1998), particularly when setting the agenda 
within interviews (Kvale, 2006), I erred on the side of caution in approaching people. I was 
explicit about participation’s downsides; encouraged questions; ‘corrected’ for any 
overenthusiastic managerial encouragement to participate; and remained sensitive to 
unvoiced unease. I welcomed refusals to participate as evidence people were freely choosing 
whether to participate. 
Observations 
110 nonparticipant observations were conducted, lasting between around 45 minutes and 3 
hours. They ranged from the most senior meetings to those of frontline teams. A 
nonparticipant approach centred on formal meetings was preferred to a more open 
ethnographic approach for two reasons. First, it facilitated compliance with NHS Governance 
rules. Second, given my history as an NHS manager, it helped ensure I looked at potentially 
familiar work through the new eyes of a researcher. 
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Meetings were sampled as discussed above. Selected meetings were approached through the 
chair or similar gatekeeper. If they approved my attendance, I asked attendees be forewarned 
of my attendance with an information sheet. As seeking written consent from every attendee 
at these busy meetings was impossible, I asked orally whether those present were happy to be 
observed and documented this by writing to chairs (or similar). In case anyone felt 
uncomfortable refusing permission in person, I noted that they could contact me afterwards to 
withdraw agreement. On the rare occasions people refused consent, I omitted them from my 
notes. 
Otherwise, I took as extensive fieldnotes as possible. It was rarely possible during observations 
to discern what was strictly relevant to austerity, as opposed to broader strategic or 
operational issues (Langley and Truax, 1994, p.643). Consequently, I erred on the side of 
recording any potentially relevant material. In line with this study’s practice orientation, this 
extended beyond what was said to include details about bodily performances, the material 
environment and objects (like PowerPoint slides). Given my focus on discourse, I recorded 
verbatim recurring or apparently significant phrases. Following Eisenhardt (1989, pp.538–539), 
I included my own reflections, clearly distinguished from direct observations. These paper 
notes were transcribed, pseudonymised and destroyed as soon as practicable. 
Interviews 
43 interviews were conducted with a broad range of staff. Invitations to interview were issued 
in writing. I liaised with interviewees to seek quiet, private venues at their workplaces. At the 
interview, I checked consent again, confirming it in writing after a further opportunity for 
questions. Where participants consented, interviews were audio-recorded then transcribed. 
Otherwise, I relied on handwritten notes comparable to observational fieldnotes. 
Interviews generally lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. They were semi-structured, to balance 
depth and responsiveness to interviewees’ concerns with a focus on austerity management. 
While questions changed as the study went on, and depending on the interviewee, they 
covered topics including participants’ work in savings initiatives, balancing of competing 
objectives and their wider work situation. At times, questions focused on the immediate 
present, asking about particular moments in observed meetings. At others, they highlighted 
the past, seeking to understand the back-story of observed activity (Pettigrew, 1987). Time 
allowing, interviews concluded by asking participants what else they expected to have been 




Interviews attempted to focus on people’s practices and normative orientations. 
Consequently, sections drew on Nicolini’s (2009a) rediscovered technique of the ‘interview to 
the double’. This involves inviting the participant to tell you, as their ‘double’, how to behave 
as them in their daily work such that nobody could differentiate you. Nicolini observes that this 
often generates somewhat idealised narratives of behaviour, revealing not only practice but its 
normative orientation. Combined with conventional interview techniques, this was revealing 
about austerity managers’ work. 
Interviews were broadly structured into two clusters, one early, and one later in a given site’s 
fieldwork. The reality of research in stretched organisations was that clear temporal 
differentiation of these ‘clusters’ was impossible; instead, they overlapped. Nevertheless, 
deliberately spreading the interviews over time helped track change and enabled re-
interviews; while conceptualising them in two clusters helped consciously shift their emphasis 
over time. Early interviews focused on people able to provide overviews of organisations’ 
work, thus highlighting potential future observations, interviewees or foci. Later ones pursued 
these leads, diversified the range of interviewees and tested theoretical ideas.  
Texts 
Texts were gathered from sites and the wider policy discourse. Texts from sites included 
documents relevant to austerity management and of broader strategic importance. These 
ranged from local plans and operational Cost Improvement Plan (CIP) Trackers to strategic 
presentations, committee papers and public documents. These were sought purposively (e.g. 
through initial conversations with gatekeepers or key figures in savings programmes) and 
opportunistically where interviews and observations highlighted key documents. They were 
gathered from the public domain or with staff permission. 
National texts were gathered in several steps. First, I sought a broad sweep of official policy 
texts 2008-2018. This official discourse was selected because such strategic documents can 
strongly influence work (Vaara et al., 2010), particularly in austerity’s dynamic policy 
environment. I systematically searched Government and NHS websites, search engines, web 
archives, and Planex’s grey literature database. Keywords pertaining to savings, austerity and 
healthcare identified texts including reports, guidelines, reviews and speeches. Basic relevance 
criteria selected 217 texts. Snowballing extended the corpus to 294 texts (1.8m words). 
During the study, I widened and refined this sample in two ways. First, sites mentioned – 
prompted and unprompted – texts pertinent to their work. If such apparently important texts 
were not yet included in the corpus, they were added. 
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Second, conversations in field sites and ongoing analysis of the policy process highlighted 
relevant types of text beyond the official policy discourse. Consequently, I extended my search 
to include media and think tank texts. It was not possible to be as exhaustive with these as 
with the initial sweep of policy texts. Consequently, focus was given to the period 2016-18 that 
covered the fieldwork and its immediate context; and 2010, which early analysis suggested 
was particularly important in the national case’s development.  
Texts were gathered through searches of European NewsStream. They included Daily Mail, 
Guardian and Times articles to balance formats and political perspectives. Similar queries of 
the two most prominent UK healthcare think tanks’ websites (Nuffield Trust and King’s Fund) 
garnered further texts. Table 5.3 quantifies the texts gathered. 
Table 5.3 – National texts gathered 
Text type Number 
Official policy discourse 303 
Newspapers 336 




This study unites multiple analytic approaches. They are described separately for clarity but 
continually interacted with one another. The aim was to analyse retroductively, creating 
inductive images of data to compare abductively with theory (Ragin and Amoroso, 2010). Thus 
I gradually, robustly identified practices. 
Notwithstanding that practices are notoriously analytically elusive (Denis et al., 2015), writers 
focus more on conceptualising them than developing methods for their identification (Feldman 
and Orlikowski, 2011). It was therefore necessary to develop a formal method for practice 
analysis. While this is outlined in detail below, an overview is merited here. 
1. Practices are evident through their ‘manifestations’: situations, actions, discourses and 
so forth. The purpose of this is not to identify ontologically distinct entities more basic 
than practices, but to document the various directly observable phenomena practices 
entail. This study’s first major analytic process inductively identified these 
manifestations through thematic and discourse analysis.  
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2. This enabled a second process which reviewed patterns of co-occurrence in these 
manifestations and theorised how they might be interconnected within practices 
(Wacquant, 1989). Interrogating these hypotheses with the support of further 
discursive analyses robustly identified practices.  
3. This enabled a third process: developing processual narratives of how practices 
changed across time. Combined, these processes enabled robust theory development.  
While there was a broad chronology from the first to the last item in this list, analysis was 
iterative and messy, involving repeated explorations and mis-steps. The reasoning process 
described above is best understood as the normative orientation of an inevitably more 
complex analytic process (Mantere and Ketokivi, 2013; Mautner, 2016, pp.5–6). Figure 5.1 
summarises this recursive process. The subsections that follow describe these processes in 
more detail. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Summary analytic process 
Preliminaries: isolating the most relevant material 
My approach to data collection erred on the side of inclusion. Before the processes described 
above, it was therefore necessary to identify data pertinent to austerity management. 
A first round of coding selected interview and observational material related to ‘responses to 
austerity’. A broad view of such ‘responses’ was taken, facilitated by Levine’s (1978) threefold 
characterisation of public organisational decline as ‘a problem’, ‘a contingency’ and ‘a 
symptom’. Austerity can be approached as a financial ‘problem’ to be solved, a ‘contingency’ 
of work not directly related to austerity, and a ‘symptom’ of external causes like government 
policy. One might therefore attempt to solve the ‘problem’ through savings plans; observe the 
‘contingency’ of financial stress while engaged in quality improvement work or complain about 
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the scarce resources government allocates. Data were counted as relevant where they 
pertained to any of these ways of approaching austerity (see Table 5.4).  
Table 5.4 – Defining the scope of austerity management 
 Austerity as… Possible activities 
Problem A requirement to redress financial 
imbalances 
Discussing, designing, conducting savings 
programmes 
Contingency A context for other action  Attempting to achieve something despite 
scarcity, creating workarounds 
Symptom A consequence of choices or 
circumstances 
Discussing likely funding situations, 
debating government policy 
 
Judgements about texts’ relevance had to be more nuanced. The study’s corpora stretched 
into the millions of words; not all relevant material could feasibly be analysed in detail. 
However, jettisoning large portions of data would have limited how meaningful conclusions 
could be. Consequently, this study adopts a ‘layered’ approach to discursive analysis in which 
concentric sets of texts are analysed in differing levels of detail (c.f. Hellgren et al., 2002; 
Tourish and Hargie, 2012).  
Following Vaara et al (2004, 2006; Mantere and Vaara, 2008), it bases itself at a meso-level 
(conducting ‘interdiscursive analysis’), periodically ‘zooming in’ on key passages (for 
‘microlinguistic analysis’). To this it adds Mautner’s (2009) suggestion of periodically ‘zooming 
out’ to consider all texts using ‘corpus analysis’ techniques. This suits a study aiming to 
understand discourse’s role as part of wider situated practices. Emphasising time-consuming 
microlinguistic analysis would have risked leaving insufficient time to analyse nondiscursive 
factors; whereas a corpus-level focus would risk de-situating the language examined. Figure 
5.2 illustrates the diversity of techniques this study employed.  
To accomplish this ‘layered’ analysis, it was necessary to get from the study’s large corpus to a 
manageable selection of texts. Baker et al (2008) describe ‘downsampling’: progressively 
narrowing down one’s data for more detailed analysis. This study operationalised this 
technique by according each of the official policy discourse texts scores describing i) their level 
of seniority within the NHS or Government; ii) their relevance to austerity; and iii) their focus 





Figure 5.2 – Approaches to discursive analysis of national texts.  
The top-scoring texts (n=22) published before mid-2016 (when this analysis process occurred) 
were thematically analysed. This allowed me to further downsample the texts while preserving 
this wider sample’s thematic diversity. I did so by comparing the themes important across the 
sample to those important to individual texts. I could then create a purposive subsample of 
texts in which all the themes important to the original 22 were represented. To avoid cherry-
picking, I built this sample by going down a list of texts ordered by score, including each text if 
an as-yet unrepresented theme was important in it. This created a subsample small enough for 
detailed analysis (n=5) which thematically echoed the wider sample. 
Process 1: identifying practice ‘manifestations’ 
The first stage of analysis involved these selected national texts alongside a quarter of the 
interview and observational data from field sites. First, the observational and interview data 
were thematically analysed. It was not necessary to thus analyse the national texts: they had 
already undergone such an analysis during downsampling. The core categories these thematic 
analyses developed were ‘actions’, ‘situations’, ‘objects’ and ‘values’: all ideas central to RE. 
While Thévenot’s thinking will doubtless have sensitised me to their relevance, they were not 









Yet this study’s interest was not only in what people said, but also in how they said it. 
Accordingly, all verbatim data (documents, interview transcripts, direct quotations from 
fieldnotes) in this subset were analysed ‘interdiscursively’ (Fairclough, 2003). This involved 
considering linguistic choices like metaphor, pronoun use and semantic choice to identify 
which ‘discourses’ – ‘way[s] of representing [the] world’ (Fairclough, 2005) – were drawn 
upon. Coded fragments were sometimes large, stretching to a paragraph or more; but usually 
smaller, restricted to words, phrases or sentences. Discourses were identified inductively, but 
then brought into conversation with categories from Thévenot. Eventually, codes representing 
individual discourses were nested within categories representing the regimes and worlds with 
which they were associated. 
This process created a coding hierarchy which differentiated and categorised the 
manifestations of practices, like situations, actions, values and discourses. This set the scene 
for the second major process. 
Process 2: manifestations to practices 
This process used these practice manifestations to identify practices. This created a practice 
coding hierarchy which was then used to code further texts and the remaining field data. 
First, I reviewed in a variety of ways coding describing the ‘manifestations’. Individual codes’ 
contents were reviewed in detail to find patterns in where and how they occurred. Meanwhile, 
I examined how pairs of codes co-occurred. This was aided by NVivo 11/12’s matrix coding 
feature, which creates matrices mapping overlap or proximity between codes. By plotting 
different types of manifestation against one another, I identified where particular ‘discourses’ 
were used in particular ‘situations’ (for instance). Each practice ‘element’ – situations, 
discourses, actions, objects and values – was thus plotted against one another, and common 
overlaps interrogated. This helped identify common co-occurrences and interrelations 
between ‘manifestations’ and hypothesise the practices of which they form part. 
These developing hypotheses were tested against analysed data. This included the coded data 
already described, and further discourse analytic approaches. Following interdiscursive 
analysis and where puzzles emerged, I zoomed in on exemplary and atypical sections of text 
exhibiting a certain discourse. These were ‘microlinguistically’ analysed using Fairclough’s 
(2015, pp.128–153) schema of linguistic features useful for social analysis (including 
‘classification schemes’, ‘nominalizations’ and ‘modality’). Pen-and-paper analysis of such 
features revealed patterns in how given discourses were deployed. These patterns could then 
be confirmed across the wider set of texts analysed. Such patterns confirmed, challenged and 
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complicated developing suspicions about how discourses were being used and, therefore, the 
practices present in these data.  
Given the many national texts available, I periodically ‘zoomed out’ to the whole corpus using 
Sketch Engine, a corpus analysis package (Kilgarriff et al., 2014). Such corpus tools have been 
used productively within CDA (Mautner, 2009) and organisational healthcare research 
(Learmonth and Mautner, 2016; O’Reilly and Reed, 2011). They enable users to analyse 
millions of words at once, producing ‘concordances’ of all uses of a given word, identifying 
words’ frequency, common collocations of words and measures of ‘keyness’: the extent to 
which words are particularly characteristic of a corpus relative to a comparator (Mautner, 
2009; Evison, 2010). Uniquely, Sketch Engine produces ‘word sketches’: at-a-glance indicators 
of a word’s collocates separated by their grammatical role (e.g. which verbs does this noun 
tend to ‘do’?). This analysis focused on official policy texts, though these were compared with 
other national texts, and with the British National Corpus (a ‘reference corpus’). 
This breadth of approaches supported retroduction. Where one data source suggested 
conclusions, I generated hypotheses about what this conclusion would suggest I would find 
through other data or analyses. Conducting those analyses tested and refined those 
hypotheses. This process was initially formalised through clearly delineated alternations of 
analytic approach. Progressively, it became organic and iterative. 
These steps helped identify practices involved in these data, and to code them accordingly. 
Because each practice manifestation could be relevant to multiple practices, they lacked a 
hierarchical (one-to-many) relationship with practices. Consequently, practices and their 
manifestations could not share one coding hierarchy (Saldaña, 2009). Practices were thus 
coded in a separate hierarchy, whose codebook recorded which manifestations each involved. 
Armed with this coding structure describing robustly identified practices, I could code the 
remaining data more efficiently. All remaining interviews and observations were coded. Where 
data fitted descriptions of existing practice codes, they were coded accordingly. Otherwise, 
they were set aside for later attention. Periodically, I returned to such passages and coded 
them like the initial subsample: coding their ‘manifestations’, finding patterns in such 
manifestations’ co-occurrence and hypothesising practices. Every practice code was thus built 
through detailed, ground-up analysis of its manifestations, without all data having to be 
processed in this labour-intensive way. 
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Three additional groups of texts were also analysed this way. First, samples of texts gathered 
from organisational sites. Second, samples of texts from media and think tank sources. Third, 
further official policy texts i) dating from mid-2016 to 2018, after initial analyses were 
conducted; and ii) related to disputes or timepoints which processual analysis (below) 
identified as particularly important. Appendix 4 illustrates the coding process thus far. 
Process 3: processual analysis 
The analytic steps above produced a detailed but static image of austerity management 
practices. Processual analysis developed an understanding of the key events in the sites, and 
how practices changed. 
First, I created detailed ‘chronicles’ – temporal databases of events which were i) relevant to 
austerity; ii) timebound and iii) material to organisations’ or focused-on departments’ overall 
position. Organisational events were identified through close reading of all data from sites. For 
the national case, I first closely read official policy discourse and think tank texts, starting with 
that given the highest score (as described under the subtitle ‘Preliminaries: isolating the most 
relevant material’). I continued reading down the list until three sequential texts added no 
previously un-noted events. To these, all newspaper texts were added because of their 
richness in factual detail. Appendix 5 shows an extract from the national chronicle. 
These chronicles were interrogated to differentiate periods within each site. This judgement 
was informed by several considerations. First, in line with Thévenot’s emphasising tests of 
worth, I closely read each chronicle and highlighted all such tests or changes in the evaluative 
devices organisations used. I followed Dionne et al (2019) in identifying tests that represented 
clear ‘discontinuities’ in disputes or other processes; but also considered more gradual 
patterns of change in test structures. Second, I examined a site’s coding temporally to identify 
continuities and change. Third, within national data, I quantitatively compared language use 
across time using Sketch Engine. Fourth, I compared organisational sites’ chronicles with the 
national chronicle to identify national policy or discourse with implications for those 
organisations. These complex considerations were collated using visual mapping techniques 
(see Appendix 6) that helped me to see multiple dynamics at once (Langley, 1999). I thus 
identified distinct periods within each case around which the accounts of change and 
development in Part 4 are structured. 
Generating theory 
The above robustly identified austerity management practices and changes therein. Theory 
was developed by elaborating connections between practices; comparisons between cases; 
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and through the interaction of practice and processual analyses. These were brought into 
conversation with RE and EW concepts to embed my understanding of austerity management 
practices in a broader conception of social life. 
Multiple strategies were used to develop theory, as Appendix 7 illustrates. The relations 
between practices were hypothesised, tested against data and refined, developing visualised 
‘practice nets’ which captured apparent relations between practices (Nicolini, 2009b). Colour 
coding overlaid the structures of practices prominent within different sites on top of one 
another facilitating cross-site comparison. Such cross-site comparison validated and challenged 
hypothesised causal relations by seeing whether differences between sites produced expected 
differences in observed outcomes (Yin, 1981, 2013; Eisenhardt, 1989, pp.540–541). Different 
departments were treated as sub-cases within organisations, facilitating further such 
comparisons. This helped develop an overall structure of austerity management practices and 
their interrelations. 
These practices were interpreted through RE. Individual practices and clusters thereof were 
interrogated for their relevance to elements of Thévenot’s schema. I considered the types of 
measurement device, qualified object, good, test and compromise different practices involved. 
This signalled clearly the regimes (and, where applicable, worlds) to which they related. This 
perspective helped explain much of what I observed in terms of Thévenot’s thinking. As well as 
providing a technical language with which to explain my findings, this illuminated as-yet 
unidentified dynamics: previously unidentified tensions between the familiar and the planned 
or justificatory play a significant role in the theory expounded in Chapter 13. 
Such static analyses were enriched through conversation with processual accounts. Visual 
mapping techniques helped characterise each site’s change processes (Langley, 1999). Outlines 
of the national policy story were created, including key events and graphs quantifying 
discursive changes or the density of chronicled events over time (Van de Ven et al., 2008). 
Overlaying these onto visualisations of individual sites’ change processes helped map local-
national interactions. Combined, these approaches helped to make clear each site’s change 
processes. These were crystallised using ‘narrative’ techniques which created temporal case 
descriptions. Attending to Becker’s (1996) warning against overemphasising ‘thickness’ for its 
own sake (Geertz, 1973), such descriptions aimed to be ‘broad’ while zooming in on moments 
which other analytic techniques suggested were important. This led me to use these data to 
elaborate its concepts of the situation (Chapter 11), opening and closing one’s eyes (Chapter 
12) and to identify new forms of critique (Chapter 13). 
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The identification of distinct periods of each site’s process also enabled ‘temporal bracketing’ 
strategies. Coded data, and the official policy discourse corpus were divided into sections 
linked to these periods (Langley, 1999). This meant that coding and language use could be 
compared across periods, helping develop and evaluate potential explanations for change. This 
precipitated multiple possible theories of change within austerity management processes 
which could be further tested against particular cases or sub-cases (Van de Ven and Poole, 
1995). 
This processual perspective illuminated how practices evolved over time and helped me find 
patterns in such sequences across sites. These patterns were theorised by returning to RE, 
considering features like tests’ temporal dynamics, with their cycles of refinement and 
revision; or the importance of critical moments at which systems of valuation are reframed. 
However, RE theory is fertile but underdeveloped when it comes to considering the wider 
range of temporal dynamics the cases observed here displayed. They thus gave me reason to 
develop an account of how situations are progressively formed (Chapter 11); and to emphasise 
sequences of tests alongside individual ones (Chapter 13). 
Conclusion 
The research process described above explains the practices involved in austerity management 
through a coherent, novel practice analytic method. Pragmatist writing is not always explicit 
about how practices are robustly identified. Perhaps theorists fear specifying too closely what 
beyond ‘practices’ themselves are observed would threaten those practices’ ontological 
centrality. But it leaves researchers with few guidelines in operationalising pragmatist 
approaches. 
Consequently, this chapter develops an analytic approach which can justify both its theoretical 
coherence and its methodological rigour. It involves first identifying practices’ ‘manifestations’ 
through coding hierarchies tailored to one’s pragmatist approach – here Thévenot’s. Coding 
software facilitates detailed review of these manifestations and their co-occurrences. Practices 
are not reduced to the co-occurrence of given elements. But the discipline of using patterns of 
their manifestations’ co-occurrences to support interpretation of practices adds demonstrable 
rigour to this analytic approach. 
This approach integrates discursive and material considerations. Drawing on Fairclough (2015), 
it integrates within Thévenot’s framework a detailed but flexible CDA to ensure that its 
discourse analysis is robust but not dominant. Based at a meso-level of detail but zooming out 
to large corpora and into small sections, this heeds Fairclough’s reminder that language can be 
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seen at multiple levels. Beginning at a meso-level enables robust but parsimonious discursive 
analysis readily compatible with the practice analysis described above. 
With greater resources or trade-offs in other analytic approaches, more detailed analyses of 
discourse, practice or process could have been developed. However, this analysis represents a 
strong combination of these approaches. This Part describes the methodological implications 
of Part 2’s theoretical conclusions in Part 1’s empirical context. The next Part continues by 





Part 4 – Organisations under austerity 
The methods described above facilitated two interrelated types of findings. First, it developed 
five key practices, and several sub-practices supported by detailed ground-up coding and 
discursive analyses. Second, it enabled processual accounts of each case, which described not 
only the key events within sites but also how these practices were involved therein. This 
produces a rounded perspective on our data accounting for both austerity’s micro-level 
dynamics and how changes therein explain developments within sites. 
This Part is structured accordingly. Chapter 6 introduces the practices, explaining how each 
was identified. The following three chapters then processually describe each organisational 
case highlighting key practices as they arise.2 Finally, Chapter 10 collates these analyses, 
developing early conclusions which Part 5 develops. See Appendix 1 for a note on the 
pseudonymisation practices and typographical conventions deployed here.  
 
2 The national case is reported within Chapter 11. 
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Chapter 6: Introducing the practices 
Chapter 5 describes the methods through which practices were identified (pp.83-89). This 
produced a practice coding hierarchy in which higher-level practices entailed more micro-level 
subordinates. Eventually, practices were collated such that five top-level practices were 
formed. This chapter has a relatively technical aim: to define, explain and exemplify these core 
practices. These practices’ empirical and theoretical implications are addressed by subsequent 
chapters. 
To better explain the five core practices and demonstrate how they were created, this chapter 
also refers to their immediate hierarchical subordinates (‘sub-practices’, names underlined). 
However, the focus remains on the five core practices, which will also be invoked by the case 
reports that follow. To compare how these core practices are iterated across cases, Chapter 10 
will refer again to their sub-practices but will remind readers of their definitions when doing 
so. This chapter’s core purpose is to establish, demonstrate and elucidate the five core 
practices. 
This chapter’s first five parts each address one core practice: i) attaining tenuous futures (or, 
attaining), ii) constructing possibility, iii) reconfiguring quality (reconfiguring), iv) conducting 
and contesting financial tests (conducting and contesting), and v) reshaping engagements 
(reshaping). The final part aggregates the coding structure thus described and makes early 
suggestions about the resultant structure’s implications. 
Attaining tenuous futures 
The first core practice which this research identified was attaining tenuous futures. Fieldwork 
revealed repeated activity associating with establishing the financial situation and negotiating 
its relationship to potential financial futures. This manifested in direct discursive and material 
efforts to characterise organisations’ financial jeopardy, and to ‘bridge’ increasingly imposing 
gaps between actual and desired financial states. Practice codes were gradually created to 
capture these dynamics. 
One cluster of activity centred on managers’ often-disputed efforts to characterise their 
financial situation as imperilled. One key set of meetings at Thyme began with what one senior 
manager called their ‘speech’, as my fieldnotes record: 
Central managers were meeting with one division following the first round 
of annual planning. Divisions had submitted initial plans; these meetings 
were designed to discuss them and prompt further savings. One central 
manager described the large ‘efficiency’ target they had started with. 
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Divisional plans had identified around a third of the necessary savings. 
However, they had also brought a ‘deterioration in outturn…in excess of 
assumptions [and] cost pressures way in excess of assumptions’. This meant 
they would have to go through everything and work out whether it was 
wholly necessary. ‘We can’t afford to have anything that’s a nice-to-have as 
opposed to an absolutely essential’. They were ‘not quite back at the 
beginning, but…’ concluded the manager. One divisional manager placed 
their hand on their mouth, seeming concerned. 
Alongside describing severe financial distress, the manager metaphorically locates Thyme near 
‘the beginning’. A trajectory is imagined from beginning to conclusion, determined by levels of 
financial improvement. To be at the beginning, it is implied, is to have lots more savings to 
make. This metaphorical location combined with the wider discussion of unexpected levels of 
financial problems was placed close to the start of many such meetings. It appeared designed 
to contextualise what followed, making clear what central managers saw as the need for 
further savings. 
This extract exemplifies material coded under constructing and managing financial crises. Such 
data were characterised by persuasive descriptions and disputes over organisations’ financial 
situations and their implications for the appropriate strategic responses. These discursive 
efforts tended to draw heavily on spatio-temporal language to locate organisations in a 
context of financial stringency. Such attempts to demonstrate the situation’s severity faced 
counterarguments and protests. To some, talk of regulatory intervention was nothing more 
than the threat of NHS Improvement’s ‘henchmen’ to justify further cuts (‘NHSI’; see p.308). 
The engagement captured by constructing and managing financial crises includes both claims 
that the financial situation was severe, and sceptical responses thereto. 
Such efforts were bound up with material changes shaping organisations’ fortunes. When mid-
year financial bailouts characterised Thyme’s financial life (see Chapter 8), this fuelled 
scepticism about the situation’s severity. Conversely, Dryas’s intensive efforts to gather data 
about its Cost Improvement Programme’s (CIP) informed and legitimised senior managers’ 
accounts of financial jeopardy (p.120).  
Constructing the financial situation was only the start. With grim forecasts in place, managers 
attempted to describe how their current state could reach acceptable financial outcomes. This 
involved identifying savings ‘items’ which could be placed in budgets to generate more 
favourable financial answers. Figure 6.1 is an example of the so-called ‘bridge’ charts 
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visualising the gap between actual and desired financial states. They displayed changes in a 
financial position, both negative and positive, actual and hypothetical.  
 
Figure 6.1 – Dryas 'bridge chart' example (values redacted; see p.9 for abbreviations) 
Figure 6.1 illustrates Dryas’s 2018/19 financial plan, exemplifying such charts’ common use in 
budgeting. The two leftmost blocks show its starting point: breaking even including 
‘Sustainability and Transformation’ bonuses for achieving prescribed budgetary outcomes (see 
p.325). The following blocks show foreseen changes relative to the preceding year’s hoped-for 
outturn. These mostly consist of the end of ‘non-recurrent’ devices used to make that 
preceding year’s ends meet. These precipitate the second blue block’s grim prediction of a 
major deficit for 2018/19 absent other changes. This is worsened by foreseen ‘cost pressures’: 
likely increases in running costs. Accordingly, green items are added on the far right to indicate 
savings to redress the balance. However, in this diagram, created halfway through 2017/18, 
what is illustrated is more the savings ‘required’ to achieve acceptable outcomes than specific 
plans for them to be made. 
As the year went on, organisations replaced these with more specific schemes associated with 
likely financial benefits. But this was not universal. Managers were sceptical about some 
savings added to plans. Some were ambitious; others were placeholder items, like the 
increasingly commonplace ‘unidentified CIPs’. These represented intentions to save 























































































































































































































































































unassociated with specific plans. Nevertheless, they sat alongside both realistic and 
contentious plans within organisations’ documentation. 
This material was associated with a further code: bridging, which was particularly prominent in 
budgetary processes. This activity was strongly associated with the acceptance of budgetary 
targets senior staff may not have seen as reasonable: in one manager’s words, Thyme’s 
budgetary ambitions were ‘very, erm [brief laugh] ambitious’. Bridging was not restricted to 
formal budgetary processes. As optimistic plans had to become reality, mid-year reformulation 
of budgets or patching up of existing ones by finding new savings was also included. Bridging 
referred to the use of discursive and material methods to create compelling plans linking the 
financial status quo to ‘ambitious’ futures.  
Constructing and managing financial crises and bridging were thematically and dialectically 
linked. Both characterised the construction of financial situations. The perpetuation of crisis 
narratives through constructing and managing necessitated bridging’s ambitious plans, while 
those plans’ ambitiousness encouraged senior managers to construct and manage financial 
crises to persuade staff savings were vital. These codes constituted attaining tenuous futures, 
our first core practice. It involved attempts to reach apparently jeopardised financial futures, 
partly through discursive efforts to create coherent plans. Table 6.1 describes its sub-codes. 
 Table 6.1 – Sub-practices of attaining tenuous futures 
Practice Definition 
Bridging Using concrete and discursive means to span the gap between likely 
and desired financial outcomes, particularly in budgets or formal 
plans. Precipitates variations across financial cycles as optimistic 




Accounts of existential financial threats and attempts to address 
them. Includes critical responses to such attempts and disputes over 
threats and their extent. 
 
Constructing possibility 
The second core practice was constructing possibility. Managers expended considerable effort 
to represent as concrete and material hypothetical savings. Organisational discourse 
continually described savings as concrete objects, supported by documents and other objects 
representing those savings. Analysis of these activities created codes to capture such efforts to 
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concretise such possible savings, and the resistance such efforts received from others and the 
world. 
Particularly prominent were industrial discourses and corresponding material efforts to 
construct proposed savings as concrete objects. One Thyme interviewee described their 
financial outlook thus: 
The things that stick out in my mind is that we still have a financial gap as we 
did last year, so we need to, also, not only to deliver what’s in the plan now, 
erm, but also to find how we’re going to plug that, it’ll probably be divided 
up between divisions, but then they’re going to be looking for opportunities 
to plug those gaps, which goes back to the data we just talked about. 
The physical metaphors used to describe spending more money than desired were 
characteristic of this dataset: they are ‘gap[s]’. Seen this way, it is logical they must be 
‘plugged’. Potential savings are thus imagined as physical objects (‘plugs’). Accordingly, they 
can be ‘divided up’ and are susceptible to the sort of visual processes (‘looking for’) to which 
pre-existing concrete objects are normally subject. It starts to seem natural to describe 
hypotheses about how to reduce spending as if they were concrete objects. 
This exemplifies the data coded under constructing possibility. It describes savings as if they 
were physical objects. Physical metaphors were archetypal of this, but so were more critical 
statements attacking individual savings for having ‘no substance’. Such accounts reinforced the 
idea that being substantial was definitional of ‘real’ savings plans. This discursive work was 
associated with corresponding material efforts. Work to create detailed databases of 
individual ‘CIPs’ enabled their aggregation into headline numbers, making them seem real and 
present (see p.111). Alternatively, creating an ‘old-fashioned brown-paper process map’ could 
substantiate the existence of hypothetical savings. Such work constituted packaging savings, 
the most prominent practice involved in constructing possibility. 
As Table 6.2 illustrates, packaging was not the only practice associated with constructing. A 
comparable technique emphasised not the possibility of individual savings but of widespread 
change in organisations’ design. Drawing on connectionist transformation rhetoric, material 
coded under constructing the good organisation also materialised hypotheticals, but those 
about whole organisations, not savings. Changes created a ‘new structure’ and needed to be 
‘embed[ded]’. Quality needed to be ‘instil[led] as a cultural foundation’; change required the 
right ‘tool[s]’. Even ongoing processes could be thus objectified and treated as a structure one 
can change. A Thyme department was said to struggle without the right ‘leadership’; ‘generic 
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improvement practices just haven’t been embedded’. Constructing the good organisation cast 
improvement as possible through a change in organisations’ material structure. 
Table 6.2 – Sub-practices of constructing possibility 
Practice Definition 
Packaging savings objects Casting savings schemes as physical objects with organisational 
locations, which may then be contested, lost, identified and so 
on. 
Constructing the good 
organisation 
Representing organisations’ structures and practices as 
material, changeable and determinative of their success.  
Juxtaposing savings 
objects with familiarity 
Contrasting the savings constructed by the practices above with 
realities drawn from the regime of familiarity. 
 
Table 6.2 also highlights the opposition techniques like constructing the good organisation and 
packaging savings faced. Some questioned the reality of the savings objects they constructed, 
often by contrasting them with more grounded, familiar contexts. This was often powerful 
where financial considerations came into contact within specific patients or groups thereof. 
One meeting between Dryas’s divisional and central managers bemoaned commissioners’ 
disputing payment for a patient: 
The divisional manager reported that, since a previous contact had left, they 
were now ‘getting some sense’ from commissioners. The remaining dispute 
was about paying for the patient’s level of clinical observations, about which 
they had requested more details. The central manager frustratedly 
suggested that commissioners might ‘want to come and see [them] on the 
ward and then’ make that judgement. 
Commissioners believed that these observations may be unmerited, thus representing 
avoidable spending. The central manager hearing this felt strongly that this judgement was 
inappropriate, citing Dryas managers’ shared knowledge of the individual. Implicitly noting that 
commissioners had not ‘see[n]’ the patient ‘on the ward’ makes their abstract questions about 
the necessity of spending seem suspect. Comparable disagreements were present within 
organisations: when Dryas’s own savings programme mobilised information about supposed 
areas of overspending, divisions observed how local eccentricities complicated such data’s 




The three practices this section describes were thematically linked, all appealing to beliefs 
about where future savings were or were not possible. They thus also often found themselves 
in disputes, both resisting and perpetuating one another. They became constructing 
possibility, which characterised the construction, concretisation and dispute of images of 
organisational futures. 
Reconfiguring quality 
The third practice was reconfiguring quality. Observations and particularly interviews 
highlighted the gradual modification of traditional ideas of healthcare quality. Sometimes, this 
involved implicitly discursively reformulating the concept of quality. Other instances were 
more overt: managers explicitly discussed the perceived extent of their quality responsibilities 
and how this affected their decisions. 
One Dryas manager explicitly advocated reconfiguring quality under austerity: 
As much as [one] think[s] it’s a deterioration in quality, actually, it’s an 
acceptable level of quality for everybody, rather than quality for you, you 
and you and then nothing for the rest of you and that’s – you have to 
redefine quality around that, I think, because if you’re, if you’re in it just to 
get to the level for – until the money runs out. 
This interviewee did not welcome these trade-offs. Elsewhere, they worried about the 
trajectory of financial pressures. ‘I don’t want to work in an NHS environment where quality 
becomes safety’, they said, fearing that this was ‘the direction of travel’. However, given 
financial constraints, they felt forced to choose between high quality for some and satisfactory 
quality for all. They thus felt obliged to ‘redefine quality around that’. What good quality 
meant had to change: it was necessary to reconfigure quality. 
This represented one version of reconfiguring – satisficing and instrumentalising quality: using 
the language of quality to pursue cost improvement or, here, the treatment of quality as a 
value to satisfice, not maximise. As Table 6.3 illustrates, several forms of reconfiguring were 
observed. Blurring quality and cost casts cost and quality as allied, even equivalent, values. Like 
satisficing, this occurred through not only explicit claims but also linguistic nuance: 
So from a financial point of view, it’s easy to add up because you’ve got a 
bunch of positives on one side and a bunch of negatives on the other and if 
the negatives are bigger than the positives, they completely wipe it out but 
quite often, what they do is they, they consume a lot of it. Sometimes it’s 
50-60% of the saving that you do is consumed by poor services, on the other 
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side of the, of the balance sheet, if you like. So from a quality point of view, 
if you took a whole patient pathway…you can improve one element of the 
pathway and all you’re doing is you’re moving the problems potentially 
further down; so I mean it’s sort of critical point stuff. 
This Dryas manager appeals to the importance of holistically improving processes. A process 
management discourse pervades the extract (‘patient pathway’, ‘further down’, ‘critical 
point’). In this framework, both quality and cost improvements are said to be potentially 
undone by downstream problems. The parallel ‘so from a [financial/quality] point of view’ 
presents them in parallel, as if the same logic is acting upon both. The two are constructed as 
not competing values but simply alternative ways of seeing the same problem. Consequently, 
it seems natural that ‘poor services’ can undermine financial improvement. Seeing quality and 
cost as alternative perspectives on the same question naturalises the idea they should be 
complementary. 
Table 6.3 – Sub-practices of reconfiguring quality 
Practice Definition 
Blurring quality and cost Representing quality as positively correlated with cost: as if 




Casting quality as a value to be safeguarded, not maximised; 
and/or repurposing its language to pursue financial ends 
De-valuation Avoiding a situation’s moral implications 
 
The practices constituting reconfiguring were completed by de-valuation, which described 
various efforts to avoid or contain a situation’s moral contents. This was often recognised 
through emotional work, including dark humour. One manager described their colleagues as 
‘just get[ting] on with it’, rather than worrying about wider debates about austerity. ‘I think 
there’s kind of hope’, they continued, ‘that people will recognise that the NHS is really 
important and – somebody will save it from destruction [laugh]’. When I asked about the 
prospect of ‘destruction’, they described painful stories about friends and colleagues who had 
left the service. Their laughter represented no glee but a way of containing the otherwise 
morally and emotionally fraught situation. 
At times, reconfiguring quality inhered largely in discourse, at others in structural change. It 
was not restricted to diminutions of quality, but extended to attempts to protect or extend it. 
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What material coded under reconfiguring held in common was that it positioned quality or 
elements thereof relative to other organisational values. 
Conducting and contesting financial tests 
The fourth core practice was conducting and contesting financial tests. Unsurprisingly, 
organisations under austerity spent extensive time and effort designing, implementing and 
disputing financial tests. These were collated into conducting and contesting. 
The data coded here generally described tests evaluating progress against some financial plan 
or other. Some were formal – like formal reviews of budgets in governance fora, others less so 
– like in-passing questions about the progress of an individual saving. With the proliferation of 
measures of financial progress, organisations featured budgets, multi-layered CIP structures 
and increasingly varied presentations of spending data. Evaluations of performance against 
financial plans became increasingly commonplace. 
Such evaluations against financial plans had become routine. Yet they were sometimes 
challenged, producing justifications of them; or were themselves used to evaluate 
departments’ or managers’ worth. In one such instance, one manager was requesting 
additional staffing for their department relative to senior managers’ plans. Senior staff 
responded that this might be possible, but the manager would ‘have to justify those additional 
two’ because they exceeded the number specified in the organisations’ external contracts. 
Organisations’ financial plans tended to be backed by justificatory imperatives characterised 
by industrial and market values. 
This practice captured not only the use of financial tests, but also techniques to resist them. It 
is not alone in including the resistance which interventions in the world face as part of the 
same practice or ‘engagement’: this is key to Thévenot’s way of seeing the world. What is 
distinctive here is that this resistance became so commonplace (see Chapter 13). One set of 
meetings at Dryas involved central and divisional managers discussing divisions’ financial 
performance in a given year. 
A manager spoke about their division’s financial outcomes. Achieving 
balance was ‘always going to be very tough’, they said, conceding that they 
had ‘underperformed’. They highlighted, however, that they had achieved 
the percentage savings requested of each division if you based that on last 
year’s actual spending (including last year’s overspend) rather than on its 
budget. ‘Though everyone is having to do more than [this percentage]’, 
interjected a central manager. With a conciliatory gesture, the divisional 
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manager said that this was in ‘no way a justification’. However, ‘is the 
budget appropriate? I’m not sure we bottomed that out’. ‘Again, it’s not an 
excuse’, they added, as the central manager pursed their lips. 
This interaction illustrates one of the subtler instances of managers responsible for divisions 
questioning the financial yardsticks against which they are evaluated. Emphasising the 
difficulty of the target and suggesting they never ‘bottomed…out’ whether it was ‘appropriate’ 
relativises their missing it: failure should not, they imply, preclude positive valuation. Yet the 
central manager’s frustrated response emphasises such arguments’ contestation and 
uncertainty. Such disagreements focusing on the propriety or otherwise of mechanisms by 
which evaluated units were judged was characteristic of a practice labelled differentiating the 
tested. It included both central efforts to construct mechanisms to differentiate those 
performing well from those performing badly and resistance to such mechanisms. 
This was frequently the most prominent element of financial tests, and that which was most 
directly contested, but it was far from the only one. Table 6.4 highlights the breadth of 
mechanisms through which financial tests were implemented and contested.  




Creation, use and contestation of measures or devices with which 
to distinguish between the worthy and unworthy 
Configuring tested 
actors 
Determining and disputing roles in an evaluative process: 
principally, determining who is responsible for an outcome and 




Affirming and disputing that a given evaluation is not simply 
legitimate but of central importance. 
Enforcing and averting 
tests 
Imposing or avoiding evaluative structures not by questioning their 
propriety but by acting to enforce or evade them (e.g. through 
authority or withholding information). 
 
At times, disputes centred on the actor which should be undergoing evaluation: should 
something be a divisional, organisational or systemic responsibility? As one set of meetings 
began, managers explained that they were there to support divisions in making savings plans. 
Central managers were there to ‘help you’, to ensure ‘constructive dialogue’ and give 
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‘feedback’ on developing plans. This management consultancy discourse of providing ‘support’ 
was often important in attempts to position others as responsible. This technique, alongside 
more overt efforts to allocate or avert responsibility, was coded under configuring tested 
actors. 
Also observed were disputes about how important a test was, and attempts to avoid 
discussing a test’s propriety altogether. The former arose when people either felt a test was 
unlikely to be permanent, or where they could plausibly claim that there were more pressing 
issues. Such claims prompted resistance of their own, as those implementing the tests 
responded by emphasising their centrality (asserting and contesting test centrality).  
The latter came where those imposing tests found it difficult or unnecessary to argue the tests 
were appropriate, instead asserting them as fact. This enforcement of tests was often 
accompanied and followed by attempts to avoid evaluation, particularly by withholding 
necessary data. Harsher enforcement and more vigorous evasion resisted and perpetuated 
one another, leading to their being collected as enforcing and averting tests. 
As these examples highlight, conducting and contesting financial tests was often more overt 
than other practices. While entailing discursive nuances, it was normally relatively overt when 
financial tests occurred. This practice was thus usually identified through explicit evaluations 
and responses thereto.  
Reshaping engagements 
The final practice was reshaping engagements. Staff at all levels found themselves working 
under policy or governance regimes which struggled in austere contexts. Organisational 
fieldwork highlighted the challenges staff faced and their ad hoc work to address contexts in 
which traditional evaluation and coordination mechanisms failed.  
One manager described their style of management thus: 
Hopefully, it’s not nagging in a ‘Oh my god, [interviewee]’s coming. 
Everyone run’ but it’s ‘OK, what are we doing today? What are we doing 
today? What are we doing today?’ It’s Forth Bridge stuff. You know, you 
cannot take your foot off the pedal. You’ve got to keep doing it every day 
and some people like that kind of work and some people can’t stand it…So 
coming in and thinking, ‘I won’t worry about this today’; you can’t. 
This interview extract emphasises work’s incessance. The repeated ‘what are we doing’ 
highlights not only the continual pressure of work the interviewee perceives, but also the 
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uncertainty within it. This contributed to a pattern of interviewees reporting increased work 
demands, and inter-goal conflict. The interviewee quoted above continued by observing that 
‘it’s the little things that make massive differences. [In one scenario], if you find three beds, 
you’ve sort of – kind of solved the problem’. In a context of large-scale pressures, the need for 
such ‘little’ or esoteric solutions also became a common strand in how people described their 
work. 
Such extracts were captured as a practice named marrying the inconsistency. This name was 
drawn from a Dryas manager whose role involved encouraging divisions to make requested 
savings. One challenge was the need to ‘marry the inconsistency of what we’re asking them to 
do [saving more while doing more]’: seen from the outside, it ‘doesn’t make any sense’. The 
need to deal with apparent ‘inconsistencies’ through extra work or ingenuity was central to 
marrying the inconsistency and reshaping engagements. Marrying sprang partly from the 
coordination difficulties staff faced. Table 6.5 catalogues it and three further practices which 
attempted to replace or work around such dysfunctional systems. 




Attempts to resolve contradictions created at higher levels. Includes 
moments such contradictions become manifest. 
Moral separation Avoiding justificatory coordination: practices that create separate 
moral domains for oneself and others, or which separate others’ 




Attempting novel planned coordination: responding to ineffective 




Attempting novel familiar coordination: understanding another’s 
practice or performance by developing close, corporeal or intimate 
connections with them; but also operating scrutiny through such 
intimate or corporeal channels 
 
One dominant pattern within fieldwork was the creation of new structures through which 
savings could be managed. Sometimes this was formal – like creating new organisations or 
units to manage savings. At others, subtle criticism of existing governance could gradually 
precipitate changes. Such efforts were characterised as re-structuring savings programmes. 
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They were characterised by attempting to replace or augment existing governance structures. 
This was identified through attempts to establish new plans or fora, and criticisms of prior 
practice. 
This was not the only way people seemed to respond to existing governance systems 
becoming problematic. Some concluded that formal planning alone was insufficient, and 
emphasised a more intimate, personal coordination style. Familiarising coordination was often 
evident through meeting observations in which familiar or personal language became 
intermixed with organisational concerns. It was also present in an increase in the language of 
corporeality and intimacy: for example, at one Dryas meeting, staff became frustrated with 
existing governance systems. They decided to get the staff they wished to monitor ‘in the 
room’, wishing to improve their ‘sight’ of them. 
Finally, people responded to coordination difficulties by avoiding potentially inflammatory 
discussions. This could be done by simply omitting to criticise senior choices one might 
otherwise have disagreed with, or by separating oneself from agendas one disagreed with. 
There was not unanimous agreement within Dryas that the emphasis given to cost reductions 
was appropriate. I asked one divisional manager at Dryas about their aims. Their answer 
distinguished success ‘for the [Division]’ (quality and compliance goals) and ‘for the big 
organisation’ (highlighting budgetary objectives). Managers frequently differentiated between 
central (or national) goals and their own, particularly when those higher-level goals were 
uncomfortable. Rather than overtly contesting the organisation’s goals, managers cast them as 
other people’s business, affiliating themselves instead with departmental values. Such efforts 
to segregate oneself from potential moral controversy was coded as moral separation. 
Management approaches designed for prosperity struggled under austerity’s pressure and 
uncertainty. Re-structuring savings programmes, familiarising coordination and moral 
separation each attempted to address resultant coordinative problems. Where they failed, 
marrying the inconsistency’s ad hoc, emergency-management style became vital. Accordingly, 
these practices were both thematically related and interlinked, resulting in their aggregation 
into reshaping engagements. All attempted to respond to breakdowns in evaluation or 
coordination by changing the spaces in which that evaluation or coordination occurred: this 
characterised reshaping. 
Practices of austerity management 
The above identifies five core austerity management practices. Table 6.6 defines them and lists 
their sub-practices. This chapter describes these practices’ formation.  
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Table 6.6 – Austerity management practices 
Practice Definition Sub-practices 
Attaining 
tenuous futures 
Constructing and disputing the financial 
situation and justifying how a 
jeopardised financial future can be 
reached. 
Bridging 




Creating and questioning objects that 
embody possibilities and plans, through 
discursive techniques and the 
construction of objects and datasets. 
Packaging savings objects 
Constructing the good 
organisation 




Formulating what healthcare quality is, 
how it relates to other values, and its 
relevance to given situations. 







Financially evaluating individuals or 
units; creating or challenging 
components of those tests, like 
measures, actors or pertinence. 
Differentiating the tested 
Configuring tested actors 
Asserting and contesting test 
centrality 
Enforcing and averting tests 
Reshaping 
engagements 
Responding to breakdowns in 
organisational structures coordinating 
activity by amending, replacing or 
bypassing those structures. Goes 
beyond simply creating a new test or 
measure of success to alter the 
engagement in which those measures 
are involved. 
Moral separation 
Re-structuring savings plans 
Familiarising coordination 
Marrying the inconsistency 
 
Speculating excessively on these practices’ implications would pre-empt the following 
chapters, which examine their organisational roles through detailed case studies. At this stage, 
however, three observations are unavoidable. 
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First, each practice appears to be characterised by severe instability. Of course, a study 
motivated by Thévenot’s theory is likely to highlight the resistance which interventions in the 
world receive. However, it takes little theoretical ingenuity to identify frequent direct efforts to 
dispute or amend the financial situations and futures constructed (attaining, constructing 
possibility), the evaluations deployed (reconfiguring quality, conducting and contesting) or 
the coordinative structures through which they operated (reshaping). This appears to 
corroborate the importance of unstable routines (Ferlie and Judge, 1981) and images of the 
situation (Rubin, 1977) while suggesting instability may stretch further. 
Second, these practices indicate that managerial effort in addressing austerity goes beyond 
determining what is to be saved and monitoring progress. Detailed and time-consuming work 
to construct an approachable situation is already evident. This corroborates Behn’s (1980) 
observation of the importance of beliefs about the situation, and lays groundwork for 
discursive analysis of how such disputes proceed. Conversely, it casts both most of the 
austerity management and EW literatures as sharing a limitation (Raudla et al., 2015). Both 
focus much more on how the situations they are interested in are addressed, and much less on 
how people understand those situations in the first place. 
Finally, it highlights the frailties of models of management built in times of plenty when 
applied to austerity, and staff’s extensive work within those systems in addressing them. 
Reshaping particularly foregrounds this activity by senior managers facing Government policy 
and junior staff encountering organisational dysfunctions. This commends this study’s multi-
level approach and emphasises the problems with an austerity management literature which 
leaves core ground-level actors so poorly understood (Williams, 2015).  
These observations highlight these practices’ importance, but all remain tentative. These 
practices are best understood by interrogating their roles within individual cases and 
investigating their interplays across time. To this end, the next three chapters detail this 
study’s three organisational cases.  
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Chapter 7: Dryas: case narrative 
Introducing Dryas 
Dryas is a large mental health provider in a major city. It operates several hospital sites and 
many community-based services. Its large, diverse local population is spread across several 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). Alongside local services, its 4,000-5,000 staff provide 
national specialist services while engaging in significant research. Dryas has strategic 
relationships with other hospitals, including other mental health trusts and nearby acute 
providers. As research began, it operated a moderately devolved structure of specialty-based 
divisions. 
Dryas espouses a strong commitment to quality and is generally considered a high-quality 
provider. It routinely scored well on national performance indicators (e.g. waiting times, 
readmissions) and CQC inspections had not raised major overall concerns. Despite the financial 
context, 2016/17 saw Dryas invest in a new quality programme. 
Dryas faced significant austerity pressures. While historically avoiding deficits, participants 
reported Dryas’s budgets tightening since 2015. In 2015/16, Dryas posted an operating deficit 
of 5-7.5% of income. In 2016/17, only Sustainability and Transformation Fund (STF) income 
avoided a deficit. Like many mental health trusts, Dryas sought proportionally smaller savings 
than many acute trusts, but started from lower baseline funding (King’s Fund, 2018a). Relying 
heavily on activity-independent funding, mental health trusts are vulnerable to the rising need 
austerity brings (Karanikolos et al., 2013, 2016). 
Historically, Dryas had responded to austerity through annual Cost Improvement Programmes 
(CIPs). Tougher recent financial forecasts had meant growing CIPs. By 2016/17, Dryas aimed 
for CIPs worth 7.5-10% of annual income. In early 2016, it hired external support to oversee its 
CIP. Latterly, Dryas had begun hiring more staff to manage CIPs in detail through the so-called 
Projects Office. 
Processual analysis identified four periods. The first (June-September 2017) covered the 
Projects Office’s set-up and early work. As its detailed CIP monitoring model faltered, the 
second period (October 2017) saw a series of exceptional meetings between senior 
management and each division to scrutinise their finances. This precipitated a third period 
(November-February 2018) focused on making additional savings this process identified and 
planning for 2018/19. By this period’s close, projections remained short of the ‘control total’ 
NHSI demanded Dryas achieve. Yet (March 2018) Dryas eventually submitted a plan promising 
to meet this control total. This chapter explains each period. 
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Period 1: Cost Improvement and reframing (June-September 2017) 
The savings programme 
Dryas had been delegated substantial savings. Senior managers expressed misgivings about 
their extent and austerity more broadly. While Government had attempted to justify these 
savings, many rejected their arguments. Senior managers thus found it difficult to justify the 
savings requested. Nor were they unaware of their own roles’ ambiguities. One worried that, 
by making savings, they were ‘an enabler’ of continued financial restraint. 
Senior managers felt obliged to make savings, fearing regulatory intervention otherwise. While 
disbelieving Government justifications, managers were unhappy to simply designate unjust the 
savings they asked of subordinates. I asked one manager whether the savings Dryas asked of 
divisions were fair: 
It has to be – it has to be, it’s not fair to health services, I cannot take you 
know in many ways they have to decide where, of course it’s not fair, this is 
not, I mean what the Government is doing is not fair. If I want Dryas to 
survive I have to play my part.  
Alongside savings, Government had delegated to Dryas a justificatory problem: unfair savings 
had to become fair. Unpersuaded of Government pro-austerity claims, managers were unlikely 
to achieve this by arguing any given service deserved to lose money. Consequently, ‘fairness’ 
was understood in terms of proportionally equal distribution of savings requirements. This 
‘internal fairness’ logic precipitated an across-the-board approach, in which divisions were 
asked for savings worth equal percentages of their budgets. 
Divisional staff apparently engaged willingly with this practice. They generally described 
themselves as attempting to save, explaining this through a similar ‘internal fairness’ logic. ‘If 
you don’t’, reasoned one manager, ‘somebody else somewhere within the organisation has a 
big gap’. Yet managers did not always see each other as similarly committed, sometimes 
criticising others for shirking this ‘responsibility’. The internal fairness logic apparently 
maintained broad support for savings, but while enabling acrimony towards those supposedly 
not doing their fair share. 
Two practices were important to this work. First, Government had delegated to Dryas a 
justificatory problem. Seen in their national context, these savings did not seem ‘fair’. 
Consequently, senior managers bracketed that national context, evaluating savings as solely 
organisational phenomena. By separating organisational savings requirements from their 
national causes, managers engaged in moral separation, a form of reshaping engagements. 
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This succeeded: staff generally accepted savings as a question of internal fairness, not national 
policy. But achieving this required managers’ ongoing moral work. It also predisposed Dryas to 
‘across-the-board’ savings which were easier to justify through this ‘internal fairness’ logic. 
This narrative relied on treating Government spending choices as unavoidable context, not 
choices subject to critique. When the manager quoted above says, ‘If I want Dryas to survive, I 
have to play my part,’ Government spending decisions have become background context for a 
managerial decision charged with an existential threat. Constructing this background of 
financial jeopardy defined the second practice important here: attaining tenuous futures. 
This practice let managers treat Government decisions as mere backgrounds to organisational 
choices and emphasised the need for colleagues to save. Managers stressed NHSI’s increasing 
intervention in financially failing organisations. Some saw references to NHSI’s ‘henchmen’ as a 
ploy to cajole colleagues into savings.  
Regardless its intention, this practice seemed to encourage anxiety and budgetary compliance. 
One manager observed that their colleagues ‘already understand there’s a black hole’, defined 
as ‘what NHSI has mandated’ they save. Managers generally accepted Dryas’s budgetary limits 
as inevitable. Bemoaning one’s financial situation was seen as unhelpful and asking for more 
money outside budgeting rounds appeared taboo.  
However, staff did decry their division, organisation or sector’s comparative funding levels. 
Others outwardly criticised the savings senior managers requested. One interviewee described 
what they saw as ‘very poor’ management decisions precipitating excessive demands on their 
division. Overall, however, the combination of reshaping and attaining described above 
successfully advocated savings through an ‘internal fairness’ logic backed by the threat of 
regulatory intervention. 
Nevertheless, this left Dryas entering 2017/18 with a substantial CIP, a quarter of which 
remained unassociated with concrete plans. Nor were CIPs Dryas’s only savings. 
Commissioners asked some services for QIPP savings (QIPPs). QIPPs were supposed to 
represent agreed schemes; but Dryas staff argued that some were simply budget-line 
reductions. QIPPs were unevenly distributed across divisions, leaving some divisions 
particularly severe targets. 
The Projects Office 
Persuading staff savings mattered was insufficient. Managers felt Dryas lacked an effective 
savings governance mechanism. A new unit was created to fill this gap. The Projects Office was 
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based around generic programme management techniques and initially focused on monitoring 
CIPs.  
When I arrived in June 2017, the Projects Office felt transient. It had a physical location, 
though hoped to move elsewhere. Its skeleton staff were largely on temporary contracts. Its 
documentary infrastructure was ‘cobble[d]…together’. These arrangements had been rapidly 
assembled to manage urgent savings and would be repeatedly altered over the following 
months. 
The Projects Office operated a complex documentary infrastructure to track savings from 
divisional schemes to central totals. Every scheme was to have an Outline Change Plan (OCP), a 
template describing its aims, planned savings, timelines and risks (Figure 7.1).  
 
Figure 7.1 – Outline Change Plan template (anonymised) 
Using OCPs, project managers detailed each CIP in the ‘CIP Tracker’, a single spreadsheet 
describing and monitoring every CIP. The Tracker financially aggregated schemes by progress, 
risk and so forth, facilitating upwards reporting. OCPs and the Tracker formed the core of the 
Projects Office’s documentary infrastructure (Figure 7.2). Such intense, detailed monitoring 
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characterises the Programme Management Office (PMO) approach to CIP monitoring which 
national guidance suggests (Audit Commission and Monitor, 2012). 
 
Figure 7.2 – Key CIP documentation 
These documents enabled an intensive monitoring cycle. Each division reported monthly to a 
senior manager. In preparation, they were expected to liaise with Projects Office staff to 
update the CIP Tracker and facilitate reporting. Meeting the senior manager may prompt 
actions, or formal escalation. These meetings fed into a monthly Programme Board which 
generated further actions. The cycle’s intensity left only days to respond to one step before 
the next arrived. This, one Projects Office manager acknowledged, might feel ‘a bit relentless’. 
This cycle structured Project Office activities and time. A copy was agreed to be displayed on 
their office wall, and managers said the cycle told staff where they were in the month.  
Two practices were important in creating the Projects Office. The setup itself involved creating 
and continually establishing a new savings unit. This setup altered the organisational domain 
managing austerity, thus exemplifying reshaping engagements. But reshaping did not stop 
once the Office was formalised. One interviewee described how savings ideas were continually 
reshaped into this structure: 
So we effectively move all of the selected schemes into the mandate, so we 
all – we sort of say, ‘Right, you’re, you’re now – you know, your scheme was 
selected’. We build them a portfolio each, so each department gets its own 
portfolio. When the, when the Projects Office is in full, they will get their 
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portfolios; the aim being each Project Manager will have, probably, the 
Clinical Service portfolio and a Non-Clinical Service portfolio. 
The manager describes creating structures for others’ work, monitored by as-yet unavailable 
earmarked members of staff. Thus was the Office to repeatedly establish itself as a way to 
structure savings efforts across Dryas. However, particularly given the Office’s 
cobbl[ed]…together’ nature, this was a gradual process of creation and tweaking. Not only the 
Office’s formal setup but also these ongoing efforts to establish and amend it exemplified 
reshaping engagements: a practice characterising the Office. 
As the Projects Office became established, so did its CIP monitoring approach. CIPs were 
hypothetical savings at various stages of development from ideas to completion. Yet they were 
treated as if ‘real’ objects. The language describing them was highly physical. Even 
hypothetical savings ideas were ‘shapes emerging from the…gloom’. Inventing savings ideas 
was ‘identif[ying]’ them; managing them well was ‘fix and grip’: verbs generally acting upon 
material objects. Even accounts of failing savings reinforced this physicality. One interviewee 
described a major ‘gap’:  
Yeah, so one of our departments had reportedly schemes in place for 100% 
of its targets and when we opened the box {laughter}, 30% of them were 
empty. There was no substance behind them whatsoever. 
CIPs are described as ‘box[es]’, purporting to have ‘substance’. Failing CIPs are ‘empty’, 
implying that true CIPs would contain substance. Even announcements that some CIPs were 
insubstantial reinforces the substantiality of CIPs in general. When CIPs thus proved 
insubstantial, they were said to create a ‘gap’, much as removing a physical object might. 
Not only was this metaphor of CIPs-as-objects discursively prominent, it was also reinforced by 
how CIPs were monitored. Generally, plans were reported as aggregated figures calculated 
from the CIP Tracker. Only when things went wrong were individual schemes highlighted. The 
default presumption was thus that these savings objects remained intact. The layers of 
documentation between the work of making savings and the reports senior managers received 
helped concretise those schemes. Packaging myriad savings schemes into reports and CIP 
Trackers made them seem more ‘substantial’ objects.  
Combined, this organisational discourse and measurement formatted hypothetical savings as 
solid, substantial objects. It thus made these possibilities seem more immediate, fulfilling the 
definition of constructing possibility. Arguably, by structuring and aggregating savings, this 
made them more manageable, and made holding divisions to savings commitments easier. 
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However, it also obscured the specific difficulties with any given scheme. Indeed, while 
labelled Cost Improvement Plans, some CIPs started the year as ‘unidentified CIPs’ – savings 
without associated plans. Yet bundled up and aggregated with actual plans, they seemed 
deceptively concrete. If reifying savings helped persuade divisions savings could be ‘realised’, 
so too it underplayed to senior management the risk that they might not be. Simply ‘realising’ 
what seemed like already-existing objects sounded too simple. 
This effect should have been mitigated by the Projects Office’s tracking and risk-rating 
schemes. Yet this was an enormous task: the CIP Tracker described about 150 schemes. This 
created what project managers called a ‘granularity issue’: there were schemes they 
understood poorly. One manager feared ‘green zombies’: schemes rated low-risk because they 
were too inactive for the Projects Office to notice they were behind. Monitoring progress 
remained difficult. Constructing possibility was central to the Projects Office’s approach. It 
arguably helped make savings but overstated those savings’ reliability. 
The Projects Office hoped to standardise schemes through not only standardised documents 
but also common evaluative criteria. Among these was a 4:1 Return on Investment (RoI) 
threshold: for every pound a scheme cost, it should save four. This was justified on the basis 
that costs and returns were unpredictable, so CIPs with lower planned RoIs risked losses. 
But the Projects Office’s ambitions stretched beyond CIPs. Managers felt its programme 
management methodologies were applicable to other savings and non-savings initiatives. One 
argued: 
So people quite often say, ‘Well, I want, I want erm, a Control Assurance 
function for my CIP – for my cost improvement because I’m scared stiff of 
that because I’m – it’s getting harder and harder to deliver. I’ve got this stuff 
over here which is my Quality Programme which is totally different’. 
Fundamentally wrong in my opinion. It’s not; they’re exactly the same – 
quality is about cost and is not separate. 
For this interviewee, an all-encompassing Projects Office can manage all projects because 
quality and cost are ‘exactly the same’. This contention is explained by an argument Projects 
Office staff often made: if you reduce errors, this improves quality and reduces cost. More 
reliable processes are better all round. 
This argument exemplifies a common practice in Dryas: reconfiguring quality. Here, quality 
becomes ‘about cost’ because it is reconceptualised as the absence of error. It becomes about 
the reliability with which acceptable outcomes are produced, not getting better outcomes. As 
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one manager argued: ‘unless you’re actually going to do more than you’re expected to, 
somewhere quality will have a cost drop out of the system’. While quality advocates might 
suggest one should do more than the minimum, this idea seemed outré to this manager. By 
reconceptualising quality as the absence of error, this practice blurred the difference between 
quality and cost. This supported the claim that the Projects Office should manage quality 
projects too. 
Over time, the Office’s reach would indeed spread. CIPs’ organisational prominence meant 
that Projects Office-led programmes were visible and prioritised. The Projects Office saw 
including other projects and departments in their framework as doing them a favour. It made 
them organised and visible. One Projects Office manager felt that IT’s business plan 
insufficiently justified their work. They offered to work with them to impose the Office’s 4:1 
RoI threshold. This should be a ‘godsend’ to IT because it ‘gives them a reason for being’. The 
manager similarly suggested ‘going back to that RoI of 4:1’ could help ‘make [the Quality 
Programme’s work] real’. Being ‘real’ meant being judged within Projects Office structures. 
Those structures had been built for financial improvement. Projects Office managers altered 
documents to accommodate non-savings-oriented projects. To accommodate quality projects, 
what were once Outline Savings Plans were rebranded Outline Change Plans, and nonfinancial 
sections were added. Yet the RoI threshold, timescales and management style of the finance-
focused CIP structure remained.  
These structures accommodated some quality initiatives more readily than others. One 
manager described attempting to fit a quality project into the 4:1 RoI structure. They flexed 
their understanding of RoI to enable this, engaging in creative accounting involving ‘notional’ 
staff time savings. However, this seemed likely easier with process-improvement quality 
projects than those focused on patients’ experiences. Towards this Period’s conclusion, a 
Project Manager announced the Quality programme was ‘finally…coming into the fold’. Proven 
quality initiatives would be managed under ‘our’ governance, so there would be ‘eventually a 
cost improvement coming in’. Later that week, there was to be a ‘quality’ workshop focused 
on bed recovery: a prime financial concern for Dryas. Reconfiguring quality to make it 
compatible with cost reduction was important to the Project Office. 
The problems 
Notwithstanding this detailed monitoring infrastructure, Dryas faced two problems. First, a 
‘bed crisis: with insufficient beds to meet high demand, Dryas was paying for ‘overspill’ into 
private facilities. This expensive move involved transporting patients many miles. By June, 
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Dryas had ‘basically been in continual escalation’ for several weeks. Entering an emergency 
management orientation, Dryas saw frequent calls between senior managers to monitor 
overspill, and phrases like ‘gold’ and ‘silver command’ became part of its lexicon. This required 
extensive senior input and high divisional workloads. In one manager’s words, ‘you cannot 
take your foot off the pedal’. 
Simultaneously, the Projects Office had identified a major ‘gap’ in Dryas’s savings plans. Among 
other problems, schemes worth 30% of the Psychosis division’s savings had been recategorised 
as non-existent or high-risk. This dented Dryas’s outlook early in the year. Managers were 
concerned about a possible regulatory response to this ‘gap’. Accordingly, they explained how 
they would fill it, telling NHSI that non-recurrent and ‘balance sheet’ measures could cover the 
shortfall. ‘Balance sheet’ measures are accountancy devices that create more favourable 
reported financial outturns without substantively changing organisational activity.  
Internally, managers sought more substantive measures. Accordingly, they quickly revised 
divisional CIP targets. This was based more on intuitive judgement than calculation: ‘It was – 
not arbitrary but [based on what] seemed reasonable’. This change precipitated disputes 
about the new targets’ fairness. Given Dryas’s strong internal fairness ethos, such critiques 
were taken seriously, and senior managers could not always persuade divisional staff to accept 
‘unfair’ targets. Some distinguished their original CIP obligations from these additional 
requests, treating the latter as somewhat optional. This ongoing disagreement made meeting 
Dryas’s budgetary targets harder. 
To ensure savings were made, corporate staff worked increasingly closely with divisions 
deemed struggling, like Psychosis. With its schemes devalued, Psychosis was escalated to 
Programme Board where it presented several recovery plans. These included ‘reproviding’ 
services targeting specific communities. ‘Reprovision’ was a common term used to denote 
services stopping through one channel but similar ones coming through another. It was less 
toxic than ‘closure’, but often implied one service channel would close.  
Even after such changes, Psychosis remained off its CIP target. Programme Board placed it in a 
‘recovery’ process involving weekly meetings with a senior manager. This process considered 
major steps, like closing Unit 1, a step-down facility struggling to break even. In mid-




These events highlighted two organisational practices. Emergency ‘escalation’ to address the 
beds crisis and divisional financial recovery both created new structures to address challenges 
for which standard processes were ill-suited: both involved reshaping engagements. Within 
these processes, revision and patching of budgets exemplified attaining tenuous futures, 
which includes efforts to make budgetary numbers add up. 
Reframing savings 
The subsection above presents resetting divisions’ CIP targets as a relatively smooth process. 
Yet it was anything but. This became clear at a Programme Board meeting discussing this issue: 
A Projects Office manager projected onto a screen figures describing the 
suggested revised savings targets. They uneasily explained that this was a 
raw Excel sheet to engage senior managers in planning. While 
unaccompanied by Finance staff, they repeatedly emphasised the figures 
had been devised with Finance. 
Extensive questions followed. One senior manager asked the amount of 
savings they were looking for. The Projects Office manager pointed to a 
figure worth half the CIP ‘gap’. The spreadsheet was, they emphasised, a 
working document.  
Later, another manager asked how CIP targets related to overall overspend. 
If divisions met these additional CIPs, would they be on-budget? The 
Projects Office manager replied that meeting these additional requirements 
would fulfil their CIP targets. But those targets are part of their budgets, 
asked the senior manager? Insofar as this was true, replied the Projects 
Office manager, it meant they would be on budget.  
The senior manager continued that they did not recognise the figures 
provided for their division: it looked like the ‘process had gone wrong’. They 
described the best-case scenario which would not happen ‘in anyone’s 
dreams’. Another senior manager said that the comment about ‘in anyone’s 
dreams’ was important: they needed a realistic analysis, not ‘paper’ 
exercises. Another senior manager described themselves as ‘immensely 
irritated’: why were Finance absent? They were not even getting to reality 
when discussing a division whose meeting ‘you sat in on, [Projects Office 
manager]’. If they ‘can’t do that correctly’, the manager continued, they had 
‘no faith’ in the other figures. They ended the meeting early. 
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For the Projects Office, this meeting should have seen senior managers agree new standards to 
evaluate divisions’ financial performance. It went badly wrong. The figures presented failed to 
offer senior managers certainty and stability. The Projects Office manager seemed uneasy 
about the figures and how they were presented, repeatedly half-apologising for their format 
and presentation. The figures thus seemed unfinished, opening questions about their 
accuracy. 
This was itself important but also signalled two longer-term trends that precipitated 
substantial alterations in savings management. Most obviously, with the figures already 
seeming unstable, one manager successfully challenged their division’s suggested targets’ 
appropriateness. With the guarantee of accuracy thus undermined, the wider reliability of the 
figures unravelled. The whole construction became branded unrealistic, a ‘paper’ exercise. The 
Projects Office relied on being trusted to produce such figures. That ‘faith’ was damaged.  
This was an important moment in a longer-term trend. When the Projects Office identified the 
‘gap’ in June, they attracted praise for discovering that, in their words, ‘the substance isn’t 
there’ within certain schemes. However, this also highlighted that the CIP Tracker’s schemes 
were not universally substantial; it seemed a less reliable way to track and evaluate 
performance. When this meeting saw the Projects Office fail to fill the resultant financial ‘gap’, 
this unreliability seemed more problematic.  
There were underlying problems with CIPs’ accuracy. As described above, the Projects Office 
was hurriedly established. In October, Projects Office manager would observe a ‘quality issue’ 
with OCPs. In the initial ‘rush to get them out the door…get them into the CIP Tracker’, OCPs’ 
quality had suffered. Attempting to catalogue plans in this detail left questions about that 
information’s accuracy. Managers outside the Projects Office echoed this concern, worrying 
that insubstantial savings ideas were getting on the CIP Tracker and being treated as real. 
Yet even had CIP data seemed unimpeachably accurate, maintaining the idea CIPs effectively 
monitored divisional finances would have been difficult. The meeting above saw managers 
question the relationship between CIPs and overall finances. This divergence became 
increasingly pertinent. Partly because of the costly ‘bed crisis’, Acute experienced rapid 
changes in spending unlinked to CIPs. This decoupled their overall financial outcomes from 
CIPs. As CIP-focused Projects Office staff saw it, the division had ‘made [their finances] so 
complex that you can’t unpick [them]…a nightmare’. By mid-September, the Office no longer 
attempted to manage Acute based on CIPs. 
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By October, finances outside CIPs became more turbulent across divisions. CIP performance 
and overall finances drifted further apart. An early October Programme Board saw senior 
managers again query how divisions’ CIPs and overall finances related. A Projects Office 
manager repeatedly emphasised they tracked CIPs, not overall overspend. But senior 
managers concluded this was insufficient: meeting CIPs was no good if one still went off 
budget. It was decided that Programme Board – a forum designed to monitor CIPs – should 
monitor divisions’ overall financial position too.  
Constructing and contesting financial tests was central to the processes this subsection 
describes. Projects Office managers attempted to instate new CIP targets as Dryas’s core 
financial test. However, data reliability problems and underlying financial instability 
undermined CIPs’ value as predictors of financial performance. CIPs themselves became 
contested and an alternative test – the overall financial position – gained precedence. 
This affected not only the measures of financial success deployed but the fora in which this 
happened. The Programme Board which decided to start monitoring the overall financial 
position, also questioned the robustness of CIP governance. Instead, managers commissioned 
a series of exceptional ‘Senior Scrutiny’ meetings between divisions and senior management to 
find new savings: once again, reshaping engagements by altering the organisational domain in 
which evaluation occurred. 
Operating outside the CIP process, these Senior Scrutiny meetings would produce separate in-
year savings. The Projects Office’s existing CIP-focused approach was increasingly displaced as 
‘hard’ trade-offs between cost and quality seemed more likely. 
Period 2: Scrutiny (October 2017) 
Senior scrutiny 
This period’s activities concentrated on the Senior Scrutiny process requested as Period 1 
ended. To facilitate this, the Projects Office created a suite of ‘Pareto charts’. Rather than 
examining department or spending-category finances, these disaggregated divisions’ finances 
into individual budget lines, comparing their budgeted and actual spending. They were then 
ranked from greatest deficit to greatest surplus. The aim was simple: in one Projects Office 
manager’s words, ‘keep the good, resolve the bad’. Accordingly, only deficit lines were 
totalled, supposedly identifying the total divisional savings available by rectifying ‘bad’ budget 
lines. The top 80% of deficit lines (by value) were highlighted for discussion during Senior 
Scrutiny meetings.  
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Projects Office managers used these documents to highlight areas of supposed overspending 
ripe for correction. Compared to CIPs, these new devices had a broader scope – the whole 
budget; and a more detailed, forensic focus. Accordingly, they were more threatening and 
accompanied by an oppositional tone. Projects Office managers were encouraged to ‘keep 
your wits about you’ when speaking to divisions, as if anticipating trickery. Pareto charts’ aim 
was described as avoiding the ‘nice’ overspend figures divisions recognised, instead creating a 
‘horrible number’. 
They were used to suggest savings were possible and necessary: 
A group of divisional managers arrived at their Senior Scrutiny meeting. 
After characterising the financial situation, a central manager said they 
assumed that the division had agreed the figures, pointing towards Pareto 
Charts in front of each attendee. A divisional manager said that they had 
seen them yesterday. The central manager described the issues they wanted 
to address, which corresponded to budget-lines towards the top of the 
Chart. Specifically they wanted to talk about the division’s plans. A central 
colleague continued that the division should remember that, if they cannot 
recover, ‘other measures’ will be necessary. What ‘worries me’, they added, 
‘is that there have been no new plans’. They were unreceptive to claims that 
such savings were too hard: ‘if we accepted that – because everybody says 
that – we would be bankrupt’. (Fieldnotes paraphrase) 
Pareto Charts shaped these meetings. By asking divisional colleagues whether they had agreed 
them, central staff attempted to establish them as devices based on which the meeting can 
proceed. Thus agreed, they became maps of available savings: overspent budgets were treated 
as self-evident indicators of latent savings. The Charts helped to construct possibilities. 
But they did more than this. With the threat of ‘other measures’ should divisions fail to realise 
these savings, they also became ways of evaluating divisions. They helped senior managers 
judge divisions against more generalised standards. This meant objections that savings were 
contextually unfeasible held little water. In the central manager’s words: ‘if we accepted that – 
because everybody says that – we would be bankrupt’. Compared to such a generalised 
standard, such objections were not indicators of specific divisional problems but just the usual 
complaint. Standardising the format of financial information helped turn specific divisional 
objections into instances of generic protests. This helped managers in conducting and 
contesting financial tests. 
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Nevertheless, these Charts remained vulnerable because they were poorly established. For 
divisions like Psychosis, these meetings prompted serious changes. Psychosis was asked to 
restructure their management and develop a business case presenting options for Unit 1. But 
others disputed the terms of the meetings and Charts. Sometimes, they destabilised the 
Pareto Charts by highlighting that budget lines they treated as independent were deeply 
intertwined. Such divisions may be told to tidy their accounting but were better able to avoid 
further savings.  
The meetings themselves were also comparatively unestablished, enabling divisional 
representatives to reposition themselves within them. While divisional staff were there to be 
evaluated, some repositioned themselves as commentators on others’ work. They might 
describe themselves as disappointed with their division’s progress or criticise organisational 
strategy. This could be strikingly successful. Such staff were often asked to summarise at ends 
of meetings – something central managers otherwise did. These meetings’ relatively inchoate 
nature enabled staff to avoid evaluative elements by altering their role within them. 
These meetings represented relatively inchoate environments featuring novel and contested 
measures of what was financially possible and necessary. They were thus the result of the 
reshaping engagements which finished Period 1, but themselves centred on two other 
practices. Disputes over the potential savings Pareto Charts constructed epitomised the 
creation and contestation of savings objects characterising constructing possibility. Such 
potential savings were not value neutral: divisions were criticised for having too many such 
areas of waste, and often resisted such evaluations. This is characteristic of conducting and 
contesting financial tests. The construction of evaluative devices based on hypothetical 
savings wove together these two practices. 
Perhaps aware that these meetings were relatively unestablished, senior managers routinely 
began them by positioning them within a financial context. They recognised a ‘heroic’, 
‘colossal’ effort so far but noted the enormity of Dryas’s financial jeopardy. The future itself 
was in doubt: not making additional savings risked ‘leaving ourselves with a financial challenge 
that does not really look deliverable’; next year was looking ‘pretty un-doable’. This context, 
managers apparently hoped, would help persuade divisions that savings were imperative.  
In line with this ‘heroic’ narrative, Scrutiny presented as an exceptional step responding to 
mid-year financial problems. Yet it was not unprecedented. Following similar pressures, the 
middle of the previous financial year saw comparable meetings. This urgent mid-year 
rebudgeting or ‘recovery’ seemed an increasingly established practice. Such efforts were 
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underwritten by the presupposition that defined financial outcomes were imperative. As noted 
above, divisional managers at Scrutiny were told ‘if we accepted that [savings suggested by 
Pareto Charts were impossible] – because everybody says that – we would be bankrupt’. What 
was arguable had to be redefined around financial necessity. This construction of a landscape 
of financial threat demanding plans that numerically add up exemplifies attaining tenuous 
futures. 
Governing savings 
These meetings signalled two types of reshaping of financial evaluation. First, the actions they 
produced focused on immediate savings and were managed outside the standard CIP 
framework. Accordingly, the Projects Office tracked them using a new document. This ‘Action 
Tracker’ and the CIP Tracker coexisted, adding a layer to an already complex monitoring 
infrastructure. Potential confusion about this structure was emphasised when the Projects 
Office held a ninety-minute meeting to ensure its own staff understood it. 
Second, these meetings signalled and deepened a change in the tone of financial monitoring. 
In Period 1, monitoring had generally been formalistic, focused on schemes not people. The 
Senior Scrutiny meetings existed partly to get people ‘into the room’. This fitted a trend of 
increasingly interpersonal relations and scrutiny. As the Projects Office grew, it became easier 
to form relationships with scheme leads. Senior staff increasingly emphasised their desire for 
the Office to deepen its familiarity with projects. Projects Office managers responded by trying 
to improve their ‘touch’ therewith. Senior Scrutiny, and contemporary CIP monitoring became 
increasingly interpersonal. 
Strategic change 
Senior Scrutiny’s sense of financial urgency set the scene for major central changes. For the 
first time, I was aware of central managers considering treating more expenditure as capital 
not revenue (‘capitalising’). Only the latter is counted when determining whether an 
organisation meets its control total.  
This Period saw Dryas cease funding any further overspill into private beds. If commissioners 
wanted patients admitted beyond Dryas’s capacity, managers announced, they would have to 
pay for it. To their reported surprise, commissioners accepted this. This decision occurred not 
through a formal strategic review but through an individual manager dealing with atypically 
severe pressures. Having refused to fund one patient’s overspill, they were called at home in 
the early hours of the morning by a colleague conveying increasing commissioner pressure to 
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do so. Tired and frustrated, it was then that they decided ‘beyond this I will not go’: Dryas 
would no longer fund private overspill. 
Both Senior Scrutiny and this late-night decision outside formal structures deviated from 
Dryas’s standard CIP monitoring structure. Each thus reshaped austerity governance, with 
long-term financial strategy implications. 
Period 3: Bridging (November 2017 to February 2018) 
Making ends meet 
Following the majority of these Scrutiny meetings, Programme Board reviewed the position. 
Not all savings suggested during Scrutiny were yet quantified, but an apparent gap of 3% of 
operating income remained. Projects Office staff announced that they would shift focus from 
monitoring CIPs to identifying in-year savings. 
This meeting also received a presentation of longer-term financial planning. This used a 
‘bridge’ chart, a bar graph visualising changes in a value based on multiple influences (e.g. 
Figure 6.1, p.96). Here, it visualised the influences on Dryas’s 2018/19 financial outlook. Called 
‘the bridge’, it showed how Dryas planned to cross the ‘gap’ between predicted and desired 
financial outturns. Attaining tenuous futures describes such efforts to enumerate and span 
this gap. 
CIPs were present on this ‘bridge’, but alongside other major influences. The ‘bridge’ showed a 
‘reorganisation’ which would restructure Dryas around geographic divisions, not clinical 
specialties. This meeting decided that this ‘reorganisation’ should make savings between 1% 
and 2% of annual income. This was a ‘large number’ one manager warned. It was necessary, 
another replied. As characteristic of attaining here, judgements about feasibility bent to 
financial necessity (see p.122). 
This reorganisation could become a broad banner under which other changes occurred, 
managers agreed. One suggested that services ‘not washing their own face, in that they’re 
losing us money’ would need to improve or ‘just stop’ in the new structure. The reorganisation 
became a major part of the bridge, and a container for other reforms. 
CIPs had become less central to Dryas’s monitoring of financial change. Not only were other 
initiatives growing in importance: the atomistic monitoring of 150 schemes had fallen from 
favour. Staff from Finance and the Projects Office – now under new management – indicated 
they should instead emphasise a small number of strategic objectives: ‘the fewer things we 
focus on the better’. At a later Projects Office meeting, one manager reflected that Dryas had 
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seen ‘CIP’ as a ‘magic bullet’ to its financial problems. Instead, they would need partnerships 
and other major changes. They ‘need[ed] to rewrite the terms of reference [for related 
meetings] – and rewrite is probably a polite term’. These shifts in the structures managing 
austerity represented a growing reshaping engagements. 
The focus on next year’s big picture seemed to alter how this year’s schemes were appraised. 
Whereas one senior manager previously encouraged the Projects Office to aggressively 
scrutinise whether plans were ‘real’, by mid-October they were encouraging them to class 
schemes as ‘green’ unless there was a good reason not to: an absence of evidence meant 
there was ‘nothing to suggest it won’t happen’. As the ‘bridge’ revealed a difficult picture of 
next year’s finances even assuming this year’s CIPs were made, willingness to believe this 
year’s CIPs were on track increased.  
Nevertheless, December’s Bridge Chart still made grim reading: a deficit of 1-2% of annual 
income, even assuming 5% savings. This was an awkward message. A senior manager 
requested an ‘upside bridge’ – a more optimistic projection – for communications. Feasibility 
judgements were apparently shaped partly by a desire for a budget meeting regulatory 
requirements.  
These optimistic efforts were influential examples of attaining tenuous futures, a prominent 
practice in this period. They created significant misgivings among some senior staff. Aware of 
recent regulatory action against a prominent hospital failing its declared targets, managers 
were keen not to promise anything they could not guarantee. The tension between the 
resultant conservatism and the simultaneous wish to report an ‘upside’ intensified. 
Two approaches therefore attempted to reduce the gap. First, Dryas used accountancy 
mechanisms to reduce their reported deficit. They began stockpiling potential savings which 
could be realised next year. Dryas had been carrying a disputed debt to NHS Property Services 
which they no longer feared would be called in. But managers delayed writing off this debt: 
Finance managers announced that they were ‘stacking up the items we can 
release either this year or next year’ to give the organisation a ‘technical 
basis’ to ‘take money across year end’. The ‘line outside this room’, one 
warned, is that they were not writing off the debt in case payment was 
demanded. There’s ‘what we decide, and when we choose to tell the world 
we’ve decided’, observed another. (Fieldnotes paraphrase) 
Under austerity’s strains, financial data increasingly became a presentational tool designed to 
fulfil numerical targets. Such accountancy devices epitomised attaining. 
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Second, senior managers’ attitudes towards divisions hardened. For next year, they would 
require ‘really good justification’ for any service developments or ‘cost pressures’ (likely 
increases in running costs). The tone about the future of Psychosis’s Unit 1 also changed. 
Whereas a meeting in early December had seen Projects Office staff enthuse about plans 
‘coming together’, soon even Psychosis staff seemed resigned to its closure. 
Quality and staff 
By this stage, cost-reduction measures seemed to carry consequences for quality. Refusing to 
fund private overspill initially reduced associated costs and patient disruption. Yet consequent 
problems with patients waiting for admission were highlighted during a quality meeting and 
again when Acute and central staff met in December. Pressures previously causing overspill 
seemed to be threatening access. 
As such potential impacts emerged, quality started to be discussed differently. Describing 
Period 1, I noted quality and cost being treated as optimistically compatible. By now, quality 
discussions increasingly sought just to maintain it at acceptable levels. As Chapter 6 
exemplifies (p.100), managers found it necessary to ‘redefine quality’ around feasibility. This 
precipitated a new way of reconfiguring quality, centred more around satisficing quality than 
synergies with cost reduction. This practice grew prominent during this period. 
Reconfiguring quality was not confined to those ambivalent about quality. Quality advocates 
often articulated their concerns in the language of harm avoidance (‘safety’) rather than 
quality maximisation, to better press those concerns. Arguably prudent given financial scarcity, 
this reinforced the trend of ‘satisficing’ quality described above. 
With Dryas emphasising harm avoidance, Quality Impact Assessments (QIAs) became 
increasingly prominent. These were nationally mandated processes in which senior clinicians 
‘signed off’ each scheme and its mitigation of any quality risks (National Quality Board, 2012). 
Organisations were permitted to screen schemes for risk levels and only formally assess some, 
but were expected to articulate how such selections were made (NHS Improvement, 2016b). 
Schemes should not go ahead before necessary QIAs.  
It was therefore problematic when new Projects Office managers discovered evidence this had 
occurred. Dryas had early on had difficulties scheduling adequate QIAs for its many schemes, 
and associated processes became unclear. This had apparently led to schemes proceeding 
unassessed. In an autumn QIA, a Projects Office manager said they would ‘ask the unaskable’ 
of a senior colleague: what should they do if a scheme is ‘on the point of going live’ but lacks a 
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QIA? If this happened, the colleague warned, they would say ‘nobody asked me’, raising their 
hands in a gesture of innocence. That day, a Projects Office manager emailed colleagues 
indicating that catching up on QIAs was imperative. Soon after, a Projects Office meeting 
emphasised that schemes should not proceed without QIAs: 
Should schemes be getting out of the development ‘pipeline’ without a QIA, 
asked a manager? Others replied that they had done in the past. ‘Well, let’s 
forget the past and talk about good governance’ the manager replied. 
That these announcements came rapidly and forcefully suggested an urgent problem to 
correct. This corroborated earlier observations, in which Projects Office staff discussed 
stopping projects lacking QIAs as if it was not currently their approach. The rush to get 
schemes up-and-running apparently compromised QIA processes. 
Staff emphasised that no QIA did not mean no quality assessment. Divisional staff would not 
be suggesting schemes that unreasonably imperilled quality, they argued. QIAs were not the 
primary quality assessment mechanism but ‘for when people start pushing the boat a bit 
hard…a safety net’. Routine substantive decisions about quality were a divisional affair. 
This represented a further way of reconfiguring quality. Central staff increasingly cast quality 
considerations as someone else’s job: questions managed by QIAs or ground-level teams. I 
routinely asked managers how they balanced financial and other (e.g. quality) concerns. One 
Projects Office manager replied ‘Well I suppose at one level this team’s been asked to do the 
assurance around the savings plans and what we’re doing. And there are other forums where 
quality and also other things are going on so at some level I don’t.’ Quality was increasingly 
reframed as someone else’s concern. 
However, those working in functions expected to safeguard quality were acutely aware of 
financial pressure. The financial scrutiny divisions faced inflected internal discussions. One 
manager described mimicking their superiors’ style of (financial) governance with divisional 
subordinates. They had senior managers’ concerns ‘playing as a script whilst I’ve got my 
colleagues in the room’ and posed the questions they expected seniors would ask. Even a 
more senior manager tasked with monitoring quality described themselves as always ‘carrying 
that context’ of financial scarcity when identifying quality imperatives. Fora designated as 




This pressure became overwhelming for staff. One interviewee described experiencing 
‘paralysis’ because of the continual focus on finances, undermining their ability to attend to 
other matters. Others equally expressed concern that the intensity of work required to 
maintain standards was ‘going to burn out the staff that are there…they’re just not going to 
have the same motivation and drive to be able to provide a good service’.  
Staff’s reluctant financial focus combined with the intensity of work required was seemingly 
becoming unsustainable. While this gradual delegation of normative puzzles and pressures was 
less formal and deliberate than creating a savings unit, it too exemplified reshaping 
engagements. Like structural change, it altered the organisational locus of austerity 
management. This reshaping increasingly placed the pressure of maintaining services and 
making value-laden decisions on junior- and middle-ranking staff. 
The priority placed on savings and corresponding staff efforts had got Dryas closer to its 
control total; but not close enough. By late January, they remained 1-2% of annual income off 
their target. The last Programme Board I observed seemed to indicate two significant 
decisions: closing Unit 1 and submitting a deficit draft plan to NHSI. 
Coda: The tactical decision (March 2018) 
I attended one final meeting to conclude my observation of Dryas’s financial year. While 
Programme Board’s preference for submitting a deficit draft plan to NHSI was in part a ‘tactical 
position’, the broader financial signals were gloomy. I went to observe a senior financial 
committee expecting them to reluctantly decide to submit a deficit plan to NHSI for 2018/19. 
This was not what I observed. Before the meeting, one group of senior managers had prepared 
financial analysis and arguments, which they presented to another group. Initially, some 
among this latter group advocated submitting a deficit plan: they did not expect to break even 
and felt they should be honest. Yet during the meeting, these managers were persuaded 
otherwise. Their colleagues presented the decision about the plan to submit as a prudential, 
strategic one, not one about forecasting likely financial outcomes. It was a question of whether 
they ‘[say we] will hit our control total and the risks associated with that’, or that they 
wouldn’t, ‘and the consequences of that in terms of possible intervention by NHS 
Improvement’. Trusts saying they would hit their control total could receive STF bonuses if 
they achieved targets. Others could not, whatever their eventual financial performance. 
By the meeting’s conclusion, it seemed agreed that – with misgivings – the decision was 
‘essentially tactical’. It was better to declare a compliant plan and be eligible for STF than 
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declare a non-compliant, but more plausible, plan. This decision was later ratified, and Dryas’s 
submitted a compliant 2018/19 plan. 
These decisions were in part presaged by an interview in late 2017: 
I: Will you deliver your control total? 
P: I think we will do everything to, if we don’t it will be a strategic decision. 
I: A strategic decision? 
P: Yeah, you have to be very mindful in today’s NHS about why you do 
things so, because this level of scrutiny and intervention from the centre 
happens very quickly if you are not seen to be managing your 
resources…you know because are you always seen as someone who delivers 
so therefore it’s OK to take from you or are you seen as someone who 
almost delivers to keep the pressure off or are you seen as someone who’s 
failing because you just can’t be bothered to deliver. 
This interviewee describes a concern with avoiding regulatory attention, whether because one 
seemed failing or comfortable. Meeting one’s control total – or not – becomes not so much a 
choice about one’s predictions or aspirations; as about tactically positioning oneself. Attaining 
tenuous futures involves stretching one’s predictions to match the budgetary totals required.  
Interpreting the case 
Dryas underwent significant changes. Savings plans were revised mid-year. Not only did targets 
change, but an ‘across-the-board’ approach became ‘targeted’ based on what divisions could 
bear, with aspirations for the following year to be focused on fewer, ‘strategic’ priorities. An 
initial focus on atomistically monitored CIPs quickly became problematic, no longer the ‘magic 
bullet’ it once seemed. Yet what seemed like an organisation heading for a deficit plan quickly 
became one declaring it would meet its control total. This section attempts to explain these 
developments by reference to the practices identified above. 
Attaining tenuous futures: forming turbulent financial cycles 
The change in emphasis at Dryas was striking. I first encountered Dryas early in 2016/17, facing 
a large ‘gap’ in recently ratified plans. This precipitated recovery processes for challenged 
divisions, rebudgeting and a Senior Scrutiny process that created new savings plans mid-year. 
This pattern of budgeting and rebudgeting was not unique to this year but seemed to be a 
repeating cycle. 
Initially, such hurried change was puzzling. Why would an overtly well-managed organisation 
end up in repeated recovery processes, and having to rebudget during the financial year? 
-130- 
 
While I understood various specific difficulties, the repeated pattern remained hard to explain. 
March brought an answer. When the 2017/18 budget was considered, the outturn submitted 
to NHSI appeared substantially determined by Dryas’s control total. Compliance was a ‘tactical 
decision’ aiming for STF eligibility as much as one about likely outcomes. This external target 
meant Dryas ended up attempting to fulfil arguably implausible plans. 
This explained earlier parts of the 2017/18 budgeting process. Managers stretched what 
savings were possible to create a viable ‘bridge’. Projections became increasingly optimistic. 
Divisional reports that required savings were unviable were unacceptable, while managers 
replied to observations that plans were ambitious by noting that they had to be. Necessity 
shaped judgements about feasibility. 
While I did not observe budgeting for 2016/17, it was similarly subject to STF pressures. Dryas 
began 2016/17 with a budget containing significant ‘unidentified CIPs’. These are savings 
aspirations without plans – IOUs from the savings programme to the budgetary bottom line. 
While ‘unidentified CIPs’ are common in NHS budgets, their extent was consistent with the 
same ‘stretching’ to meet STF demands that I observed in preparation for 2017/18. 
These budgeting approaches enabled managers to submit compliant plans and be eligible for 
STF money. But they also set the scene for problems. As the financial year progressed, plans 
proved difficult to implement. Dryas found key divisions in recovery; and engaged in mid-year 
rebudgeting. While rebudgeting replicated some optimistic assumptions of initial budgeting 
processes, the general pattern was of increasing monitoring and scepticism. Managers nervous 
of further overoptimistic plans and hoping to sniff out further savings increased scrutiny of 
both savings plans and divisional spending. Managers increasingly deployed discourses of crisis 
and epic struggle to cast the financial situation as desperate, hoping to spur colleagues into 
greater savings. Sometimes, they cast the next year itself as potentially ‘undoable’: as staff 
struggled to make the future itself attainable, mid-year saw attaining adopt an increasingly 
pessimistic tone in the sight of ever-receding plans. 
Attaining at Dryas was a process of optimistic budgeting, mid-year recovery and rebudgeting, 
and year-end scrambles to reach targets. Figure 7.3 is a stylised visualisation of the resulting 
annual process. Inevitably, such diagrams are reductive. Yet Figure 7.3 encapsulates the 
apparent cyclicality of the processes driving Dryas’s austerity management. This pattern left 
Dryas’s evaluations of the savings it discussed unstable and made it harder for staff to trust the 
ongoing process: budgets were unreliable when rebudgeting was possible. And changes in how 
savings were appraised made those appraisals hard to credit. 
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Figure 7.3 – Key events in Dryas 
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Constructing possibility: creating hypothetical CIPs 
I observe above that the Projects Office adeptly constructed CIPs as concretised objects. Seen 
thus, they were apt to fill ‘gaps’ in Dryas’s ‘bridge’. Yet the financial cycle described above 
made the Projects Office’s life difficult. It was formed under financial urgency, causing the 
‘granularity problem’, misleading data and ‘green zombies’ described above. Consequently, 
while they effectively constructed possibility through CIPs, many of these CIPs turned out to 
be rather less material than their constructions.  
This was exacerbated in the case of ‘unidentified CIPs’, which became placeholders within the 
CIP Tracker and 2017/18 bridge. While some assumptions made about the CIPs possible 
seemed reasonable, treating CIPs as already-existing objects overstated the likelihood of their 
realisation. While the CIP management system was repeatedly reviewed, and its risk ratings 
refined, reports to senior management did not risk adjust the overall ‘value’ of promised 
savings. They knew that many CIPs were ‘red’ but did not therefore receive a prediction of the 
savings likely to materialise. 
Constructing and contesting financial tests: shifting measures 
CIPs were both statements of possibility and standards against which to evaluate divisions’ 
financial performance. Yet the problems described above made them increasingly subject to 
criticism from managers and the divisions those CIPs were supposed to hold to account. 
Alongside accuracy problems, it became clear that CIPs insufficiently described Dryas’s 
financial fortunes. 
CIPs were never designed to measure organisations’ overall financial state. Most income and 
expenditure fall outside a trust’s CIP. Measuring CIPs focuses on planned expenditure changes, 
excluding other financial ‘noise’. This is sensible where other expenditure remains stable. In 
Dryas, it rapidly became clear that other spending was anything but stable. This made CIPs 
harder to measure, easier to dispute, and less useful to managers interested in Dryas’s overall 
financial outlook. 
The immediate response was to complement CIPs with new documents associated with Senior 
Scrutiny. However, just as tweaking CIPs had made them more complex, so this did not provide 
the desired stability. Instead, this relatively new system of documents, and this new meeting 
structure were if anything easier for divisions to resist. Unestablished, they had not yet gained 
the credibility of repeated use. However, CIPs failure did precipitate longer-term change: 
rather than the ‘magic bullet’ of atomistic CIP management, staff felt, they needed fewer, 
more strategic priorities. 
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Reconfiguring quality: commitment and ‘thinning’ 
The financial cycles described above placed great pressure on Dryas. One way to address this 
pressure would be to deliberately reduce quality or access to services. Dryas was not willing to 
do so: there appeared a genuine, forceful commitment to quality. While managers sometimes 
euphemistically discussed moves like ‘reprovision’, the fact such euphemisms were necessary 
reaffirmed managers’ profound discomfort about quality or access reducing. However, this 
discomfort did not avert the financial imperatives managers experienced. Another way had to 
be found. 
The eventual approach was exemplified by the senior manager quoted on p.100: managers 
had to ‘redefine quality’ around what was possible. Early on, ‘quality’ started to be framed as 
optimistically compatible with cost reduction through processes with fewer errors. This 
identified changes that might improve quality and cost at once. But it also presented an 
increasingly ‘thin’ version of quality: one based around reducing process error. 
Accordingly, quality began to be discussed largely in terms of ‘safety’. Managers focused on 
avoiding quality actively worsening or cast it as the task of specific organisational functions, 
like QIAs or divisional management. With these domains taking care of quality, some 
reasoned, focus on cost elsewhere was legitimate. Yet divisional and QIA staff themselves 
experienced great pressure towards financial concerns. While some apparently imagined a 
neat division of concerns between domains considering cost and those considering quality, it 
seemed those supposedly addressing quality felt extensive cost pressure. Financial pressures 
seemed to produce a progressively ‘thinner’ account of quality, and one increasingly restricted 
to certain organisational domains. 
Reshaping engagements 
How Dryas measured and evaluated its financial progress had major implications. Reluctance 
to overtly trade quality off against cost sometimes effectively delegated such moral decisions 
to divisional staff. Combined with resource pressure, this left divisional staff experiencing long 
hours and difficult decisions that caused ‘paralysis’ and threatened burnout. It seemed to 
particularly affect middle managers who reported buffering junior staff from such pressures. 
These changes also affected Dryas’s strategic core. CIPs had functioned as a mechanism of 
filling gaps in its overall financial plans. Upon realising that CIPs were no longer fulfilling this 
function, managers took remedial action. They reallocated savings among divisions, switching 
from an ‘across-the-board’ to a more ‘targeted’ strategy. Yet this change was difficult. The first 
budget had been advocated based on equal division of burdens. Staff therefore wondered why 
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they now had to make what seemed like other people’s CIPs, making it hard to make budgets 
stick. 
With atomistic CIP management decreasingly credible, the Projects Office and strategic centre 
set a course for next year which gave more emphasis to major strategic savings and less to 
CIPs. Projects Office management agreed they needed fewer, strategic priorities, and 
bemoaned the time spent monitoring 150 schemes. Next year’s ‘bridge’ allocated substantial 
savings to major strategic changes, and less to CIPs. Following the failure of managerialist 
savings run through atomistic CIP monitoring, it seemed that the approach for 2018/19 would 
be more strategic. 
Conclusion and theoretical reflections 
This interpretation highlights practices derived from the situated, pragmatic and discursive 
approach which distinguishes this study from others. They suggest theoretical questions and 
tentative conclusions about i) types of savings, ii) the programmes managing them, iii) 
evaluation and iv) the austere situation. This section briefly explores these in anticipation of 
Chapter 10’s more thorough treatment. 
Across-the-board to strategic savings 
Dryas partly confirms the literature’s expectation that organisations move from ‘across-the-
board’ to more ‘targeted’, particularly ‘strategic’, savings (Hood and Wright, 1981; Kelly, 1989; 
Levine, 1979, 1985; Pollitt, 2010). The ‘best developed’ version of this sequence is Beck 
Jørgensen’s which foresees a gradual progression from ‘across-the-board’ via ‘managerial’ to 
‘strategic’ savings (Dunsire and Hood, 1989, pp.170–178). This pattern was observable both 
between and within years, with an initial ‘across-the-board’ approach with managerialist 
elements becoming more targeted and strategic. However, the literature expects this 
movement to arise as organisations realise long-term savings requirements and find that 
across-the-board, then managerial savings no longer suffice. 
There are elements of this in Dryas, but its shifts are better explained through another 
mechanism. Initially, Dryas attempted to coordinate its financial affairs through CIPs. They 
were the devices by which staff constructed the possibility of savings and then conducted 
financial tests to evaluate performance. In Thévenot’s (2001b) terms, they were the 
‘measurement objects’ staff used to understand, test and thus coordinate their world. Yet they 
rapidly proved unable to capture the realities Dryas faced: they overstated savings’ 
concreteness and under-accounted for wider financial fluctuations. These objects thus came to 
seem less suited to the situation at hand. Consequently, a different, more ‘strategic’ way of 
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capturing the situation became preferred. This shift arose not because staff realised short-
term savings were no longer rewarding but because CIPs no longer seemed useful objects by 
which to understand the situation. 
This explanation also accounts for this case’s lower level dynamics. Alongside CIPs themselves 
being discredited, there were gradual tweaks in financial management approaches based on 
smaller destabilisations of the measurement objects used. CIPs’ risk ratings, initial targets and 
so forth were all altered as measurement objects failed to capture austerity’s turbulent 
realities. There thus seems to be a layered structure in which short-term destabilisations of the 
objects designed to measure organisational finances progressively precipitate longer-term 
destabilisation and wider changes in approach. Because objects acquire their credibility by the 
investments associated with established use (Thévenot, 1984), these frequent changes set the 
scene for CIPs themselves to become destabilised. 
Managing savings 
As Chapter 2 argued, austerity management literature says little about the ground-level 
activities savings involve (Williams, 2015). Dryas exemplified one structure characteristic of 
contemporary ‘managerialist’ responses to austerity: the PMO-led CIP (Audit Commission and 
Monitor, 2012). Such units are created where senior management wishes to oversee not only 
divisional savings totals but individual schemes’ details. Consequently, they are primarily 
monitoring bodies. This case suggests difficulties in managing their organisational boundaries. 
This case suggests such units might have an outward momentum under austerity, spreading 
their jurisdiction beyond the savings programmes they initially oversee. Programme 
management is styled as generically applicable to changes; indeed, Dryas’s Projects Office 
described its value in terms of its ability to bring together plural schemes to avoid adverse 
interactions. This industrial logic suggests they will fulfil their role better the wider their scope. 
Particularly when austerity gives such organs such prominence and visibility, they expand their 
influence beyond their original focus. This risks spreading their financially-focused 
measurement and evaluative apparatus further than organisations intend.  
Justice and familiarity 
This case highlights the role of normative evaluations under austerity. Yet the austerity 
management literature focuses heavily on the practicalities of financial planning. Aside from a 
few writers on the fringes of austerity management who themselves adopt normative 
approaches (e.g. Fuller, 2017), austerity management is presented as a problem of planning. 
Where disputes arise, they are disagreements between interest-bearing actors (e.g. Glassberg, 
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1978), not moral or interpersonal-emotional disputes (see p.35). Yet Thévenot (2007) 
highlights dimensions of organisational life outside the regime of planning, including both the 
broad questions of priorities discussed above (justification) and more intimate interactions 
(familiarity). 
Through this lens, Dryas illuminates dynamics conventional austerity management literature 
omits. Justificatory work is important to making savings possible in organisations with strong 
normative commitments. Reconfiguring quality demonstrates the careful work managing the 
compromise between cost and nonfinancial values. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) note that 
such compromises are inevitably vague to avoid conflicts between contradictory values 
surfacing. In Dryas, this ambiguity was used to redefine the terms of the cost-quality bargain.  
Alongside justification and planning, familiar work was vital here. When formal governance 
mechanisms failed, senior staff emphasised familiarity, corporeality and personal trust as ways 
to understand their worlds. Simultaneously, where formal mechanisms failed, dilemmas were 
increasingly delegated to ground-level staff (Hyde and Exworthy, 2016, p.262). This presented 
them with justificatory dilemmas but also required familiar emotional work to regain the ease 
such dilemmas take away (see p.45). Understanding justification and familiarity alongside 
planning seems vital to austerity management. 
The turbulent situation 
Amidst all this, Dryas was a case of mid-year reallocation of budgets. Such ‘rebudgeting’ is 
rarely observed in the austerity management literature, which tends to underplay austere 
situations’ instability (see p.30). However, Caiden and Wildavsky’s (1980) analysis of budgeting 
in poorer countries identifies a similar phenomenon, which they say is more likely under 
uncertainty. For them, where budgets are continually stretched, it becomes likely that budgets 
are continually temporary, only there until the next revision. This precipitates chaotic 
budgeting and rebudgeting. 
Dryas partly recalls this account. It did face significant uncertainty, which contributed to in-
year rebudgeting, through both divisional ‘recovery’ and mid-year target reallocations. But 
Dryas’s rebudgeting was not a chaotic, shock event, but relatively predictable: part of a routine 
annual cycle. Further explanations for such events are necessary. 
The annual process traced from p.129 can be explained by considering budgeting as a 
prolonged engagement with the world (Thévenot, 2001b). Each year, organisations and their 
senior tier face demands for ‘compliant’ budgets. This is a financial test they can ill afford to 
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fail: a viable-sounding planning document must be created. Consequently, organisations 
discursively construct the ‘unidentified CIPs’ and similar devices needed for a viable plan. Yet 
as Thévenot (2001b) observes, engagements face resistance. Over the year, the focus shifts 
from creating a budgetary plan to fulfilling the plan created. When people try to ‘realise’ 
always optimistic savings, they find this is exceptionally difficult: in Thévenot’s terms, the 
world offers considerable resistance. Eventually, the budgetary plan no longer adequately 
grasps the world, necessitating rebudgeting. 
Concluding comments 
Dryas demonstrates the turbulence of austere financial cycles, the instability of the objects 
measuring financial savings and the pliability of moral terms. We should expect this pliability 
particularly in organisations with strong ethical commitments because this can make directly 
describing quality reductions taboo. It highlights the dominant, defining role STF obligations 
play and the pressure under which this eventually places ground-level staff. This suggests 
important theoretical developments for those researching austerity management. We should 
attend more to how austerity programmes are measured, the structure of those programmes 
themselves, and organisational austerity’s national context. 
All this occurred in a mental health trust facing moderately severe financial pressure. One 
might reasonably wonder whether similar effects are observed within the acute care 
mainstream; and in better funded organisations. Accordingly, we now turn to examine Thyme: 




Chapter 8: Thyme: case narrative 
Introducing Thyme 
Thyme is a large, acute Foundation Trust in a major city. Across two hospitals and community 
settings, it serves a diverse urban population of above average deprivation. Its 10,000-20,000 
staff also provide specialist national and international services while maintaining a large, busy 
Accident and Emergency Department. A major teaching hospital, Thyme engages in extensive 
research. Recently, it has been involved in many strategic partnerships and initiatives, 
including continually developing its estate to meet rising demand. 
Overall quality assessments at Thyme have been favourable. As of the year fieldwork began, its 
most recent CQC rating was ‘good’. Its Standardised Hospital Mortality Indicator (risk-adjusted 
death rate) was strong. However, it routinely missed access targets. Even in an organisation 
enjoying a strong reputation and good regulatory relationships, signs of strain were growing. 
Nevertheless, Thyme’s financial pressures were milder than most. It had generally posted year-
end surpluses and held sizable reserves. Notwithstanding all NHS organisations’ constrained 
funding, there seemed little reason to doubt Thyme’s solvency. 
Research began midway through 2017/18, coinciding with particularly turbulent national 
policy. Lord Carter (2016) had recently published his review of hospital efficiency, which 
suggested £5bn savings were possible (see p.325). Carter argued that there were costly 
problems in hospitals’ structures and management, localising these problems to individual 
organisations through benchmarking. Regulators and government seized on this latter 
element, requiring organisations to address ‘overspending’ areas. Organisations faced 
pressure to demonstrate they were ‘responding’ to Carter and particularly to reduce short-run 
costs. 
It was in this environment that Thyme found itself responding to financial pressures. By early 
2017, Thyme had adopted two savings approaches. One was based around its annual financial 
planning cycle. Senior management would articulate their expectations of divisional savings. 
Divisions devised annual plans based thereon alongside applications for special purpose funds. 
These they submitted to Thyme’s operational centre for approval. This process emphasised 
central control of savings totals but delegation of how to meet those obligations. 
In 2013, Thyme had launched a more direct central approach to managing short- and long-
term pressures. ‘Transforming Thyme’ was a complex change programme combining in-year 
savings with longer-term transformation programmes. Some were major transformations; but 
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most sprang from Transforming Thyme flexibly facilitating local changes to develop a culture of 
improvement. It began in opposition to traditional savings programmes: in one senior 
manager’s words, to avoid ‘some kind of big overarching Programme Management 
infrastructure’. Transforming Thyme spoke a different language to conventional PMO-driven 
CIPs, and to Thyme’s operational business planning process. 
Processual analysis identified three periods. The first (September 2017-January 2018) saw 
attempts to make savings in 2017/18 while determining 2018/19’s financial strategy. This 
slightly overlapped with the second (November 2017-February 2018), which involved repeated 
efforts to cascade central targets to divisions. As financial strains intensified, the third (to May 
2018) saw savings drives jeopardise existing commitments. Transforming Thyme struggled to 
assert its role within an organisation increasingly preoccupied with short-term savings. The 
following sections report each period. 
Period 1: Financial recovery, financial strategy (September 2017 to January 2018) 
This period involved two intertwined developments, described separately for clarity: urgent 
efforts to meet 2017/18 targets and developing 2018/19 financial ambitions.  
Making ends meet 
By 2017, even financially secure organisations like Thyme faced genuine financial problems. 
This was not a sudden shock, but the consequence of progressively diminishing resources. 
NHSI required Thyme commit to an ambitious 2017/18 budget. While Thyme could have 
refused, this would have rendered them ineligible for STF income (p.327). Accepting this 
‘control total’ left Thyme needing to save around 6% of 2016/17 turnover. Like Dryas, Thyme 
sought these partly through ‘unidentified CIPs’.  
Making these putative savings real proved challenging. STF rewards are paid quarterly to 
organisations meeting their plans. Halfway through the year, Thyme was 7% down on its 
targets. They thus missed STF payments, near-doubling the financial impact of the savings they 
had missed.  
Thyme responded with a ‘financial recovery’ process. An ‘Operational Finance Forum’ was 
created, initially tasked with focusing on three poorly-performing divisions. Operational 
Finance complemented high-level Senior Review meetings scrutinising divisional plans. 
Notwithstanding the Forum’s initial styling as an exceptional process to address a severe 
problem, this recovery process did not seem to surprise people. As one senior manager said: 
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‘we’re always in recovery by quarter 3, quarter 4’. They were in recovery ‘because everybody 
is. The whole of the NHS is always in recovery. It’s a fact of life’. 
While expected, this recovery phase involved a step-change in financial stringency and close 
scrutiny of supposedly failing areas. Three divisions placed in ‘special measures’ saw frequent 
visits from Operational Finance representatives. According to the manager quoted above, 
being in ‘recovery’ means ‘do[ing] the stuff that you should have done in the first year – the 
first part of the year…stopping recruiting, you know, putting all the controls back in that you 
took off at the beginning of the year’. Recovery entailed a sharp change in financial stringency. 
This sequence of optimistic budgeting to make plans add up, struggles to realise those plans, 
then urgent ‘recovery’ to patch resultant gaps epitomises attaining tenuous futures. At 
Thyme, attaining was formalised, well-defined, and apparently routine. 
Yet ‘recovery’ did not resolve Thyme’s financial problems. When reviewing the process, 
managers claimed only that it had prevented further deterioration in selected areas. 
Approaching December’s Quarter 3 STF payment date, Thyme was still missing financial 
targets. Given they had already missed STF money, missing more would be damaging. During 
November, managers released financial reserves to the divisions, improving Thyme’s reported 
financial position. But the impact was smaller than anticipated. By mid-December, a senior 
manager said STF targets remained ‘touch-and-go’. A later report describes the 
‘transformation reserve’ being released in December and STF funding being received. Strategic 
distribution of reserves helped present a sufficiently favourable position to receive STF 
payments. Helping to patch gap-ridden budgets, these bailouts exemplified attaining. 
Such late-in-the-day bailouts were not new to staff. Rather, there was a sense that missing 
targets would result in senior finance staff solving the problem: as one interviewee said, 
‘everybody always says, “Oh, don’t worry too much. [Senior finance manager]’ll pull something 
out of the hat”’. This commonly articulated claim both diminished the budget’s day-to-day 
evaluative relevance, and challenged central rhetoric about the financial situation’s severity. It 
thus interwove attaining with constructing and contesting financial tests in an account of 
budgetary processes as ‘smoke and mirrors’. ‘In the main’, one manager insisted, ‘those 
[requested savings] are real asks’. Nevertheless, compensation for operational 
underperformance with central bailouts made persuading staff that such financial ‘asks’ were 
‘real’ and unavoidable difficult. 
Transforming Thyme was designed to help divisions fulfil these ‘asks’. Yet rather than simply 
finding short-term cost savings, it aimed to transform the organisation, crafting a ground-up 
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‘culture where everyone is doing improvement’. Thyme would become a better version of 
itself, saving money along the way: Transforming Thyme attempted to construct possibilities 
beyond short-term savings. 
In practice, Transforming Thyme’s short-term savings efforts focused on schemes into which 
divisions could opt. Any savings these schemes delivered counted against divisional targets, 
incentivising divisional participation. Ideally, Transforming Thyme would enable divisions to 
make sufficient savings to hit STF goals without compensatory ‘balance sheet’ measures. 
However, Transforming Thyme faced the same difficulties as Thyme’s wider savings. Its 
2017/18 ‘operational productivity initiatives…performed extremely badly’. Deficits there were 
compensated by projects achieving cheaper input prices and altering how clinical activity was 
reported (‘coding’) to increase remuneration. One senior Transforming Thyme figure worried 
the latter was ‘distracting people from actually doing efficiency change’. The desire to make 
financial numbers add up – the pressure to attain tenuous futures – perhaps limited how far 
real operational change was pursued. 
Financial strategy 
This was also the time organisations characteristically plan for the next financial year. Planning 
therefore occurred in an environment of ‘recovery’ and uncertainty in which concrete 
operational savings were increasingly difficult. 
Senior staff announced Thyme’s overall financial aims at a large November planning meeting. 
There, they forecast the savings needed to break even. These forecasts formed a ‘big ask’. A 
management interviewee later explained such targets’ derivation: 
The Finance Team, stick into their, you know, machine, the activity 
estimates, that are sent down, if you like, from national bodies for the year. 
So the kind of rules for business planning are set out by NHS England and 
NHS Improvement. Finance takes those, combine them with kind of local 
factors; what the Commissioners are saying and all the rest of it and, and 
then pass that down to [divisions] as a kind of…“The gap, unfortunately, is 
[amount] and we think this where it’s going to be allocated out”. 
Target-setting is here a calculative process based on a ‘machine’ and ‘rules’. ‘The gap’ is taken 
as an arithmetic fact but embodies the assumption Thyme must break even. This ‘gap’ is 
inevitably ‘allocated out’: this year, most areas would be asked to save the same substantial 
percentage of current expenditure. This was necessitated by existential threats to Thyme: at 
the meeting, one manager argued that they kept getting ‘beaten up by the regulator’ and must 
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break even to continue to ‘control our own destiny’. Balance sheet measures would not work 
this time: ‘the magic has run out’. 
Before describing specific financial targets, the meeting highlighted systemic threats: ‘if we 
thought we were in uncertain times last [year], it is even more uncertain now…more unstable’, 
warned a senior manager. The slide behind them showed several images: a Minister’s 
concerned expression during the recent Conservative Party Conference; a still from the film 
Mission Impossible. Failure was cast as a real threat with grand implications: in another 
manager’s words, ‘if we sink, the NHS is sunk’. 
These framing efforts drew extensively on attaining tenuous futures in vividly depicting an 
organisation nearing severe problems. Yet here they found mixed success. While few staff 
argued Thyme need not save, several took solace in its comparative financial security. ‘We’re 
less sunk than the average trust’, they observed; ‘we are very privileged to be in a hospital that 
doesn’t have a sort of out-of-control deficit’. Thyme’s turbulent surroundings could be 
mobilised to suggest a sense of emergency, but also offered favourable financial comparisons. 
Demonstrating the high savings requested were necessary proved challenging. 
Reaching this challenging bottom line was hard enough. Yet the bottom-line was not Thyme’s 
only financial requirement. The Carter Review was important across hospitals, but particularly 
occupied Thyme managers’ minds, having cast Thyme as among the NHS’s more expensive 
hospitals. Such was the regulatory interest in Carter at Thyme, one manager noted, that they 
could meet regulators about it ‘weekly…if we didn’t avoid – evade them’. 
Senior managers experienced significant pressure to demonstrate that they were responding 
to Carter. Sometimes, this meant seeking Carter’s predicted savings, notwithstanding 
objections to its methodology. At the annual planning meeting described above, the ‘Carter 
model, imperfect as it is’ was highlighted as a method of finding savings. In May 2017, a senior 
committee paper broke down the Carter ‘savings opportunity’ by department and suggested 
focused savings efforts on overspending ‘pathways’. This identified areas for future work and 
allocated to divisions responsibility for correcting supposed inefficiencies. Carter’s approach of 
benchmarking spending in given categories was replicated internally to help Thyme 
operationalise its suggested savings. 
Other times, Thyme rejected Carter’s conclusions. Yet it could not do so out-of-hand. One 
senior manager complained that reluctant divisional staff did ‘not understand [Carter] is what 
we’re benchmarked against externally’. Consequently, if disputing its accuracy, they must be 
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‘able to evidence it’. In practice, this meant conducting similar analyses to Carter to 
demonstrate supposed savings were unavailable. Whether accepting or rejecting Carter’s 
conclusions, it became difficult not to engage with its efficiency-oriented analytic lens.  
Carter and its organisational use drew on constructing possibility and conducting and 
contesting financial tests. By highlighting areas of ‘inefficiencies’, the report and associated 
data constructed them as areas of hypothetical future savings. The relative prevalence of such 
‘inefficiencies’ then became a financial test of organisations – one in which Thyme fared 
poorly. Thyme’s response involved the same engagements. It sometimes questioned supposed 
possibilities; but at others used a Carter-like method to localise those possibilities to 
departments. Thyme variously aimed to meet, evade and localise to divisions Carter’s financial 
tests. Constructing possibility and conducting and contesting captured the engagements 
associated with Carter. 
Transforming Thyme became the umbrella under which Carter savings were pursued. 
Transforming Thyme staff wrote the paper on Thyme’s Carter opportunities and led the 
response. Its informatics capacity extended Carter’s analytic approach. This is superficially 
surprising. Transforming Thyme prided itself on being a developmental programme, with a 
longer-term perspective and an appetite for bottom-up initiatives whose benefits extended 
beyond the financial. It defined against shorter term cash-grabs and overarching PMOs that 
excessively monitor constituent projects. Yet Carter adopted a top-down, financial lens, while 
associated savings had to be ‘evidence[d]’ to regulators. Addressing Carter would require a 
more top-down emphasis and greater reporting requirements. 
Transforming Thyme’s apparent willingness to adopt Carter responsibilities makes more sense 
given the challenges it faced. The programme had emphasised longer-term transformation and 
taken a hands-off approach to monitoring. With short-term savings pressures mounting, 
Transforming Thyme staff knew that quick, measurable savings gave them license to continue 
their more developmental work. If ‘initiatives [like Transforming Thyme] are not – driving out 
the kinds of financial benefits that the organisation might expect to see, then it’s very easy to 
cut back on them when finances become pressured’. Transforming Thyme was increasingly 
facing an organisation whose financial tests stressed short-term savings. A programme with 
transformational ambitions faced imperatives to demonstrate its short-term financial 
credentials. 
Adopting Carter tied Transforming Thyme to one of Thyme’s strategic priorities and promised 
quick savings. With its existing guise vulnerable, linking to Carter attempted to rearticulate the 
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programme as central to Thyme’s priorities. This reformulation of the programme changed 
how savings were addressed: Transforming Thyme reshaped engagements to remain relevant. 
However, by late 2017, this link appeared increasingly problematic. Observations of 
programme-level meetings highlighted repeated tensions about what Transforming Thyme 
should be: how should it position itself on the spectra between top-down and bottom-up; 
financial gain and broader transformation; standardised monitoring and local flexibility. Trying 
to adopt Carter, whose objectives contrasted with much of Transforming Thyme, cannot have 
helped. It came alongside wider short-term financial pressures which encouraged 
Transforming Thyme to emphasise in-year savings. Justifying its organisational position 
increasingly required it to focus away from its transformational aims of longer-term 
sustainability. 
Thyme was required to create financial plans which not only seemed sensible and met its 
control total but also cohered with other obligations like Carter. Managing all these 
responsibilities in a rapidly changing environment was extremely challenging. That this all 
occurred during the 2017/18 turnaround process only made it harder. 
Period 2: Making financial plans real (November 2017-February 2018) 
‘First cut’ 
If it was challenging to construct financial plans in Thyme’s upper echelons, converting them 
into specific, realisable divisional plans was harder still. Divisions were expected to submit 
‘business plans’ meeting these obligations. They were invited to simultaneously report likely 
‘cost pressures’ (likely increases in running costs) and submit ‘short business cases’ for desired 
initiatives. The Forum monitoring financial recovery also ran this process. 
Annual planning was an established routine, if an uncomfortable one. One interviewee called it 
‘a set piece drama every year’. Initial divisional plans would receive feedback, and further 
versions be requested. This process had historically run too close to the wire for senior 
managers’ liking. Accordingly, this year’s process was starting earlier, and was intended to 
involve only two versions of the plan. As described under ‘Period 1’, attaining was central to 
this process. 
Transforming Thyme was intended to help divisions find savings to include in their plans. While 
they took multiple approaches, regulatory pressure to use Carter data remained high. 
Consequently, managers sought improvement objectives through that lens, identifying 
available ‘efficiencies’. One Transforming Thyme interviewee described their approach: 
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We wanted them to use the Carter report, so that we can respond to our 
regulators and say, “Well, at least we’ve looked at it and these are the things 
we will do. These are the things we won’t, but we’ve got a good reason for 
that.” 
This illustrates efforts to ‘find’ or refute Carter’s claimed ‘efficiencies’: both of which 
contributed to constructing possibility by creating or challenging images of what was possible. 
However, staff did not believe in Carter’s approach. Consequently, Transforming Thyme staff 
faced a bind: external pressures required them to ‘speak’ Carter’s language but doing so made 
engaging with staff harder. Consequently, these efforts were unproductive: ‘we’ve spent 
masses of time on this and not got very far’, continued the manager quoted above. 
Transforming Thyme continued multiple programmes offering divisions savings ideas but still 
found divisional commitment elusive. The programme eventually planned savings worth 
around 1% of trust income: a respectable amount for a transformation-oriented programme, 
and an increase on 2017/18. Yet some areas expressed discontent about the lack of 
opportunities they received. Instead, large proportions of identified savings focused on coding 
and procurement changes: combined, these two projects (of thirteen) represented 40-50% of 
the programme’s proposed savings. They were genuine savings to Thyme but less intimately 
involved with divisions’ daily work, confirming that true operational improvements remained 
difficult. 
Re-enforcing tests 
Initial plan submissions fell beneath central requirements. While some felt some savings 
deficits were likely in a ‘first cut’, managers were disconcerted that divisions predicted 
considerably more cost pressures than central budgets assumed. 
Central managers responded in two ways; both prompted resistance. First, they grew reluctant 
to accept divisional funding appeals unconnected to financial returns. Staff foreseeing ‘cost 
pressures’ had been asked to categorise them based on the risk not funding them posed; and 
whether they were avoidable. In January, Operational Finance decided that no medium or 
lower risk, discretionary or avoidable ‘cost pressures’ should be funded. 
With senior staff making such ‘batch’ decisions about categories of spending, divisional 
managers thought carefully about how they categorised their requests. One divisional meeting 
feared a ‘business case’ for nursing staff might be refused and discussed how to better frame 
the request. Later that day, a divisional manager announced ‘the…nurse is now a growth 
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scheme…don’t ask how!’. As central managers used divisions’ categorisations of spending 
requests to refuse tranches of spending, divisions had reason to use these categories tactically. 
Second, central managers asked divisions to look again for savings, requesting a ‘stocktake’ of 
where divisions were even before the second version of the business plan. This ‘stocktake’ 
became known as ‘version 1.5’. It improved the position somewhat, but insufficiently. A 
further version, dubbed variously ‘1.5.1’ or ‘1.75’ was requested before version 2. The idea 
was to supplant the previous version with one offering a more favourable financial answer. 
Divisions had anticipated this cycle of repeated savings requirements and its concomitant 
pressures. Knowing further savings requests would come, committing too much too soon 
seemed unwise. Holding back savings ideas left latitude when asked to ‘look again’ for more. 
As requested versions of the plan proliferated, this became more pertinent; and each version 
seemed less likely to be definitive. The difference between the intended and actual number of 
versions apparently seemed risible. The strained use of version numbers 1.5, 1.5.1 and 1.75 to 
ensure the final version remained ‘version 2’ became an organisational punchline. Managers 
expected further versions after version 2. 
These repeated requests constituted tests of financial compliance. Yet as versions proliferated, 
each version seemed transient. Through such interactions, the planning process drew 
extensively on conducting and contesting financial tests. 
‘Looking again’ 
Notwithstanding divisional managers’ foreknowledge that they would be repeatedly asked to 
‘look again’, doing so was laborious. As one manager in a pressured division observed, it was 
‘unacceptable’ to report that one’s initial assessment had been exhaustive: 
So, we’ve just done – we’ve been through what are supposed to be two 
rounds of business planning, they’ve actually been four rounds so far and 
there will continue to be some, and the answer is because there’s still a 
financial gap – we’re not forecasting to hit the profit number we need to 
next year. So, the response organisationally is, ‘Have another go, find more 
savings’, so that then gets apportioned out to the different teams, including 
mine, and they come back and they say, ‘Find more savings’. And the – the 
kind of unacceptable response managerially is, ‘There are no more savings’. 
You just can’t say that, you have to say, ‘We will look again’.  




But you get into this, you know, there’s only so many times you can look, 
right? Nothing magic bumps up. We got to the stage in our service…where 
we expect – we’re building our financial models and our budgets based on 
teams being able to run a perfect game every single day of the year. 
With requests for new savings each year, and repeated requests within a given year, staff had 
to find new ideas or else draw on ideas previously deemed undesirable. In one divisional 
manager’s words, they would ‘have a look again this year’, consulting ‘the desperation list of 
things that will suddenly turn good, because another year’s passed’. Repeated savings requests 
necessitated a changing account of what was ‘good’: put differently, it led staff to reconfigure 
quality, an increasingly important engagement in this period. 
These difficult trade-offs increasingly became divisional managers’ task. One Operational 
Finance member described balancing financial with nonfinancial priorities as done ‘very much 
by the teams when they’re considering how they structure their financial plans’. Operational 
Finance increasingly segregated itself from nonfinancial concerns. When one member went to 
discuss a division’s annual plan, they were candid: while annual plans capture divisions’ broad 
annual intentions, ‘we’re really here to talk about money, if we’re totally honest’. This does 
not mean group members did not care about nonfinancial priorities; they were simply not the 
Forum’s focus. When plans desirable on nonfinancial grounds were brought, members 
suggested ways to justify them by finding financial benefits.  
The effect of focusing on finances was not so much to prioritise money over quality, but to 
delegate this balancing act to divisions. Because this shifted the organisational domain in 
which austerity management occurred, it exemplified reshaping engagements. This form 
thereof became increasingly prominent in this period: ethical uncertainties not resolved 
centrally were delegated to divisional managers’ ad hoc efforts. 
‘Like they were genuine’ 
With bailouts historically commonplace, savings increasingly elusive and annual plan versions 
proliferating, financial targets and plans seemed decreasingly fixed. It thus became harder for 
central staff in regular direct contact with divisions to maintain that meeting assigned savings 
targets was essential. At one meeting, one such central manager was left urging the division to 
do their best, anticipating they would ‘end up with an in-year discussion’. People decreasingly 
believed that assigned savings expectations were necessary or permanent. 
Central staff thus deployed national discourses to vindicate the situation’s urgency. They 
invoked the language of there being ‘no money’ left. I observed Senior Review meetings held 
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with each division to pursue further savings. These generally began with one central manager’s 
‘speech’ about the financial situation’s severity, which quoted Thyme being the country’s 
‘[rank] most expensive’ hospital. This figure had become current within Thyme: ‘it’s a figure 
I’ve quoted without asking for the source’, a senior manager explained, ‘but I think it’s the 
model hospital [a dataset associated with Carter]’. These efforts drew on external perspectives 
of Thyme to represent a situation of severe financial distress. 
Central managers invoked Thyme’s relative financial privilege to argue spending should 
reduce. Routine comparisons were made with more impoverished trusts, the apparent logic 
being that if they could get by on less, then so could Thyme. When extra spending was 
suggested to improve one department’s waiting times, a central manager responded that 
‘compared to most organisations we already do well’; whereas financial data cast Thyme as 
expensive. When divisions disputed these data’s reliability, one manager replied that ‘if you go 
to other trusts who are in poverty or under the cosh with NHSI or NHSE, the data you’ve got is 
the data you’re judged against’. Divisions disputing data became itself representative of 
Thyme’s undue financial privilege. 
The most influential single example invoked was the resignation of a well-respected Chair of 
one of the country’s most prominent Foundation Trusts and that Trust’s subsequent 
placement into Special Measures. Asked about what influenced them, one manager responded 
that ‘when – on the Today Programme the other day, the Chair of [Trust] said he was resigning 
and, and so on. That certainly had an influence’. That Trust’s position was actively mobilised in 
meetings. A central manager told divisional staff that the ‘point is if we did find ourselves in 
the [Trust] situation, and the [NHSI] turnaround team came in, how easy would they find it to 
[make efficiency savings]? We want to be the ones [doing it]’. ‘Yeah, I get that’, came the reply. 
By contextualising Thyme alongside more impoverished organisations, central managers 
constructed a pressing financial threat. 
These efforts had mixed results. As one central manager noted, ‘it was really hard to try and 
get those messages across and…for them to land and people to feel like they were genuine, 
because that’s just what Thyme always does is they pull through because that’s Thyme’. 
Divisional staff did describe feeling their own financial distress was a ‘microcosm’ of 
organisational and sectoral problems. Yet others took solace in Thyme’s financial strength 
relative to other trusts; or felt dwarfed by impending sectoral crisis: staff ‘just get on with it 
[and] hope that…someone will save [the NHS] from destruction’. Situating Thyme within wider 
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fiscal crisis, such discursive work exemplified attaining tenuous futures – an increasingly 
prominent engagement during this period. 
This period saw balancing the financial plan receive extensive focus. Repeated requests to 
divisions sought ever-improving financial positions. Deliberate attempts to frame the external 
financial situation as severe attempted to increase the urgency with which such goals were 
pursued. Nevertheless, with savings elusive and business planning unpredictable, Thyme had 
not reached financial stability. February saw managers warn Thyme may submit a deficit plan. 
Period 3: Destabilising (February-March 2018) 
In this context, Thyme further prioritised financial balance. While designed to create financial 
stability, these measures destabilised existing programmes and quality guarantees. 
Transforming Thyme 
This context was difficult for Transforming Thyme. The increasingly short-term financial tests 
dominating Thyme challenged the programme. It had responded by evidencing its financial 
benefits and aligning with strategic priorities like Carter. In Period 1, this had introduced 
strains over the programme’s identity. By now, these tensions were jeopardising Transforming 
Thyme’s relationship with its constituent projects. One programme participant I interviewed 
said: 
I think somewhere along the way we’ve completely lost what Transforming 
Thyme as a programme, is it a programme, is it a support mechanism, is it a 
spread and scale mechanism, is it a sharing best practice, what is the 
programme meant to be doing. And I think somewhere along the way it’s 
probably become a bit of a beast we feed paperwork through, not entirely 
sure where the paperwork is going or who’s seeing it and to what end. 
For such participants, Transforming Thyme seemed decreasingly cohesive and coherent. 
Simultaneously, with pressure growing to demonstrate financial benefits, reporting pressure 
on constituent projects grew. Notwithstanding individual projects’ achievements, some 
doubted that Transforming Thyme was the best mechanism to coordinate them.  
Criticism became increasingly public and direct. By March, a senior operational manager 
overtly criticised Transforming Thyme during a project meeting. Discussing potential future 
savings governance, someone asked whether the operational manager envisaged 
Transforming Thyme’s continued existence. ‘Not if I have a say in it’, they replied. They 
foresaw a ‘bust-up’ with Transforming Thyme managers. 
-150- 
 
The threat Transforming Thyme faced had become clear days earlier at a programme-level 
meeting attended by senior financial managers. 
Attendees discussed next year’s funding for various projects. Transforming 
Thyme managers asked repeatedly about their likely financial allocations, 
finance managers replying by describing Thyme’s financial difficulties. One 
Transforming Thyme manager referred to a table of the programme’s 
financial requests. Some were in green, they noted, indicating they were 
‘signed off’. A finance manager interjected: ‘Bear in mind…the context of 
sign-off’, implying that the changed context jeopardised already signed-off 
budgets. Transforming Thyme managers understood this implication. ‘I think 
you appreciate’, said one, ‘that [we are discussing] whether we have a 
transformation programme at all next year’.  
This meeting saw Transforming Thyme’s financial insecurity escalate. Even ‘signed off’ 
expenditure can no longer be relied upon, because such sign-offs are now ‘context’-
dependent. Given the increasingly unstable context, this precedent was threatening. Attaining 
tenuous futures is important here, because finance managers use the ‘context’ to justify 
reclaiming signed-off expenditure to make ends meet. Undercutting such previously agreed 
spending made Transforming Thyme’s situation feel more uncertain. Its questionable project 
and operational support became even more dangerous. 
Transforming Thyme’s leadership responded by proposing a new structure for next year’s 
programme. Slides described ‘establishing a new partnership between ops [operations], [the 
Transforming Thyme team], nursing and finance’. Headline changes involved increased 
operational leadership of programme initiatives. ‘[Senior ops managers] and [junior ops 
managers], working with the Transforming Thyme team, will lead the development of 
improvement practices’. While this did not wholly transfer Transforming Thyme’s work to 
operational staff, it ceded significant control. 
This was accompanied by changes in management style. Whereas Transforming Thyme began 
in opposition to programmes which imposed ‘big overarching Programme Management 
infrastructure[s]’, it now included ‘bring[ing] together all of our transformation efforts, under 
one plan with one…programme management function, one set of objectives and all the rest of 
it’. It had moved towards a conventional PMO-led programme. Such developments entailed 
significant reshaping engagements. Austerity’s short-term savings pressures left Transforming 




Quality and staff 
Transforming Thyme’s changes were not the only reshaping this period saw. Divisional staff 
faced increasing savings pressure, making providing the quality they were used to harder. 
Junior staff sometimes buffered the potential consequences of senior resource allocation. 
Participants reported themselves and others working exceptionally hard to maintain 
standards. Staffing was reduced in some areas, increasing workloads. I heard reports of teams 
working until 8 p.m. to cover shortages.  
Such efforts took a toll, apparently making long-term improvement harder. One manager 
noted that ‘people’s ability to keep on engaging in change’ was diminishing because initiatives 
increasingly required ‘goodwill’ labour: extra hours to address austerity’s pressure. This shifted 
austerity management labour towards rank-and-file staff: a form of reshaping engagements 
on which Thyme appeared increasingly to rely. 
Despite such ‘goodwill’ efforts, Thyme’s quality guarantees were becoming less stable. 
Historically, Thyme had prided itself on its quality. Managers continued to view quality as a key 
selling point; nor did I identify major deteriorations during fieldwork. Yet these long-held 
priorities appeared to become less secure. One interviewee suggested trade-offs between 
quality and cost were approaching: 
And we probably, nationally, set our safety bar much higher than everyone 
else, and therefore load in additional costs, and we’ve been able to do that 
historically. We’re now being asked [series of descending hand gestures, as 
if to mime this ‘bar’ descending] – so we go out or I go out and have really 
difficult conversations about this. 
Such downward pressure on quality, albeit from a high start, exemplifies reconfiguring quality. 
While such pressure was neither extreme nor uniform, there were broader signs that quality 
guarantees were increasingly negotiable. Whereas fora like Operational Finance had initially 
treated quality concerns as divisional issues, this period saw a related meeting directly discuss 
possible quality trade-offs. A divisional manager noted that the savings found were ‘getting 
smaller and smaller and smaller’. ‘Being radical [as requested] means lowering our safety bar’, 
they warned. A senior manager acknowledged that it indeed meant ‘having a greater risk 
appetite’. 
As they acknowledged possible quality-cost trade-offs, senior managers defended the 
possibility more overtly. One favoured method involved comparing Thyme with other 
organisations. At one meeting, a senior manager floated having fewer clinical staff involved in 
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certain procedures ‘like many other hospitals have to’. If they get by, the logic seemed to be, 
why couldn’t we? This use of other hospitals to suggest savings were possible exemplified 
constructing possibility and became important at Thyme. Once again, the comparison 
between Thyme and its surroundings became central to assessing what was possible and 
desirable. 
Notwithstanding such putative savings, financial pressures worsened. While tightening targets 
could prompt increased financial stringency as the financial year’s end approached, the 
opposite effect was also evident. I observed several recovery-focused divisional meetings with 
an Operational Finance presence. A senior manager introduced one such meeting to me: it was 
meant to be a recovery-focused meeting, but now emphasised next year’s planning, because 
‘there’s no chance of financial recovery’. This prompted laughter: as targets became further 
away, they seemed decreasingly relevant, reinforcing Thyme’s problems. 
This culminated in March with managers announcing a plan they had submitted to NHSI. Slides 
noted that they remained off their 2017/18 target by 2-3% of income. However, they told NHSI 
they would meet their target through balance sheet measures worth around 1% of income and 
as-yet unidentified cost savings of 1-2%. This was, one senior manager observed, ‘a very, erm 
[brief laugh] ambitious – amount of work’.  
Even as 2016/17 plans’ optimism made their fulfilment risibly unlikely, Thyme formed equally 
optimistic 2017/18 plans. Both represented attaining tenuous futures, as numerically 
adequate plans proved difficult to realise. So optimistic were 2017/18 plans that some 
managers felt they exceeded what was plausible through normal means. 
Accordingly, they had written to divisions to ask them ‘what unpalatable actions’ could yield 
further savings. In calling such actions ‘unpalatable’, the manager drew on a term current in 
national NHS discourse. When NHS Providers feared ‘unpalatable’ choices, these included 
‘rationing…relaxing performance targets; shutting services…or more explicitly controlling the 
size of the NHS workforce’ (Hopson, 2016). When the King’s Fund (2017b) used it in late 2017, 
they were alluding to risks of rationing or increasing waiting lists. These resonances were not 
lost on those present when Thyme managers suggested ‘unpalatable’ measures. One picked 
up on the term, noting an absent colleague would strongly object to it. However, they 
continued, ‘one person’s unpalatable idea is another person’s way of meeting their financial 
target’. Invoking ‘unpalatable’ options seemed a reluctant description of potential quality-cost 
trade-offs, and thus of reconfiguring quality. 
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This period saw the financial year end; plans need finalising; and financial pressures mount. 
This reformulated existing savings structures (reshaping engagements), shifted the quality 
risks Thyme accepted (reconfiguring quality) and precipitated an ‘ambitious’ financial plan 
(attaining tenuous futures). 
Interpreting the case 
As fieldwork began, Thyme had an apparently stable process for addressing savings 
requirements. Annual planning cycles enabled a structured approach to annual divisional 
savings, while a large central programme supported both in-year and transformational efforts. 
Yet Transforming Thyme underwent substantial change; the planning cycle, while resilient, 
displayed instabilities; quality came under increasing pressure, with ‘unpalatable’ savings 
requested. This section explains these developments. 
Attaining tenuous futures: ‘smoke and mirrors’ 
Thyme’ operated a delegated savings model: divisions pursued proportional savings, the 
centre taking little routine interest in how those savings were made. Consequently, they relied 
on divisions seeing these targets as meaningful and material. Thyme’s habit of ‘bailing out’ 
divisions made this harder. This was strongly incentivised by national STF rewards for setting 
and meeting ambitious targets. These were not always targets senior managers felt to be 
comfortably feasible. 
Senior managers adopted various approaches to avoid the sense that divisional targets need 
not be met. These included deliberate shows of putting balance sheet money in at the 
beginning of the year and vigorously enforcing targets. They set Thyme in a wider national 
context, variously emphasising the financial and regulatory climate, Thyme’s supposed 
expensiveness or the potential sectoral consequences of its failure. These techniques 
sometimes appeared to succeed. Other times, people read such national context differently, 
seeing Thyme as comparatively financially stable. This ambiguous relation between Thyme and 
its context, alongside the belief further bailouts were likely, prevented divisions quite believing 
senior managers’ urgency. 
It was therefore unsurprising that recovery appeared routine at Thyme. So entrenched was it 
that a senior review of the year’s financial management sought to refine it, as if its continual 
necessity was inevitable. One division was encouraged to create their plan in the expectation 
of a ‘mid-year conversation’. 
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The financial year therefore adopted a staccato character. Budgeting entailed optimistic 
assumptions to reach control totals. Divisions would miss prescribed budgets – perhaps 
expecting bailouts, perhaps because their plans had stretched to reach ‘ambitious’ goals. This 
would result in a rapid turn towards stringency and fiscal pessimism: ‘putting all the controls 
back in that you took off at the beginning of the year’. Financial planning would begin in this 
atmosphere of trepidation and frustration. Yet, by the final plan, considerably more optimistic 
assumptions would be included to make ends meet.  
This precipitated the ‘jerky’ movement Figure 8.1’s stylised illustration shows. This movement 
perpetuated uncertainty. Guarantees were unreliable and plans routinely revised. 
Transforming Thyme staff complained that divisions facing mid-year problems routinely 
swapped the programme’s more developmental savings schemes for quick, reliable cost 
reductions. During this staccato cycle, planning was difficult.  
Conducting and contesting financial tests: version control 
As attaining focuses on budgeting processes and conducting and contesting on evaluations, 
overlaps between them were frequent across cases; but particularly at Thyme. Business 
planning involved frequent evaluations of divisions, which saw senior managers allocate scarce 
resources, like money and physical capacity. Given these stakes, one might be surprised that 
divisional managers initially submitted plans so far off central demands. 
However, this would misunderstand the role of the plan’s multiple versions. Managers 
expected repeated versions. Notwithstanding the pledge that this year would feature only 
two, the use of many versions seemed so entrenched that divisions anticipated more 
iterations, particularly as versions 1.5 and 1.51 were requested. They therefore also expected 
to be asked repeatedly to ‘look again’ for savings. Those initially submitting a compliant plan 
may have left little scope to do so and risk the impression their division housed savings 
aplenty. Thus initial plans were far from the required total, necessitating the anticipated 
further versions. The expectation of multiple versions became self-fulfilling, and managers 
ceased to view earlier versions as the pertinent evaluation of their division. 
Business planning was simultaneous with and conducted by the same group as, recovery. 
Elements of recovery like its tone of frustrated stringency thus also inflected business 
planning. These emphases contrasted with divisions’ ingoing tone and foci. As Operational 
Finance became increasingly frustrated that divisional plans missed financial targets, divisional 
staff increasingly disbelieved that any given plan would be treated as final. This attitudinal 














A similar tension increasingly inflected Transforming Thyme’s organisational role. Whereas 
Thyme increasingly emphasised short-term financial gains, Transforming Thyme’s outlook was 
of long-term transformation. Historically, it had justified itself by highlighting short-term gains, 
but demands for these were growing. And the programme’s hands-off approach was ill-suited 
to robustly demonstrating them. As financial savings were further prioritised, these evaluative 
tensions jeopardised the programme. Yet its efforts to better meet these new demands, like 
increasingly seeking and measuring short-term savings, sometimes caused greater internal 
tensions about such steps’ propriety. 
Constructing possibility: seeing things differently 
These problems were rooted in a divergence between Transforming Thyme and others over 
Thyme’s future. Programmes like Transforming Thyme constructed aspirational images of a 
‘transformed’ future. Others’ more modest financial ambitions were based around realising 
efficiencies. While one could pursue both goals, they represented contrasting images of 
Thyme’s potential future, and competed for the same resources. 
This precipitated tensions. Sometimes these manifested as differences between Transforming 
Thyme and Thyme’s operational core. These tensions could be articulated through doubts 
about the other’s aspirations, as when an operational manager jokingly characterised 
Transforming Thyme’s likely contribution to a meeting as ‘talk’. Other times, tensions arose 
during Transforming Thyme’s internal discussions, where managers differed about how much 
to accommodate these rising pressures. 
Reshaping engagements: reshaping transformation 
Transforming Thyme had changed to fit to the world in which it found itself. While some 
changes were the moderate modifications to reporting and priorities highlighted under 
conducting and contesting, others reshaped the programme’s identity. Steps like embracing 
Carter and increasing internal reporting were controversial. They perhaps mitigated criticism 
about Transforming Thyme’s bottom line. But they were hard to sell to those who had started 
off in a forward-looking sustainability initiative emphasising ground-up cultural change and 
transformation. The programme found it difficult to articulate quite what it was. 
Transforming Thyme was particularly vulnerable to such tensions because it was ‘optional’. 
Divisions did not have to participate, but were only encouraged by CIPs for their bottom lines. 
Divisions need not worry if Transforming Thyme projects failed, so long as they found 
alternative savings. Transforming Thyme complained divisions would sometimes cancel 
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initiatives mid-year having found easier savings. Without support, it was harder for 
Transforming Thyme to achieve operational savings. 
While many of its initiatives were seen as valuable, Transforming Thyme’s strategically 
oriented programme infrastructure struggled to survive in its current form. As direct criticism 
rose, programme leaders suggested the restructure that introduced more operational 
leadership and a PMO. Some Transforming Thyme staff welcomed this as a long-desired 
greater integration with operational management. However, it was undoubtedly a reform that 
ceded control, and introduced under pressure more managerialist savings approaches. 
Whether a smart strategic shift, the result of the predicted ‘bust-up’ with operational 
management or both, this major change came as austerity surfaced tensions about Thyme’s 
future. 
Reconfiguring quality: layers of judgement 
The intersection of the practices described above brought Thyme to a financial position where 
a compliant plan for the following year represented an exceptional stretch. Yet it was 
nevertheless remarkable to see an organisation which so prided itself on quality seek 
‘unpalatable’ savings. This section attempts to explain that decision. 
Financial scarcity inevitably made it difficult for even a comparatively well-off organisation like 
Thyme to combine STF targets with high quality. Its deteriorating access targets had made 
clear that quality consequences might be difficult to avoid. This pressure seemed to affect how 
quality was discussed. Increasingly, staff set less optimistic goals for quality. Particularly when 
savings were discussed, staff talked of reaching acceptable, not maximal, standards. 
Sometimes, this acceptable standard was based on Thyme’s current standards. As pressure 
intensified managers also looked further afield, noting organisations with, say, fewer staff per 
patient. If their quality standard was acceptable, ran the argument, was it not acceptable here 
too? Managers advocating a raised ‘risk appetite’ drew on the wider context NHS to justify it. 
There was a movement from maximising to satisficing quality.  
Potential quality problems also prompted avoidance of some value-laden quality decisions. 
This was partly structurally entrenched: Operational Finance acted increasingly as a group 
designed to discuss finance, not quality, which they saw as a divisional matter. Yet they set the 
budgetary parameters shaping financial and quality outcomes. Other times, this withdrawal 
from value-laden dilemmas was achieved discursively, like the euphemistic call for 
‘unpalatable’ savings. Notably, this phrase came from national discourse, letting managers use 
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it partly in quotation marks. Some increasingly retreated from value-laden decisions about 
quality. 
In turn, this sometimes precipitated oblique or ambiguous discussion of savings’ quality 
implications, leaving more junior staff to resolve these ambiguities. This does not mean quality 
was neglected, nor that staff disregarded it. Rather, it explains how an organisation that was 
invested in quality came to call for ‘unpalatable’ solutions. 
Conclusion and theoretical reflections 
Thyme’s case is partly explained by existing austerity management theory. The subsections 
below examine areas where it is not. They cover i) types of savings, ii) the process of austerity 
management; iii) repeated budgeting, and iv) external factors affecting organisations. Points 
already made in Chapter 6 are not rehearsed here; Chapter 10 covers explicitly comparative 
points. 
Hybrid savings and overdetermination 
Traditional austerity management theory sharply distinguishes across-the-board from 
‘targeted’ savings (Levine, 1985; Raudla et al., 2015). Yet Thyme demonstrated more complex 
formations. Most obviously, it combined Transforming Thyme’s specific ‘targeted’ savings with 
divisions’ ‘across-the-board’ responsibilities. It is unsurprising to find such ‘hybrid’ 
combinations of savings; organisations’ strategies seem more nuanced than traditional 
dichotomies accommodate. 
Yet it is how Thyme combined these approaches which is striking. Rather than segmenting its 
savings aspirations, allotting a proportion to divisions and the rest to central programmes, it 
made Transforming Thyme one device by which divisions could fulfil their responsibilities. 
Individual savings could therefore be counted as both a Transforming Thyme saving and a 
divisional one. The dichotomy between ‘across-the-board’ and ‘targeted’ is unsatisfactory. 
Such savings were overdetermined, both centrally targeted and allocated across-the-board. 
Nor was this overdetermination incidental. Structured around these overdetermined savings, 
Transforming Thyme was merely one option among many for divisions seeking savings. Rather 
than divisional participation in central plans being mandatory, Transforming Thyme found 
itself competing with more direct, less aspirational savings. It was thus difficult to keep 
divisions committed to its savings. This partly explains its operational initiatives’ 
underperformance, and thus the programme’s problems. Savings programmes structured 
around overdetermined savings may struggle to maintain their organisational position.  
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Strategic to managerialist savings 
The traditional austerity management literature subdivides ‘targeted’ savings into ‘strategic’ 
and ‘managerialist’ efforts (e.g. Dunsire and Hood, 1989). The former orient to the future and 
involve major changes; the latter are shorter-term and emphasise efficiency improvements. 
While clear boundaries between ‘across-the-board’, ‘managerialist’ and ‘strategic’ savings are 
elusive, Transforming Thyme’s long-term transformational ambitions represented the 
‘strategic’ end of Thyme’s approach. 
In long, drawn-out periods of austerity, theorists expect such elements to become 
progressively more prominent as organisations realise the deeper changes required to 
overcome the crisis (Hood and Wright, 1981; Kelly, 1989; Levine, 1979, 1985; Pollitt, 2010). 
Beck Jørgensen specifically anticipates a movement from across-the-board, to managerialist, 
to strategic efforts (Dunsire and Hood, 1989, pp.170–178). It was therefore surprising 
Transforming Thyme fared poorly. It was striking to see it increasingly emphasise short-term 
financial savings and latterly adopt the PMO structure and operational control characterising 
managerialist approaches like Dryas’s. Meanwhile, Thyme’s ‘across-the-board’ component 
survived without apparent question despite routine delivery difficulties. 
With such developments puzzling existing theory, Thévenot’s concept of measurement objects 
again proves useful. Transforming Thyme had been built on a long-term connectionist 
‘transformation’ ambition and saw the world primarily in terms of such long-term aims 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). Yet Thyme’s time-horizon was contracting. Short-term 
financial plans became increasingly dominant. These evaluations were difficult for 
Transforming Thyme’s aspirational programme. It thus increasingly measured short-term 
financial benefits to fulfil such tests. Yet this fuelled disquiet inside what was styled as a light-
touch transformational programme. Facing ongoing strategic pressure and internal opposition, 
it eventually moved towards the managerialist, PMO-style programmes it once defined 
against. 
The changes in Thyme pertained less to staff ‘realising’ the realities of a long-term crisis, and 
more to a programme’s difficulty grasping the evaluative regime austerity brought. Long-term 
aspirational programmes like Transforming Thyme may face difficulties because their 
evaluative outlooks clash with the situations organisational leaders apprehend. 
Repeated budgetary evaluation 
Writers on austerity management generally conceptualise resource allocation as something 
that happens once each year. Budgeting is often imagined as a one-off ‘decision’. Where a 
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multi-stage process is envisioned, it is progressive, with different questions gradually 
assembling information necessary for decision-making. Rubin (1977) describes in-year 
revisions to the budget, but bases these on changing external circumstances and poor internal 
estimations thereof, not organisations’ inherent internal dynamics. Others considering such 
phenomena do so in terms of frenetic mid-year rebudgeting (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980). 
They thus do not account for Thyme’s budgeting process. Neither mid-year disarray nor a 
formal additive process, it involved repeatedly asking divisions the same questions until 
answers improved. 
Thyme’s repeated requests for budgetary plans did involve the instability Caiden and 
Wildavsky (1980) expect of mid-year rebudgeting, but was surprisingly routinised. So 
established was the pattern that managers knew to expect more versions of the financial plan 
than initially announced, and even ‘mid-year conversation[s]’. That central staff repeatedly 
asked ‘how much can you save?’ did not demonstrate limited financial control but was a 
mechanism by which that control was maintained. While I observed a period which saw this 
mechanism pressurised, it seemed to have become established over years. Uncertainty over 
which plan would be final did make planning and relationships difficult. But it facilitated a 
gradual movement towards a required goal, in which divisions themselves ‘found’ additional 
savings over time. A stabilised instability had developed. 
Role of the external 
Given this model of financial control, Thyme’s delegated budgets relied on divisional managers 
believing savings needs were real. Senior managers worked to cast Thyme as facing major 
financial threats. They routinely imported the national context of austerity, arguing Thyme 
should behave as poorer organisations had to. Key meetings with divisions followed a pattern, 
beginning with a ‘speech’ about financial jeopardy, and Thyme’s reputation as expensive. In 
Thévenot’s terms, managers contextualised Thyme’s situation in this wider landscape, 
describing greater financial jeopardy than would describing Thyme alone.  
Managers also utilised normative language from national debates, like the ‘unpalatable’ ideas 
they requested. These quotations came when navigating delicate normative questions like 
possible trade-offs between cost and quality. In Thévenot’s terms, managers drew on 
established compromises between cost and quality. If compromises become more durable with 
use (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006), we might expect such nationally authorised compromises’ 
to be more acceptable than new ones. Invoking a compromise devised elsewhere arguably also 
limited managers’ personal implication in such ‘unpalatable’ suggestions. 
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This vindicates Chapter 4 (p.62) and Chapter 5’s (p.77) suggestions: austerity management is 
partly shaped by its national policy and discursive context. A detailed analysis of austerity 
management cannot be constrained by organisational boundaries. 
Concluding remarks 
Thyme demonstrates the complexity of organisations’ savings approaches, and the breadth of 
their developmental trajectories. It highlights organisations’ multiple objectives and the 
consequences when they conflict. Transforming Thyme’s development demonstrates the risks 
programmes targeting ‘strategic’ change face under short-term austerity pressure, particularly 
when structured around overdetermined savings. Meanwhile, Thyme reinforces earlier claims 
about the importance of a multi-level, discursive approach to austerity management. 
Thyme contrasts with Dryas, which started with a considerably more ‘managerial’ approach, 
moving towards a more ‘strategic’ one. Yet it also echoes Dryas’s story in demonstrating how 
savings approaches grow unstable when unable to capture austerity’s turbulent realities. Yet 
neither organisation faced the most significant austerity pressures. They demonstrate the 
consequences of even moderate pressure: one wonders how such pressures would play out in 
poorer organisations. Accordingly, we now turn to Aloe: both an example and a product of 




Chapter 9: Aloe: case narrative 
Introducing Aloe 
Aloe is a private company providing support services to NHS hospitals. Exemplifying an 
increasingly popular structure in the NHS, it is a Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) of Garrya, a 
large Foundation Trust. WOSs are characteristically created when NHS bodies ‘spin out’ 
departments into private bodies. They have been described as ways to exploit commercial 
opportunities or outsource services without losing profits and control. More controversially, 
they can reduce pay costs by circumventing NHS employment terms.  
They can also reduce hospitals’ tax bills. When hospitals provide services in-house, they pay 
sales tax on supplies. Yet when private companies – including WOSs – provide those services to 
the NHS, such tax can be reclaimed (Value Added Tax Act 1994; HMRC, 2012). WOSs let NHS 
providers reduce their tax liabilities without ceding control to external corporations. 
Depending on one’s perspective, this is either a scandalous manipulation of tax rules or a way 
to level a playing field previously skewed towards private competitors. 
Garrya was Aloe’s owner and sole client. To protect Aloe’s identity, I do not specify the 
services it provided. However, they fell within the range of functions WOSs characteristically 
perform, like estates, facilities, laundry, pathology, pharmacy, procurement and strategy 
(Dunhill, 2018). Unsurprisingly, given potential tax advantages, WOSs generally provide 
services requiring significant supplies procurement. They are largely non-clinical but 
interdependent with clinical work. WOSs are characteristically medium-sized: the Health 
Service Journal categorises them into organisations with more and fewer than one hundred 
staff. In these senses, Aloe typified WOSs. 
Aloe was a young organisation formed under austerity. Across sites, I asked staff about 
responses to austerity. Aloe staff often replied that Aloe itself constituted such a response. 
Garrya decided to create Aloe when under substantial strain. Tax officials (HMRC) approved 
Aloe’s creation so long as it had a non-tax commercial purpose and was demonstrably at arms’ 
length from Garrya. This arrangement still offered tax benefits. 
Garrya recruited a major accountancy and consultancy firm (AccountantsCo) to design Aloe. 
Within a few months, it had received NHSI’s go-ahead. Aloe was created as a legal entity, and 
senior managers seconded to set it up. When I arrived in March 2017, Aloe was responsible for 
varied activity formerly conducted by Garrya. Many senior staff were still temporary and its 
systems nascent; but Aloe’s responsibilities were real. 
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Garrya, and consequently Aloe, faced major financial problems. By 2016/17, Garrya had been 
seeking CIPs around 5% of annual income. These savings ambitions had failed, Garrya posting a 
year-end deficit of 5-10% of income. 2017/18’s CIP target was higher still. Around 10% of these 
CIP ambitions were to be achieved within Aloe. For a new, small organisation without 
independent investment capital, this represented an extremely high ambition. 
Period 1: Becoming real (March to June 2017) 
‘Imaginary savings’ and ‘concrete things’ 
Aloe had been set up rapidly. While rank-and-file staff were largely transferred from Garrya, 
senior managers included staff with private sector backgrounds on short-term contracts. It 
relied on some of Garrya’s administrative procedures but was hurriedly establishing its own. 
Senior managers focused on getting junior colleagues to adopt a ‘commercial’ attitude towards 
their erstwhile Garrya colleagues. Changes were sometimes more intended than achieved: 
managers regularly found themselves invoking ‘the new structure’ to cajole junior colleagues 
into working through its commercial channels. New and old processes, commercial and 
cooperative attitudes, overlapped uneasily, lending the Aloe I entered in March 2017 
something of a knocked-together feel.  
When AccountantsCo designed Aloe, they had identified savings their model would enable. 
Alongside input costs reductions, these focused on ‘clinical time’. Improvements at Aloe were 
to ‘release’ time Garrya’s clinicians previously spent on Aloe’s inefficient processes. In fact, 
Aloe’s savings targets assumed they could more-or-less eliminate clinical time from the 
functions they now controlled. Additionally, each transaction at Aloe was expected to make 
‘profit’, which returned to Garrya’s bottom line.  
It was difficult for Aloe to contest these suggested savings on which its creation was partly 
premised. It thus became outwardly committed to their viability. This study did not observe 
AccountantsCo’s work, but they seemed to have derived proposed savings totals for Aloe 
through discussions with individual Garrya departments, thus linking global savings estimates 
to concrete organisational sites. All this helped make hypothetical savings seem concrete and 
immediate: it helped construct possibilities of savings.  
Even were this unpersuasive, Aloe profoundly depended on Garrya. It was solvent only 
because of loans Garrya provided following lengthy negotiations around the turn of 2017. It 
had a poor bargaining position to resist suggested savings. March 2017 saw AccountantsCo’s 
projections become the basis for Aloe’s 2017/18 CIP obligations. 
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Aloe’s dependence on Garrya left it in continual financial jeopardy. Its work required 
significant supplies. But Aloe lacked sufficient internal resources to pay eventual bills, relying 
on Garrya’s reimbursement, which was not always promptly forthcoming. With debts unpaid, 
Aloe would each month be placed ‘on hold’ by several suppliers: they would stop providing 
goods. This made day-to-day work difficult, anxious and inefficient, highlighting Aloe’s broader 
resource scarcity. By May, a senior manager would observe that without further funding, ‘no 
matter how you model it up, we’re bankrupt this time next year’. 
With Garrya’s savings demands significant, senior managers prioritised them. Yet galvanising 
all staff towards making savings was difficult. Commercial virtues of profitability and efficiency 
did not come easily, senior managers suggested, to longstanding NHS staff. While this did not 
seem true of everyone, requested savings sometimes conflicted with more junior staff’s 
priorities, like their loyalty to Garrya and its services. Senior managers cast savings as vital 
given Aloe’s financial difficulties, as the prediction of bankruptcy above exemplifies. Such 
construction of financial emergency exemplified attaining tenuous futures. 
If such narratives persuaded staff savings were needed, they did not simplify making them. 
With significant gaps in its financial plans, Aloe engaged in extensive constructing possibility 
by critiquing earlier savings objects and constructing their own. Managers criticised how 
savings were managed before Aloe’s creation. One described earlier CIP tracking efforts as a 
meaningless ‘management game’. Such critiques of savings seeming inadequately linked to 
real-world savings set the scene for a ‘raft of rules’ defining CIPs to avoid ‘reporting savings 
that weren’t real’. Both this critique and its remedy constituted important efforts to construct 
possibility by casting today’s savings ideas as material, ‘real’ entities. 
Yet these changes were not immediately successful. When April’s CIP performance was 
disappointing, senior staff explained this underperformance in terms of poor CIP plans. ‘Ideas’ 
had been put onto the CIP Tracker without clear associated plans associated, overestimating 
likely savings and precipitating subsequent underperformance. Aloe still seemed troubled by 
‘management game’ savings. 
If a CIP Tracker’s reliability generally matters, it was vital in Aloe. Many of their savings accrued 
not to their bottom line, but Garrya’s (e.g. ‘clinical time’). To be credited with such savings, 
they needed to demonstrate that they had made them. If they improved a process’s efficiency 
for Garrya’s clinicians, they were only financially rewarded if able to demonstrate the specific 
portions of ‘clinical time’ saved. Aloe had not only to make savings but also to pinpoint how 
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they did so. Such savings were not only guided by measurement but financially useless to Aloe 
without it.  
This necessitated a complex infrastructure of measurement and modelling to establish a 
process’s costs before and after Aloe’s intervention. Senior staff bemoaned junior colleagues’ 
inadequately measuring the clinical time a process consumed before interventions to reduce 
it. Making a CIP involved not only reducing overall spending but also fashioning that reduction 
into a specific, definable benefit. One meeting discussed potential service changes. 
Senior managers expressed disquiet about inadequate ‘process mapping’ of 
one process before changing it. What they saw as an insufficient, 
rudimentary map had been supplied. One complained that ‘unless you 
process map something then the SOP [standard operating procedure] isn’t 
real’. A ninety-minute training session on process mapping was requested.  
Later on, another change Aloe was leading was discussed. A senior manager 
asked whether anything therein could ‘release back clinical time’ and thus 
become a CIP. Not receiving a definite answer, they decided a session 
should be run on the definitions of CIPs. (Fieldnotes paraphrase) 
‘Process mapping’ and identifying ‘clinical time’ to ‘release’ were important because they 
pinpointed elements of a process which could be stopped. Process mapping visualised these, 
constructing them as ‘real’ objects. Fitting a change to the definition of a ‘clinical time’ CIP 
similarly formatted it as a removal of a real, specific time period from a repeated ‘process’. 
Both were sufficiently important that an organisation under significant stress requested 
training on them, because both helped staff create complex changes as clear, concrete objects. 
That is, it helped construct possibilities of savings, a step vital to receiving financial 
compensation from Garrya. 
‘Making the business real’ 
Even while Aloe depended on Garrya, it also had to demonstrate its independence. HMRC’s 
approval relied on Aloe remaining at ‘arm’s length’. Early work attempted to demonstrate 
Aloe’s distinctness from Garrya, such as by adopting different administrative systems. 
Central among these efforts was a complicated contractual infrastructure managing the 
organisations’ relationship. Senior managers sought to operationalise these contracts by 
strictly defining the services provided to Garrya and avoiding unauthorised changes therein. A 
system of ‘service change requests’ was established. If a Garrya department wanted Aloe to do 
something new, they were to complete a form and send it to a Garrya official responsible for 
-166- 
 
the contract. They would then liaise with senior Aloe managers and decide on the change and 
its pricing. This aimed to replace less formal coordination between junior staff, which 
appeared previously to have been normal. 
Junior Garrya staff were no longer authorised to request such changes. Without formal 
contractual requests, said one senior Aloe manager, it was unclear whether Garrya really 
wanted something, or there was just a ‘bod’ there who did. For senior managers, contracts 
were vital to deciding the right thing to do because they evaluated whether senior staff were 
happy to pay for a given service. Put differently, contracts were used to conduct and contest 
financial tests. They kept such judgements senior, ‘narrowing’ where decisions were taken: 
between senior managers, not ‘bods’. 
If successful, this policy would make inter-organisational coordination a more senior activity. 
One potential downside of such an arrangement is a loss of local relationships; accordingly, 
Period 1 saw plans to hire staff placed in Garrya departments to preserve local relationships. 
Yet this was taking time. Without them, there was little evidence that the contractualised 
structure fostered close working relationships between junior staff. I asked one staff member 
about the organisations’ relationships: 
I: What’s the situation at Aloe’s relationship with [department P recently 
worked with] like at the moment? 
P: Not great. 
I: OK 
P: Not great. 
I: Is there more that you feel able to tell me about that, or? 
P: Yeah, I’m just thinking cos that was my instant reaction. We don’t have a- 
well there’s not a presence there yet. There’s not – staff at Garrya don’t 
automatically look to Aloe for answers. 
The interviewee continued by bemoaning the lack of routine engagement between their 
colleagues and Garrya staff: ‘Garrya probably wouldn’t even know who half the staff here are’, 
they said. For this interviewee, this lack of contact perpetuated poor relationships. 
Consequently, Garrya did not look to Aloe for ‘answers’. Instead, they were seen as a ‘barrier’ 
– people bringing ‘policies and procedures’ not ‘an integral part of them delivering care to 
patients’. Staff would later describe the client-customer relationship as inhibiting 
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collaboration. Increasingly emphasising senior contractual relations, Aloe did not foster 
relationships between more junior staff. 
Yet this did not imply that Aloe staff adopted the commercial identity their contractual 
infrastructure promoted. Some saw the transition as more-or-less cosmetic:  
Aloe have come in, we’ve got new uniform, the guys have got a new uniform 
but not a lot has changed really not to the fundamental operation or activity 
you know. We still go to those wards [and act] under the Trust’s policy. 
Notably, this interviewee describes ‘Aloe’ coming in, as if an outsider to ‘the guys’ (‘we’) who 
were there before. ‘Aloe’ seems to describe not a shared organisational identity, but the new 
management regime. It was still Garrya’s ‘wards’ and ‘policy’ under which staff act. The ‘new 
uniform’ is ephemeral; the ‘wards’ and ‘Trust’s policy’ as enduring. New contracts and 
structures did not make new identities. 
Staff loyalties were at best torn between Aloe and Garrya. This tension was clearest when the 
organisations’ interests conflicted. Before privatisation, Aloe had been piggy-backing on 
another organisation’s service to provide additional help to Garrya. When the other 
organisation decided to stop providing their service, Aloe staff discussed how they should 
respond: 
A manager updated the meeting on efforts to continue providing their 
service. But a senior colleague interjected, suggesting they should just tell 
Garrya they could no longer do it: the ‘business case won’t stack up’. The 
fact that they did this historically, they continued, did not mean they should 
continue. But who would therefore be picking it up, asked the first 
manager? ‘Not our problem’, replied their senior colleague. (Fieldnotes 
paraphrase) 
The first manager here adopts a traditional conception of healthcare organisations’ 
responsibilities. Asking how the service will continue, they seem to consider the problem from 
Garrya’s and patients’ points of view. Yet their senior colleague focuses on Aloe’s commercial 
responsibility: they should follow ‘the business case’. Such interactions highlighted the plural 
conceptions of the right thing to do present within Aloe. The same issues would recur over 
several discussions, as disputes played out as negotiation processes. For many, reducing 
quality or access was unacceptable. Yet for some senior colleagues, often with private sector 
backgrounds, quality was primarily relevant when there was a ‘business case’ for it. Such 
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disputes thus exemplified reconfiguring quality, which was often based on the disputed extent 
of Aloe’s moral role where quality was in question. 
The above passage, with senior managers’ effort to separate off Aloe’s responsibilities from 
those of other organisations draws also on conducting and contesting financial tests. It 
highlights disagreement between junior and senior managers about how Aloe should allocate 
resources. Senior managers’ arguments consider Aloe as a standalone private company 
whereas junior colleagues are concerned with what is right for Garrya-and-its-subsidiary. Here, 
the dispute is not so much about the metric evaluating appropriate action as about the actor 
being evaluated. The disagreement is less about ‘what we should do’ than about who ‘we’ are 
in the first place. 
This struggle to be evaluated as a distinct, independent organisation was also central to Aloe’s 
supplier relationships. Aloe was not consistently successful, many suppliers continuing to view 
them as Garrya’s offshoot. By May, they had begun paying some suppliers which had placed 
them on hold. Yet many offered them low credit limits, still associating many of Aloe’s orders 
with Garrya, whose financial problems made it less creditworthy. This was no trivial problem: 
some credit limits were low enough to prevent anything but the smallest orders. Association 
with Garrya perpetuated Aloe’s financial problems. 
Aloe thus faced a thorny problem: it was seen as too close to Garrya to be evaluated 
independently; yet collaboration with Garrya remained difficult. This made getting enough 
resources from Garrya difficult, precipitating continued problems being ‘on hold’ this period. It 
also left Aloe having to improvise. As financial pressures mounted, Aloe could not do all it was 
supposed to. Being so often ‘on hold’ had clinical implications for Garrya. But it was Aloe’s 
finance managers who faced decisions about allocating scarce money – and faced them 
without close working relationships with Garrya’s clinicians:  
I asked one manager how they allocated scarce cash when trying to get ‘off 
hold’. They explained that they first prioritised getting off hold, then based 
on clinical need and availability of substitutes. However, ‘finance [are] not 
geared up’ to be making decisions about ‘urgency of clinical need’. 
Consequently, they ended up prioritising whichever clinical area ‘shout[ed] 
loudest’. (Interview notes paraphrase) 
Without clarity on what they were meant to prioritise or the close clinical relationships that 
could have enabled them to find out, Aloe staff were left making clinical prioritisation 
decisions for which they were ill-prepared. This represented a version of reshaping 
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engagements, but one characterised not by innovatively reframing how decisions were made 
but scrambling to cope.  
Aloe seemed a difficult organisation to work in. For all its effort to become real, independent 
and viable, it faced pressures that left it struggling to continue. While one could see this as a 
situation of existential threat, staff tended towards less troubling narratives. Interviewees 
located Aloe on a natural trajectory of growth and development: ‘like an infant, trying to learn 
how to walk, learn how to talk’. A senior manager evaluated early progress positively because 
they had made ‘strides in terms of operationalising the business’: they were ‘making the 
business real’.  
This narrative of becoming real was prominent within Aloe and explained its otherwise 
somewhat chaotic situation in terms of its future trajectory (constructing possibility). While 
Aloe’s separation from Garrya was not wholly convincing and its financial standing precarious, 
this period nevertheless saw its basic systems get up-and-running. It looked possible that 
narratives of development towards a ‘real organisation’ could come true.  
However, it was during this delicate stability that Aloe faced a major shock. I first learned of 
Aloe’s CIP target in April, though interviewees noted it was not necessarily yet confirmed. After 
two months’ underperformance, I learned in June that Aloe’s CIP obligations were to be 
higher: an additional ‘CIP Plus’ gave a target 50% higher than the totals I had heard in April. 
Staff also seemed surprised by this, and a senior manager would later complain about targets’ 
changeability. June seems to have been an important instance thereof. 
Period 2: External shock and suspicion (June to August 2017) 
CIP Plus 
This change in the savings target seemed to significantly destabilise Aloe and its relationship 
with Garrya. Conducting and contesting financial tests remained important and increasingly 
emphasised disputing and evading Garrya’s apparently altered financial tests. This subsection 
focuses heavily on this practice. 
During a meeting in which a senior manager had announced the new savings target, they 
warned that Garrya had hired AccountantsCo to find savings. Consequently, they continued, 
they to ‘manage our data out of here’ to avoid AccountantsCo’s financial evaluation of them. 
While Aloe had previously shown caution about sharing data, the urgent tone was new and 
attached to fears financial targets would rise. There seemed decreasing faith that financial 
targets were fixed. 
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CIP Plus frustrated managers, particularly given previous smaller increases in savings 
obligations. One described this process in an interview. 
I: Tell me about that discussion [about savings levels] 
P: Well I suppose it’s a reflection of where the Trust [Garrya] is currently in 
its financial position. So contractually annually we’re required to deliver 
[amount]. So then we had a new [senior Garrya manager] who said ‘Oh 
influenceable spend, you must be [higher amount]’ but historically 
this…department have been – perhaps not looked at certain areas because 
they’ve either not had the resource or they’re not encouraged. So then 
given that the CIP Plus came along and again no real science behind how it 
got, it was [amount] and then it went to [higher amount], lovely [senior 
manager at Garrya]. 
To this manager, Aloe’s savings obligations seemed to ebb and flow with the waters Garrya 
navigated. I did not directly request a history of their savings targets; by giving one, they 
emphasised the targets’ changeability, and exhibited frustration. The language attributed to 
one Garrya manager – ‘oh, influenceable spend’ – makes their decision sound casual or 
capricious, while the other is ironically labelled ‘lovely’ for adding to Aloe’s obligations. The 
interviewee thus critiqued Garrya’s apparently changeable financial tests. 
Aloe ran a workshop to discuss responses to these savings targets. Partly, this became a forum 
for Aloe staff’s frustration about Garrya’s expectations. This included both senior Garrya 
managers’ savings targets and junior staff’s hopes about what Aloe might provide. One Aloe 
manager worried that Garrya staff, seeing Aloe make improvements, had begun to suspect 
they had a ‘magic pot of money’. Echoing language prominent in contemporary political 
discourse, staff said they needed to clarify that Aloe had no ‘magic money tree’. Anxiety about 
Garrya’s potentially changeable expectations pervaded organisational levels. 
At the workshop, senior Aloe managers described their proposed approach to the additional 
savings requirements. They described decreases in departmental budgets, significant CIP 
targets and an increased central reserve to buffer further financial shocks. While senior 
managers emphasised continuity with earlier financial plans, departmental staff seemed 
surprised by the extent of these financial requirements. 
Like the organisational targets Garrya imposed, these divisional targets provoked significant 
opposition. One department was now expected to realise CIPs equivalent to most of the 
‘clinical time’ involved in the processes they supported. 
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A departmental manager queried their department’s projected savings, 
noting that it seemed to be about 80% of the total clinical time 
AccountantsCo had estimated in their processes. A corporate manager 
explained that this was because they did not think that all clinical time could 
be excluded from the process. The departmental manager protested that, 
given the point in the year, achieving this target required them to do just 
that. A senior manager intervened, stating that the department could find 
other ways of making savings too. When the departmental manager 
protested, they simply replied: ‘That’s your target’. (Fieldnotes paraphrase) 
This conclusion was surprising; senior managers had generally attempted to justify, not 
impose, their targets. Yet in this meeting, justification had become difficult. When the senior 
manager intervened, the consensus had already developed that these targets constituted 
saving 100% of AccountantsCo’s estimated clinical time and that this goal was unreasonable. It 
was thus that they ended up stating the target as fact, not something up for dispute: when 
financial tests were explicitly contested, they attempted to authoritatively enforce them. 
Such targets might once have been justified by reference to Aloe’s contractual obligations. Yet 
these too came under increasing fire. This meeting saw managers describe the complex 
contractual infrastructure negotiating the two organisations’ responsibilities. Yet they 
admitted that contracts were not yet finalised and signed, with key elements like Aloe’s KPIs 
unconfirmed. Departmental managers strongly criticised this situation, noting that they 
needed to know their goals. They characterised holding off signing contracts as pointless: they 
were already in bed with Garrya, so how long could this stand-off continue? The contractual 
infrastructure that might have vindicated Aloe’s commercial responsibilities was increasingly 
seen as ephemeral. Contracts were irrelevant: the real relationships with Garrya already 
existed. 
Consequently, rather than making inter-organisational relations seem just, robust and durable, 
efforts to contractualise Aloe and Garrya’s interactions had the opposite effect. As observed 
above, they centralised coordination at a senior level, and created or perpetuated distance 
between junior colleagues. With contracts unsigned and savings demands changeable, Aloe 
staff did not feel Garrya’s equals. As one observed at this meeting, ‘they own us’. 
With savings obligations rising, trust in Garrya decreased. During the above finance meeting, 
staff suggested ways to save. One senior manager emphasised the importance of taking a 
baseline before a change so one could demonstrate subsequent improvement. A junior 
colleague suggested a good way of doing this: 
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The trick was to speak to clinical staff about the status quo before they 
knew ‘your intentions’: ‘before they know you’re [trying to] strip their 
clinical hours’. The manager acted out casually asking a clinician how much 
time a problem was wasting. (Fieldnotes paraphrase) 
The manager making this suggestion did not trust clinicians to identify the extent of problems 
if they knew Aloe’s financial motivations. Consequently, they recommended withholding their 
reasons for asking. As financial tests grew increasingly demanding, a climate of mistrust 
appeared to grow. 
‘What keeps us alive’ 
The apparent increase in Aloe’s targets based on ‘where the Trust is…in its financial position’ 
made the organisations’ interconnections increasingly clear to Aloe staff. Yet frustration, 
diminishing trust and the need to demonstrate Aloe’s independence perpetuated distance. 
Aloe felt closer to Garrya’s financial threats and quality dilemmas without experiencing more 
collaborative relations. 
Efforts to distinguish Aloe from Garrya continued but showed increasing strains. Period 1’s 
trend, in which managers emphasised Aloe’s non-responsibility for considerations outside 
their contracts, did persist. Managers proposed to charge Garrya for an ‘on-call service’ they 
were accustomed to receiving without charge.  
Yet other times, there was an uneasy recognition of the implications of Aloe’s choices for 
patient wellbeing. Asked about receiving Garrya requests that contravened Aloe’s interests, 
one manager suggested they should consider among other factors the implications for ‘quality’ 
and ‘how close it is to patient care’ before adding the caveat: ‘that’s my sway on it because I’m 
too Garrya’. This concern for the clinical outcomes of Aloe’s choices seemed to be 
unavoidable, but not what managers felt they were supposed to be doing. This increasing 
acceptance of Aloe’s embroilment in quality dilemmas signalled that it had become harder to 
reconfigure quality as they once had, by diminishing quality questions’ moral implications. 
Facing CIP Plus demands and continued problems ‘on hold’ with suppliers, Aloe became 
increasingly aware of its own fragility. Even in what might be expected to be more optimistic 
areas of work like the possibility of gaining new business, frustration and apprehension were 
evident. It was always intended that Aloe would gain business from other hospitals, and staff 




One senior manager updated on work to gain new business. A potential 
customer had made an offer to which Aloe were broadly amenable. Another 
manager noted they would need Garrya’s agreement but that ‘we’ve also 
become a CIP to do this’; ‘£[amount] stuck against us’ confirmed the first. 
Managers noted that it might be hard to be ready to deliver the proposed 
services in time. The first manager observed that they were ‘selling the idea’ 
of Aloe but at the same time ‘running alongside’ to get services up-and-
running. (Fieldnotes paraphrase) 
The language managers chose to describe Aloe’s financial obligations to gain new business 
exhibited their frustration: obligations were ‘stuck’ against them; that they had ‘become a CIP’ 
emphasises the change relative to initial expectations. With rising savings obligations, Aloe 
seemed decreasingly stable. Managers described rapidly reshaping engagements by readying 
Aloe’s processes. Casting this as ‘running alongside’ emphasised their increasing unease about 
Aloe’s incompleteness. Even while selling their infrastructure to clients, they found themselves 
scrambling to create it. 
This awareness prompted a tone of threat and urgency during this period. Whereas Period 1 
was characterised by discourses of natural development, Period 2 saw Aloe’s incompleteness 
increasingly problematised (‘we don’t have any SOPs; we don’t have any policies’). It was 
accompanied by a growing discourse of existential threat of the sort which characterised 
attaining tenuous futures. As the finance meeting described above ended, one senior 
manager suggested discussing the ideas generated with frontline staff before implementing 
them. But another said they could not afford to delay: it ‘doesn’t take Einstein to know £2m in 
6 months is £4m’. If savings were not made quickly, they would end up with a ‘red pen 
exercise’ and ‘looking at people’s budgets’. ‘Nobody in the business should not be contributing 
to this’, the manager continued: ‘this is what keeps us alive’.  
Period 3: Internalising instability (September 2017 to February 2018) 
As Period 2 became Period 3, frustration with Garrya and its targets gave way to acrimony 
within Aloe around efforts to meet them. It began with a senior meeting in September at 
which several steps were taken to increase internal scrutiny. This intensification of savings 
governance and decreasing internal trust characterised Period 3. 
Internalising mistrust 
Period 2’s frustration with Garrya continued. But this outwards-looking frustration was 
complemented by an increasingly uncertain internal environment. Uncertainty about Garrya 
and about Aloe’s ability to fulfil financial plans were augmented by high staff turnover. Since 
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Aloe took over these services, some former Garrya staff had left; while senior managers’ short-
term contracts were ending. This fresh instability reinforced Aloe’s growing sense of 
uncertainty and financial urgency, contributing to attaining tenuous futures. 
Facing these multiple types of uncertainty, Aloe’s senior management turned their gaze 
inwards. Notwithstanding ongoing frustration at new financial targets, senior managers 
treated them as necessary. Senior managers had repeatedly expressed frustration about 
certain junior colleagues, particularly concerning savings. During this period, they responded 
with a new governance structure which increasingly emphasised tracking CIPs, including a 
weekly monitoring meeting led by a senior manager. By creating a new framework for 
increasingly intense financial tests, this interwove reshaping engagements and conducting and 
contesting financial tests – a combination exemplary of this period. 
This decision came at a senior meeting which signalled a change of direction. Managers 
established a new governance structure, decided against renewing one manager’s contract, 
and rejected a business case they broadly supported to encourage more work describing its 
financial benefits. This tougher tone and emphatic monitoring characterised Period 3. 
This tone seemed pervasive. I observed a meeting designed to monitor CIPs. One manager 
intensively questioned colleagues about the savings they and their teams oversaw. Some 
questions focused on individuals responsible for savings, including asking whether one was up 
to the job. There did not seem to be complete mutual trust: one manager prefaced a section of 
the meeting by telling colleagues that they ‘need[ed] you to be – and I’m sure you always are – 
absolutely honest’. When managers argued that they lacked resources to make these savings, 
they were asked to stop bringing up the ‘resource issue’, which was not the meeting’s 
purpose. This felt a more personal, edgy form of scrutiny than previously encountered. 
Departments facing growing financial targets and more stringent oversight attempted to avoid 
negative judgements. One department was required to conduct part of a process within ten 
working days. Staff there felt that this was frequently difficult because the process was handed 
over to them with errors or obstacles remaining. Consequently, they created a standard 
operating procedure that stated the upstream department should not hand over the process 
until everything was ironed out. This meant starting the clock on their part of the process later 
without necessarily speeding the process overall. 
Departments anticipated more negative interactions with one another, and their overseers. 
One department faced atypically severe ‘credit hold’ problems. They resolved to continue to 
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pressure another department to resolve the problem but had little faith their colleagues would 
act on their requests. Another meeting saw a department feeling under-resourced discuss 
plans to ask a senior manager for more staff. The manager tasked with doing so anticipated 
the ‘shit sandwich’ they would receive in return. 
This was not eased by a lack of trust between staff and managers. Still loyal to Garrya, and 
particularly its patients, some staff found senior management’s increasing financial focus 
objectionable. As one interviewee reported, ‘it’s one of the things I struggle sometimes with 
Aloe, so, certain [senior managers] at Aloe don’t believe we’re here for patients, we’re here to 
save money’. They argued that ‘we work in a hospital so, there’s only one person [the patient] 
that’s at the end of [Aloe’s processes]’. I heard of a large February meeting in which one 
member of staff expressed similar views. Senior staff replied – in one interviewee’s words – 
‘no, no, no, we’re here to make sure that our client saves money and to be more cost 
effective…they openly say that’. The modifier ‘openly’ marks the distance between this 
reported attitude and the interviewee’s own. Some prioritised objectives which conflicted with 
those of senior staff. 
Like Period 2, this period entailed considerable conducting and contesting financial tests; but 
these tests turned inwards as senior managers sought ways to find savings. They often 
happened through new structures or with new tones, entailing significant reshaping. They 
were not universally accepted, but substantially contested and evaded by departments 
decreasingly trustful of each other and their leaders. 
Zooming in on savings 
This intensifying search for savings manifested as an ever-closer focus on CIPs. While this 
meant greater focus on some savings, certain ways of reducing spending had long been 
excluded from a CIP’s definition. When Aloe staff reduced the cost of a planned Garrya 
expenditure, this could avert the same amount of spending as a CIP while technically counting 
instead as a ‘cost avoidance’. With Aloe’s focus increasingly on CIPs, these ways of avoiding 
spending received little emphasis. They thus did not benefit from the authorising effects of the 
CIP infrastructure, which so effectively constructed possibilities of savings (see p.163). They 
received considerably less focus despite also saving money. 
Simultaneously, as urgency intensified, and trust declined, appetite for complex, longer-term 
savings diminished. The ‘clinical time’ savings Aloe had long sought were always going to be 
challenging. They could require complex service change for comparatively moderate financial 
reward. Nevertheless, some managers had developed a proposal for such savings. At a savings 
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monitoring meeting, they described this approach as ‘transformational’. However, the savings 
offered were not deemed sufficiently quick and uncomplicated to be CIPs. Instead, a manager 
decided they should be sent to Aloe’s project management function for prioritisation against 
other potential initiatives. The initiative’s proponents’ response to this did not suggest they 
thought it likely this would allow their project to progress. Under significant uncertainty, CIPs’ 
functional definition came to entail quick, certain savings. 
Instead of these more ambitious efforts, Aloe attempted to improve its finances by better 
describing the financial benefits their standard service brought Garrya. Alongside proposing 
the ‘on-call service’ described above, they sent letters to staff in clinical areas, asking them to 
quantify the clinical time their day-to-day work saved. Instead of a specific project to save 
additional clinical time, Aloe sought to capture and concretise savings its service model made 
anyway. Such efforts to constructing possibilities became the increasing focus, even where the 
supposed savings had already been made. 
Increasing focus on savings meant more vigorous work constructing possibilities. This 
occurred against a background of growing internal strife. Senior managers governed activity 
more strictly, and junior colleagues sought to avert negative judgements. Rather than seeking 
ambitious longer-term programmes, the savings becoming dominant in Aloe were direct and 
comparatively simple. Aloe’s future continued to feel uncertain. 
Interpreting the case 
Aloe experienced exceptionally difficult circumstances. While it rapidly set up a new 
infrastructure for a spin-out organisation, it was expected to make exceptional savings as a 
subsidiary to a jeopardised organisation. Merely surviving in such circumstances was striking. 
Yet problems developed over the period: facing substantial internal and external acrimony, 
coordination became increasingly difficult; realising the savings demanded proved challenging; 
while ambitions like ‘releasing clinical time’ were apparently side-lined. This section accounts 
for these developments by analysing the practices observed. 
Reshaping engagements: creating a ‘commercial’ organisation 
Aloe was created in haste by an organisation under immense financial pressure seeking to 
make ends meet. Whatever this move’s financial consequences, it disrupted existing ways of 
working. Collegial relationships were to be replaced by commercial ones, old processes 
jettisoned. Given Garrya’s financial pressure, all this happened rapidly. The result was the need 
to continually refine Aloe’s structures as circumstances changed and to replace interim 
processes borrowed from Garrya. This precipitated confusion, with staff sometimes unsure 
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which process to follow. They disagreed about how to make decisions: whether through the 
‘new structure’ or established practice. Reshaping Aloe so quickly may have mitigated financial 
problems, but perpetuated uncertainty. 
Most strikingly, it became considerably less clear how Aloe and Garrya would collaborate. Aloe 
managers reported differing expectations about their relationship; and the boundary between 
their relative responsibilities became contested. Aloe’s hierarchy increasingly demanded that 
changes in provision be signed off by senior managers. This was intended to prevent Aloe 
inadvertently doing unremunerated work. Yet it seemed to play into the distance between 
Aloe and Garrya’s rank-and-file: interorganisational coordination was increasingly to be 
restricted to senior management. Increased opposition and distance between the 
organisations made harder dealing with non-routine problems, like the need to choose which 
suppliers’ credits to pay. 
Attaining tenuous futures: ‘what keeps us alive’ 
Thus the uncertainty Aloe faced was more than purely financial. Nevertheless, Aloe faced 
significant financial jeopardy. While probably safe from liquidation, Aloe’s dependence on 
Garrya and difficulty paying its debts presented genuine risks to its autonomy and longer-term 
viability. Senior managers knew they needed Garrya’s ongoing financial support, and Aloe’s 
savings were high among Garrya’s priorities. But it was not only to senior staff that Aloe’s 
financial problems were manifest. When suppliers placed Aloe ‘on hold’, staff across 
departments found their work significantly disrupted. The sense that Aloe was on the financial 
brink felt part of working life. 
The introduction of CIP Plus targets played into financial and relational uncertainty. With rising 
financial obligations and apparently fissile financial targets, financial uncertainty was 
significant. The responsibilities associated with their relationship with Garrya also seemed 
subject to change. This increased uncertainty left Aloe seeming much less sure of itself and its 
future. It was in this context that the most overt language of existential threat was deployed, 
often when exhorting others to take savings seriously. It also precipitated new departmental 
targets, which were themselves resisted, worsening internal relationships and trust. As targets 
were changed and crisis rhetoric grew, Aloe’s relationships and future felt decreasingly certain. 
As Figure 9.1 illustrates in stylised fashion, this period saw a rapid increase in the sense of 




Figure 9.1 – Key events in Aloe3 
 









Constructing possibility: making savings ‘real’ 
Throughout fieldwork, Aloe had faced atypically strong imperatives to prove it was making 
promised savings. While people often wish to demonstrate to superiors how well they have 
done making savings, Aloe’s situation was unusual in that its financial benefit for certain 
savings relied on proving it had made them. This necessitated extensive discursive and 
measurement work to create such ‘demonstrable’ savings. 
In part, this probably helped savings efforts: emphasising clearly measuring spending around 
an intervention could minimise the ‘management game’ managers feared. However, it also 
represented a significant expenditure of time. It also relatively deprioritised expenditure 
avoidances not fitting the CIP’s standard definition. 
As Aloe’s financial position deteriorated and their uncertainty grew, they focused more on 
CIPs, and prioritised the most certain available savings. Even initially prioritised but slightly 
more aspirational schemes, like ‘clinical time’ savings, fell from favour. Where clinical time was 
addressed, it was by attempting to document that Aloe’s existing activity was saving time. 
Here, the need to construct demonstrable savings seemed to distract from materially reducing 
costs. Aloe found it difficult to not only make but also prove the volume of savings requested. 
Conducting and contesting financial tests 
With savings difficult to obtain, staff at both organisational and departmental levels worked to 
avoid responsibility for more of them than necessary. Managers sometimes disputed the 
reasonableness or feasibility of assigned targets, prompting senior colleagues to defend or 
enforce them. Other times, those facing savings demands would be cautious in their 
communication to avoid further obligations, or to achieve existing ones at the expense of 
others. Such strategic avoidance of obligations was unsurprising given the scale of 
controversial, difficult, financial targets. Yet it seemed to diminish trust, encouraging more 
aggressive enforcement of such targets. As the assignment and measurement of financial 
responsibilities became contested, it became more fractious. 
From the start, a key way in which senior management avoided potential costs was drawing 
clear and narrowing boundaries around Aloe and its responsibilities. They suggested stopping 
longstanding activities whose ‘business case[s]’ no longer ‘stack[ed] up’; and scrutinised 
changes for implied costs. This caused controversy between senior managers, who saw Aloe as 
a freestanding private organisation; and some junior staff, who felt part of Garrya. This further 
problematised coordination: even where staff agreed about what was desirable, they differed 
about Aloe’s responsibilities in pursuing it. 
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Reconfiguring quality: ‘not our problem’ 
These coordinative difficulties were amplified because some of these questions were morally 
charged. Contesting the boundary between their and Garrya’s responsibilities meant 
negotiating the extent of Aloe’s moral implication in clinical activity. Initially, senior staff 
appeared to have a clear view: their responsibility was to fulfil their contract. The language of 
contractual responsibility was repeatedly deployed to suggest that their moral duties were 
similarly bounded. Their gestures towards a broader sense of doing the right thing appeared 
primarily directed towards persuading junior colleagues. Yet I became increasingly aware of 
senior managers’ own moral struggles. Some seemed torn between their perceived 
organisational role and feelings of responsibility towards patients. 
What compromise there was between these points of view became decreasingly tenable. With 
changes in Garrya directly affecting Aloe’s budget, and examples of Aloe activity with direct 
clinical consequences in Garrya, staff found it harder to distance themselves from their sole 
client’s clinical work. Simultaneously, it appeared to become harder for senior staff to afford 
such qualms. Coordinative difficulties and acrimony thus grew. Staff increasingly seemed to 
disagree about Aloe’s purpose. 
Conclusion and theoretical reflections 
Instability and dispute 
Aloe’s case shows an organisation in flux. Rapidly created and attempting to distance itself 
from its origins as a Garrya department, it found relationships and decision-making under 
increasing strain. There were strong and recurrent disagreements about whether staffing 
allocations should be based on the ‘new structure’ or pre-existing conventions. With each 
change, new priority or process a potential site of dispute or confusion, Aloe’s staff sometimes 
lacked clarity on what they should do; or disputed senior managerial preferences. 
While the austerity management literature does foresee disagreement, ‘resistance’ and 
acrimony where cutbacks disadvantage staff (Levine, 1978; Schmidt et al., 2017), it struggles to 
explain Aloe’s dynamics. Not solely related to directly disadvantaged staff, these extended to 
more basic uncertainties about how business would be done. Reshaping Aloe disrupted 
existing routines and resource allocations. This was reinforced when Garrya’s increased savings 
expectations became clear, prompting a cycle of conducting and contesting financial tests 
that destabilised all such financial evaluations. That renegotiating their responsibilities in line 
with their new ‘commercial’ ethos precipitated reconfiguring quality left Aloe torn between 
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different accounts of its responsibility towards Garrya’s patients. Accounts of staff protecting 
themselves and their departments explain little of this. 
We should instead remember Thévenot’s (2001a) observation that organisations represent 
compromises between contradictory goods. Such goods and compromises therebetween help 
coordination by suggesting what to prioritise and how to act in given situations. These 
compromises are stabilised by measurement objects designed to measure the goods involved; 
and structures through which people interact in pursuit thereof (Thévenot, 1984). Aloe’s rapid 
structural and normative change made it difficult for these goods, measurement objects and 
structures to survive or adapt. The new ‘commercial’ principles and structure were unfamiliar 
and frequently changed with changing circumstances or to achieve independence with Garrya. 
They were hard to invest in.  
That these divisions did not cause greater problems seemed down to their repeated 
discussion. Senior managers could sometimes advocate their preferred strategies according to 
junior colleagues’ values. Other times, junior staff persuasively advocated their positions, 
convincing senior managers to grant their requests. Some such agreements were temporary; 
but accepting these temporary staging-posts rather than pushing for permanent decisions 
helped preserve delicate agreements. While I heard of less conciliatory interactions later, 
these early approaches preserved coordination for a time. 
From an austerity management perspective, this story seems esoteric – more about structural 
than financial change. Yet nothing suggests such structural change is rare in contemporary 
austerity. It seems likely austere organisations commonly create new structures, whether 
whole organisations, or individual ‘savings programmes’ (see Audit Commission and Monitor, 
2012). The NHS incentivises the former (see p.162). Both seem likely to face Aloe’s challenge of 
rapidly establishing robust structures, accepted goods and invested measurement devices. 
Urgency and strategy 
Creating Aloe would be classified as an instance of ‘strategic’ savings: ‘targeted’ savings based 
around major change. Levine (1985) welcomes this approach to savings under many 
circumstances because it represents a long-term, forward-looking approach. Yet this presents 
such major steps as the leisurely products of sober reflection. These data cannot support 
detailed investigation of how Garrya decided to create Aloe. Yet the haste of Aloe’s formation 
and early existence is clear. Characterising such savings as ‘strategic’ is misleading if we 
imagine ‘strategy’ to concern long-term, progressive developments. 
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Instead, the case of Aloe highlights the radical shortening of time-horizons austerity 
precipitates. Not only at its creation, but as savings targets tightened, Aloe was acutely aware 
of its short-term objectives. The narrative of existential threat senior managers promulgated 
was both product and cause of this perspective. Time was frequently discussed at Aloe, 
particularly when early savings efforts failed and targets rose. Aloe increasingly focused on 
immediate survival. It was thus that it initially adopted interim management arrangements; 
that in-year savings grew in priority; and that aspirational goals took a back seat. This seems 
likely to be common in organisations under severe austerity. Yet the austerity management 
literature tells us little about time and urgency. 
Thévenot highlights the different formations of time associated with different forms of 
engagement, and their corresponding goods. With increasing uncertainty about Aloe’s future, 
it turned to planning, the regime associated with projecting oneself into the future. While 
planning can be used to construct long-term aims, real and discursive pressures had radically 
contracted Aloe’s time-horizon. Accordingly, its plans tended to emphasise immediate 
preservation. This planning orientation also explains the shift in emphasis from justifying to 
imposing targets. Increasingly, senior managers oriented not towards justification but 
planning; accordingly, simply stating ‘that’s your target’ became sufficient: the goal was not 
public justification, but the successful fulfilment of an existentially charged plan. 
Demonstrating savings 
Aloe’s need to demonstrate savings was uncommonly pronounced. Yet this need is not 
uncharacteristic of austere organisations. From an individual manager’s perspective, the 
personal benefits of a given saving accrue only if its existence can be proven to superiors. As 
austerity tightens, senior managers are increasingly likely to demand such demonstration. The 
growing focus on demonstrable savings at Aloe represented not a misleading case, but a 
peculiarly observable one (Pettigrew, 1990, p.275). Aloe demonstrates constructing savings 
objects can preoccupy, enable and constrain austerity efforts. 
Yet austerity management writing rarely interrogates the various savings objects devised 
under austerity. Instead, writers tend to focus on one object – the formal budget – and to treat 
it as evidence about finances, rather than as itself an influential part of an austerity 
management approach (e.g. Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015). 
Focusing only on Aloe’s headline budget and not considering its CIPs would have masked key 
dynamics within its austerity management approach. Equally, taking its CIP data as 
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uncomplicated evidence about the fate of its austerity management approach, as opposed to 
itself part of that approach would mislead us. 
Conceptualising such devices instead as measurement objects illuminates their influence. It is 
unsurprising that organisations facing austerity’s growing uncertainty are liable to increasingly 
emphasise measurement. This precipitates the proliferation of increasingly prominent 
measurement objects. Thévenot (1984) notes that making such objects or forms meaningful 
involves investment: one must create the infrastructure and process of use that makes them 
meaningful. This is perhaps truer of CIPs than the standardised data Thévenot highlights, 
because each CIP must be individually demonstrated: each instance of the form requires 
independent investment. 
This explains two peculiar features of Aloe’s case. First, the instability and contestability of CIPs 
is in part down to their prominence as a financial form and the need to invest in each instance 
thereof. Because such forms have evaluative uses, there are always incentives for people to 
contest their validity or blur their definitions (c.f. Rubin, 1977). This is only facilitated by their 
incompletely invested state. Second, creating certain CIPs requires more labour than others. 
The less unusual its method of saving; and the less complex and contestable its outcomes, the 
more attractive it seems. Partly because of this, organisations like Aloe prefer savings based on 
reduced supply costs than those based around changes in processes. This tells us something 
not previously identified about the savings organisations might be likely to make: the more 
evidencable and standardised are probably preferred. 
Concluding remarks 
Aloe’s case demonstrates the volatility of both organisational measurements and relationships 
within uncertain organisations. Pressure to make certain, visible savings seemed to make it 
harder to make savings at all. Creating a new body within an already turbulent austerity 
process was difficult and precipitated divisions within and between organisations. The growing 
instability in Aloe’s relationships can be explained by these changes and the apparently 
unexpected increase in its savings obligations over the year. These problems highlight the 
importance of Aloe’s placement of embedded staff within Garrya, and staff’s ability to 
compromise over issues on which they differed. These seem to explain why Aloe’s problems 
did not worsen.  
These cases cover organisations in different healthcare markets, of different sizes and facing 
different degrees of austerity pressure. Five practices – attaining tenuous futures, 
constructing possibility, reconfiguring quality, conducting and contesting financial tests and 
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reshaping engagements – characterised each of them, albeit in different ways. These case 
reports explain each organisation’s development in terms of these practices’ interplay. 
However, they only glancingly illuminate the relations and differences between the cases. 




Chapter 10: Austerity management across sites 
Introduction 
These sites had striking similarities. Each experienced significant uncertainty about their 
situations, worsened by attempts to reach the budgetary targets turbulent financial cycles 
demanded. Each built unstable savings objects to fill budgetary ‘gaps’, and reconceptualised 
their quality commitments. In each, traditional evaluative criteria and means of coordination 
struggled, prompting staff to work inventively to manage consequent uncertainties. Said 
differently, each involved attaining tenuous futures, constructing possibility, reconfiguring 
quality, conducting and contesting financial tests and reshaping engagements. These 
practices characterise austerity management. 
Chapter 6 defined and exemplified these practices. This Chapter further details the practices, 
their variations and the wider temporal patterns of which they form part. This account 
describes increasing uncertainty – both financial and nonfinancial. Organisations grow unsure 
about their situations, values, evaluative standards and coordinative mechanisms. These 
practices’ relative importance varies across organisations, but each contrasting case features 
them all.  
To aid interpretation of these similarities and differences, Table 10.1 re-articulates differences 
originally highlighted in Chapter 5 (Table 5.1, p.78). To them it adds two inter-organisational 
contrasts observed during fieldwork. First, organisations’ structures differed. Dryas and 
Thyme’s multidivisional forms both contrasted with Aloe’s relatively unitary structure. Of the 
two, Thyme accorded divisions greater autonomy. 
Table 10.1 – Core features of sites 
Site Dryas Thyme Aloe 
Market Mental health Acute health Support services 
Austerity 
pressures 
Medium Minor Major 
Size Medium Large Small 
Age Old Old Young 













Second, organisations’ ethical outlooks differed. Aloe saw conflict between former NHS staff’s 
traditional public sector values and the ‘commercial’ outlook managers pursued. Dryas had a 
more emotionally charged, interpersonal ethos. Senior managers expressed themselves in 
terms of individual patients, and incited staff to fulfil savings targets to avoid unfairly requiring 
colleagues to fill any resultant gap. Thyme’s ethos was more corporate and individualistic. It 
prioritised quality as an organisational selling point while inciting divisions to save precisely 
because any gaps would remain their own. These contrasts inform the following analysis. 
Five sections follow, each dedicated to one practice. These enable a conclusion which models 
these practices’ relations and uses them to account for cases’ similarities and differences. 
Attaining tenuous futures 
Chapter 6 defined attaining as organisational efforts to construct and reach jeopardised 
financial futures. Processual analysis revealed further dynamics related to attaining across 
sites. In each organisation, attaining was inflected by the financial year’s rhythms. National 
pressures precipitated ‘ambitious’ planning, quickly followed by pessimism, centralisation and 
scrutiny as such discursive plans failed to become reality.  
With financial requirements set nationally, cross-site similarities in attaining are unsurprising. 
Yet the level thereof – particularly between the hospitals – startled me. Both had normalised 
mid-year ‘recovery’. Both arranged extraordinary meetings to recover finances mid-year. And 
both began these with similar attempts to contextualise themselves within extreme financial 
distress. This annual pattern was central to these sites’ austerity management experiences. 
‘Removing prudence’ 
During planning, attaining meant stretching to meet required totals. In Dryas and Thyme, this 
meant complying with national ‘control totals’. In Aloe, it meant offering the savings Garrya’s 
own budgets presumed. Failure meant angering one’s superiors and losing potential funding. 
Budgeting processes were required or strongly encouraged to produce predetermined 
answers. Evidencing this, Dryas’s ‘bridge’ diagram (Figure 6.1, p.96) contains bars indicating 
not the savings found, but the amount ‘required’. Efforts to fill these totals (bridging) drove 
organisations’ financial cycles. 
Such ‘bridges’ visualised this ‘gap’ between desired and required totals (see p.139). With filling 
these gaps using only concrete changes in practice challenging, organisations turned to a 
variety of presentational changes. So-called ‘balance sheet’ measures, like altering accounting 
practices or releasing reserves, could produce more favourable reported outcomes. However, 
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there were only so many presentational changes one could make. Balance sheet measures 
were themselves a scarce resource. 
Their benefits were frequently non-recurrent: they accrued only in the year the change was 
made, not continually thereafter. So further savings would be necessary next year simply to 
prevent expiring one-off benefits looking like losses. Using balance sheet measures consumed 
a scarce resource and saved up problems for the future. 
Accordingly, concrete savings were always eventually necessary. But this remained difficult. As 
Chapter 6 details, organisations unable to find enough such plans turned despite misgivings to 
‘savings’ of dubious feasibility. Claims that further savings were unfeasible were unacceptable. 
As one Dryas manager said, ‘if we accepted that – because everybody says that – we would be 
bankrupt’. Regulators advised NHS finance managers to ‘remove prudence’ from their 
‘handling of bad debts’, creating increasingly optimistic predictions. Feasibility took a back seat 
so plans could meet required totals. So necessary was presenting a good financial face that 
‘unidentified CIPs’ unassociated with even optimistic plans routinely populated budgets and 
CIP Trackers. 
Over the year, ‘ambitious’ savings plans had to become realities. What was optimistic had to 
become realistic; the discursive must materialise. Given budgetary assumptions’ optimism, this 
was frequently formidable. Occasionally, mid-year rebudgeting briefly inverted these trends, 
but they remained clear. By mid-year, plans had gaps, precipitating ‘recovery’ across sites. 
‘We’re always in recovery by quarter 3, quarter 4…the whole of the NHS is always in recovery.’ 
‘Recovery’ meant increasing financial stringency and increasingly pessimistic evaluations of 
















Figure 10.1 assembles the stylised representations of changes across financial cycles from 
Figure 7.3, Figure 8.1 and Figure 9.1. While the original diagrams highlighted different 
elements of these changes, each site saw optimistic plans turn to pessimism; flexibility to 
scrutiny and central control; and defined to unstable relations. While borrowing quantitative 
graphing’s representational conventions, Figure 10.1 lacks graphs’ numerical precision, so we 
should not rely on it to highlight fine-grained differences between sites. Instead, it emphasises 
the cases’ broadly similar patterns. Figure 10.2 therefore abstracts Figure 10.1 into a 
generalised pattern. 
 
Figure 10.2 – Attitudinal and policy changes across financial year 
This cycle of budgeting and recovery required rapid shifts in not only organisations’ processes, 
but also their evaluative criteria for savings plans. Plans managers saw as feasible during 
planning may be reframed as risky by implementation. Things organisations originally intended 
to delegate were centralised and controlled as ‘recovery’ set in. These evaluative differences 
and financial cycles were mutually perpetuating.  
Organisations found elements of their budgets so deviated from reality that they became 
useless. Consequently, Aloe and Dryas rebudgeted during the year. This created more useful 
plans, but made plans in general seem less reliable. Thyme retained its original plans but 
functionally amended them by releasing reserves. This avoided discrediting its planning 
Financial year 
Optimistic plans, flexibility, defined relations 
Pessimism about plans, control, instability 
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mechanism but left some divisions with plans so distant from reality as to became useless, as 
jokes about the impossibility of recovery demonstrated (p.152). 
Initial plans’ degradation and amendment became part of Figure 10.2’s cycle. Plans were 
optimistically created until pessimism set in and they were deconstructed. Every year that they 
were amended became further evidence such cycles were inevitable. 
Making crises 
The regularity of these cycles was itself notable. Yet what was striking was not only that each 
site’s cycle was comparable, but that they were conducted so similarly. As plans grew insecure, 
both hospitals ran large, formal processes dedicated to generalised financial improvement 
alongside targeted divisional interventions. Thyme’s detailed annual planning process 
complemented this. Both Dryas’s Senior Scrutiny and Thyme’s planning were characterised by 
set-piece meetings between central staff and individual divisions. These meetings had 
strikingly similar genres. Both began with what one Thyme manager called their ‘speech’: 
attempts to contextualise the meetings within significant financial jeopardy heretofore limited 
by ‘heroic’ savings. 
The financial cycle encouraged these narratives of threat and heroism. Staff were used to 
growing mid-year pessimism, but also to organisations pulling through. Often, this was 
because organisations used accountancy devices or ‘bailouts’ to plug growing gaps. Senior 
managers identified that some staff therefore doubted that organisations’ financial situations 
were severe. 
This posed senior managers a problem: they needed to inspire to urgent action staff who 
believed things would turn out fine. Consequently, they attempted to situate staff within ever-
more severe financial situations. This involved material work measuring, describing and 
visualising the ‘gap’, and discursively placing organisations within landscapes of financial 
desperation. This was the constructing and managing financial crises which Chapter 6 
describes. 
These efforts were often purposive and planned, as the ‘speech[es]’ described above 
exemplify. One Dryas manager introduced a Senior Scrutiny meeting by announcing they 
would give the introduction they had ‘given everybody’. A Thyme counterpart at a late annual 
planning meeting worried they might forget parts because they had ‘not done it for a bit’. 
Constructing and managing was often purposive and deliberate. 
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Such efforts often took on an existential tone. Language questioning whether the following 
year would be ‘do-able’ or ‘undeliverable’ proliferated. While organisations’ future financial 
fortunes are inevitably uncertain, this conditional language cast the future itself as in doubt. 
This accompanied a wider existential threat discourse, which emphasised language of violence 
and disaster. At Aloe, it was vital everyone made savings because ‘this is what keeps us alive’. 
One manager warned that if Dryas did not ‘get to grips’ with ‘hard decisions…next year 
[becomes] very difficult if not impossible’. The future itself was threatened. 
This similarity was more striking because organisations’ actual financial situations differed. 
Aloe managers were hyperbolic in describing savings as ‘what keeps us alive’, but Aloe was 
approaching the financial edge. But Thyme was considerably wealthier: its appeals to financial 
peril were harder to take literally. Organisations constructed similar financial crises in quite 
different financial contexts. 
They achieved this by drawing different boundaries around the situations they described. 
Managers described a crisis associated with Aloe’s immediate survival. Dryas was slightly 
better off; there managers still emphasised urgency but appealed less to Dryas’s immediate 
destruction. They generally focused on their own, medium-term financial risks, and nodded 
towards worse-off local organisations. The threats they invoked were of regulatory 
intervention limiting their autonomy. They positioned Aloe in a local system and characterised 
more medium-term threats. 
Positioning Thyme as in crisis meant widening the lens again. Managers focused on national 
austerity. Invoking national news about another hospital’s recent entry into special measures, 
one warned that the ‘point is if we did find ourselves in the [hospital] situation, and the 
turnaround team [from NSHI] came in, how easy would they find it to [make savings]? We 
want to be the ones [doing it]’. Another highlighted the comparatively plentiful Thyme 
resources they ‘keep hearing’ about from staff used to other organisations. Each time, the 
implication was that, in an austere landscape, Thyme should follow austere norms by 
mimicking the approaches of others: whether other hospitals or ‘turnaround team[s]’. To 
contextualise within austerity an organisation whose staff considered it financially stable, 
Thyme managers appealed to a wider sectoral austerity. 
Such efforts met resistance from staff doubting financial imperatives were as strong as 
claimed. Particularly in organisations used to large financial bailouts, dissuading staff that 
bailouts would save them this year was hard. ‘There was always the – these sort of, you know, 
everything looked gloom and doom and then, you know, extra stuff came in towards the end 
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of the financial year and we were all right’. This interviewee’s language of cyclicality (‘always’) 
and vagueness (‘extra stuff’) exemplifies the sense of intangible inevitability years of bailouts 
precipitated. Budgeting went from mathematical exercise to opaque cycle in which only the 
outcome was certain. As one manager observed, there was a sense of having ‘cr[ied] wolf’. 
With this resistance preventing consensus over the situation, senior managers continued 
striving to emphasise its severity. 
Cycles and crisis 
All organisations drew on attaining similarly, adjusting their approaches over the year. In each, 
ambitious plans failed to become realities. Yet organisations handled this differently. Matching 
its autonomous divisional structure, Thyme maintained its basic budgetary plan, thus 
‘containing’ problems within overspending divisions. This avoided a precedent that budgets 
change mid-year but meant some divisional plans lost credibility. Dryas and Aloe, conversely, 
revised their budgets mid-year. Reallocating savings responsibilities may have helped planning, 
but ensuring budgets remained meaningful became difficult: some Dryas divisions never 
accepted their new targets as equally important to their initial ones. How organisations 
navigated attaining’s financial cycle seemed key to their outcomes. 
Whatever their budgeting approach, central management needed to persuade staff to save. 
This was only more important in organisations with Thyme’s delegated structure, hence 
attaining’s greater prominence. Yet it was also harder in organisations with Thyme’s long 
experience of financial stability. Increasingly, staff trusted the seasonal pattern of jeopardy and 
resolution more than the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of budgeting and financial projections. 
Accordingly, managers developed a financial crisis narrative, which staff predictions of ongoing 
stability resisted. This left the situation increasingly disputed, often in high-flown language of 
desperation and heroism. Attaining left organisations whose sense of their situation was 
uncertain and temporally unstable. 
Constructing possibility 
Organisations needed to believe attaining’s optimistic plans could be fulfilled. Chapter 6 
observes their attempts to fill these plans through constructing possibility. This section 
explores the roles these practices played in each organisation’s development. 
Forming savings 
Organisations seeking to fill their ‘bridges’ sought savings objects to plug the gap. ‘Bridge’ 
diagrams’ physical metaphor and the desire for something reliable led them to fill these gaps 
with concrete ‘things’. Packaging savings objects – constructing hypothetical savings ideas as 
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material objects – was the most prominent way organisations constructed possibility. 
Packaging was prominent across all organisations. Unsurprisingly, it was most evident in Dryas, 
which spent extensive effort monitoring individual savings plans. As Chapter 6 describes (p.97), 
this involved extensive discursive work to construct such objects (see also Chapter 11 on the 
national case). However, this should not underplay the material work involved. Maintaining 
CIP Trackers and savings infrastructures helped construct savings schemes as tangible 
budgetary objects. 
These cases highlight the implications of constructing savings objects. Reifying savings made 
them manageable. They could be treated as budgetary entities, moved around, included and 
excluded. ‘CIPs’ could be separated from the general flow of finances, enabling them to be 
highlighted, interrogated and amended. Taking them as existing objects subject to ‘realisation’ 
rather than mere possibilities enabled central managers to make decisions free of the 
uncertainty so many hypotheticals would otherwise imply. Constructing possibilities as 
concrete objects made them manageable. 
Simultaneously, reifying savings unhelpfully simplified them. Manufacturing a hypothetical 
saving into a ‘CIP’ required work (see p.163). Savings which were not only easier to make but 
simpler to demonstrate became more valuable, apparently influencing the savings made. With 
CIPs constructed as objects located ‘in’ one department or another, managers displayed 
reticence about savings garnered near interdepartmental boundaries. They could cause 
disputes about who ‘got’ the associated CIP. Conceptualised differently – say, as plans with 
many contributors – it might make sense to ‘share’ a CIP two departments contributed to. But 
constructed as an object, a CIP is either ‘in’ your domain or not. Disputes about savings 
ownership are not inevitable but promoted by how savings are conceptualised. 
Most importantly, reifying CIPs made them appear easier to invent and achieve. As pre-
existing objects, they merely had to be ‘identified’ and ‘realised’. This contributed to the 
financial cycles described above. It was easier to be optimistic about concretised CIPs reported 
as aggregated figures than it might have been about hypothetical savings described with all 
their uncertainties. This contributed to the early optimism and – when those CIPs failed – later 
pessimism and panic (see p.116). 
Particularly outside Dryas, other practices complemented packaging. Organisations drew on 
constructing the good organisation: deploying transformational discourses to represent 
organisations as capable of radical change. This was iterated differently across sites. Within 
Transforming Thyme, it was used in an aspirational manner which contrasted significantly with 
-194- 
 
the short-termism of packaging. At Aloe, it frequently referred to Aloe’s literal creation and 
unfinished state, latterly adopting a negative tone. Either way, constructing presented an 
alternative image of the future: rather than simply filling ‘bridges’, it recast organisations as 
subject to transformation. Whereas bridges and CIPs assumed an organisation’s broad 
financial parameters were fixed, constructing suggested it could be a different organisation 
altogether. 
Problematising savings 
All sites saw such savings objects resisted. Not only were they resisted by the world – as when 
they could not be made into real savings – but also by those who doubted their reality. 
Tensions were marked in organisations where both packaging and constructing the good 
organisation were important. Without necessarily contradicting one another, they implied 
different aspirations for the future and different allocations of scarce resources. 
Transforming Thyme exemplifies this (see pp.149-151). Some working there felt more direct 
CIP-savings programmes regrettably short-termist. However, operational staff increasingly saw 
the programme as not engaging with the realities of the day. At one project meeting with 
operational managers present, participants discussed the programme’s future structure: 
A senior operational manager recalled a ‘lively’ discussion at a recent 
meeting of another workstream. It had been suggested they might convene 
a panel of senior clinicians to lead across the programme. One could bring 
anything there; the manager listed some things. Within this list, they said 
‘Not [developmental Transforming Thyme workstream]; [they’ll] take up the 
whole thing…Transforming Thyme could come along and – talk’. (Fieldnotes 
paraphrase) 
This meeting occurred at a time when Transforming Thyme’s status was becoming less clear. 
The manager says, after a pause, that the programme staff could merely ‘talk’, and warns that 
one of their more developmental workstreams would ‘take up the whole [meeting]’ with their 
words. Here, the programme’s supposed ‘transformation’ is cast as mere words, not the 
concrete savings others might offer. Transforming Thyme’s possibilities of a good organisation 
are presented as far from real. As Transforming Thyme’s eventual fate illustrates, this tension 
between packaging and constructing the good organisation could be vital to organisations’ 
development. 
Where not deconstructing one another’s differing visions of future savings, these practices still 
faced resistance. Juxtaposing savings objects with familiarity was common across sites. Often 
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interacting with other subpractices of constructing possibilities, juxtaposing was defined by 
ironically comparing savings objects associated with planning with more familiar realities. One 
Dryas interviewee observed that ‘when I talk about the finance…it seems to pervade all but 
actually that’s not our business…our business is the – the people that walk into our resource 
centres who need looking after’. To this interviewee, even their own description of savings 
objects seemed to miss the point: the point was ‘people’ needing ‘looking after’. 
Such critiques were mobilised on a higher level to rebuff broader narratives of possible 
savings. 
We’re getting to a stage where we expect – we’re building our financial 
models and our budgets based on teams being able to run a perfect game 
every single day of the year, which just isn’t realistic. Like sometimes I get 
out of bed and I feel I’m productive and sometimes I’m less productive. 
Humans are not robots; and stuff happens, stuff goes wrong, people, you 
know you have snow [points upwards] and people can’t get into work and 
you could say, ‘We’re not – we’re going to plan that there will never be 
snow for, that no one will ever pregnant or that there will never be any 
sickness’. 
This interviewee criticised planning objects like ‘models’ and ‘budgets’ as inadequately 
accounting for the esoteric variations inherent to people. By invoking the domestic 
environment (‘sometimes I get out of bed’), they encouraged an understanding of people as 
situated humans with personal lives, not units of labour on a spreadsheet. Rather than being a 
calculation, even ‘productiv[ity]’ is reframed as a ‘feel[ing]’, something dependent on personal 
not organisational drivers. Indexical language (‘stuff goes wrong’) operates at a level of 
vagueness which eludes extremes of planning. ‘Stuff’ cannot be pinned down enough to be 
rationalised; rather a generalised latitude for the unusual, esoteric and human is necessary. 
Generalised planning is cast as excluding familiar realities. 
The resistance packaging and constructing the good organisation faced from juxtaposing and 
one another affected organisations’ development. Clashes between multiple visions of 
potential futures could make it difficult for the programmes they embodied to survive intact. 
Meanwhile, appeals to the familiar could successfully destabilise hypothetical savings. 
Managers that avoided additional savings responsibilities during Dryas’s Senior Scrutiny often 
invoked their division’s esoteric circumstances (p.120). Constructing possibility helped 
organisations believe in a viable financial future; but at the expense of disputes and unstable 




The potential savings thereby constructed made some anxious about possible negative 
consequences for healthcare quality. This concern promoted reconfiguring quality across 
organisational sites. This practice reshaped the meaning of healthcare quality to reconcile it 
with potential cost reductions.  
Quality across sites 
All organisations extensively reconfigured quality, albeit differently. Dryas significantly 
emphasised blurring quality and cost: representing financial savings as aligned with – even 
indistinguishable from – quality improvements. One manager described the relation between 
quality and cost thus: 
The processes are quality, which means that the product at the end is a 
quality product but it also means that – once your processes are quality, 
then quality is free and mistakes cost money. So failures – not getting it right 
first time; it needs rework; it needs constant massaging and a system to 
make it work and things like that. So, in the NHS, there’s almost this thing 
that quality costs money…quality isn’t a gold bar versus a lead bar; it’s what 
you need when you need it, first time every time. (Interview, Dryas) 
Quality and cost are here aligned as joint outcomes of ‘quality’ ‘processes’. Conversely, 
‘failures’, ‘not getting it right first time’, and ‘rework’ are affiliated with one another. Quality 
and cost impacts are listed together as joint consequences of a third value, process efficacy. In 
linguistic terms, their ‘meaning relations’ are configured to frame them as co-hyponyms, or 
joint instances of a wider set. In this instance, both are consequences of good processes. 
Conversely, ‘quality’ is represented as an ‘antonym’ – opposite – of ‘mistakes’. Conceptualised 
as the absence of costly process errors, seeing quality as ‘free’ makes sense. In this context, 
quality and cost are blurred as joint consequences of process efficacy. 
Blurring suited Dryas’s emotionally engaged attitude to quality: it was generally unacceptable 
to staff, including top management, not to actively prioritise quality. If quality improvements 
could be construed as aligned with financial savings, pursuing such savings accorded with 
Dryas’s values. 
Thyme initially also emphasised blurring. Yet blurring’s optimism soon seemed misplaced 
(p.146): marrying quality and cost no longer seemed possible. An alternative practice became 
prominent: satisficing and instrumentalising quality. This involved casting quality not as a goal, 
but a necessary minimum. Linguistically, it often involved ‘contrastive’ meaning relations, 
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those casting things as opposed. One Aloe manager observed that ‘it’s been drilled into me 
since I started you know, cost improvements, looking at opportunities to save money but 
without impacting the service delivery’. Here ‘impacting the service delivery’ potentially 
conflicts with ‘cost improvements’. The narrative is not that both quality and cost will improve, 
but that, with due caution, costs can fall without quality following suit.  
Satisficing grew especially prominent at Thyme when claims that quality and cost could be 
simultaneously improved lost credibility. However, it became popular across sites, with ‘safety’ 
(harm avoidance) increasingly quality advocates’ focus. At Thyme, satisficing quality seemed – 
temporarily – a more plausible alternative to blurring. 
Yet soon even these quality minima seemed under strain (p.151). With neither satisficing nor 
blurring persuasive, Thyme managers increasingly deployed de-valuation, the denial of a 
question’s moral nature. This was exemplified by one manager’s observation that ‘[we’re] all 
trying to stick within a budget…right or wrong [is a different question]’. The normative 
language of ‘right or wrong’ is explicitly side-lined: budgets are facts of life, not choices to be 
morally evaluated.  
De-valuation was also achieved by replacing the language of moral concern with that of 
preference. In Thyme and Dryas, requested savings were latterly described as ‘unpalatable’, a 
term used nationally to euphemise quality or access reduction (pp.127; 152). Whereas such 
concerns might be considered in terms of whether they are right or wrong, this language 
recasts them on a spectrum from pleasant to distasteful: an ethical question becomes an 
aesthetic one. Where moral decisions became exceptionally difficult, de-valuation became a 
means of escape. 
De-valuation thus made sense when Thyme found it ever harder to save without quality 
consequences. It was also prominent within Aloe, where managers often characterised 
requests for resources in terms of complainants’ dearth of understanding, not the presence of 
a substantive need: there was no ‘magic money tree’. De-valuation appealed to a senior 
hierarchy keen to emphasise Aloe’s ‘commercial’ nature and separation from Garrya’s 
troubles. 
Quality across time 
The previous subsection notes how the balance of reconfiguring quality’s subpractices shifted 
in Thyme over time: initial blurring became satisficing, then de-valuation, each responding to 
resistance to its predecessor. Thyme was not alone in such transformations. Dryas followed a 
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comparable path. As described, its practice was dominated by blurring, which stayed 
important throughout. However, as Dryas entered Senior Scrutiny and sought additional 
savings, it became less possible to select those with the most positive quality implications: 
satisficing became more plausible. Yet it soon emerged that existing mechanisms of satisficing 
– like QIAs – were functioning poorly, and further savings may be needed: de-valuation too 
became prominent. 
Conversely, de-valuation was prominent in Aloe throughout, driven by a desire for separation 
from Garrya’s moral complexity. As this seemed decreasingly possible (p.172), managers 
addressed these dilemmas more directly. Satisficing grew in prominence as managers began to 
address them, emphasising the quality minima Aloe should ensure. Figure 10.3 illustrates 
these patterns. 
 
Figure 10.3 – Reconfiguring quality across periods. N.b. periods were defined within each case. 
This highlights two features of reconfiguring quality Chapter 6 omits. First, conceptions of 
quality were generally unstable within sites. While Aloe’s above look deceptively stable, this 
masks the fact that Aloe’s rank-and-file generally differed from its senior hierarchy about their 
quality responsibilities. Across sites, conceptions of quality changed across periods observed. 
Second, while these change processes differed depending on organisations’ choices, 
circumstances and ingoing ethos (p.185), they generally moved away from blurring towards 
de-valuation, often combined with satisficing. As financial pressure bites, moral disputes 
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associated with quality-cost balances seem progressively harder to engage with and tempting 
to evade. 
Reconfiguring quality reconciles with prevailing quality compromises some of the changes 
constructing possibility suggests. Yet this comes at the expense of altering those 
compromises’ meanings. Organisations thus find themselves with ever-shifting quality 
bargains. Collectively, organisations tend towards a thinner conception of quality more based 
around harm avoidance (‘safety’) than maximising benefit. 
Conducting and contesting financial tests 
The above practices configured the situations, objects and value formations financial 
evaluations mobilised. Yet this does not suggest that those tests could be carried out 
undisputed. Across sites, conducting and contesting financial tests captured attempts to 
evaluate people or things on financial grounds and to avert such evaluation. These tests and 
contests proved vital to organisations’ development. 
Tests and transformation 
Examining these mechanisms alongside the processes observed above highlights their 
importance to organisations’ development. Where attempts to question an evaluative 
approach succeeded, this could precipitate profound organisational change. At Dryas, CIPs 
were frequently critiqued or disputed precisely because of their organisational importance. 
This precipitated a series of small changes in their management. As these proliferated, and 
CIPs seemed less stable tests, larger changes resulted. The Projects Office began reporting 
financial bottom lines alongside CIPs which became supplemented by Senior Scrutiny actions. 
CIPs progressively seemed less robust and all-encompassing than before, no longer a ‘magic 
bullet’ for financial improvement. Dryas eventually eschewed such managerialist savings, 
preferring fewer, more strategic priorities. 
Thyme began with such a strategic approach. Transforming Thyme entailed the type of longer-
term cross-cutting priorities Dryas determined to develop. However, as financial pressure 
grew, Thyme became keener for short-term financial savings, which Transforming Thyme 
struggled to evidence. It approached the world through a longer-term, more developmental 
paradigm; nor did it robustly collect short-term financial benefit data. Just as Dryas’s CIPs 
inadequately grasped the turbulent world it faced, so Transforming Thyme could not grasp the 
landscape of short-term financial imperatives senior managers now apprehended. This 
eventually precipitated the significant restructure towards the managerialist PMO model the 
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programme once eschewed. Thyme moved away from strategic, towards managerialist 
savings. 
Comparing conducting and contesting financial tests across these sites emphasises that we 
are not dealing here with a natural progression from managerialist to strategic savings (Hood 
and Wright, 1981; Kelly, 1989; Levine, 1979, 1985; Pollitt, 2010). Rather, austerity makes it 
exceptionally difficult for any single financial measurement regime to adequately capture its 
complexity. This leaves such regimes open to critique, prompting destabilising adjustments. 
Shifts in the ‘types of savings’ sought are often better understood as shifts in predominant 
measurement regimes. Instability among these appears likely, as austerity’s turbulent 
demands are exceptionally difficult for any regime to wholly grasp. 
Shaping contests 
Chapter 6 described the subpractices of conducting and contesting financial tests. Configuring 
tested actors negotiated roles within an evaluation, particularly identifying and disputing the 
actor to be tested: is this a departmental issue, or an organisational one? Differentiating the 
tested applied criteria or measures to such actors to determine their worth, prompting 
disputes about those criteria themselves. As senior actors grew tired of such critiques, 
enforcing and averting tests involved their authoritatively imposing tests regardless others’ 
opinions; in response others might withhold information or other material facilitating such 
tests. Finally, asserting and contesting test centrality described disputing tests’ importance 
itself: something might be accurately evaluated, but was it central? Each engagement 
emphasises and contests a different element of these tests. 
In different sites, different elements were most vigorously contested. Dryas, in attempting to 
amend its financial management system to adequately capture austerity’s complexity used 
differentiating the tested particularly intensively. It created a plurality of new evaluative forms, 
whose novelty left them vulnerable to contestation. When this contestation came, managers 
often responded by altering those forms, perpetuating the critique differentiating the tested 
involves. Continually altering evaluative forms made them less stable. 
Perhaps attempting to avoid such destabilisation, Thyme instead refused to alter its approach 
during the budgetary process. Instead, it simply asked its divisions for their predicted savings 
until more favourable answers emerged. The test remained consistent but was repeated. 
While this helped it become established, its repetition questioned whether any one iteration 
thereof really mattered. Extensive asserting and contesting test centrality occurred. Thyme 
avoided one type of instability at the expense of another. 
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Meanwhile, Aloe’s novelty made well established evaluative forms scarce, while its significant 
savings targets changed. This made justifying targets tricky, eventually leaving managers 
simply asserting and enforcing tests not otherwise accepted. Asserting and evading tests was 
more important at Aloe than elsewhere (p.170). They thus sidestepped the need for consensus 
about their evaluative frames’ propriety, but at the expense of increasing internal mistrust and 
reduced flows of information. Organisations appeared able to influence the type of resistance 
their evaluative approaches faced; but resistance itself seemed perennial. 
These practices substantially overlapped and interrelated. When critique destabilised a test, 
organisations often responded by altering it, opening new avenues for criticism. Successful 
critiques of a means of differentiating the tested sometimes left managers enforcing the test 
they could no longer easily justify. More generally, tweaking tests often made them feel less 
stable and established, making all resistance more viable. No matter where an organisation’s 
greatest disputes lay, conducting and contesting financial tests’ four subpractices were 
mutually reinforcing. 
Reshaping engagements 
Conducting and contesting financial tests destabilised the evaluative mechanisms 
underpinning coordination; while reconfiguring quality complicated those tests’ underpinning 
values. Combined, this left staff operating in a profoundly uncertain context. As Chapter 6 
details (p.104), reshaping engagements describes their efforts to coordinate despite the 
failure of traditional structures. 
New structures 
Organisations attempted to restore order in three ways (see Chapter 6). Some attempted to 
re-structure savings plans: to create new organisational units or fora to monitor and govern 
savings (or deconstruct older ones). This was particularly prominent in Dryas and Aloe. The 
former had created an obvious ‘savings unit’ in its Projects Office, which worked continually to 
establish itself. Aloe itself represented a new unit created as existing structures struggled. 
Seeking tax advantages and a new ‘commercial’ relationship between former departments, it 
forged a new organisation. This new organisation’s commercial ethos was to fit Garrya’s new 
situation. While restructuring was less prominent in Thyme, Transforming Thyme also 
exemplified responding to erstwhile governance systems’ insufficiency with new units. 
While these units doubtless did many things well, they were created in difficult circumstances. 
Novel and hurriedly assembled, they could augment the uncertainty they intended to 
dissipate. Such units’ role boundaries often remained unclear. Dryas’s Projects Office’s remit 
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seemed to progressively broaden. Its governing logic was of generic capability in project 
management and a belief cost was intimately connected to other factors. With finance so 
organisationally prominent, its remit grew. This was partly desired (e.g. early gains in 
responsibility for quality work), but partly unsought (e.g. increasing responsibility for reporting 
the overall financial position). Conversely, Transforming Thyme struggled to articulate a clear 
identity for itself coherent with Thyme’s strategic priorities, precipitating a curtailment of its 
autonomy. Savings units struggled to maintain clear boundaries. With austerity an increasingly 
central issue, units designed to address it risk becoming everything or nothing. 
Aloe Managers described comparable uncertainties in their boundary with Garrya. Yet equally 
important were internal disputes over how Aloe should make decisions. In one characteristic 
incident, managers disagreed over whether old organisation charts or Aloe’s contracts with 
Garrya should determine a unit’s staffing. Not only external boundaries but internal principles 
of coordination became unclear. 
The uncertainty these structures faced left them open to critique. Changes of leadership were 
common because units’ hurried setup often necessitated temporary contracts. New staff 
tended to politely criticise the structures they entered: as one Dryas manager said, ‘let’s forget 
the past and talk about good governance’. Accordingly, re-structuring savings plans could 
become cyclical. New structures created to manage austerity pressures were then themselves 
serially tweaked under criticism or the pressures of austerity. Frequently changing structures 
contributed to the problems of unstable tests described in conducting and contesting and 
made it harder for relationships to mature. Rather than resolving problems of coordination 
created by austerity, restructuring seemed to perpetuate them. 
New relationships 
With new and old structures struggling, it was tempting to bypass formal structures altogether. 
Across sites, but particularly in Dryas, familiarising coordination became important. When Dryas 
managers determined that existing structures were not working, they wanted to get staff ‘in the 
room’ to discuss projects. As the Projects Office grew, they were increasingly incited to have 
more ‘touch’ with projects. Senior staff increasingly described making judgements based on gut 
intuitions. That this was most prominent in Dryas was unsurprising. Dryas had a more 
interpersonal ethos; and its formal systems received criticism for their lack of familiarity 
(juxtaposing savings objects with familiarity). Addressing failing formality by looking to the 
familiar was appealing. 
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This strategy sometimes succeeded but tended to be hardest where most needed. Staff in 
financially struggling divisions found attempts to ‘get closer’ to them invasive. In Dryas, 
Projects Office staff expressed bemusement at one division’s reluctance to engage more 
closely. Yet given the significant scrutiny this division faced over its spending, this was 
unsurprising. Nor were more intimate, interpersonal cues always viewed as reliable. One 
manager described a colleague crying in a meeting, casting this as a ploy to reduce their 
savings obligations. With close relationships and emotional signals distrusted, intimate 
coordination was difficult. This distrust was only greater where restructuring savings plans had 
intensified formal governance. 
New moral domains 
Absent effective coordination, and with organisational values less clear (see reconfiguring, 
pp.196-199), moral separation became prominent. This practice describes people separating 
their own moral domains from those elsewhere in an organisation, avoiding outright dispute 
and facilitating more local coordination. Sometimes, staff simply avoided raising potentially 
contentious issues. One Dryas interviewee described ‘very little open and honest discussion’ 
because divisional staff ‘feel…silenced’. This view was not universal, but Dryas and Thyme staff 
seemed reluctant to raise controversial issues, particularly those surrounding cost-quality 
trade-offs. 
Groups could also engage in moral separation by segregating their normative projects from 
those of a wider group. Dryas’s senior management activated this practice in creating an 
‘internal fairness’ narrative to justify actions associated with ‘unfair’ austerity. Departments 
used similar devices to dissociate from organisational objectives. This enabled departmental 
coordination precisely by distinguishing themselves from wider austerity projects. 
These cases reveal moral separation as often vital to organisations’ stories. Staff responsible 
for savings sometimes separated themselves from quality considerations. It became 
‘something for someone else to worry about really’. This was facilitated by nationally 
mandated QIAs. Managers responsible for finances often invoked these or divisional staff as 
guardians of quality, meaning it need not be their routine focus. When nonfinancial priorities 
were introduced to financial fora, managers tried to justify them in financial terms. Staff 
wished to discuss those issues, but some fora made it feel inappropriate. 
Managers separating themselves from quality considerations did not assert that those 
considering quality did so without regard to finances. Nevertheless, it is important to 
emphasise how influenced by financial considerations those assessing quality seemed to be. 
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With the supposed guardians of quality having senior managers’ financial considerations 
‘playing as a script’ in their minds, or always ‘carrying that context’, quality and cost 
considerations were not neatly segmented into different domains. Instead, there was an 
uneven segmentation, in which some domains consider both quality and finance, others 
finance alone. This influences how balances between them are struck: it effectively delegates 
challenging value-laden decisions to those fora managers described as covering quality 
considerations.  
Making do 
Sites were unanimous in presenting instances of strain where comparatively junior staff were 
left resolving major issues when traditional coordinative approaches had failed. While the 
above three mechanisms sometimes resolved these failures, often they did not. Indeed, they 
could conflict with one another, as when new, strict governance regimes (restructuring) 
undermined the trust familiarising coordination relied upon. Such circumstances saw staff 
marry the inconsistency to address the situation. This practice relates to resolving conflicting 
or unclear goals in which successful coordination seems impossible. Like reshaping overall, 
marrying was particularly prominent in Aloe, whose nascent structures and resource scarcity 
predisposed to such difficulties. 
Notwithstanding staff’s ingenuity in marrying the circumstances they found, these cases 
demonstrated this was getting harder. The importance of ‘goodwill’ time was common across 
organisations. But such ‘goodwill’ was becoming harder to come by. This was not simply 
because staff were becoming less willing. One manager in a clinical area described doing the 
equivalent of two roles to maintain good service. But they worried: ‘I don’t have a succession 
plan. I don’t know if there’s anybody who wants to take my job’. They also doubted how long 
they could continue their current workrate. Organisations were already losing staff and 
struggling to recruit replacements. 
This had serious implications. The manager above described what would happen without their 
extra hours: 
It would be chaos because staff would feel very uncomfortable, unsafe, 
unsupported, which then would permeate throughout the patients. The 
patients would feel this uncertainty, you know, unsupported, you know, 
uncomfortableness with staff. You have to work like this if you’re to deliver 
a really good service. (Interview, Dryas) 
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The cost of working only one’s hours was the ‘chaos’ and ‘uncertainty’ extra work otherwise 
contained. This threat of ‘chaos’ was ever-present. When Aloe’s finance managers lacked 
resources to meet their obligations, they were forced to make prioritisation decisions for 
which they were ill-equipped. This precipitated chaotic decisions which one manager 
described as funding whoever ‘shout[s] loudest’ (p.168). When Dryas managed the ‘beds 
crisis’, it faced what one manager called the ‘normal chaos’ of scrambling to find beds. As 
inconsistencies proved impossible to sustainably marry, such activity increased. 
This meant that a considerable proportion of marrying became the emotional work of simply 
getting by in environments of uncertainty and moral jeopardy. Staff regularly observed ‘the 
impossible thing we’re trying to square’. Black humour became commonplace as staff 
attempted to defuse the anxiety such decisions brought. One Dryas interviewee described 
‘paralysis’ coming from the increasingly financial focus of their work.  
With evaluative mechanisms failing (conducting and contesting) and values decreasingly fixed 
(reconfiguring), staff variously attempted to regain stability. This was sometimes possible. 
Where coordination continued to fail, marrying the inconsistency became central to 
reshaping. But short-term, ad hoc solutions and informal work made longer-term planning 
harder, further destabilising efforts to understand the situation. This only made attaining 
tenuous futures harder, reinforcing the practice which started this Chapter. 
Conclusion: modelling austerity management 
The subsections above use processual analysis and inter-case comparison to provide more 
developed, dynamic accounts of the practices Chapter 6 introduces.  
They thus highlight these practices’ interrelations and how they develop a mutually reinforcing 
system. Austerity pressures precipitated attaining. To fill the gaps attaining’s budgeting 
processes left, constructing possibility concretised hypothetical ideas into savings objects. As 
these possibilities, and the need to save itself, threatened erstwhile compromises around 
quality, organisations reconfigured quality to make it compatible with such savings. This fed 
into the possibilities which could be constructed, which in turn enabled corresponding 
financial tests to be conducted and contested. Yet all this still precipitated instability, as the 
resistance these practices met from the world and from other people was significant. This 




From this account and those preceding in this Chapter, Figure 10.4 models the interrelations 
between these practices.  
 
Figure 10.4 – Austerity management practices 
The model and the rest of this Part highlight practices which cut across organisations despite 
their differing circumstances. Strikingly, each organisation constructed comparable crises 
through attaining tenuous futures despite differing financial states. While the futures they 
foresaw sometimes differed, each invested significant work in constructing possibilities. The 
different possibilities they constructed shaped different financial tests, but each of those 
financial tests was similarly conducted and contested. Organisations anxious about quality 
found different ways to reconcile themselves to savings. But all reconfigured quality variously 
over the period. Across differing organisations, sectors, and levels of financial stress, staff 
found traditional means of coordination undermined, leaving them reshaping engagements. 
Despite sites’ variations, these engagements consistently formed interrelated elements of 
austerity management practice. 
Yet these five core practices are not homogeneous. As this Chapter emphasises, each 
comprises multiple sub-practices in mutual tension. As Thévenot predicts, interventions meet 
a resistant world. The sub-practices identified stress that austerity sees that resistance become 
particularly stern. As the circular arrows illustrate, each box of Figure 10.4 is a site of resistance 















packaging savings objects, constructing the good organisation and juxtaposing savings objects 
with familiarity. Such dynamics mean no element of this cycle is reliably stable. 
This chapter highlights this instability within our five core practices. Each organisation 
reconfigured quality in different ways across the periods observed (p.197). Their patterns of 
change differed; but each changed, and each change was driven by resistance to earlier 
approaches. Processual and comparative analysis highlight similar propensities for tension or 
change across the practices reviewed. 
The interconnections between these unstable engagements means that they destabilise one 
another. Uncertain but demanding financial situations (attaining) precipitate contentious 
savings objects (constructing possibility). Yet their contentiousness exposes them to disputes 
which can discredit them, making attaining tenuous futures once again more uncertain. There 
are dialectic instabilities between many of our core practices. 
The cases 
Notwithstanding that Figure 10.4 emphasises cases’ consistencies, it also helps understand and 
anticipate their differences. The austerity management literature normally highlights three 
inter-organisational differences: i) broad approaches to austerity; ii) types of savings sought; 
and iii) outcomes achieved. This model helps explain these. 
Approaches to austerity 
As explained above, Thyme’s movement from ‘strategic’ to ‘managerialist’ savings and Dryas’s 
opposite journey can be explained by the same dynamic. Austerity programmes were expected 
to help their organisations navigate austerity’s turbulent waters. Yet each struggled to grasp 
the totality thereof. Transforming Thyme did not fit the developing urgency for short-term 
savings, precipitating its more managerialist restructure. Yet where Dryas already had such a 
PMO in its Projects Office, tracking myriad savings projects became both too difficult to 
achieve and insufficient to grasp austerity’s complex dynamics. Dryas thus yearned for a more 
manageable focus on fewer, more ‘strategic’, schemes. Both units failed to conduct and 
contest financial tests that accounted holistically for the austere realities senior managers 
perceived, precipitating reshaping engagements. 
Types of savings 
Sites sought different types of savings. Thyme was ecumenical in its attitude to savings: if 
bottom lines added up, the centre was relaxed about how this was achieved. Conversely, Aloe 
strove to create clear, measurable savings meeting CIP definitions, deprioritising other types.  
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This contrast sprang from the different prevalence of constructing possibility. Constructing 
possibility created an imperative towards constructing clear savings ‘objects’. It was least 
prevalent at Thyme, but strong at Aloe. Here, the need to construct was enforced by 
accounting structures that prevented Aloe from financially benefitting from savings they could 
not clearly demonstrate. Accordingly, for Aloe’s finances, demonstrating CIPs could be as 
important as savings themselves. Thus did an organisation in significant financial stress 
respond by contracting the range of savings it focused on. Across sites one might thus expect 
austerity to increase focus on conceptually plausible, simple, easily measurable savings. As this 
comparison demonstrates, we should expect this to be strongest where constructing 
possibility is strongest. 
Outcomes 
No organisation achieved continual, consistent stability. Yet they differed in the extent and site 
of the instability affecting them. Dryas’s financial governance was destabilised by criticisms 
and replacement of its means of financial measurement. Its rebudgeting and many methods of 
financial measurement seemed to help close divisions’ budgetary gaps, but at the expense of 
preventing budgets and measurements becoming well established as meaningful measures. 
They better attained tenuous futures in the short term but destabilised their financial tests. 
Conversely, Thyme refused to continually alter its budgetary measurement or to rebudget. 
They preferred to repeatedly ask divisions the same budgetary question until favourable 
answers emerged, filling in-year gaps with bailouts. This consistency apparently arrested 
instability in financial measurement (conducting and containing financial tests). But continual 
bailouts and repeated evaluations left divisions unsure that financial urgency was real or that 
any one iteration of the budget would turn out to be the important one. The situation grew 
more contested (attaining).  
Aloe’s instability was perhaps most challenging because it focused on Aloe itself. Hurriedly 
created to enable a ‘commercial’ logic, it found its boundaries unclear and decision-making 
procedures contested. By radically reshaping itself under austerity, Aloe’s own identity 
became unstable. Creating new units and organisations under austerity appears risky. 
The model thus helps us understand the types of uncertainty from which organisations under 
austerity suffer and highlights the consequences of attempts to stabilise any one element. 
Organisations appeared sometimes able to successfully limit instability in one domain, but at 




Reflections on prior theory 
Emphasising the destabilisation of measurement devices, values and evaluation, this analysis 
already highlights Thévenot’s (2001b) relevance. Part 5 will develop and explore this further. 
Therefore, this section emphasises only some of this analysis’s consequences for austerity 
management research. 
First, austerity management literature often bases its analyses on organisations’ own 
budgetary or financial data. Chapter 2 (p.30) theoretically demonstrated that this was 
problematised by organisational data’s instability under austerity. This research confirms and 
amplifies this argument. Not only are the ‘accountancy wheezes’ already highlighted 
(Gainsbury, 2017; Pandey, 2010) strongly present, but even apparently concrete savings are 
shaped by strategic optimism. This is not a question of organisation-level inaccuracies that a 
large enough sample can ‘even out’. Such data are distorted by national factors like STF 
rewards. Research based on such data will be systematically misguided. 
Second, writers highlight a lack of deterioration in quality, often through interview-based 
studies. Unexpectedly, this research identifies a destabilisation of and contraction in what 
‘quality’ means under austerity. ‘Quality’s meaning today may differ from its meaning ten 
years ago. Assuming its meaning was constant could lead to false conclusions based on 
interviewees describing ‘quality’ remaining robust. Austerity destabilises normative referents. 
Third, writing about the austerity management process characterises changes in austerity 
management approaches as smooth and progressive. This research suggests that they are 
neither. Rather, it describes a multidirectional macro-level movement between across-the-
board, managerialist and strategic approaches as chosen approaches prove incapable of 
grasping the full complexity of austerity’s reality. Yet by getting closer to the ground than most 
predecessors, highlights the frequent lower-level changes in management and measurement. 
The picture is not one of gradual progress, but of frequent, choppy, uncertain multidirectional 
changes which occasionally amount to the structural change higher-level studies perceive. 
Theory and questions 
The foregoing paragraphs emphasise what this model already tells us. Equally importantly it 
implies three avenues for better explanation. These set an agenda for Part 5, which enriches 
the practices and model found so far by theorising it through RE (Thévenot, 2001b). 
First, the cases demonstrate that these organisations rely on situations shaped by internal 
discursive and material work; and by national policy and discourse. Key texts like the Carter 
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review substantially influenced austerity management in sites like Thyme. Across 
organisations, NHS budgetary rules, particularly around control totals were important to 
attaining tenuous futures’ pathological features. To adequately theorise these dynamics, we 
must i) better understand NHS policy discourse, and ii) theorise how discursive work shapes 
one’s situation. Thévenot is deeply interested in such situations but does not theorise how 
those situations are discursively constructed. Doing so alongside NHS policy discourse becomes 
our first task. 
Second, this model emphasises the role of situational uncertainty and attempts to manage it. 
Attaining’s presentation of financial circumstances, constructing possibility’s account of latent 
potential and reconfiguring quality’s various presentation of extant cost-quality compromises 
all shape how situations are seen. All are themselves beset by uncertainty, resistance and 
instability. Thévenot’s work focuses on apprehensions of situations, ways of stabilising the 
same and the types of resistance and uncertainty they bring. Theorising this model through his 
lens becomes our second task. 
Third, there is striking instability in these cases’ financial evaluations, and the organisational 
structures through which they are conducted. These are vital to determining organisations’ 
responses to austerity, and how they are enacted. Evaluations – or tests – are equally central 
to Thévenot’s analysis. And the various ways people reshape engagements can be incisively 
understood in terms of the distinctions between the regimes of justification, planning and 
familiarity. Better theorising these interconnections will be vital to austerity management. 
Doing so becomes our third task. 
Part 5 addresses these tasks by drawing theoretical conclusions from our model and the data 
supporting it. Chapter 11 investigates how national dynamics shape local situations. Chapter 
12 examines the uncertainty characterising austere situations and attempts to stabilise them. 
Chapter 13 interrogates evolving financial tests and corresponding forms of engagement in 
austere organisations. Combined, these developments utilise Thévenot’s thinking to theorise 




Part 5 – Theorising austerity management 
Chapter 11: Situating work 
Introduction 
The foregoing chapters demonstrate empirically that organisational practices and processes 
are driven by more than those organisations’ immediate material circumstances. Austerity 
management seemed shaped also by how people characterised those circumstances, and the 
national policy factors they invoked in doing so. Accordingly, Chapter 10 concluded that it was 
important for us to understand i) that national discourse, and ii) how people shape the 
circumstances deemed part of their situation. This chapter addresses these requirements. 
We start with the observation that EW/RE should be well adjusted to the latter end. This 
perspective emphasises the situation and explains that different situations render different 
types of principles appropriate (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Situations can therefore be 
formatted to make them more or less appropriate to given principles or regimes, thereby 
avoiding uncertainty. On face, EW/RE should be well adapted to conceptualising how 
situations are discursively shaped and why this appears to have such consequences for our 
cases. 
Yet, puzzlingly, EW/RE’s theory of discourse’s role in shaping such situations remains implicit. 
The theory is acutely aware that language matters, acknowledging that no such thing as a 
‘pure’ situation outwith any ‘report’ can exist (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Nevertheless, 
perhaps nervous of neglecting EW/RE’s acknowledgment of materiality’s importance, 
empirical work investigating how situations’ are shaped focuses resolutely on the material (e.g. 
Dionne et al., 2019). Nor does Thévenot’s own work elaborate these discursive ‘report[ing]’ 
processes. While EW/RE is well suited to understanding how situations are shaped, empirical 
and theoretical work is needed to conceptualise this. 
This chapter undertakes that work, demonstrating more theoretically how this ‘situating work’ 
occurs, and considering its dynamics. Thus can remaining chapters then begin with the premise 
that situating work matters and insights about how it occurs. As the cases above demonstrate, 
this perspective is important to further theorising austerity management. To provide valuable 
supplementary empirical insights, this Chapter theorises this work through the example of UK 
healthcare austerity discourse and policy, 2008-18. My aim here is not to rehearse previous 
chapters’ elaboration of how organisational actors use such national discourse within 
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organisations, but to use the national debate as a case through which to theorise situating 
work. 
Doing so is necessary to conceptualising some practices observed above. This is true of efforts 
to locate organisations within existential threats (attaining tenuous futures), construct savings 
objects (constructing possibility) or modulate the meanings of quality compromises 
(reconfiguring quality). This Chapter therefore focuses on these three practices. Recognising 
the national debate as a public dispute, the Chapter locates itself within the EW literature, a 
parsimonious way of operationalising RE in such circumstances. It conceptualises situating 
work and highlights the discursive practices associated with it. These correspond to elements 
of the practices listed above. 
It proceeds in four sections. First, it recalls the EW/RE literature, and its treatment of the 
situation and theoretically considers its discursive shaping. Second, it reports and analyses the 
national case of UK healthcare austerity, 2008-18. Third, it reflects on what this means 
conceptually for the EW and RE literature. Finally, it adds brief conclusions about UK 
healthcare austerity and its interconnections with organisational work. 
Conceptualising the situation 
Situatedness is EW’s strength, but also its weakness. Attempts to conceptualise social action 
often present excessively individualistic or excessively collective accounts of people’s 
motivation and action (Diaz-Bone, 2011). Individualist accounts common to domains like 
orthodox economics imagine motivations as inhering in the individual. Insofar as there are 
social values, they are shared because individuals with similar interests share similar motives. 
In these accounts, aggregated individuals present a full picture of society. There is no space for 
truly social action or motivations, creating an unsatisfactory picture of a world which involves 
movements and processes irreducible to individual interests. 
Others conceptualise values as ‘social norms’, shared among societies or collectives. These 
norms exist beyond individuals and are taken to explain their action. Workers are sometimes 
described as acting according to ‘institutional logics’ (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) explaining 
their choices as ‘members’ of a given organisation. While accommodating social action, such 
accounts struggle to explain why people’s preferences vary, or why groups adopt different 
priorities in different contexts. 
EW’s situatedness resolves this dilemma. By explaining disputes as situated action it avoids 
both excessive collectivism and individualism. Agency remains individual; but individuals share 
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a sense of what is situationally appropriate. People may freely invoke any principle to justify 
their views but know which ones others find contextually relevant (see p.50-51). Thus they will 
often use similar principles in similar situations, but because of individual agential choices. This 
situated approach explains shared values which individualistic approaches leave mysterious 
while maintaining agency better than accounts which subjugate people to ‘social norms’ or a 
unitary habitus. EW’s (and RE’s) situated nature is core to its theoretical advantages. 
Yet starting with the situation begs questions about where that situation originated. Discursive 
writers observe that situations are socially constructed (Grint, 2005). Rather than their existing 
patently in the world, we create situations by identifying circumstances, people and other 
factors as pertinent and interconnected. Different people facing the same bare facts perceive 
different situations. Today’s news makes manifest the distance between situations and reports 
thereof (Newman et al., 2017, pp.20–23): brute facts seem increasingly frail and how 
situations are communicated increasingly pertinent (Fairclough, 2000, p.165). Indeed, 
contemporary disputes often centre around situations of which multiple competing accounts 
exist (McCann, 2013).  
Yet most EW research does not focus on how such situations arise, instead taking the 
‘situation’ as its starting point. This misses half the story (Ramirez, 2013). Boltanski and 
Thévenot observe that the values deemed befitting a ‘situation’ depends on how its elements 
are arrayed: how they are configured and related. Thus how situations are arrayed can shape 
the values according to which decisions are made, and even whether disputes occur at all. 
Nor is the idea people ‘shape’ situations only academic speculation (Gond et al., 2016). 
Consider the executive who wants ‘transformational thinking’ so sets up an off-site ‘away day’ 
to precipitate it; or the manager who painstakingly prepares data to contextualise their 
department’s apparently questionable performance. Neither is (yet) involved in a dispute; but 
both work to ensure certain justifications seem apt should disputes arise. Their work precedes 
and shapes the situation. EW research leaves such work underanalysed. 
This omission matters because situations are central to EW. The work described above affects 
the objects in a situation, and how they are ‘arrayed’ (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006, p.140). It 
shapes the situation apprehended, and the justifications appearing apt. Understanding this 
work involves theorising both how a situation’s material circumstances come about; and how 
discursive processes shape those circumstances into situations.  
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Writers have begun the first of these (Ramirez, 2013). Dionne et al (2019, p.666) identify the 
‘evaluative moves’ in a series of disputes to ‘highlight the material dimension of the evaluation 
process’. Gilbert et al (2017) explore people’s preparation anticipating disputes. Investigating 
these material processes partially reveals what precedes and shapes disputes. 
The second, discursive development is equally necessary. One cannot respond to the situation 
‘out there’, but only to one’s perception thereof. Writers outside EW highlight that ‘situations’ 
themselves are selections of material circumstances seen as salient and interrelated (Grint, 
2005). They highlight some contextual facts, omitting others. The same brute facts thus 
produce various situations. Indeed, EW’s pluralism requires that given circumstances can be 
seen variously, according to differing worlds. In Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006, pp.139–140) 
terms, how a situation is perceived depends on how its constituent elements are linguistically 
‘arrayed’: 
The way the beings involved are arrayed is not defined apart from a report 
that records them, a transcript that sets down their presence and their 
relationships. It is impossible to imagine anything like a “pure situation” 
unrelated to any report. 
Such ‘reports’ are most prescient in situations partly communicated linguistically. The complex, 
public controversies EW scholars tend to analyse (e.g. Patriotta et al., 2011) exemplify such 
‘textually mediated’ situations (Fairclough, 2000, p.165). We know the details of public 
controversies because newspapers describe them. Executives know their corporation’s 
‘situation’ because middle managers report it. The details writers or speakers include and how 
they include them affect how those situations are perceived (Fairclough, 2003; Jones and 
Exworthy, 2015). Meaning-making (‘discourse’) shapes how these situations are perceived 
(Fairclough, 2015). 
With meaning-making central to recognising situations, one might expect two things. First, that 
EW scholars regularly analyse how proximal situations are discursively constructed. Yet such 
attempts are absent. Where we do analyse how language is used to construct disputes’ 
context, that context is macro-level: a ‘political regime’ (Nyberg et al., 2017, pp.162–164) not a 
specific situation (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002). Such ‘regimes’ are neither a substitute for 
analysing proximal situations nor an unproblematic avenue for EW: explaining situations in 
such macro-level terms risks returning to the ‘macro-social skeleton’ which conventionalism 
attempted to escape in the first place (Thévenot, 2014a). 
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Second, one might expect EW scholars to deploy nuanced linguistic methods to understand 
how situations are formed. Yet we instead tend to treat language as a more-or-less 
transparent medium for conveying meaning. Our analyses focus on who means what when, as 
opposed to how language was used to create those meanings (e.g. Nyberg et al., 2017; 
Patriotta et al., 2011; though see Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002). To understand how 
situations are shaped, we need the detailed language analysis Thévenot demands (Moody and 
Thévenot, 2000). 
This study is not the first to consider EW discursively. Diaz-Bone’s Foucauldian approaches 
explore deep structures implicit in worlds (e.g. Diaz-Bone, 2013). Others use forms of the CDA 
used here (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002; Nyberg et al., 2017). Yet others’ foci have tended to 
be considerably grander: whole ‘worlds’ or ‘regimes’. The more prosaic but theoretically vital 
question of how particular situations are shaped within individual EW disputes is surprisingly 
under-considered. 
Situations and healthcare austerity 
This chapter addresses this limitation by analysing how situations are shaped within a 
particular controversy: UK healthcare austerity 2008-18. Selected for reasons considered in 
Chapter 5, it represents an ideal, prolonged period through which to examine such 
transformations. Austerity is particularly suited to and demanding of this treatment because it 
is a complex situation subject to multiple contrasting descriptions (McCann, 2013). Through 
this case, this chapter identifies discursive practices which shape how this situation is 
perceived (Vaara et al., 2004).  
The methods used in this analysis are detailed in Chapter 5. Of the data described there, this 
analysis uses only the corpus of national texts (p.82). These were analysed using the full 
breadth of analytic resources Chapter 5 describes, including thematic and processual analyses. 
However, considerably more attention was given to discursive analysis here, including 
microlinguistic and corpus analytic techniques (p.87). The following sections narrate the 
progress of healthcare austerity, highlighting key discursive practices. 
Period I – Disputing efficiencies 
Following the 2008 financial crash, the then Labour Government increased borrowing and 
investigated ways of saving money. In 2009, they commissioned McKinsey, a management 
consultancy, to find savings within the NHS. McKinsey’s report (Achieving World Class 
Productivity in the NHS; hereafter, Achieving) argued that £15-20bn of productivity 
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improvements were possible ‘without compromising quality’. Without publishing Achieving, 
Labour announced a £20bn NHS savings plan (National Audit Office, 2011). 
Following the 2010 General Election, the incoming Conservative-led coalition signalled their 
intent to increase and hasten savings. Simultaneously, they launched an unexpected series of 
NHS structural reforms, widely seen as a pet project of Andrew Lansley, now Secretary of State 
for Health (Powell and Exworthy, 2016, pp.368–369). Both moves attracted criticism; some 
cast their combination as an impossible challenge which jeopardised quality. 
Constructing and managing crises 
It was in this context that the Government decided to publish Achieving. Its and similar texts’ 
discursive practices were important to efforts to legitimise savings requirements. The first 
practice, constructing and managing crises (constructing crises) became important in Period I 
and remained so throughout. 
Achieving begins with a set of slides titled: 
Q1. Macroeconomic context has dramatically worsened in the last 12 
months 
Q2. Declines in health care spend are typically observed after a crisis across 
European countries 
Q3. In the UK, after the private sector recession comes the public sector one 
Q4. The next spending review period from 2011/12 will be much tougher 
with a potential [NHS] funding gap of £10-15bn  
Quotations 2-4 describe processes of changing public sector spending. ‘Declines in health care 
spend’, Q3’s ‘public sector’ ‘recession’, and the ‘tougher…spending review period’ each 
describe sustained choices to reduce areas of public spending. Such processes are usually 
linguistically represented using verbs. Yet these processes are in fact realised as ‘noun phrases’ 
(groups of words together acting as a noun). This makes several differences; but one is that 
verbs usually mark the processes they represent for tense, whereas noun phrases do not. 
Whether something ‘declines’, ‘declined’ or ‘will decline’, the temporality of its decline is made 
clear. The reader sees the process of decline occur during the sentence. Put technically, verbs 
usually delimit in time the processes they represent. Q1-4’s processes are not thus delimited, 
so do not seem to begin or end during these clauses. We know that ‘declines’ (noun) must 
begin and end somewhere; but during Q2, ‘declines’ remain statically present, being 
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‘observed’. Thus represented, decision-making processes become background objects, not 
temporally delimited events. 
Yet they are temporally immediate, cast as intimately related to the present. ‘Context’ (Q1) is 
defined by this immediacy. Q2 and Q3’s ‘declines’ and ‘recessions’ are described through the 
‘timeless present’, a structure which uses the present tense to describe what seem eternal 
laws (Fairclough, 2003, p.152). While relevant to ongoing events, these immediate but not 
temporally delimited circumstances thus act as fixed backgrounds to other actions. They 
become not processes, but parts of the situation. 
Spatial categories achieve a similar effect. Q1-Q4 offer concentric spatial classifications 
travelling from a global ‘macroeconomic context’, through crisis-stricken ‘European countries’, 
a ‘UK’ in ‘recession’, to the ‘NHS’. The immediate NHS context is constructed within a global 
macroeconomic crisis. Spatially and temporally, texts combine the proximate with the 
universal. Government spending decisions become elements of a taken-for-granted 
background situation. Comparable effects occur throughout the corpus as constructions like 
the ‘financial landscape’ juxtapose financial and spatio-temporal schemes of classification. 
Spending choices are embedded in situations of financial crisis. 
Transformed into situations, spending choices are deprived of their governmental actors. 
Instead, language like ‘the public sector recession’, ‘decline’ or ‘negative growth’ describe 
Governmental choices as if they were indicators like Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Recast as 
an economic indicator within a market situation, spending seems less agential. ‘Spend’ has 
‘declined’ because that is all the inexorable logic of the market would allow.  
Freezing Government spending choices into features of a macroeconomic crisis makes market-
world principles seem unavoidable. With a market context taken for granted, texts can exhort 
readers to ‘face’, ‘meet’ or ‘face up to’ a global crisis in their NHS work. With market logic 
embedded in the situation, not focusing on finances becomes not ‘fac[ing] up’ to a critical 
situation. 
Satisficing and instrumentalizing quality 
Notwithstanding constructing crises’ efforts to place healthcare in a market context, the NHS’s 
situation was no blank slate. A dominant NHS quality discourse appealed to principles of 
collective welfare and, through objects like the NHS Constitution (Department of Health, 
2009b), to rights and entitlements. Healthcare quality, with its civic overtones, was an 
important competing value (Exworthy and Mannion, 2016, p.12).  
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This necessitated further work to govern the relationship between quality and market 
principles. Delivering Sustainable Cost Improvement Programmes (Delivering) is a set of 
guidelines published in January 2012. It praises a dataset designed to evaluate hospitals’ 
worth. The ‘Quality Indicator Pyramid’ includes patients’ rating of care, ‘serious untoward 
incidents’, mortality, readmission, staff sickness absence, bed occupancy, cost improvements 
and financial management. 
We can analyse this Pyramid through its ‘meaning relations’: the ways texts relate terms to 
one another (e.g. synonymy). ‘Hyponymy’ describes the relation between a generic term and 
instances of it (‘tree’ and ‘elm’). In advocating the variables described above as measuring 
‘Quality’, Delivering structures them as ‘hyponyms’ of ‘Quality’. Yet most fit market (financial 
value) or industrial principles (productivity). Similarly, cost reduction elsewhere becomes a 
dimension of ‘quality improvement’. Texts restructure ‘quality’ to incorporate preferred 
market-industrial values. 
Yet it would be premature to cast texts as granting market values simple dominance over 
quality’s civic heritage. Simultaneously, they insist that quality will be preserved: 
Q5. Adopting certain ways of working can deliver planned [savings] without 
reducing quality and safety (Delivering) 
Q6. Which success examples of improved efficiency without compromising 
quality could be shared? (Achieving) 
Q5 and Q6 structure different meaning relations between quality and cost. Their ‘without’ 
constructions suggest prioritising finances imperils quality by implying antonymic relations 
between them. Recognising this potential trade-off, texts promise quality will not be harmed: 
they might not maximise quality but will satisfice it. 
This practice configures meaning relations between quality and cost. ‘Quality’ is sometimes 
reconfigured to include financial values as its hyponyms. Yet quality and cost are also 
contrasted, with quality being satisficed. Combined, these specify a compromise between 
these values: quality should be satisficed, then savings maximised. 
Packaging savings objects 
Constructing crises and satisficing cast market values as suiting healthcare’s situation and 
negotiate their relationship with quality: savings will be maximised, quality satisficed. Yet this 
raises a further challenge: how can such harm-free savings be achieved? The next practice – 
‘packaging savings objects’ (packaging) – attempts to construct an answer. It became 
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prominent during Period I and continued throughout. Through industrial appeals to 
‘efficiency’, it argues costs can fall without reducing quality. 
This passage from Delivering exemplifies packaging. It encourages organisations to seek 
savings using Service Line Reporting (SLR). 
Q7. SLR and benchmarking information helps budget holders to identify 
savings, transform services and present evidence to staff to help engage 
them in the change process. It highlights variation within services which 
supports teams to identify the inefficiencies and areas for improvement. 
Several organisations had encouraged staff to identify potential CIP 
schemes through using SLR data. 
Each sentence in Q7 describes devising savings plans. This is an ideational, uncertain process. 
Devised plans may work, or not; may damage quality, or not. ‘Savings’ necessarily remain 
uncertain. 
This uncertainty comes because suggesting ‘savings’ or ‘efficiencies’ are available describes 
more than the status quo. It suggests that things can be done cheaper without diminishing 
quality, positing a relation between a system’s current and potential future state. Even 
ostensibly concrete, present-tense entities like ‘waste’ or ‘inefficiencies’ are similarly 
hypothetical. Something is ‘wasteful’ only if the same outcomes can be achieved with fewer 
resources. The ‘plans’ we ‘devise’ remain uncertain because they posit things about 
hypothetical futures. 
Q7 describes such uncertain, ideational processes. Yet it describes them as people 
‘identify[ing]’ and ‘highlight[ing]’ savings: visual, not cognitive, processes. Whereas cognitive 
processes like ‘devising’ describe intangible objects like ideas, visual processes act on pre-
existing concrete objects. The text casts SLR data as showing the ‘areas’ ‘savings’ are in, 
according them concrete organisational locations. Described thus, ‘savings’ seem not 
hypotheticals to be devised but pre-existing objects to ‘realise’. 
Linguists differentiate ‘realis’ statements (statements of fact) from ‘irrealis’ ones 
(hypotheticals/possibilities). Suggesting a ‘saving’ involves realis and irrealis statements: it 
describes something’s cost today, and its potential future cost (Graham, 2001). Yet these texts 
cast such suggestions as if they involve merely identifying concrete industrial objects (e.g. 
‘efficiencies’, ‘waste’) in organisations’ presents. The uncertainty inevitably involved in 
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hypothetical plans is obscured as these hypotheticals are packaged up in imagined concrete 
objects like ‘savings’ and ‘inefficiencies’. 
This makes it seem more plausible that costs can fall while maintaining quality. Seen as 
uncertain hypotheticals, savings always pose quality risks. Yet packaging transforms such 
savings from uncertain hypotheticals to already-existing improvements in concrete 
organisational locations. A lower cost, equal quality organisation is possible if one can only 
‘find’ and ‘realise’ such already-existing ‘efficiencies’. 
Period II – Disputing responsibility 
For a time, these practices succeeded. The idea that the NHS ‘contained’ inefficiencies 
remained credible, making harm-free savings plausible. However, the extent of proposed 
efficiencies was consistently contentious. A 2010 Guardian article questioned Achieving’s 
savings: 
Q8. McKinsey…warned that GP [General Practitioner/family doctor] time 
"lost to tea breaks" should be reduced as part of a scheme to improve 
"GP productivity" to the tune of £400m.  
Small, mundane ‘tea breaks’ are juxtaposed with large, formal savings ambitions, ironically 
questioning McKinsey’s analysis. ‘Tea breaks’ seem too quotidian to fit alongside productivity 
and savings schemes; and too small to cohere with £400m targets. The link between grand, 
irrealis savings proposals and specific mundane savings ideas loses credibility. 
Such attacks became more potent when hoped-for organisational savings failed to materialise. 
With savings demands large and ‘efficiencies’ doubtful, concerns about impacts on quality 
were reignited. By June 2012, the NHS Confederation, a major representative body for 
hospitals, reported 85% of surveyed hospitals feared financial stringency was jeopardising 
quality. 
Later that year, Jeremy Hunt replaced Lansley as Secretary of State. A change in approach 
followed. As opposed to focusing predominantly on specific ‘efficiencies’, Hunt increasingly 
targeted hospitals’ management capabilities. In July 2014, he commissioned Lord Carter of 
Coles to review hospital productivity: the report’s (hereafter, Carter) eventual conclusions 
criticised management quality. Meanwhile, a series of speeches signalled Hunt’s intent to cast 
financial and quality woes as joint symptoms of poor management. 
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Constructing the good organisation 
As packaging ceased to be enough, constructing the good organisation (good organisations) 
became an important discursive practice. It complemented and displaced packaging by 
offering an alternative image of harm-free savings: ‘good organisations’ capable of reconciling 
competing cost and quality demands. Carter writes: 
Q9. We see the best performing hospitals around the world not only provide 
high quality care but do so with a keen eye on productivity and a 
tightened grip on resources. There is strong international evidence that 
good hospital management practices deliver both improved outcomes 
and productivity. It seems every country has variation, but the best 
performing hospitals are typified by strong leadership and management 
of both quality and efficiency. 
Q9 describes organisations simultaneously achieving multiple goals. Yet these achievements 
are not realised as processes but embedded within descriptions of organisations themselves: 
‘the best performing hospitals’, or those with ‘good hospital management practices’. Other 
texts similarly invoke ‘successful organisations’, ‘strong’ or ‘weak performers’ and 
‘organisations that deliver CIPs well’. All represent succeeding not as something organisations 
do but as part of what they are.  
Texts explain this ‘success’ in terms of how organisations are built. Connectionist 
organisational development logics reinforced by industrial metaphors cast good organisations 
as possessing the right structures (‘management structure’, ‘cornerstone’, ‘reinforced’, 
‘mechanisms’). Carter describes a ‘model hospital’ exemplifying the consequences of such 
good construction. Poor organisations can become good if they only ‘transform’ themselves as 
organisational development discourses invite. If they struggle, it is through lack of ‘maturity’, 
or because ‘barriers’ obstruct ‘change’. Even these setbacks promise optimistic futures. The 
immature will age; ‘barriers’ imply surmountable obstacles on otherwise progressive 
trajectories. ‘Bad’ hospitals contain the germs of good organisations. 
This practice attributes success not to one-off present-tense actions but enduring structures 
and practices which predict tomorrow’s success as surely as today’s. It thus aligns realis 
organisational structures with future (irrealis) success. Even organisations with poor real 
outcomes contain the latent potential to be ‘good’. As packaging located latent efficiencies 




Blurring quality and cost 
Good organisations enables an alternative framing of the relationship between quality and 
cost. Q9’s ‘good management practices’ deliver ‘both improved outcomes and productivity’. 
Whereas earlier meaning relations between quality and cost were often contrastive, here they 
are additive. A few months after commissioning Carter, a Hunt speech (Good care costs less) 
exemplified such relations: 
Q10. World class care is not just better for patients, it reduces costs for the 
NHS as well. And in doing so creates a virtuous circle where ever more 
resources can be invested in improving patient care rather than wasted 
on picking up the pieces when things go wrong. 
Q10’s first sentence demonstrates the additive relations between quality and productivity. Its 
second contrasts ‘patient care’ with ‘waste’, suggesting consonance between ‘patient care’ 
and a cost-saving absence of waste. Quality and cost become complementary. 
In each instance analysed above, the relation between quality and cost is governed by a third 
term. In Q9, ‘improved outcomes’ and ‘improved…productivity’ are both things which ‘good 
management practices’ precipitate. Q10’s ‘world class care’ and ‘virtuous circle’ include among 
their implications reduced costs, lower waste and improved care. Quality and cost both spring 
from the virtuous management practices good organisations constructs: they become co-
hyponyms, each exemplifying good management’s good consequences.  
This practice draws on good organisations to blur quality and cost. Rather than being merely 
compatible (as packaging argued), they become correlated. Rather than distinct values, they 
become dimensions of the same underlying good: effective management.  
Period III – Disputing quality and losing grip 
While discursively effective, shifting from targeting ‘efficiencies’ to management capabilities 
required financial governance changes. If management was the problem, different measures 
of success were appropriate. Carter thus introduced savings obligations targeting changes in 
management structure and practice. 
Opposition to good organisations prompted further changes. Opponents argued systemic, not 
organisational, problems caused the NHS’s financial woes. Parliamentary committees 
repeatedly called for greater Government leadership on sectoral problems. With many 
hospitals facing problems, it was hard to deny systemic problems. Consequently, Hunt 
responded by casting those systemic problems themselves as organisational responsibilities. 
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Good care costs less casts ‘good organisation[s]’ as having ‘the right relationships’. With ‘better 
partnerships between commissioners and providers’, ‘we [can] develop…integrated care 
pathways’. Interorganisational relationships themselves become just another attribute the 
‘good organisation’ should possess. But making organisations responsible for 
interorganisational collaboration demanded further governance change: in 2016, organisations 
were asked to fulfil new financial targets within geographically defined ‘Sustainability and 
Transformation Partnerships’.  
These changes in how organisations were evaluated made those evaluations seem less stable. 
If Government would tomorrow change its mind about organisations’ goals, why should its 
targets seem credible today? Mechanisms of financial governance which lacked credibility 
tended to control spending poorly, prompting Government to revise or replace them. But each 
revision or replacement further destabilised and discredited financial governance.  
By June 2016, the Department of Health (DH) announced an unusual mid-year financial ‘reset’ 
regain financial control. Two new spending caps followed: organisational ‘control totals’ and 
regional ‘capped expenditure processes’. Hospitals ended 2016/17 cumulatively £3.7bn over 
budget (Gainsbury, 2017). With financial problems affecting ever-more organisations and 
Government intervention increasing, casting problems as organisational issues became 
unsustainable.  
Frequent Government financial intervention reignited concerns there was a ‘substantial risk’ to 
quality (Robertson et al., 2017, p.56). So mainstream did this view become that senior NHS 
England figures publicly emphasised that Government, not they, controlled their budgets. 
When the Chancellor refused extra funding, NHSE’s Chief Executive stated that the NHS would 
fail its highest profile access indicator.  
De-valuation 
With growing fears about quality, it was decreasingly plausible that ‘efficiencies’ (packaging) or 
transformation (good organisations) offered harm-free savings. With these discourses 
ineffective, previous ways of reconciling quality with cost were undermined. Consequently, 
Government relied increasingly on de-valuation, a practice exemplified by ‘Value vs values’ 
(Value), a 2016 blog post.  
Q11. The principles that underpin all decision making are expressed in the 
NHS Constitution and the key principles in past decades have focused 
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on the need to use resources only on effective interventions and the 
need to meet need equitably.  
More recently another principle has been added, the need to make 
decisions that do not waste resources and which will ensure the long-
term sustainability of the NHS.  
Q11 invokes ethically charged language (e.g. ‘principles’). Yet its context suggests more 
complex readings. Three ‘hyponyms’ (instances) of ‘principles’ are described: ‘effective 
interventions’, ‘equit[y]’ and ‘resources’. They are described as not absolute ethical 
imperatives, but historicised (‘past decades’, ‘recently’), contextual ‘need[s]’. ‘Principles’ are 
‘expressed’, ‘added’ or ‘focused’ as people instrumentally determine. Even ‘principles’ become 
not objects of ethical reflection, but instrumental strategic devices. 
To understand whether this was idiosyncratic to these texts, values language was reviewed 
across the corpus. Sketch Engine identified collocations between ‘principles’ and modifiers like 
‘guiding’, ‘organising’, ‘core’, ‘key’ and ‘nhs’. ‘Principles’ are ‘set out’, then ‘applied’ and 
‘followed’. They are listed alongside ‘rule’, ‘value’ and ‘behaviour’. This describes pragmatic 
corporate devices defined by authoritative governments, not disputable moral values. As in 
Values, the meaning systems in which ‘principles’ exist removes their ethical charge and 
represents them as agreed, neutral strategic planning devices. De-valuation reframes this 
moral dispute as never having been moral at all. 
Dénouement 
But removing the moral charge from accusations that quality was worsening proved 
unsustainable. Media coverage highlighted stories of individuals affected by resource scarcity. 
For opponents, such stories manifested spending decisions’ moral implications.  
Opponents increasingly successfully cast Government as directly responsible. Healthcare 
establishment figures continued to link Government choices to clinical consequences. In 
November 2017, NHS England’s leadership demanded £4bn in the upcoming Autumn Budget 
to prevent quality deteriorating. A week before the Budget, a British Medical Journal paper 
linked spending reductions to 120,000 ‘excess deaths’. Yet the Budget refused the NHS the 
amount requested. Within days, NHS England announced a list of treatments which would 
consequently stop. Government choices were unavoidably linked to clinical consequences. 
Unable to cast efficiencies as latent within organisations; or to blame hospitals’ poor 
management, Government had been left avoiding the crisis’s moral content. Yet as 
-225- 
 
Government choices became patently linked to moral consequences, this strategy proved 
insufficient. In March 2018, the Prime Minister announced extensive further NHS funding. 
Situating work 
Through the practices described above, official discourse shaped the situation in which 
healthcare spending was evaluated. Figure 11.1’s process model describes the crisis’s three 
major periods and the discursive practices therein. 
 
Figure 11.1 – The healthcare spending crisis. 
EW and CDA help further categorise the practices identified above. EW theorises disputes’ key 
elements, including their situations, the evaluative principle used, and the qualified object 
measuring compliance with that principle. Different discursive practices acted on each of these 
dimensions. Table 11.1 categorises these practices accordingly, noting how clusters of 
practices act on given EW dimensions.  
Table 11.1 – Discursive techniques of situating work. 
Practices EW dimension  Linguistic features 
Constructing crises Freezing choices into 
background situations 
Nominalisation/process nouns; spatio-











Meaning relations of evaluative terms 
 
This chapter focused on three of this thesis’s five core practices: attaining tenuous futures, 
constructing possibility and reconfiguring quality. These three categories correspond to Table 
11.1’s three rows, highlighting that each acts on a different EW dimension. Building on this 
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insight, the sections below consider the pragmatic and discursive functions of each of these 
clusters of practices. 
Attaining tenuous futures: freezing situations 
The justification work literature starts its analysis by focusing on a selected situation. It thus 
risks taking that situation for granted, as if situations are simply happened upon, not made. A 
few writers highlight the material practices shaping them (Dionne et al., 2019; Gilbert et al., 
2017). Yet even they imagine pre-existing situations modified by actors’ material efforts. 
Conversely, I highlight discursive work’s importance in not only modifying but also initially 
forming situations. Constructing crises was important across each Period. In constructing 
healthcare within a wider macroeconomic crisis, it highlighted certain contextual elements and 
obscured others. Through nominalisation and spatio-temporal schemes of classification, it 
froze ongoing Government spending decisions into fixed backgrounds for organisational 
decisions. Inchoate, mobile processes became static, manageable situations. 
Attaining tenuous futures entails subpractices which construct and manage situations, 
freezing potentially unstable, inchoate and disputed flows of activity into static, if pressing, 
backgrounds for action. The ubiquity of such practice is unsurprising. For organisations to be 
manageable and decisions made, the flux of events must be intermittently solidified and 
interpreted (Chia, 2000; Langley et al., 2013). Valuation requires ongoing trends and processes 
like Government decision-making to become solid, coherent situations.  
This discourse achieves this by constructing crises, casting processes like ‘macroeconomic 
context’ and ‘public sector [recessions]’ as static backgrounds to spending decisions. Other 
discourses will use other means to freeze life’s ongoing processes into coherent situations. This 
chapter therefore theorises attaining as a mechanism of ossifying situations, making 
organisational life manageable. Doing so through constructing crises additionally makes 
engagement with that situation through a market lens profoundly difficult to avoid. 
Constructing possibility: forging realis-irrealis links 
Yet the situations analysed entailed more than information about the present. Periods I and II 
were characterised by packaging and good organisations (Figure 11.1). As argued above, 
packaging links ‘realis’ (fact-claims) to ‘irrealis’ statements (predictions/hypotheticals). Objects 
it constructs – like ‘waste’ – encapsulate claims about both current and potential future 
productivity. Similarly, good organisations constructs concretised features of organisations, 
like effective ‘management structures’, which describe both organisations’ contemporary 
-227- 
 
features and future successes. Like packaging, good organisations constructs concretised 
objects which links realis and irrealis statements (Graham, 2001). Both practices use objects to 
construct possibility in the present by forging realis-irrealis links. 
These links integrate potential futures into our understanding of organisations’ presents and 
thus our judgements about what they should do. This way of thinking is not unusual or 
esoteric. In seeing something as inefficient or substandard, we hypothesise improved 
efficiency or standards. In suggesting something should improve, we imply minimally that 
improvement is conceivable. In our intuitive evaluations, ought implies can. Accordingly, the 
texts analysed here argued whether improvement was possible to justify (or undermine) 
critiques of organisations. 
Yet EW appears not to account for such judgements about potential improvement. It 
emphasises evaluations of tested entity’s current compliance with chosen principles. Perhaps 
nervous of deviating from its present-tense ‘situationalism’ (Diaz-Bone, 2011, p.44), it does not 
allow for people’s judgements about whether tested entities could conceivably comply better 
with selected principles. It thereby omits a demonstrably important consideration. 
Notwithstanding EW’s desire to focus on the current situation, a rounded account of valuation 
must account for such judgements. 
Recognising how realis-irrealis links construct possibility enables EW to do so without 
sacrificing its situationalist focus. Elements like ‘management practices’ and ‘waste’ inhabit 
present-tense realis situations. Yet they speak not only to that present but also to irrealis 
futures by embedding within accounts of what-is assertions about what-could-be. Analysing 
them enables EW to account for judgements about whether a tested entity could do better, 
presenting a more rounded account of justification and critique. Because realis-irrealis links 
embed these considerations in the situation, they do not undermine EW’s situationalist focus. 
Reconfiguring quality: modifying value relations 
Alongside images of the present and potential futures, situations entail contextual 
understandings of the values and compromises relevant thereto. Across Periods, we identified 
practices dedicated to relating value concepts to one another: satisficing, blurring and de-
valuation (together reconfiguring quality). These do not discuss values abstractly but suggest 
how they relate in context. 
EW analyses of value combinations characteristically focus on the eventual bargains between 
values. Reinecke et al (2017) differentiate traditional ‘compromises’ from ‘transcendence’ 
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(creating new worlds), and ‘niche legitimacy’ (defining against a rejected principle). Nyberg and 
Wright (2012) highlight strategies which relate plural worlds through structures of equivalence 
and difference, including ‘combining’ multiple justifications to vindicate one practice, 
‘collapsing’ one justification into another and simultaneously testing distinct practices 
(‘coupling’). 
Emphasising situations’ discursive construction, this chapter advances this literature in two 
ways. First, we highlight de-valuation, a response to clashing values that avoids justification 
altogether. Analysts focusing on multi-value outcomes inevitably miss such techniques, 
because they result in arrangements apparently devoid of values. It is revealed by this thesis’s 
broader focus on a multi-value situation. Affirming this, Demers and Gond’s (2019) comparable 
focus on situations of institutional complexity recognises ‘sheltering work’ which similarly 
‘defuses’ a compromise’s moral foundations. The two practices differ in that one ‘shelters’ a 
compromise behind a third ‘world’, whereas de-valuation embeds normally value-laden 
language in a context which wholly drains its moral content.  
Second, this chapter links these normative compromises to the situation’s discursive 
construction. Packaging’s harm-free ‘efficiencies’ makes credible satisficing’s suggestion we 
maximise cost savings while satisficing quality. Constructing generic ‘good management’ as 
driving quality and cost alike, good organisations supports blurring’s representation of them as 
dimensions of the same underlying good. How situations are shaped affects how values can be 
combined within them. Put differently, methods of reconfiguring quality rely on which 
possibilities are constructed. As if to vindicate this, when Period III saw no plausible 
possibilities embedded within the present, Government was left avoiding justification 
altogether, adopting its least successful strategy of de-valuation. 
Situating work 
Attaining, constructing possibility and reconfiguring stabilise the flux of austerity into a 
manageable situation, include within it objects characterising possible savings and configure 
how plural principles contextually relate. Appropriately to this thesis, these practices are 
specific to austerity. Yet they also represent instances of wider practices relevant to other 
situations. Rather, one can discursively ossify situations, forge realis-irrealis links and modify 
value relations across various situations. This section considers them in this broader manner. 
Echoing the ‘justification work’ EW frequently studies (Jagd, 2011), I collectively call these 
practices situating work. Of course, situating work is itself a situated practice: but there is no 
reason to believe actors within a situation cannot shape how it or its successors manifest. 
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Figure 11.2 illustrates relations between situating work’s three dimensions. Solid arrows 
signify causality and facilitation; dotted arrows show chronology. Attaining is highlighted as 
vital to stabilising a situation so possibilities can be constructed therein. Those links enable 
related reconfiguring of values, shaping the evaluative measures adopted. 
 
Figure 11.2 – Situating work. 
This study demonstrates that discourse is central to forming stable, test-able situations. This 
realisation not only broadens our conception of how situations are formed, but also highlights 
an underappreciated variable. In public disputes, material changes are usually communicated 
linguistically, or with accompanying commentary. Focusing only on the material omits a 
mediating factor which determines the influence those material changes have. 
Figure 11.1 and Figure 11.2 highlight the opposition which those attempting to shape the 
situation face. As Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) posit, critique can drive the transformation of 
dominant justificatory frameworks. Expanding this, we highlight critique’s importance outside 
tests themselves. Opposing voices often critiqued the latent possibility constructed in realis-
irrealis links. Successfully deconstructing such claims prompted transformations in realis-
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irrealis links and consequently in how quality values were configured. Transformations of 
dominant values may start with critique of how potential futures are discursively represented. 
Table 11.1 (p.225) associates these techniques with their recurring linguistic features. While 
these associations were formed inductively, they are theoretically cogent. Attaining represents 
processes using nominalisation and process nouns. Because this avoids marking them for tense 
(Halliday and Matthiessen, 2013, pp.140–142), it is apt to freeze them into background 
situations. The realis-irrealis links of constructing possibility are elsewhere highlighted as 
capable of projecting visions of potential (Graham, 2001). Finally, reconfiguring is primarily 
achieved through meaning relations, one effect of which is to form structures of equivalence 
and difference. The practice therefore expands earlier accounts attributing value compromises 
to such structures (Nyberg and Wright, 2012). 
Conclusions and implications for organisations 
Situating work 
This chapter demonstrates discursive work’s importance to shaping and evaluating situations 
within complex, pluralistic organisations. It notes how practices involved in attaining, 
constructing possibility and reconfiguring shape situational elements drawn from EW theory. 
Combined, these comprise situating work, a counterpart to the ‘justification work’ 
organisational EW often analyses (Jagd, 2011).  
The chapter’s central contribution is to conceptualise and model situating work. EW literature 
generally analyses justification work occurring within a pre-existing situation. Conversely, 
situating work precedes and shapes that situation. Others highlight how material efforts can 
alter situations (Dionne et al., 2019; Gond et al., 2016) or how broad ideological ‘regimes’ 
contextualise disputes (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Nyberg et al., 2017). However, EW has 
not previously focused on and specifically theorised the situating work discursively shaping 
specific situations. 
Doing so is essential to EW’s ability to analyse situations like austerity. With situations 
increasingly textually mediated, neglecting how material circumstances are shaped leaves us 
as far from understanding as neglecting those circumstances themselves. Austerity exemplifies 
such discursively mediated and contested situations (McCann, 2013). 
Yet this is relevant beyond austerity. Situations are necessarily selections and perceptions of 
circumstances. Few – if any – situations are wholly sensorially experienced. Wise to this, 
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006, pp.139–140) reject the idea of a ‘“pure situation” unrelated to 
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any report’. Yet EW has previously lacked an analytically and conceptually rigorous approach 
to this discursive shaping. Without conceptualising discursive situating work, EW struggles to 
explain where its situations come from. 
This chapter’s detailed model elaborates the concept of situating work (Figure 11.2), 
highlighting the practices involved. First, the situation must be ossified through practices like 
attaining. Situations are selective, structured cross-sections of life. These do not simply occur 
but are made by selecting what matters and ‘arraying’ it to clearly relate its components. 
Unlike previous EW work, this paper recognises the necessity to this process of discursive work 
and highlights linguistic techniques associated therewith (Table 11.1). This ossification is key to 
any justificatory dispute. We as researchers should therefore seek such work whenever 
applying EW and beware the ossifying we do when describing the situations we analyse. 
This situating work model also highlights the construction of possibility through realis-irrealis 
links. EW generally describes tests as evaluations of how well an object of evaluation currently 
fits a chosen justificatory principle. Yet another question was important to our disputes: 
whether objects of evaluation could genuinely comply better with said principles. Condemning 
an organisation for its inefficiency or poor structures seems reasonable only if it could be more 
efficient or better built. We describe participants’ discursive efforts to embed such ‘irrealis’ 
possibilities of better performance in present-tense situations. Considering how realis-irrealis 
links are forged enables EW’s situated approach to explain people’s considerations of whether 
an organisation could be better.  
Finally, our model highlights reconfiguring quality. Unlike grander attempts to describe 
hierarchies of societal values (Nyberg et al., 2017), this chapter highlights how texts respond to 
contextually specific multi-value situations. Vitally, it observes that these shifts rely on the 
visions of what is possible described above: different realis-irrealis links support different 
modifications of value relations. It therefore reveals both the discursive techniques involved in 
constructing value compromises themselves and the wider discursive contexts on which they 
rely. This deepens our understanding of how values are combined, better differentiating the 
ways people address such multi-value situations, including through wholesale de-valuation.  
These situating work practices substantially improve EW’s ability to explain how its situations 
are discursively shaped. Considering only how material circumstances shape said situations 
risks omitting work vital to the outcome of disputes. EW studies should routinely consider how 
the situations they analyse are discursively shaped. 
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Healthcare austerity discourse and organisational management 
While this chapter aims to demonstrate the general relevance of situating work, it also 
highlights insights into austerity discourse in UK healthcare. First, the form of situation which 
national discourse emphasises is consistently a market crisis, achieved by constructing 
healthcare organisations within a troubled macroeconomy. This emplacement echoes the 
narratives of existential crisis found within organisations. Similarly, it is consonant with their 
drawing boundaries of varying sizes around their own organisational situations to enable these 
narratives (see p.160). The way national discourse constructs the situation coheres with 
organisations’ approaches. 
Second, there is a strong emphasis within the discourse on not simply suggesting ‘savings’ are 
possible but specifying concrete ‘savings’ latent within organisations. Such objects, like those 
identified through Carter and its associated datasets were often directly delegated to 
organisations, as Thyme’s narrative highlights. While useful to Government, these discourses 
cast savings as unduly guaranteed within organisations, promoting excessive optimism. 
Organisational confusion was the price of Government rhetoric. 
Finally, the practices elucidated here were changeable across the period. As illustrated best by 
the changes in how healthcare quality was considered, discourse rapidly transformed as 
opposition rose and circumstances changed. Conceptions of quality and associated narratives 
about what was possible changed, precipitating growing uncertainty. Such changes affected 
not only Government rhetoric but also policy, creating a still-more unstable environment for 
organisational austerity management. 
Moving on 
This chapter offers important lessons for future research. Identifying discursive situating work 
emphasises that EW analyses which take given situations as their starting point risk seeing only 
half the dispute. Indeed, even efforts to materially shape the situation (e.g. Dionne et al., 
2019) will be discursively mediated. Future work could combine Jagd’s (2011) ‘justification 
work’ with this chapter’s ‘situating work’ to provide a rounded model of situated justification; 
or examine the interrelations between material and discursive situating work. Meanwhile, 
studies of austerity discourse tend to offer fairly static accounts of such ideologically charged 
narratives (e.g. Z. Morris, 2016; O’Brien, 2013). Consequently, such representations’ instability 
is rarely considered. Yet it is important to organisations working under such regimes and 




Chapter 12 begins this effort. So far, this thesis has elaborated the empirical context of such 
organisations and the national level, using the latter to theorise situating work. Chapter 12 
builds on this to consider a context in which thus situating oneself becomes exceptionally 
difficult: organisational austerity management.  
As the thesis progresses the current chapter’s insights play two roles: first, the thesis draws on 
the idea of situating work as integral to organisational life; second, it draws on the account of 
national austerity discourse elaborated here. This enables further chapters to build from 




Chapter 12: ‘Looking again’: opening and closing one’s eyes 
Introduction 
This chapter and the next theorise organisations’ responses to austerity, covering all practices 
Chapter 10 identifies. This chapter focuses on how organisations understand and manage 
austerity’s uncertainty; the next on how they deal with its complex evaluative landscape. In 
considering austerity’s uncertainty, this chapter engages with a particularly problematic 
instance of the ‘situating work’ Chapter 11 identifies. It does not rehearse Chapter 11’s 
demonstration that such situating work is perennial and important. Instead, it considers how 
difficult this shaping of circumstances into coherent situations becomes under given austerity’s 
profound uncertainty. 
The cases presented here highlight uncertainty as ubiquitous under austerity. Organisations 
attempted to manage this uncertainty through normal means: budgets, savings plans and the 
compromises constituting their organisational values. Yet austerity required financial targets so 
‘ambitious’ that such efforts were doomed. They contained uncertainty only transiently and, 
when they failed, discredited the tools they used. Understanding austerity management 
means understanding severe, plural uncertainty and its impact on organisations’ uncertainty 
management techniques. 
Many would be unsurprised to learn that austerity presented profound uncertainty. Writers 
highlight that austerity pressures prompt people to strategically shape reported data (Ferlie 
and Judge, 1981; Rubin, 1977; Schmidt et al., 2017; Davidson and Ward, 2013). It is implicit in 
others’ writing that savings classifications become unreliable (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 
2015). Others note that budgetary pressure can severely complicate planning (Caiden and 
Wildavsky, 1980). Uncertainty is an established, albeit not major, theme in austerity 
management writing. 
These fragmented observations generally treat uncertainty as an outcome or unavoidable 
contingency of austerity. Yet uncertainty is a constant, austerity or no (e.g. Calnan et al., 2017; 
Thévenot, 2001a). Organisations prosper not because their worlds are wholly predictable but 
because they manage uncertainty effectively. To understand uncertainty’s impact under 
austerity, we must understand why those usual strategies seem to fail. 
Thévenot (2002a) shares this interest in uncertainty. For him, uncertainty is an inevitable 
feature of the world. Therefore, we develop conventions: understandings which mitigate 
uncertainty by helping predict how one another will respond to certain situations. Without 
them, the myriad possible ways people might respond would become overwhelming, making 
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action and coordination prohibitively difficult. Founded on a recognition of the importance of 
uncertainty and the devices we use to manage it, Thévenot’s conventionalism is apt to theorise 
these features of austerity (Diaz-Bone, 2011; Wagner, 1994). 
Consequently, this chapter adds to the austerity literature by conceptualising austerity 
management through RE and its focus on uncertainty. It thus attends to Thévenot’s (2009) 
observation that conventions and their associated devices can never wholly avert uncertainty. 
Rather, because conventions are always somewhat arbitrary, we are constantly able to ‘open 
our eyes’ to this arbitrariness even as we can ‘close our eyes’ to use those conventions as 
reliable coordinating devices. Opening and closing one’s eyes proves a valuable concept with 
which to theorise the annual changes observed in these sites. 
Yet applying to austerity this distinction between opening and closing one’s eyes also highlights 
the concept’s comparatively limited development. While Thévenot insightfully identifies that 
one may open or close one’s eyes to conventions’ arbitrariness, he says little about when these 
two orientations occur. Nor does the literature consider the work involved in executing such a 
change. This chapter extends the RE framework by theorising the patterns of opening and 
closing of eyes occurring in different circumstances. 
Thus developed, the framework theorises austerity management, foregrounding the 
uncertainty against which people struggle, and the devices with which they do so. It 
emphasises the vicissitudes of the financial year which precipitate a cycle of opening and 
closing one’s eyes as compliance with formal budgetary targets and attendance to concrete 
circumstance are alternately prioritised. Yet it notes that this cycle does not affect all staff 
equally, causing conflict between those seeing the situation differently. Understanding one’s 
situation and the normative compromises in which one is engaged becomes exceptionally 
difficult. 
Uncertainty and austerity 
Austerity is a time of not only reduced resources, but also profound uncertainty. Austerity 
characteristically arises during economic and political instability, making future resource 
allocation uncertain. It also sees a sector’s internal resource allocation destabilised: as one’s 
partners become poorer, they may become less prone to share, and more likely to seize 
resources. As organisations seek unprecedented savings (Comptroller and Auditor General, 
2012), they lack empirical bases on which to estimate their likelihood of success: their internal 
financial fortunes become decreasingly predictable. Under austerity, uncertainty can be as 
challenging as financial scarcity. 
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Simultaneously, one’s savings monitoring mechanisms become less reliable. Under extensive 
pressure, and in times of job losses and restructures, managers are keen to report favourable 
outcomes. Consequently, writers have observed that the data reported under austerity can be 
strategically shaped (Rubin, 1977). One becomes less sure how one’s decreasingly certain 
savings efforts are progressing. 
Uncertain situations are inevitably difficult to manage. Financial scarcity entrenches this, with 
fewer resources available to analyse one’s situation (Levine, 1978). Even where short-term 
plans are made, they are continually subject to disruption by changes in spending rules 
prompted by Governmental anxiety about deteriorating sectoral finances (e.g. Simpson and 
Barker, 2017). Organisational planning becomes difficult. 
Uncertainty is not only financial. Theorists studying 1980s austerity recognise that budgetary 
uncertainty can disrupt coordinative routines (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980; Ferlie and Judge, 
1981). The informal agreements enabling cooperation in times of plenty are pressurised as 
departments compete for resources. Those departments find it harder to anticipate likely 
priorities, as organisations’ plural objectives increasingly conflict (Pandey, 2010). With 
individuals worried for their futures, such uncertainty can become acrimonious. 
As the above demonstrates, the austerity management literature considers uncertainty, but 
briefly. Its consideration has been fragmentary: associations between the uncertainty causing 
organisational ‘planning blight’ and those making staff feel insecure (Levine, 1984) are 
unexamined. Nor does it analyse how organisations manage this rising uncertainty. 
Yet these cases demonstrate uncertainty’s centrality to austerity management. During 
fieldwork, I heard repeated complaints about the uncertainty people faced, whether because 
of delays confirming national budgeting rules, or ‘very ambiguous’ internal processes. The 
dynamics Figure 10.2 describes highlight uncertainty as central to austerity management. 
Analysis of managing austerity’s uncertain situations is overdue. 
Uncertainty and the regimes of engagement 
Thévenot’s (2001b) approach is well suited to such an analysis, as it focuses on uncertainty as 
pervading social life. For Thévenot, life is always uncertain because one cannot predict our 
actions’ consequences: we know neither how the world will respond, nor how others will react 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, 2001b). This ‘natural’ uncertainty (Thévenot, 2002a) 
gives life the character of a series of interventions which the world resists (see Chapter 3). 
Receiving such resistance, one adjusts one’s intervention, tailoring it to receive the desired 
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results from others and one’s environment. Through such gradual changes, coordination 
emerges. 
Over time, such gradually developed coordination solidifies into the conventions or 
engagements Thévenot describes. This is just as well: absent these devices which short-cut 
coordination, social life would be incredibly difficult. Conventions make situations 
approachable because we have a sense of the situation we are in, and faith that others share 
that sense. That shared sense of the situation and the way of acting appropriate to it enables 
coordination. 
Conventions, and the regimes of which they are part are thus vital to managing ‘natural’ 
uncertainty. Yet they cannot banish uncertainty altogether. Thévenot (2002a) also describes 
‘critical uncertainty’, which springs from an inability to agree the convention befitting the 
situation. This possibility does imply a convention’s dysfunction, but is inherent to conventions 
per se. Thévenot (2009, p.797) observes that ‘conventions are structurally two-faced’, entailing 
both the security of a reliable guarantee and an arbitrary agreement’s fragility. Once invested 
in, conventions can convey ‘quietude’: the comforting reliability of an accepted process. Yet 
this involves ‘a necessary sightlessness’ to the possibility of other only-equally-arbitrary modes 
of coordination. Thus the convention’s second ‘face’ is that of ‘inquietude’, the sense that the 
convention possesses a ‘conformist, formulaic and inauthentic arbitrariness’. Both orientations 
to conventions are constantly available. 
Closing one’s eyes is the normal way we approach conventions-in-use. We do not experience 
significant unease about the convention, but get on with using it to coordinate (Thévenot, 
2009). This is neither under-reflective nor representative of one’s ideological subjugation. 
Rather, it is the way we benefit from conventions. Constantly questioning them would rob us 
of the ‘quietude’ characterising this period and stop us benefitting from conventions’ 
coordinative powers. 
Opening one’s eyes engages with the ‘inquietude’ that comes with recognising conventions as 
arbitrary. Thévenot (2009) tells us that it is a necessary component of initially forging or 
subsequently challenging conventions. Where closing one’s eyes enables us to use a 
convention, opening them creates uncertainty about that convention, presenting it not as the 
only way to handle a situation but as one of many potential approaches. 
These are valuable concepts in understanding the orientations of our organisations to their 
coordination devices, like budgets and normative compromises. Yet Thévenot’s account 
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thereof is comparatively limited. We know little about when, how and why these different 
orientations occur. Instead, we know that opening and closing can occur separately or in close 
alternation in a formation known as ‘blinking’ and that this is present in models of regulation 
based around regulatory objectivity. However, this is presented as an isolated observation not 
a thoroughgoing account of when and in what formations such behaviours obtain (Thévenot, 
2009). Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) theorise that critique or movement between worlds 
entails opening one’s eyes. But empirical evidence on the types of environments likely to 
prompt such movements is scant. 
This comparatively limited account of when these orientations to conventions occur may 
spring from Thévenot’s commitment to treating them as agential choices, not deterministic 
consequences of the context. Yet recognising people’s agency need not prevent our wondering 
when, how and why they tend to make decisions. Thévenot’s approach gives us valuable 
concepts with which to understand our cases. Simultaneously, those cases should be valuable 
empirical grist to the theoretical mill in helping us understand the circumstances in which each 
of these orientations to conventions arises. 
Managing uncertainty under austerity 
Organisations in this study experienced extreme uncertainty. To manage this, they deployed 
devices which traditionally manage financial – and associated normative – uncertainty. Yet the 
budgets, savings objects and organisational values they deployed stretched to fit austerity’s 
financial demands. Over time, this damaged those objects themselves, increasing uncertainty. 
This section theorises organisations’ difficulties managing austerity’s uncertain situations. It 
draws on the practices most associated with such situations and the devices through which 
organisations understood them: attaining tenuous futures, constructing possibility and 
reconfiguring quality. It does so with reference to the idea of opening and closing one’s eyes. 
This theorisation is reported in five subsections that cut across these practices, highlighting 
their similarities and interactions. 
Myriad uncertainties 
Organisations under austerity experience extensive uncertainty about both their current 
situations and their continued existence. Austerity presents rapid policy changes from nervous 
Governments (see Appendix 3) and complex, fragile organisational financial arrangements: no 
wonder that understanding one’s situation is hard. Our organisations thus invested extensive 
material and discursive effort in attaining tenuous futures, a key element of which was 
constructing an image of their financial situations. Prodigious work attempted simply to 
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understand the ‘financial position’; continually tracing myriad initiatives and circumstances 
represented a substantial investment to mitigate uncertainty. 
Yet austerity presents more than simply a heightened version of the uncertainty common to all 
situations. These difficulties in describing organisations’ situations fuel a wider sense of 
jeopardy about their future. Under austerity, organisations find creating viable financial plans 
difficult. While perhaps rather dry and technical to outsiders, within organisations budgetary 
plans are not only allocations of resources: they are the prime method by which organisations 
plan. 
Thévenot (2009, p.803) observes that planning is the regime directly associated with 
‘project[ing oneself] successfully into the future’. Through planning, one can not only 
pragmatically direct one’s action towards goals, but also thus identify and attain an image of 
one’s continued existence. By implication, a deficit in planning – like that caused by budgets 
not adding up – threatens this future projection. Tellingly, managers described financial 
deficits in terms of their ‘sustainability’ or next financial year becoming ‘un-do-able’. The 
future was in jeopardy. 
Austere governments are unlikely to simply allow organisations to achieve whatever financial 
outcomes they choose. Increased regulatory intervention is likely to reinforce the sense that a 
balanced budget is a prerequisite for organisations’ independent futures. Cases described 
increased NHSI intervention in financially failing organisations. Tellingly, senior managers’ 
concerns about regulatory intervention invoked losses of ‘autonomy’ or regulators’ 
characteristic ‘short-termis[m]’. Budgetary deficits jeopardised organisations’ continued 
existence as agents and their ability to project themselves into long-term futures.  
This existential jeopardy related to individuals too. Senior staff experienced their own 
positions as precarious. As one interviewee observed: 
What’s slightly changed at national level is, to put it bluntly, people now get 
sacked when they don’t make the money stack up. Five years ago, ten years 
ago, you only got sacked if you had back clinical outcomes…And there’s 
been some high-profile sackings, resignations-slash-sackings that 
reverberate around. 
Organisations and individuals faced existential imperatives towards creating budgetary plans 
that ‘add up’. Cognitively, they must be able to project themselves into the future by creating 
viable plans. Pragmatically, Government and regulatory intervention is otherwise a real threat. 
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Individually, financial failure may risk senior managers’ jobs. All this threatens organisations’ 
ability to project themselves into an autonomous future. 
Managing budgetary uncertainties 
In the first instance, organisations attempt to manage such uncertainty through their normal 
means of creating budgets that ‘add up’: that is, by attaining tenuous futures. Such processes 
rely on measurement instruments like budgets and ‘bridge charts’. Sites used bridge charts’ 
visual metaphor to translate inchoate, unstable financial circumstances into simple, static 
‘building blocks’. This made the financial situation approachable and increased the sense that 
it comprised distinct, divisible elements whose aggregation predicted a reliable future. That is, 
it formatted the financial situation in a way which helped create plans projecting organisations 
into the future. Such plans help assure organisations their futures are safe and satisfy 
regulatory demands for acceptable budgets (control totals, see p.327). Numbers adding up is 
reassuring. 
Yet under austerity, budgetary numbers rarely ‘add up’ spontaneously. Rather, as the closing 
months of Dryas and Thyme’s cases demonstrate, reporting compliant overall sums becomes a 
‘tactical decision’. In acknowledging the decision’s ‘tactical’ nature, organisations are explicitly 
opening their eyes, noting financial measures’ arbitrariness. Gaps in the plan are filled as 
necessary, including through ‘paper’ savings or otherwise questionable devices. Managers 
invoking ‘tactical’ decisions understand that their decisions are about how to report finances, 
not about the likely financial consequences of concrete organisational activity. 
For a time, opening their eyes to conventions’ arbitrariness reduces organisations’ uncertainty: 
a coherent plan has been created, and Government demands satisfied. But these plans are not 
only for show: they are key to coordinating organisational activity. They enable and justify 
enforcing and monitoring divisional savings obligations. But they can do so only if they are 
treated not as arbitrary, but as natural and accurate representations of organisational 
phenomena. Managers must close their eyes to the possibility things could just as easily have 
been coordinated differently. 
Yet this seems difficult while uncertainty remains about how such ambitious budgetary totals 
can be filled. Accordingly, organisations need to seek savings matching their plans. This 
becomes harder as austerity proceeds. Most likely, austerity’s early years consume any sure-
fire savings which do not jeopardise service quality. Consequently, the budgetary objects 
available to fill gaps become more complex and contentious. Characteristically, this study’s 
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organisations used three approaches to deal with this uncertainty: i) accountancy devices, ii) 
savings objects and iii) contentious changes.  
The first involved presentational and categorisation changes in budgetary data: shifts in the 
budgetary practices associated with attaining tenuous futures. These ‘accountancy devices’ 
avoid concrete changes in organisational practice by instead altering the relationship between 
concrete practices and reported financial outcomes to create more favourable reports or 
predictions. That is, they are changes in measurement devices not mirrored by changes in 
concrete realities. 
Austere organisations use such devices extensively. Within the UK, they have been central to 
austere healthcare accountancy (Gainsbury, 2017). But they are finite: one can improve 
reported budgetary outcomes by only so many presentational changes. And they are generally 
short-term, bringing benefits for one year that must then be replaced with more concrete 
measures to prevent the supposed saving disappearing. They only defer requirements for 
substantive savings. Yet temporarily, they create apparent savings not requiring organisational 
change.  
Such accountancy devices contribute to the opening of one’s eyes characterising the start of 
the financial year. To utilise one is to recognise that accountancy’s relationship to reality is 
somewhat arbitrary, subject to ‘tactical’ adjustment. Yet once included in the budget, these 
devices reduce the tension between that budget and one’s ability to fulfil it: for this year, at 
least, part of the ‘gap’ is filled. The reported budget’s arbitrariness thus becomes less visible. 
Once created, accountancy devices help managers once again close their eyes.  
Organisations’ second approach to addressing this is through creating savings objects. Facing 
‘gaps’ in budgets, organisations naturally yearn for something substantial to ‘fill’ them. This 
desire is amplified by a national discourse frequently emphasising the ‘identification’ of 
apparently concrete savings objects (see Chapter 11). Chapter 10 details how constructing 
possibility creates the ‘substantial’ savings objects ideally suited to this task. These devices 
contain the uncertainty formerly evident in budgetary processes in discrete, packaged-up 
savings delegated to divisions and given the appearance of solid, reliable objects. 
Our organisations were subject to national rules requiring such savings be reported – and a 
certain proportion marked low risk – when budgetary submissions were made. Consequently, 
the logic behind them was at least partly of budgetary compliance, not financial prediction: 
this formed part of the pattern of opening one’s eyes described above. Yet constructed as 
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physical objects, they seemed more substantial than the raw budgetary headlines reported to 
regulators. Organisations’ complex, detailed monitoring and measurement tools contributed 
to that apparent solidity. This helped organisations once again close their eyes, seeing these 
savings objects as if they were real, reliable savings waiting to be ‘realised’. 
The third strategy often overlapped with the second. It involved modifying organisational 
values to accommodate proposed savings. Organisations under austerity can rarely restrict 
themselves to savings according with their values. Thévenot highlights that organisations tend 
to be built on normative compromises between multiple values. In healthcare, such a balance 
is often between financial and civic-world quality objectives (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; 
Thévenot, 2001a). Such compromises formed in normal times may be poorly configured for 
austerity. 
However, such compromises are defined loosely (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). While such 
loose definition is normally explained in terms of avoiding making explicit the conflict between 
ultimately contradictory values (see Chapter 3), it also lets people adjust that compromise with 
changing situations. Here, the compromise built around the idea of healthcare ‘quality’ was 
progressively modified (reconfiguring quality) to accommodate savings which might once have 
jarred with organisations’ normative precepts. This practice involved modifying what was 
meant by quality to justify otherwise contentious savings. Managers opened their eyes to the 
flexibility of their organisation’s quality compromise, shifting its definition to make more 
savings compatible therewith. Once established, these new savings helped reduce uncertainty 
about how budgetary totals would be attained, closing managers’ eyes to that budget’s 
arbitrariness. 
Each of these strategies – embodied by attaining, constructing possibilities and reconfiguring 
respectively, help austere organisations manage short-term uncertainty. Facing multiple 
ultimata to create compliant budgets, austere organisations open their eyes to such initial 
budgetary decisions’ arbitrary or ‘tactical’ nature. This is effective in its immediate purpose of 
budgetary compliance but creates problems when people must close their eyes to use the 
budget for coordination. Techniques like accountancy devices, savings objects, and 
reconfiguring organisational values help construct apparently reliable savings. These make 
overall savings totals more ‘real’, reducing uncertainty and enabling managers to close their 
eyes once again.  
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Stores of uncertainty 
Yet ‘packaging’ away this uncertainty is not resolving it. As budgets, savings objects and quality 
compromises stretch to make required financial totals ‘add up’ they lose referentiality to real-
world objects. The prominence of accountancy devices in our sites highlighted this trend. 
These meant that budgetary outcomes had progressively less to do with the stuff of 
organisational life. Austerity’s pressure drives objects which measure, forecast and plan 
spending apart from the concrete activity they notionally describe. 
This stores up problems for the rest of the financial year. Managers face extensive resistance 
when try to make real the savings encapsulated by such plans. As Thévenot (2001b) describes 
it such resistance comes not only from other actors, but from the world itself. Resistance is a 
normal feature of life, simply characterising the response one receives to one’s interventions. 
But when severe, it can undermine such interventions. Under austerity, such resistance 
becomes greater as the financial year wears on and attempts to reconcile espoused budgetary 
plans with organisational reality become more ill-fated. 
Budgetary objects fashioned through attaining face resistance from the world when their 
optimistic savings plans must become actual financial outcomes. When our organisations 
attempted to ‘realise’ their ‘ambitious’ plans, the gap between budgets and reality became 
apparent. As staff attempted to make improbable savings, it became difficult for financial plans 
to remain stable. Plans went significantly off-track, resulting in each organisation modifying 
those plans. The uncertainty those plans had initially contained returned. 
As time went on and such plans seemed increasingly daunting, staff themselves resisted those 
plans’ use. Staff held to increasingly challenging financial plans questioned those plans’ 
realism. This tension was expressed when one division was missing its targets towards the end 
of the year. In a passage analysed on p.102 for its relevance to financial tests, a manager 
begins to question the meaningfulness of the budget itself: 
Achieving balance was ‘always going to be very tough’, they said, conceding 
that they had ‘underperformed’…However, ‘is the budget appropriate? I’m 
not sure we bottomed that out’. ‘Again, it’s not an excuse’, they added, as 
the central manager pursed their lips. (Fieldnotes paraphrase) 
As the fuller analysis above highlights, the budget here is now treated not as a fact, but as one 
of many budgets that could have been set. Having struggled to meet the required budget, this 
manager instead opens their eyes to that budgets’ relativity, prompting central managers’ 
evident inquietude. While this did not wholly mitigate the criticisms made of this division, it 
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illustrates the propensity for resistance from staff over the financial year, and how this can 
cause eyes once again to open. 
This possibility is not limited to budgets themselves. Savings objects created through 
constructing possibilities are similarly vulnerable to losing referentiality. Because those 
savings objects initially arise to fill budgetary necessities, their contents are always defined as 
much by budgetary arithmetic as connection to realities. This disconnect was epitomised by 
the ‘unidentified CIP’, an increasingly common budgetary object. It denoted frequently 
significant savings ambitions unassociated with any plan. Yet it inhabited the same ‘bridge 
charts’ and CIP Trackers as more substantive plans. Such objects were far from guaranteed to 
materialise. 
Accordingly, savings objects forged through constructing possibility also meet significant 
resistance as the financial year continues and they become due to deliver espoused savings. 
These hypothetical savings represented as already-existing objects merely requiring 
‘realisation’ face resistance from the world. In our sites this manifested as the realisation that 
some savings objects were in fact ‘empty’. Over time, their ability to package budgetary 
uncertainty proves temporary. 
Nor will such savings objects be neutral in organisational life. For those allocated savings to 
make, they become obligations, potential future negative evaluations. Use of such objects thus 
faces resistance from staff as such evaluations approach. During one meeting, a manager 
queried allocated savings responsibilities because circumstances they had been ‘predicated’ on 
had changed. This manager was thus urging others to open their eyes to such savings objects’ 
arbitrariness: they are not real but based on contextual, defeasible logics. 
Reformulations of organisational values achieved by reconfiguring are similarly likely to meet 
resistance. While compromises offer latitude for redefinition through their vague formulation, 
austerity is a radical contextual change. Compromises designed under prosperity are unlikely 
to wholly weather its storm. The redefinitions of quality which reconfiguring creates probably 
push definitions further than some find comfortable. 
These ethical changes may be too subtle to prompt outright disputes. Rather, our sites showed 
a growing unease among many about the changes in the quality compromises in which they 
were implicated. Often expressed as anxieties about the ‘direction of travel’ or euphemisms 
used around shifts in quality, this unease signalled a growing uncertainty about prevailing 
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compromises. This unease was associated with unspoken objections, less than wholehearted 
commitment and ambivalence about organisations’ priorities. 
Even the use of mutually agreeable quality compromises could face resistance from the world. 
Representing the relationship between quality and cost in a given way can legitimate savings 
meeting certain normative criteria. Yet this is useful only so long as the context enables savings 
opportunities meeting that description. As contexts changed, representations of quality 
changed with them. Initially, savings that helped both quality and cost were sometimes 
legitimised (blurring quality and cost). This was effective at justifying such savings. Yet over the 
year, such ‘win-win’ opportunities dried up. With financial gaps remaining, it was necessary to 
tweak such quality compromises, seeking ‘unpalatable’ savings. Such tweaking required 
managers to once again open their eyes to the arbitrariness and changeability of such quality 
compromises. 
The devices constructed through attaining, constructing possibilities and reconfiguring 
initially helped managers close their eyes to budgetary goals’ arbitrariness. Yet they did so at 
the expense of losing referentiality to concrete phenomena. Thus their use to plan and govern 
concrete activity faced extensive resistance, from a world they poorly described and staff who 
rejected the standards to which they were being held. These devices had not solved, but 
temporarily contained budgetary uncertainty. As this became clear, managers were forced to 
once again open their eyes. These devices’ foreclosure of the inquietude of budgetary 
arbitrariness was temporary. 
This opening and closing of eyes adopts a cyclical character. During budgeting, senior staff 
must open their eyes to conventions’ arbitrariness to meet the tests of budgetary arithmetic 
(attaining tenuous futures). This was the phase in our sites during which budgetary plans 
stretched feasibility, ‘unidentified CIPs’ filled gaps and quality was reformulated to enable 
‘unpalatable’ savings. Attaining, constructing possibilities and reconfiguring join to 
reconfigure the meanings of these conventions: senior budgeters open people’s eyes. Yet as 
time continues, managerial eyes close once again so that budgets, savings plans and normative 
principles can be used to coordinate work. When solidified, the accountancy devices, savings 
objects and compromises described above help managers close their eyes. 
For a time, this may work well. Yet with austerity’s demands so great, resistance progressively 
grows. Through people’s and the world’s resistance, it becomes clear that financial objects are 
far from financial realities and that normative compromises are open to debate. During this 
period steps may be taken to preserve existing plans by keeping them aligned with realities, as 
-246- 
 
when Thyme used reserves to realign its ailing plan with observable outcomes. However, 
fulfilling budgetary targets and creating compliant plans for the following year eventually 
requires senior staff to once again open their eyes and focus on reported – as distinct from 
concrete – outcomes.  
Figure 12.1 illustrates this dynamic. Sometimes, most senior managers acted consistently with 
their eyes open; at others, consistently with them closed. At others, a more mixed picture was 
observed in which orientations were varied, changeable and sometimes involved ‘blinking’. 
The vertical position of the arrow represents the tendency towards eyes opening or closing. 
The dotted line represents a feature found in two of three organisations, in which mid-year 
rebudgeting occurred early in the financial year. This included a partial shift back towards the 
opening of one’s eyes characterising the main budgeting cycle. Organisations under austerity 
face consistent drivers requiring senior managers to open and close their eyes over the 
financial year. 
 
Figure 12.1 – Opening and closing one’s eyes among senior budgeters 
Seeing the cycle from outside 
Yet this annual change between opening and closing one’s eyes does not affect all staff 
symmetrically. Senior budgeters are most prone to these alterations between states. Their 
heightened connection with the budgetary process, and the risk of personal consequences if 
Financial year 
Opening one’s eyes 
Closing one’s eyes 
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things go wrong makes them most likely to respond vigorously to the changing budgetary 
imperatives described above. Thévenot (2009, p.797) also observes that those who create 
conventions are united in a shared ‘awareness of arbitrariness that, in another moment of 
confident adhesion, should be forgotten’. Such ‘secret societ[ies]’ seem likely to be particularly 
aware of conventions’ dual states, and able to move between them (c.f. Boltanski, 2011). 
Senior budgeters are most likely to follow Figure 12.1’s dynamics. 
However, other staff do not simply retain a blind faith in these conventional objects. More 
rooted in day-to-day service provision, they are less embroiled in budgeting, and have a 
greater sense it should reflect the concrete realities of their daily work. They observe a 
landscape of rapid change in which savings targets once treated as concrete necessities are 
suddenly solved with a bailout or ‘paper’ measure. Predictable annual changes in managers’ 
orientations to objects like financial instruments and normative compromises make those 
objects seem less stable. 
These changes in orientation often mean changes in the objects themselves. As our sites’ plans 
came under strain, managers amended or replaced them to avoid criticism and keep them 
realistic. Thus were CIP risk ratings tweaked, or accountancy devices like bailouts used to fill 
the gaps in ailing budgets. This can keep plans feasible and objects linked to reality. But it 
makes it harder for staff to see them as stable, ‘real’ requirements. Staff lost trust in our sites’ 
savings requirements which instead seemed so much ‘smoke and mirrors’. They got used to 
annual cycles in which mid-year predictions of ‘doom and gloom’ preceded acceptable year-
end outcomes achieved through such artificial devices. Those outside organisations’ central 
budgeting teams grow wise to Figure 12.1. 
Whereas senior budgeters are focused on the budgetary task at hand, those beyond these 
teams see the budgeting process from a greater distance. This leaves them increasingly aware 
that senior managers variously treat these financial devices as arbitrary and real, fissile and 
fixed over the year. This led sometimes to critique but often simply to a blurry disconnection 
from conventional objects expressed through irony or dark humour. They became aware of the 
multiple ways such objects could be oriented to at different times.  
This is comparable to ‘blinking’ – a simultaneous awareness of both faces of a convention 
(Thévenot, 2009). But whereas ‘blinking’ sounds like the two faces are crisp and distinct, here 
they seem blurred together. They are not two neatly differentiated ways of seeing a 
convention available to one in the present, but the gradually altering orientations to expect 
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over the financial year. This meant that either orientation to such objects, whether as arbitrary 
or real, was itself relativised by the history and expected future of other orientations. 
Figure 12.2 illustrates this dynamic. It overlays onto central budgeters’ changing orientations 
to financial objects a gradual widening of others’ perceptions of said objects as they grow 
accustomed to this cycle. This highlights the increasing divergence between budgeters’ and 
others’ orientations to these objects. This disjuncture enables significant disputes between 
these groups, who see their financial situations, savings possibilities and normative 
compromises differently. 
 
Figure 12.2 – Opening and closing eyes across financial year 
This is a problem for senior budgeters. Responding to austerity’s imperatives, they rapidly 
change their orientation to the financial conventions which help them grasp reality and 
coordinate action. Yet others do not change their orientations similarly. Rather, they stand 
outside these rapid changes and observe them as an annual pattern. From that perspective, 
the conventional objects senior budgeters often treat as real and stable become predictably 
mobile. Budgetary objects no longer created consensus pictures of the financial situation. 
This is an unusual form of resistance for an engagement to face. Usually, we think of resistance 
coming from others, or the world itself. Here, however, resistance comes because of the 
Financial year 
Opening one’s eyes 
Closing one’s eyes 
Other staff Senior budgeters 
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history of cyclical change within an engagement. A budgeter may say savings are vital, but staff 
have heard it all before. Used to similar claims, they know she will be offering bailouts soon. To 
cast this as simply resistance from others, or from the world, is to omit the influence of this 
engagement’s history. As their cyclical change is understood and predicted, engagements like 
attaining, constructing possibilities and reconfiguring face resistance to themselves across 
time. 
Responding to resistance 
If senior budgeters rely on colleagues to make savings, dissensus about the financial situation 
is deeply problematic. In our sites, senior managers often interpreted this difference in terms 
of junior colleagues’ lack of understanding. Accordingly, they routinely attempted to 
demonstrate the situation’s severity by depicting their organisation as embedded within 
financial jeopardy. It was thus that attaining tenuous futures came to involve not only 
budgeting work but discursive efforts to construct the situation as desperate. 
It was notable that the urgency described did not seem to vary with organisations’ actual 
likelihood of financial failure. In the least and most financially stable organisations alike, the 
stakes sounded existential: savings were necessary to ‘keep…us alive’ (Aloe); ‘if we sink, the 
NHS is sunk’ (Thyme). Chapter 6 details this discourse of existential threat (p.190). By 
presenting that situation as an emergency, managers attempted to make it urgent enough that 
others must engage with it.  
However, this tone of desperation only reinforced situational uncertainty. Like each practice 
reviewed here, this element of attaining also faced significant resistance. Some disputed 
whether threats of regulatory ‘henchmen’ were genuine; indeed, these threats did not always 
materialise. And the rhythm of despair and bailouts made it hard to maintain that – this time – 
the threat was real. In one manager’s words, a sense grew organisations were ‘crying wolf’. 
Not only did this destabilise the situation, it contributed to growing frustration in relations 
between more senior and junior staff. Understanding the situation differently, they sometimes 
saw one another as variously incognisant or dishonest. Coordination became increasingly 
difficult. 
Theorising cycles of opening and closing one’s eyes 
This theorisation characterises austerity management as a problematic cycle of opening and 
closing one’s eyes. As Figure 12.2 illustrates, efforts to avoid uncertainty precipitated a 
turbulent landscape in which austerity’s baseline instability was joined by an annual cycle of 
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changing perceptions of the situation. The Figure highlights the seasonal change which 
affected attaining, constructing possibility and reconfiguring quality alike over financial years. 
It also highlights the variance between senior budgeters’ and others’ perceptions, accounting 
for disagreement and acrimony. 
This cycle renders the situation fissile. People understand similar circumstances differently as 
the budgetary cycle proceeds and eyes are opened and closed. With eyes open and financial 
data treated as arbitrary, making budgets add up is easier and the situation seems less 
desperate. But with eyes closed and those data needing to tie tightly to real circumstances, 
greater pessimism arises. We thus cannot assume that organisations perceive a single fixed 
‘situation’. Adopting theorists’ advice to manage austerity differently depending on the 
situation (Levine, 1978, 1985; Williams, 2015) could prompt rapid vacillations in management 
style. 
The cycle of opening and closing implies not only descriptive but also evaluative differences 
(Thévenot, 2001b). Savings plans which might have seemed ‘do-able’ during budgeting might 
rapidly become ‘risky’ by mid-year. I do not intend ‘do-able’ and ‘risky’ to sound contradictory, 
but to illustrate the changing evaluative criteria applied. These evaluative differences are most 
evident when it comes to the transformations of normative compromises over the year. As 
financial circumstances change, the meaning of an organisational commitment to ‘quality’ 
might alter. 
This situational and evaluative instability makes coordination particularly difficult. Thévenot’s 
model of interventions and tests describes coordination as the achievement of repeated 
adjustment in response to resistance. Normally, this coordination is possible because one can 
expect reasonable stability in the responses received to similar interventions, enabling the 
gradual tailoring of interventions. Under austerity’s environmental turbulence and cycles of 
opening and closing, one instead finds oneself aiming for a moving target. Interpretations of 
the situation, savings objects and normative compromises all become movable, leading people 
to respond differently to the same intervention over time. Coordination becomes exceptionally 
difficult. 
This is only worsened by the fact that there are multiple inter-reliant variables involved. 
Coordination would be difficult were it only that data were unreliable (Rubin, 1977) or 
budgetary processes uncertain (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980; Ferlie and Judge, 1981). Yet not 
only situations but also possibilities and normative compromises are unstable. Based on the 




Figure 12.3 – Process model of austerity management as uncertainty management 
Figure 12.3 illustrates how attaining, in its dimensions of forging budgetary plans and 
constructing fiscal crises both responds to and fuels uncertainty. It notes the relationship 
between attaining and the practices which it prompts in order to contain the uncertainty 
inherent in its budgetary work. These practices of constructing and reconfiguring, alongside 
attaining face the common-or-garden resistance all interventions meet from other people and 
the world.  
Vitally, these three practices act upon interrelated variables. If the situation changes, a given 
normative compromise stops being useful; if a normative compromise is reconfigured, certain 
former possibilities become irrelevant; and the loss of such possibilities alters the financial 
situation. Cycles of opening and closing one’s eyes can always cause changes in one of these 
dimensions, with knock-on consequences for others. Dryas managers quickly re-evaluated 
savings possibilities as their focus turned from budgeting to monitoring and scrutiny (closing 
one’s eyes). This contributed to undermining the initial budgetary plan, rendering its hard-won 
budgetary compromise inviable. The interdependencies of these engagements left the 
agreements reached through them profoundly fragile. 
Over time, such resistance and the vicissitudes of the financial cycle precipitate rapid and 
predictable change within engagements. Each year, members of organisations became used to 
profound change in budgetary expectations over the year, with ‘doom and gloom’ preceding 
acceptable outcomes. This precipitated a longer-term form of resistance based on these 
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these engagements started to resist themselves across time. This further destabilises these 
engagements, further problematising the management of uncertainty. 
Conclusion 
Austerity and engagements 
Writers have previously identified the heightened uncertainty this chapter highlights. Yet they 
generally conceptualise uncertainty as a variable exogenous to organisational action and 
peculiar to austerity. It becomes a contingency under which austere organisations inevitably 
act (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980; Ferlie and Judge, 1981; Rubin, 1977).  
Yet this chapter demonstrates that uncertainty is neither specific to austerity not exogenous to 
organisational action. Rather, as Thévenot notes, uncertainty is ubiquitous to human life. Its 
heightened importance under austerity reflects actors’ newfound difficulties in managing it. 
Under austerity, techniques of budgetary management, savings monitoring and normative 
compromise cease to be effective approaches to managing uncertainty.  
Neglecting uncertainty’s endogeneity to austerity management has led academics to advise 
practitioners poorly. Levine (1985) encourages managers to use a ‘strategic capacity’ that 
sounds much like a conventional strategic management system. Elsewhere, he (1979) wonders 
why organisations fail to adopt ‘strategic’ responses to austerity. Yet these ‘strategic 
capacities’ are exactly the uncertainty management tools which can become counter-
productive under austerity. 
Conversely, appreciating uncertainty’s dynamic role has facilitated this chapter’s key 
contribution. Central to this contribution has been the dynamic between opening and closing 
one’s eyes. This is driven by the differing imperatives central managers face across the year, 
from making early budgetary plans ‘add up’ to reaching predicted totals. Measurement 
researchers often characterise people’s relationship with metrics as moving from scepticism to 
naturalisation (Power, 2019; Espeland and Sauder, 2007). Conversely, austerity appears to 
create a cyclical movement between the two. This destabilises situations’ portrayal, 
organisations’ normative compromises, perceptions and evaluations of savings objects. 
This instability reflects a pathological version of the situating work Chapter 11 discusses. That 
chapter and this address the same practices, but here they appear far less stable. 
Organisational austerity is a situation which refuses to stabilise, kept continually in motion by 
the annual cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes. 
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This cycle has implications far beyond the budget. Through the practices investigated here, it 
directly affects not only budgetary information, but individual projects and even organisational 
values. Its differential impact on senior budgeters and others precipitates different perceptions 
of the situation which cause misunderstanding, acrimony and relational uncertainty. Put 
simply, it undermines coordination. 
This insight challenges the static accounts dominating the austerity management literature. 
These characteristically understand austere organisations through synchronic data (e.g. 
Jimenez, 2013; Maher and Deller, 2007) or information based heavily around budgetary 
processes (e.g. Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015; Hendrick, 
1989). This produces accounts of apparently stable austerity management approaches, and 
substantially underplays the instability situated actors face. It is through accounts like these 
that it has been possible to see situations as so simple and manageable that simply taking an 
adequately strategic approach should suffice (Levine, 1985) 
While this insight is partly built on this thesis’s processual approach, it cautions against longer-
term processual accounts that lack attention to local practice (e.g. Cepiku et al., 2016; Sosin, 
2012). While they produce instructive accounts of strategic change, they present misleadingly 
stable pictures of the austere day-to-day. Unstable rhythms across the financial cycle are 
absent, characterising austerity managers’ working environment as excessively stable. 
Instead, this insight echoes Chapter 11’s observation of the importance of situating work while 
highlighting the extreme difficulty such work can face alongside organisational austerity. 
Rather than treating their ‘situations’ as given, we should investigate how those situations are 
constructed and how those constructions change over this financial cycle. Rather than 
according organisations fixed priorities (Leider et al., 2014), we should track the 
transformations in how they evaluate potential changes over the financial year. Rather than 
treating uncertainty as a static contingency, we should understand how organisations manage 
it and the relief such techniques do or do not give.  
Finally, engaging more fully with the endogeneity of uncertainty allows this chapter to theorise 
the price of instability. It highlights the risk of resistance to oneself over time excessively 
changeable engagements face. When a budget or principle contrasts with its predecessor, this 
risks relativising it, undermining its ability to remain a reliable means of coordination. When 
budgets start to resist themselves over time, it becomes hard for them to function. 
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Engagements under austerity 
This central contribution is valuable also to RE literature. First, resistance to oneself over time is 
novel and important to a literature founded on a model of interventions in the world and 
resistance thereto (Thévenot, 2001b). Likely to occur when there are vigorous and predictable 
changes over time, such resistance need not wholly discredit the engagement involved, but 
rather temporalises it. People treat financial ‘doom and gloom’ not as an emergency but as a 
facet of the budgetary season: the fiscal weather is not ‘cold and dreary’, but ‘not bad for 
November’. 
Second, it identifies a processual formation of opening and closing eyes. Aside from Thévenot’s 
observation of blinking, an essentially simultaneous combination of opening and closing, such 
processual patterns of opening and closing have not previously been theorised. Doing so 
highlights that opening and closing can be structurally built into regulatory systems. 
Finally, this chapter characterises the situations likely to prompt such a cycle by forcing one to 
open one’s eyes. While the situation here is austerity, it is not financial scarcity that 
precipitates opening of one’s eyes, but austerity’s regulatory structure. Where regulatory 
consequences for unacceptable reported outcomes outstrip one’s ability to substantively 
improve those outcomes, opening one’s eyes is likely. This represents a more detailed 
empirical account of opening and closing one’s eyes than otherwise available. 
Moving on 
This chapter identifies austerity management as a cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes 
aiming to manage radical uncertainty. This opens extensive ground for future research. First, 
one wonders what organisations might do to avoid, minimise or even utilise such cycles. 
Further studies could compare these organisations’ practices with those who appear better 
buffered against such pressure. Second, the UK’s STF regime produces short-term pressures 
particularly likely to precipitate the cycles described here. Future study could reveal whether 
alternative policy approaches can avoid such consequences. Finally, it would be interesting to 
see how far such cycles’ effects stretch. A similar long-term processual lens could investigate 
annual changes in other dimensions of austerity, like centralisation, staff impacts, or the 
savings selected. 
Simultaneously, this chapter develops the RE model. This opens further research 
opportunities. First, this study is novel in highlighting patterned temporal changes in 
orientations to a convention (open and closed eyes). Further research here could track 
comparable shifts in environments with annual regulatory calendars, like periods of formal 
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inspection. Second, one wonders what more broadly causes shifts from open to closed eyes. 
Further work could investigate the trigger points for such changes in orientation. Finally the 
chapter introduces the concept of resistance against oneself over time, but its exploration 
thereof is limited. There remains extensive scope to understand such resistance and the 
broader circumstances precipitating it. 
This Chapter and Chapter 11 describe a turbulent situation. Government and organisations 
alike engage in significant, contested situating work. Within organisations, this work creates 
cycles of opening and closing one’s eyes that compound austerity’s day-to-day instability. The 
management devices which once stabilised organisational uncertainty now perpetuate it. Yet 
organisations must manage despite these circumstances: they must still determine the right 
course and create structures to enable it. The practices governing such processes of evaluating 
action and amending one’s structures were coded as conducting and contesting financial tests 





Chapter 13: Evaluative turbulence: austerity management as a struggle for 
coordination 
Introduction: austerity and evaluative turbulence 
Writing on austerity management generally asks how organisational leaders should – or do – 
coordinate their work. Yet given extreme instability, we should not presume that effective 
coordination occurs at all. What might be taken for granted in normal times becomes no 
longer guaranteed, disrupting organisational routines (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980; Ferlie and 
Judge, 1981). 
As Chapter 12 affirms, the austere context jeopardises coordination. Austerity brings not only 
financial scarcity but also profound situational uncertainty. This instability can be both long-
term and part of an annual cycle in which perceptions of the situation and how to approach it 
routinely change. Facing such an unstable landscape, organisations and Governments 
understandably seek to reduce uncertainty. One way they do so is seeking more information 
about how well they and their subordinates are doing (Breviglieri, 2018; Hayne, 2015; Oakes 
and Oakes, 2016). This includes both financial information and other performance data, like 
guarantees that financial pressure is not adversely affecting quality (National Quality Board, 
2012). Multiple agencies might request comparable information to meet related, sympathetic 
but distinct priorities. 
While these proliferating and changing standards reassure superiors, meeting them becomes 
difficult for organisations, particularly given their unstable situations. The sheer effort of 
providing the datasets requested should not be underestimated. Nor should we assume that 
because metrics share cost-cutting agendas, their ways of assessing them are compatible. 
Meeting these diverse agendas becomes harder under austerity. 
Where Chapter 12 focused on organisations’ changing views of their situation, this Chapter 
investigates the proliferating and fissile evaluations to which they are subject. Of course, the 
two are intimately interrelated, and I do not pretend they can be empirically disentangled. But 
alongside the insights into the instability of perceived situations, possibilities and prevailing 
compromises, we must understand austerity’s intense and changing regimes of evaluative 
governance. This Chapter thus focuses on the practices most related to these patterns: 
conducting and contesting financial tests and reshaping engagements. If Chapter 12 
investigated where organisations think they are, this one investigates what they – and others – 
think of their being there. 
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Its focus on the measures organisations, regulators and Government use to evaluate 
organisations’ positions comes from their importance as coordinative devices. Yet, as observed 
above, the literature too often begins by assuming coordination is unproblematically possible. 
Thévenot’s theory is therefore a helpful corrective: first, because it views coordination not as a 
starting point but as an achievement; second, because it highlights austerity’s rapidly 
proliferating evaluative devices, or measurement objects, as coordination mechanisms. 
Accordingly, this introduction first considers what is known about evaluation under austerity, 
second analysing relevant elements of RE in more detail. This sets the agenda for the 
remainder of the chapter. 
Evaluative turbulence 
The foregoing cases demonstrate that austerity is a site of considerable evaluative turbulence: 
organisations face rapidly proliferating and changing evaluative standards within uncertain 
situations. This section outlines this turbulent landscape, reflecting on our cases and the 
literature’s limitations in addressing them.  
Austerity and evaluative change 
Austerity tends to occur during political and economic instability, in which governments and 
organisations face extensive pressures to justify themselves (Dommett and Skelcher, 2014; 
Pollitt, 2010). Such environments probably prompt ever-increasing financial scrutiny from the 
multiple organisations to whom public agencies answer: governments, commissioners, 
regulators, partners (see Chapter 1, Chapter 11). As governing actors worry about savings 
plans, new forms of financial measurement arise, complementing the NHS’s rich tapestry of 
measures (Power, 1999, pp.104–109).  
This plurality of evaluations can overwhelm organisations. One Dryas manager explained: 
So we’ve got a CIP Programme, the QIPP Programme, the [Commissioning 
for Quality and Innovation] Programme that we’ve talked about. We’ve got 
a [service-specific national change programme]. We’ve got the Trust 
Strategy. We’ve got R&D. We’ve got IT changes. We’ve got a Quality 
Programme. We’ve got our divisions’ own internal change programmes to 
meet the development of their own services. We’ve got national mandated 
programmes that come down. We’ve got the Sustainability and 
Transformation Plan Initiatives…We have Quality Impact Assessments 
Mitigation Plans against everything that we do…We have an Infrastructure 
Plan to keep on top of our infrastructure charges…We’ve got a nationally 
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mandated Agency Reduction Plan, and we’ve got a Mobile Working and 
team digitisation Plan. 
This interviewee describes the plural evaluative regimes Dryas faced. This was common across 
cases. Between them, commissioners, regulators and Government imposed many evaluative 
structures. In acute hospitals, the high-profile Carter review would have added to the above 
evaluative schemes. Organisations saw rapidly proliferating national evaluative structures, 
generally captured under conducting and contesting financial tests.  
UK healthcare is not alone in this rapid proliferation of evaluative devices. Wider research 
highlights such rapid changes in accountability arrangements across austere settings (Landri, 
2014; Bracci et al., 2015; Oakes and Oakes, 2016; Hayne, 2015). As Chapter 12 highlights, 
austerity sees public organisations experience unclear normative compromises and unstable 
perceptions of situations and possibilities. Such circumstances are ripe for ever-more 
evaluative frameworks to be introduced and modified to grasp changing situations. 
Organisations often add to such national evaluative structures, whether to delegate national 
obligations to departments (p.142) or to reassure senior managers regarding local 
performance priorities (Clayton et al., 2016; Raudla et al., 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017). 
Organisations under austerity experience turbulent evaluative landscapes. 
Conceptualising evaluative turbulence 
To better understand what I call evaluative turbulence, this chapter breaks it down into 
constituent elements: the simultaneous use of many evaluative tests (synchronic evaluative 
heterogeneity), the circumstances’ unsettledness and perceptions thereof (situational 
instability), and consequent changes in tests and measurement devices across time (diachronic 
evaluative heterogeneity). These produce a self-sustaining landscape of uncertainty. 
Under austerity, synchronic evaluative heterogeneity is common. Organisations apprehending 
uncertain futures frequently seek the ‘guarantees’ of increased measurement (Breviglieri, 
2018). Hence do these studies demonstrate increasing measurements from external overseers 
and through internal governance channels. Austerity management studies characteristically 
analysed these changes as an intensification in central monitoring (Raudla et al., 2013, p.29). 
They are not wrong; ever-more measurement can be associated with increasing centralised 
control (Oakes and Oakes, 2016). However, seeing such measurement objects as an 
undifferentiated mass of ‘more intensive measurement’ risks missing the variations and 




Yet it is equally unsatisfactory to reduce this plurality to the direct normative conflicts on 
which EW/RE research often focuses. Where EW/RE generally seeks direct clashes between 
goods (Patriotta et al., 2011) or regimes (Meilvang et al., 2018), many of the measures cited 
above are sympathetic to one another, defending similar financial plans underwritten by 
market-industrial values. The difficulties they posed (see p.263) sprang not from their 
normative clashes but the sheer variety of differently measured evaluative devices. They 
should be seen neither as simply ‘more intensive measurement’ nor reduced to individual 
normative conflicts. Instead, their defining feature was variety itself: hence I conceptualise 
them as synchronic evaluative heterogeneity. 
Such synchronic evaluative heterogeneity is made more difficult by its occurrence under 
austerity’s situational instability. As Chapter 12 demonstrates, perceptions of the situation 
remain unstable, continually altering the situations in which evaluations occur (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006). This makes identifying the situationally appropriate evaluative standards 
difficult. Austerity augments such problems with frequent changes in material circumstances. 
Services, leaders, organisational and systemic structures repeatedly change. As Aloe’s troubles 
demonstrated, such concrete changes can precipitate major evaluative uncertainties. Nor are 
such troubles uncommon: Chapter 12 identified comparable instability as a routine feature of 
the financial year. Building on this, this chapter recognises this situational instability 
complicates evaluative processes. 
Together, synchronic evaluative heterogeneity and situational instability precipitate diachronic 
evaluative heterogeneity. Conducting and contesting financial tests describes rapidly changing 
financial measures, often in response to changing situations (p.149). This is often hurried, 
individual measures ‘cobbl[ed]…together’. These rapidly proliferating tests therefore 
themselves require continual tweaking. This produces diachronic evaluative heterogeneity: the 
presence of a breadth of different tests across time. 
Just as situational instability contributes to this evaluative heterogeneity, so the plurality of 
evaluative devices available makes the situation harder to pin down. Evaluative devices 
provide information about one’s situation. As they change and become more numerous it 
becomes harder to reach consensus about the situation. Thus synchronic and diachronic 
evaluative heterogeneity relate dialectically to situational instability. This interrelated bundle 
of circumstances constitutes the evaluative turbulence this chapter investigates.  
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Austerity as a site of evaluative turbulence 
The term evaluative turbulence is chosen to bring out the unsettled feeling that such regular 
situational and evaluative change precipitates. Yet the literature’s implied model of austerity 
management seems to be one of more-or-less circumspect judgement. One should be able to 
divine what sort of crisis one is in (Levine, 1978); or use high level budgetary categories to 
strategically direct savings (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015). The image is of managers as 
planners making decisions about austerity, not as uncertain individuals bound up in austerity.  
The measurement tools managers use to coordinate their work are similarly treated not as 
part of those efforts, but evidence about them. Characteristically, researchers use budgetary 
data as if they diagnose success and usefully describe organisations’ savings (e.g. Dunsire and 
Hood, 1989; Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015). Notwithstanding the evaluative turbulence 
described above, measures are treated as both reliable and simple. 
This is perhaps most obvious when it comes to the budgetary bottom line. Austerity is often 
imagined as a time in which evaluating one’s relative success is simple: absent disasters, if 
one’s bottom line is improving, things are going well. Research reinforces this common-
sensical assumption. Consequently, many studies erase austerity’s proliferating measurement 
devices as if the budgetary bottom line is the only show in town (e.g. 1989). 
Yet austere organisations face myriad other evaluative standards. Schmidt et al (2017) posit 
that such broader measures matter but neither emphasise nor operationalise this suggestion. 
Where writers describe themselves as examining the use of performance data in austerity 
management, they mean they are examining their use in budget-setting (Hou et al., 2011; 
Jimenez, 2013; Raudla and Savi, 2015; Troupin et al., 2013). The use of nonfinancial or 
nonbudgetary data to evaluate performance against financial plans or other objectives goes 
unexamined. We acquire a contractile picture of evaluation under austerity. 
Not only is the full range of evaluative devices under austerity underappreciated, changes 
within individual devices are also omitted. It has been observed that measurement tools 
become unreliable under austerity because of budgetary ‘fudging’ (Ferlie and Judge, 1981). But 
studies have not asked what this ‘fudging’ means once budgets are set. Indeed, writers treat 
budgets primarily as planning devices, neglecting their role in monitoring spending against 
planned allocations (e.g. Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Sosin, 2012). 
The literature’s picture of evaluation is both contractile and oddly static. 
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Some recognise that multiple financial evaluative forms exist within organisations (Wildavsky, 
1978). Several highlight the centralisation likely to prompt new data requests (Clayton et al., 
2016; Raudla et al., 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017). Yet those focused on austerity’s new measures 
remain on the literature’s periphery, not analysing how such measures shape austerity 
management (Oakes and Oakes, 2016). The austerity management literature struggles to 
account for the situational instability or the evaluative heterogeneity austerity entails. 
This limitation highlights the austerity management literature’s heritage in private sector 
budgeting and cutback management theory (Raudla et al., 2015). While private organisations 
might focus primarily on financial outcomes, austere organisations’ evaluative pluralism 
reflects public bodies’ plural objectives (Denis et al., 2007). With governance decreasingly 
unitary (Dunleavy et al., 2006; Moore, 2013), public organisations must no longer merely 
reconcile their political masters’ multiple goals: alongside government targets and measures 
they also face those from commissioners, regulators and others. The austerity management 
literature’s theoretical heritage constrains its understanding of evaluative turbulence. 
Evaluative turbulence and the regimes of engagement 
There is thus a need for a theorisation of such changes that exceeds the literature’s traditional 
budgeting theory approaches. Built out of Thévenot’s (1984, 2016) detailed exploration of 
measurement devices, RE highlights their role in coordination – that is, within organisational 
life (Thévenot, 2001a). Unlike other approaches, RE treats coordination as a defeasible 
achievement, not a starting point. It is apt to theorise austerity’s evaluative turbulence 
because it treats measurement devices as central successful coordination (Thévenot, 2001b). 
Thévenot theorises in detail how evaluation can facilitate coordination in normal times. With 
life adopting the rhythm of a series of tests oriented to some good or other, evaluation helps 
us determine whether our interventions need amendment to achieve said good (Thévenot, 
2001a, 2001b). Evaluation requires measurement devices tailored to the good sought and the 
way reality must be grasped to achieve it. This hints at why this study found organisations so 
frequently altering evaluative mechanisms. Measurement objects were found not to grasp the 
world in a manner befitting the goods organisations sought, prompting their repeated 
adjustment to improve this fit. This was repeated and urgent because evaluation and the tools 
one uses therein are vital to organisational goals.  
Such objects can provide stability. More-or-less standardised evaluative approaches help us 
know the criteria we should use to assess people, actions or policies. They are formatted to 
assess certain types of subject or object using certain forms of information and are important 
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to certain situations. These evaluative approaches and the objects they use thus temporarily 
solidify important details that help us coordinate, making social life more predictable (Diaz-
Bone, 2011). Measurement objects associated with such evaluations are thus central to 
containing conflicts or difference. Yet this is not permanent; there is always the risk such 
tensions may be reactivated (Thévenot, 2014a). Thévenot’s thought is a promising way to 
conceptualise the coordinative function of evaluation, and the tensions which might arise 
when evaluative systems are placed under strain (Bourguignon and Chiapello, 2005). 
This theorisation of coordination in normal times sows the theoretical seeds for us to 
understand how this might change under austerity. However, RE is theoretically based around 
analysis of individual situations, tests and measurement devices. Consequently, many studies 
focus on individual tests or devices, or how small numbers thereof conflict or interact (Huault 
and Rainelli-Weiss, 2011; Oldenhof et al., 2014; Pohler, 2019). Where studies do consider 
larger numbers of devices, they tend to be analysed more for their similarity than their 
interactions (Meilvang et al., 2018) or to be linked more empirically than by RE’s theory. 
Theoretically, RE remains based around individual tests and direct flashpoints of contradiction 
between competing normative orientations. We know considerably less about broader 
contexts in which multiple measures coexist and interact without forming neat normative 
conflicts. 
This is organisationally significant. Organisational strategising involves evaluating options and 
performance, and thus forwarding and challenging evaluative ‘devices and measures’ (Gond, 
2017, p.22, emphasis original). Yet such ‘devices and measures’ are far from isolated but exist 
among wider circumstances and complexes of other measures in whose context they are 
understood. Practitioners know well that individual measures must be understood as part of a 
wider measurement landscape – inter-metric overlap is a key consideration when devising 
measures. We must better understand how suites of measures behave. This is vital under 
austerity’s evaluative heterogeneity. 
This chapter next tracks through RE how austerity’s measurement devices are used, resisted, 
and the implications for coordination. It concludes that austerity’s evaluative turbulence 
destabilises both individual measurement devices and the wider organisational arrangements 
supporting them, precipitating a crisis of coordination. Identifying the evaluative dynamics of 
an extremely unusual situation unsurprisingly takes us beyond usual RE theory. This 
precipitates supplementary findings, like novel forms of critique and the organisational 




Evaluative turbulence is difficult to handle. Organisations facing proliferating and changing 
measurement regimes took little consolation from the fact that these multiple measures 
shared similar normative orientations. Their different measures of comparable goals increased 
measurement labour, confusion and complexity. One site described the ‘disconnect’ between 
internal and external budgeting, which used different spending categories: this created 
significant uncertainty.  
Equally, one might find that measures targeting similar goals pushed organisations in 
contradictory directions. Sustainability and Transformation Partnership savings targets and 
organisational savings responsibilities were comparable financial plans backed by market-
industrial outlooks. Yet one’s savings goals within a Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnership (STP) could conflict with one’s organisational savings targets because the two 
devices measured different actors’ spending. Even repeating exactly the same evaluation of 
the same division could lead to conflicts as later versions undercut their predecessors (see 
p.146). Evaluative heterogeneity implies plural measures that evaluate different actors using 
differently defined metrics at different times. 
Situational uncertainty entrenches such problems. Given evaluations’ appropriateness is 
situated, quickly changing circumstances always threaten to make even established evaluative 
approaches seem inappropriate (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Changing financial situations 
required Aloe’s erstwhile agreements about reasonable savings to be revised (p.169); or Dryas 
to review its ‘across-the-board’ principle of sharing savings burdens (p.110). Like evaluative 
heterogeneity, situational uncertainty made it difficult for organisations to know what to do. 
Evaluative turbulence jeopardised coordination. 
Evaluative devices are supposed to help coordination. Thévenot (2001b) theorises the 
responses the world offers to our interventions as resistance. The type of resistance we receive 
helps us know if we are achieving our desired good and adjust our interventions as required. 
Evaluative devices help give clear indications of whether a good is being achieved, making 
successful interventions easier. Yet this becomes harder when multiple established measures 
are broadly aligned with one’s chosen good. The paragraphs above describe the possibility of 
one receiving different responses from different evaluative devices each aligned with one’s 
good. This makes tailoring one’s interventions harder. 
These problems multiply when one attempts to coordinate with others. Evaluative 
heterogeneity leaves myriad ways of counting organisations’ and departments’ savings 
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contributions. Should one consider only internal CIP obligations or also QIPP savings when 
balancing divisions’ savings contributions? This plurality of ways of counting means one can 
select one more favourable (or damning) to a given unit. Such clusters of measures therefore 
do not facilitate adjudication on what is proportional, fair or efficacious. Notwithstanding 
individual metrics’ coherence, their plurality undermines their coordinative utility. 
This possibility became clear in our organisations: 
Corporate Dryas managers prepared to welcome a division to a Senior 
Scrutiny meeting. One talked through the division’s budget. They highlighted 
their overspends and the so-called offsets against them. However, these did 
not cover the whole gap ‘whether legitimate’ offsets or not. There was also 
a very large gap, but a QIPP amounting to almost this amount [which might 
explain part of the gap]. However, the division was overperforming so they 
expected that QIPP to have a smaller impact than its headline figures 
suggested. A manager reflected that there were a lot of technicalities; they 
could get locked into an argument here. Another replied that these 
technicalities had made this a ‘circular argument’. (Fieldnotes paraphrase) 
Managers here discuss a budgetary document made more complex by the ‘offsets’ and QIPPs 
associated with diverse financial tests. These complicating factors provide many ways to count 
divisions’ performance against financial targets. This led divisions to critique official counts – 
and the manager ending this extract to describe such criticisms as ‘circular argument[s]’. 
Financial tests’ heterogeneity undermines their evaluative-coordinative function. 
To limit this, organisations may promote one of their many measures as a ‘flagship’ evaluation. 
However, these measures can rarely contain the full complexity of their austere landscapes. 
Unable to account for all variables organisations prioritised, or to deal with the many details 
important to a turbulent situation, such measures are liable to lose credibility, as CIPs did at 
Dryas. This is caused in part by the situational instability austerity brings: as the situation 
changes, any stable measure will struggle to continually encapsulate its vicissitudes. Partly, it is 
caused by synchronic evaluative heterogeneity: with so many measurement devices available, 
switching becomes too easy for any one to remain stably superordinate (Thévenot, 1984). 
‘Flagship’ measures are thus likely to be displaced.  
Evaluative critiques 
Such critiques often centre on the criteria used to differentiate worthy from unworthy objects 
of evaluation. Gond (2017, p.22; Gond et al., 2015) highlights such critiques as a feature of 
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strategy-making writ large: people ‘challeng[e], either openly or tacitly, the devices and 
measures used…by criticizing the criteria upon which such measures are based’ (emphasis 
original). Such disputes are not unique to austerity, but inherent to strategizing. 
Yet it would be wrong to therefore conclude that what was being observed here told us 
nothing about austerity itself. Organisations in our cases changed their evaluative standards 
frequently, with unstable and troubled results. Differentiating tested actors, a sub-code of 
conducting and contesting financial tests, was defined by capturing such application and 
contestation of criteria differentiating worthy from unworthy. It highlighted the regular 
alterations made to Dryas’s CIP infrastructure. These often responded to the presence of other 
measures like the Finance department’s alternative way of rating risk. This sub-code highlights 
the rapid, fevered adaptation of evaluative devices, which could become ubiquitous. 
Austerity’s heterogeneous measures and continually changing situations eased, legitimised 
and amplified the critique found to a lesser extent in common-or-garden strategising. 
But this is far from evaluative turbulence’s only effect. Under austerity, tests involve not only a 
greater variety of evaluative criteria but also a greater variety of actors undergoing evaluation. 
As scrutiny intensifies, organisations may be evaluated not only as individuals, but also as 
clusters or geographies. Within those organisations, people face regular evaluations as 
divisions, departments and even budget lines. With financial pressures rising, organisations 
and systems undergo significant restructures creating whole new organisational actors. 
Austerity’s evaluative turbulence involves not only the criteria but also the actors involved in 
tests. 
As plural criteria facilitate critique, so do plural actors. Configuring tested actors captured 
times when disputes about tests centred on which actor should be evaluated. Following a 
restructure of a department, one of that department’s successors objected to being left with 
what they felt a disproportionate share of their predecessor’s CIP responsibilities. The new 
evaluative standard was disputed not on the basis that CIP fulfilment was an unfair evaluative 
standard, but that the wrong actor was being evaluated. 
Nor did it end there. If an evaluation still seems apt despite such potential critiques, this need 
not imply it seems important. With many frequently changing evaluations occurring, it 
becomes plausible for people to dispute whether a given test is – and will remain – central 
among them. In this study, this was captured under asserting and contesting test centrality, 
another sub-code of conducting and contesting. 
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This activity does not dispute an evaluation’s criteria, but its prescience. This is best illustrated 
by situations in which the same test, with identical criteria, is repeatedly conducted. 
Organisational staff were asked repeatedly about the level of austerity savings they could 
make. In Thyme, such requests to ‘look again’ and corresponding proliferations of budgetary 
plan versions made each one look temporary, enabling disagreement about any given version’s 
importance. These are not disputes about the appropriateness of criteria deployed, but about 
why one evaluation should be considered prescient. 
As tests are increasingly challenged across multiple dimensions under significant financial 
pressure, discord grows. A shared sense of a test’s aptness may become impossible. 
Consequently, managers may attempt to simply enforce such tests, others to resist them. This 
precipitates contestation over the practical apparatus associated with those tests. Enforcing 
and averting tests sees tools necessary to such tests – like the data they use – authoritatively 
demanded and withheld. 
This contestation is promoted by staff feeling vulnerable – something austerity promotes. 
Aloe’s decision to ‘manage our data out of here’ followed a demonstration that evaluative 
devices were changeable (p.169). Staff discomfited by Garrya’s changing of their financial 
targets and recent recruitment of AccountantsCo were not dodging a specific test. Rather, they 
displayed concern about the possibility of as-yet undetermined evaluative approaches. 
Apprehensiveness about diachronic evaluative heterogeneity precipitated caution about access 
to the practical apparatus of testing. 
Austerity sees not only tests’ criteria but also actors, prescience and practical apparatus 
(collectively, their ‘constituents’) face significant resistance. Going beyond the criteria-based 
critique identified in conventional strategising (Gond, 2017), this highlights austerity’s multiple 
forms of instability. Austerity’s evaluative turbulence creates more bases for critique of 
measurement devices than usually apparent. Figure 13.1 illustrates this system, highlighting 



























Under austerity, a greater breadth of test constituents seem disputed than in accounts of 
strategising in general (Gond, 2017). This occurs because each seems subject to change rather 
than part of an unambiguously established form (Thévenot, 1984). Evaluative turbulence 
provides both the heterogeneity that relativises these constituents; and the uncertainty and 
concrete situational changes which precipitate change therein. This does not suggest such 
critiques are impossible at other times: there is no theoretical reason why, say, the actor 
undergoing evaluation could not form the basis for critique in other settings. But the 
simultaneous availability of all of them as potential bases for dispute seems to characterise 
austerity’s evaluative turbulence. Figure 13.1 illustrates the dimensions of this turbulence and 
their relation to the multiple types of critique described here. 
Evaluative adjustments 
One characteristic response to such critique is to amend a test to make it more acceptable, 
thereby enabling coordination (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). So, if someone responds to a 
strategic intervention by critiquing the criteria based on which individuals are differentiated, 
one may stabilise the situation by adjusting them. Normally, such tweaking can help 
precipitate a more stable arrangement. However, austerity twice problematises such 
adjustment. 
First, amendments to tests intensify diachronic evaluative heterogeneity. In response to critical 
claims that organisations could not solve financial problems individually, Government grouped 
them into Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships and began financially evaluating 
them. When Dryas’s CIP approach was found not to have prevented ‘empty’ schemes, it 
altered its risk-rating approach. And when Transforming Thyme’s strategic ambitions met 
resistance in an organisation focused on short-term savings, it progressively shifted towards 
aiming more at this alternative good. Tests were frequently amended in response to critique, 
with significant organisational consequence. 
Such changes attempt to address the criticism evaluative turbulence enables. Yet they 
contribute to the diachronic evaluative heterogeneity described above. Altering individual 
evaluative devices might solve local problems; but together they contribute to the bewildering 
plurality of evaluative devices in recent use. This entrenches one of the conditions Figure 13.1 
highlights as necessitating such adaptations in the first place. 
Second, amendments to any one test constituent probably require compensatory adjustments 
to others. Normally, when it is primarily the criteria by which the worthy and unworthy are 
distinguished that are questioned, progressive adjustments of those criteria can lead to 
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stability and compromise. However, under austerity, evaluative turbulence emphasises the 
relativity of not only test criteria but also actors, data and prescience. With these variables 
open to critique, their inter-reliance becomes important: something is only the right criterion 
by which to evaluate a given actor; and a prescient test only possible with the right apparatus. 
Changing one constituent can require changes in others to maintain an appropriate test. Not 
only does austerity’s evaluative plurality create more bases on which measurement devices 
can be criticised, such resistance is also mutually reinforcing, creating ongoing cycles of 
instability. 
This was observable in these sites. Managers tended to adjust the tests whose constituents 
came under severe critique, often bringing knock-on consequences for other constituents and 
causing further problems. By shifting to managing the overall position when CIPs faced 
resistance, Dryas’s Projects Office were changing the criteria used to differentiate actors. But 
in so doing, they had to shift from testing actors like project leads to those like departments 
and budget-lines, causing more resistance. When Thyme responded to Carter by delegating 
savings imperatives to divisions, it was changing the actor undergoing evaluation. But this 
precipitated fresh resistance from divisional staff who rejected Carter’s criteria. And 
attempting to clarify responsibilities at Garrya by creating Aloe changed who owned 
performance data, enabling them to resist future tests by withholding the apparatus they 
required. Responding to critique of one constituent risks destabilising others. 
Situational instability reinforces these dynamics. Given the fragile balance of constituents 
creating a viable test, tailoring that test to new situations can be a delicate process under 
austerity (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Chapter 12’s situational instability makes this 
tailoring frequent. Dryas had reached a delicate agreement about its budget was undermined 
when the changing situation meant more savings were needed. Evaluative criteria, test 
apparatus, and the actors responsible became controversial, further problematising 
coordination. If evaluative heterogeneity is temporarily overcome, situational instability always 
threatens to undermine temporary agreements. 
Adjusting tests can increase diachronic evaluative heterogeneity and destabilise those tests’ 
constituents. Austerity facilitates these effects by creating unstable situations and leading 
more constituents to seem contestable. Figure 13.1’s arrows illustrates these feedback 
interrelations between constituents and between tests and evaluative heterogeneity. 





With such cycles proliferating, organisations are unlikely to seek stability by naïvely simply 
repeatedly changing their measurement devices. Instead, they will recognise there are 
systemic problems with the contexts individual measures inhabit. Yet unable to change 
austerity itself, they alter the organisational structures facilitating certain evaluations and 
limiting others. These are devices like savings monitoring programmes or governance 
arrangements. They are organisational arrangements that create the contexts for, and 
practically enable, certain types of evaluation. I will call them test infrastructures. 
Reshaping engagements captured changes in test infrastructure. Such practices could be 
effective: creating a new programme management unit might provide missing data, 
completing a test’s practical apparatus; or restructuring a department may resolve ambiguities 
about the actor responsible for savings. However, the evaluative turbulence which made 
forming the right evaluative devices difficult also problematised reshaping engagements 
under austerity. 
This study found three forms of reshaping. One response to the growing prevalence of public 
disputes over chosen measurement objects is to avoid the regime of justification altogether. 
This was achieved through moral separation. This shift in organisations’ test infrastructures 
was often structural. Organisations structurally separated their savings functions from those 
seen as responsible for quality concerns, limiting criticism over their focus on costs. But moral 
separation was not a wholly structural process, also involving significant discursive work 
(p.203). Either way, it limited or mitigated the possibility of justificatory dispute over the bases 
on which measurement devices operated. 
Such action can be locally beneficial. It avoids acrimony and can ease people’s reconciliation to 
projects whose underlying ethos they find uncomfortable. However, austerity’s evaluative 
turbulence does not disappear, and staff are likely to continue to disagree about which of the 
many measurement devices should be used to coordinate activity. Justificatory disputes are 
normally a mechanism by which such disagreements are addressed. Yet moral separation 
eschews this mechanism, avoiding acrimony but perpetuating irresolution. This was illustrated 
in one site when some described things they could not say outside their departments, whose 
objectives differed from central aspirations: disagreements went unaddressed. 
Consequently, organisations probably seek to improve coordination in other ways. They might 
set aside situations where their plans face justificatory critique, and instead attempt to shore 
up how those plans are monitored. This they often achieve by creating new monitoring 
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structures to govern the financial tests described above. Re-structuring savings programmes 
included creating, embedding and revising organisational units dedicated to savings. Such work 
is likely dominated by traditional savings programmes, but extends to new organisations like 
Aloe. The manager who cast the plurality of evaluations Dryas faced as so chaotic and 
unmanageable (p.257) demanded exactly such structures. Theoretically, such infrastructures 
can provide the apparatus (e.g. data) preferred monitoring approaches need, or craft 
situations in which their criteria seem apt (Thévenot, 1984). 
However, such structures’ stability is not guaranteed. The evaluative turbulence that makes 
individual measurement devices unstable similarly affects these infrastructures. As diachronic 
evaluative heterogeneity leads to tests changing, it grows necessary to further revise their 
enabling infrastructures. Under austerity’s urgency, such structures are hurriedly ‘cobbl[ed] 
together’. Their relationships and organisational status thus remain unestablished, and 
probably require constant tweaking and amendment. To claim to be broadly relevant to their 
organisations, they must cover a breadth of evaluative devices. Staying relevant to many, 
changing measures means continually reshaping themselves.  
Consequently, these units tend to be characterised by ongoing efforts to establish themselves; 
questions over their purpose and boundaries; and continual tweaking following opposition. 
Such continual changes make it less certain what forms of evaluation they will enable and 
increase diachronic evaluative heterogeneity. While such specialist units are designed to 
enforce plans more surely, they can end up creating more questions. 
As planning proves difficult, organisations seek alternative modes of coordination. Not 
enthused by open justificatory disputes in a landscape of evaluative complexity, and with 
formal plans often criticised for not seeing what things are ‘really like’ on the ground (p.194), 
they may pursue more familiar coordination. Familiarising coordination involved using gut 
intuitions, close relationships and personal or corporeal discourse. 
Familiar coordination can work well within organisations even during difficult times 
(Duymedjian and Rüling, 2010). Within intimate teams with established, clear relations built 
over time, people can understand deeply each other’s objectives and thus coordinate through 
familiarity. However, austerity’s evaluative turbulence makes such coordination difficult. The 
organisational upheaval associated with situational uncertainty destabilises relationships. 
Given intense evaluative heterogeneity, those being monitored experience overwhelming 
scrutiny, making difficult the trust on which familiar relations rely. Evaluative turbulence 
makes more familiar coordination difficult. 
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The triple crisis of coordination 
The foregoing paragraphs highlight the aims and limitations of changes in test infrastructures. 
Organisations attempting to alter these under austerity’s evaluative turbulence can find that 
planned, familiar and justificatory coordination each become unstable. Worse, efforts to 
coordinate in one regime can make other coordination harder. Renewed efforts to enforce 
plans often intensify scrutiny, problematising familiar coordinative efforts: it is difficult to be 
both governor and confidant. Familiar efforts which bypass formal planning undermine those 
plans’ consistency. Unresolved justificatory disputes help neither effective planning nor 
successful familiar relations. There arises a triple coordinative crisis in which coordination in 
any regime seems difficult. 
This crisis left staff lacking clear ways to coordinate. Staff were sometimes unsure how to 
decide what to do, as when non-clinical Aloe staff faced clinical prioritisation decisions. With 
neither a clear guiding plan or principle nor trusting familiar relationships with Garrya 
clinicians, they were left prioritising whoever ‘shouts loudest’. With coordinative devices 
failing, decisions adopted the characteristic of tests of strength in which interests are pursued 
without coordinative principles (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, pp.30–32). 
Other times, such dilemmas manifested through staff’s language. One middle manager 
wondered whether they needed to get better at showing people ‘the impossible thing we’re 
trying to square’. Other times these linguistic cues were subtler: 
A clinician might say, ‘Well you’re interested in discharge. I don’t believe 
that patient’s well enough to be discharged’, and this is difficult stuff but – 
‘and this is my – that’s my bailiwick. That’s what I do, so don’t tell me when 
I’ve got to discharge somebody’ to which the response might be, ‘Yeah, I 
know but there’s somebody else who’s even more ill and we can’t get him in 
the door’. How does that – when you, you can’t compromise the quality? 
But what if I had to? What would I – what would that look like? You know, 
and th-, tho-, those are, those are the sort of questions and those are 
resourcing questions – absolutely resourcing questions. This is scarcity. 
(Interview, Dryas) 
This extract comes in the middle of a long answer about this manager’s perspective on 
resourcing in healthcare. They begin by imagining an archetypical interaction with a clinician in 
which a logic of professional autonomy and a (familiar) focus on ‘my patient’ conflict with a 
more planned population-oriented logic based on concern for an abstract ‘somebody else’. The 
manager continues to consider the intractable dilemma of capacity constraints alongside an 
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inability to ‘compromise the quality’. Without adequate coordinative logics, they imagine such 
an impossible normative dilemma. As it becomes clear they do not know which good to 
prioritise, the manager’s speech becomes fragmented and hesitant. Their uncertainty becomes 
great enough that sentences struggle to finish. What makes this more striking is that this is not 
a front-line manager regularly encountering such situations, but a corporate manager 
considering their work’s unsettling dilemmas. 
The lack of coordinative clarity prompted various coping strategies labelled marrying the 
inconsistency. Staff had to achieve multiple evaluative measures, and in circumstances in 
which alternative modes of coordination had failed. This partly explains people working extra 
hours. It also accounts for the moral stress managers reported, who found adequately and 
justly reconciling the multiple demands they faced difficult. More optimistically, it also 
prompted esoteric, local practices which helped resolve seemingly intractable puzzles. 
Organisations continuing effectively under austerity owed much to the ingenuity – and 
burdens – of staff closer to the ground.  
Such measures brought consequences for staff themselves and for organisations’ ability to 
coordinate. Even when they succeed, relying on esoteric solutions perpetuated long-term 
uncertainty. Because such actions are unpredictable, coordinating them was hard and their 
effect on organisations’ situations uncertain. This reinforced the evaluative turbulence this 
chapter highlights, and the situational uncertainty occupying Chapter 12. Figure 13.2 expands 
Figure 13.1’s representation of austerity’s evaluative heterogeneity to include changing test 
infrastructures and the triple crisis of coordination.  
Considering evaluative turbulence 
The above develops an account of austerity as the destabilisation of measurement devices, 
evaluative practices and the test infrastructures supporting them. This occurs as austerity’s 
evaluative turbulence leaves tests open to multiple critiques which damage their coordinative 
abilities. Consequent attempts to fundamentally change how coordination is achieved by 
modifying test infrastructures are subject to the same pressures, precipitating a crisis of 
coordination. 
This contribution is important to the austerity management literature because it provides a 
coherent and developed account of austerity that takes its uncertainties and instability 
seriously. Notwithstanding passing observations that austere organisations are unstable (Ferlie 
and Judge, 1981; Rubin, 1977) or that organisations might feature multiple sources of 
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evaluation (Wildavsky, 1978), this literature too often presents austerity management as a 
series of discrete, isolated ‘decisions’ (Langley et al., 1995) taken with calm circumspection. 
 
 
















































Instead, this study identifies the ambiguities, pressures and consequent coordinative problems 
managers face. Prior approaches account inadequately for these realities. Austerity’s turbulent 
environments and the ever-increasing evaluative demands organisations, individuals and 
departments face cause profound coordination difficulties. A literature about managers’ 
‘strategic’ decisions about how best to coordinate their work is of little use to organisations 
struggling to achieve coordination at all. 
Thévenot highlights the difficulties inherent to coordination, viewing it as an achievement not 
a starting point. Seen thus, austerity management becomes an attempt to retain effective 
coordination despite increasing situational uncertainty and evaluative heterogeneity. This 
heterogeneity is reducible neither to ‘more scrutiny’ nor to specific conflicts between 
individual measures. Rather, it represents a superfluity of broadly consonant measures which 
undermines the certainty such devices aim to provide. As this plurality and situational change 
causes measures to change, they are replaced or augmented. In contrast to attempts to 
explain why metrics proliferate despite their failures (Power, 2019), this account explains their 
proliferation because of such failures. The harder governments and organisations seek surety 
through additional measures, the less sure everything becomes. 
Thévenot’s approach reconceptualises budgets as measurement devices. Seen thus, they are 
not only the allocative devices frequently analysed, but also ways of monitoring financial 
compliance. Considering budgets’ dual role is necessary to a genuinely processual account 
thereof. This is vital to understanding the effects of previously observed features of austere 
budgeting, like ‘fudging’ savings objectives (Ferlie and Judge, 1981). Without this perspective, 
we tell but half the budgeting story.  
This view of budgets enables comparison with other evaluative devices, and thus broadens the 
range of devices analysed. Only by doing so can we understand how budgets interact with 
their environments of radical evaluative plurality. This enables this study to analyse previously 
underappreciated complexities of a task that far exceeds addressing the bottom line. These 
insights reconceptualise austerity management as, initially, an attempt to coordinate despite 
one’s circumstances.  
While providing a more realistic picture of managing within austere contexts, this perspective 
solves several problems in the austerity management literature. First, it provides a corrective 
to those who wish (Levine, 1978, 1985) or imagine (Behn, 1980; Raudla et al., 2015, p.434) 
organisations can simply adopt more ‘strategic’ approaches. Writers who suggest 
organisations should be more strategic do acknowledge that organisations need a ‘strategic 
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capacity’ that not all possess (Levine, 1985). Yet this study highlights that these ‘strategic 
capacities’ (e.g. savings programmes) are themselves destabilised by austerity. Tools effective 
during comparative plenty become problematic under austerity. 
Second, it provides a more compelling explanation for how people determine the savings they 
will make. Whereas earlier attempts emphasise clashes of interests (Glennerster, 1980), this 
chapter emphasises the nuances of such decisions. While people might pursue a given course 
based on their preferred outcomes, earlier approaches consider little the situations in which 
they do so. This chapter highlights the difficulties people might face fulfilling multiple 
imperatives, and the possible changes in their preferences as situations develop. Without 
doing so, it is not possible to develop a full account of how austere priorities are set. 
Third, it addresses the otherwise high-level focus of the austerity management literature. This 
study draws attention to the dilemmas, pressures and capacities of ground level staff involved 
in austerity management (Hyde and Exworthy, 2016). While savings programmes are rarely 
analysed alongside strategic austerity management (e.g. Kardakis et al., 2014), this study 
interrogates both, linking them through organisations’ measurement devices and the test 
infrastructures facilitating them. 
Perhaps most importantly, this chapter reframes austerity management as a coordination 
problem. It emphasises that coordination is not natural but enabled by somewhat predictable 
situations and clarity over the appropriate tests and measurement devices to use. When 
austerity undermines these, the sorts of measured and effective decisions many austerity 
management writers wish or imagine organisations take become near-impossible. Effectively 
coordinating one’s own work, and particularly coordinating with others can become 
prohibitively difficult. The first decision becomes not whether to make across-the-board or 
targeted savings but how to effectively coordinate work at all. 
This realisation should highlight the competencies which organisational actors show in 
managing to continue organisational life under austerity. These characterise the esoteric ad 
hoc approaches coded under marrying the inconsistency. But they are also evident in the ways 
organisations manage to maintain key measures of success despite evaluative turbulence. 
Thyme chose to hold constant its core budgetary test. This precipitated disbelief about which 
version would be prescient but nevertheless avoided prolonged instability. Aloe sought its 
early stability by emphasising its boundaries and telling a story of its development from 
‘infanthood’ that presented problems as natural developmental snags, not reasons to radically 
restructure. Meanwhile Dryas mitigated the effect of situational change on individual divisions 
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by re-distributing savings responsibilities. None of these steps were cost-free, but we should 
better recognise the labour that goes into merely preserving organisational coordination.  
Beyond austerity 
This chapter focuses on austerity management. Yet its empirical observations and theoretical 
developments have farther-reaching implications. First, the effects observed are prompted not 
by austerity’s scarcity alone, but its evaluative turbulence. Thus these phenomena are likely 
wherever substantial uncertainty and intensive measurement reign. As Breviglieri (2018) 
observes, this increasingly characterises modern bureaucracies. Even outside crises, anxiety 
precipitates calls for ever-expanding measurement. Such circumstances may see measures 
destabilise, test infrastructures change, and even triple coordinative crises occur.  
Second, analysis of critique has generally operated at a general level, not differentiating 
between disputes focused on distinct components of a test. As Gond (2017) makes usefully 
explicit, such generalised descriptions of critique of a test or measurement device generally 
mean critiques of its criteria. This chapter notes critiques and resistance based on the actors, 
apparatus and prescience of tests. This is a central contribution to RE, providing a more 
sophisticated vocabulary to describe critique, highlighting previously unrecognised forms 
thereof, and identifying their interrelations. This is vital to this study because these 
interrelations form a self-reinforcing cycle of instability. It is likely useful elsewhere because 
attention to all test constituents is important to understanding the plural forms of critique 
such tests might prompt. 
Third, RE/EW tends to analyse sequences of specific tests rather than broader evaluative 
environments. To do the latter, this chapter uses the concept of the test infrastructure: This 
recognises that organisational situations – particularly their savings programmes – are not 
coincidental, but partly the product of design choices. Organisational arrangements encourage 
certain types of test, and deter others, through the contexts they create, the actors they 
constitute and the apparatus they provide. Without considering such structures, 
understanding organisational evaluation remains difficult. 
Moving on 
This contribution highlights four routes for further research. First, further austerity 
management studies that investigate how coordination is achieved (or not) are urgently 
needed. Studies of actors’ competencies in enabling organisational life to continue are a 
necessary corrective to repeated instructions to managers to be more ‘strategic’. Second, it is 
startling that this research remains atypical in considering in detail the operational 
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programmes designed to manage austerity. Further studies of the delivery – not conception – 
of austerity savings are overdue. Third, this study identifies multiple dimensions of tests which 
can be critiqued, but there is no guarantee that these are an exhaustive range. Future work 
could further analyse critique using and extending this typology of test constituents. Finally, 
the test infrastructure is a promising concept. While RE rightly builds from analysis of the 
individual test or evaluative measure, these measures exist alongside organisational 
infrastructures which facilitate several tests. Analysing the development of test infrastructures 
facilitates analysis beyond the individual test. 
This thesis has brought three core contributions. Chapter 11 identifies the role played by 
situating work in evaluation under austerity. Chapter 12 builds on this to characterise 
organisations’ understanding of their situation, possibilities and values as destabilised through 
a cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes tied to the financial year. Finally, Chapter 13 notes 
the instability created by austerity’s evaluative turbulence and the consequent challenges of 
coordination. These contributions are sympathetic with one another; already, a pattern 
emerges in which austerity brings multiple forms of uncertainty, organisations attempt to 
manage these, and risk reinforcing them. However, it remains unclear how these findings 
interrelate, and what conclusions their combination implies. Chapter 14 concludes this thesis 








Part 6 – Conclusion 
Chapter 14: Conclusion 
Introduction 
This study aimed to conceptualise austerity management not as a series of savings but as a 
response to a situation (Chapter 2). The analysis that followed highlighted austerity as a time 
of instability in which coordination is imperilled. Organisations’ finances become not only 
tighter but also less predictable. External demands change rapidly with public finances and 
political whim. Requirements to meet unfeasible budgetary totals create an annual rhythm of 
optimism and pessimism that destabilises how one perceives the situation (Chapter 12). As 
panic grows, organisational and governmental searches for ever-more metricised performance 
leave organisations facing a bewildering evaluative landscape (Chapter 13). Situating work 
becomes time-consuming and problematic (Chapter 11): organisations know neither where 
they are nor what is demanded of them. Austerity undermines certainty, precipitating 
continual revision of situational and evaluative judgements. 
Yet too often, academics approach austerity management as if it were – scarcity aside – like 
managing in normal times. Foundational approaches demand more ‘strategic’ approaches to 
austerity management (Levine, 1978, 1979, 1985), as if circumspect strategic judgement was 
simple during crises of coordination. Key debates ask which savings are chosen (Bailey et al., 
2015), or why, as if these were cognitive questions about managerial preferences (e.g. Leider 
et al., 2014; Meier and O’Toole, 2009). Such writing generally imagines itself as advising or 
describing circumspect rationalist managers lying outside the situations they manage.  
This thesis contradicts these suppositions. Drawing on Thévenot, it highlights managerial 
action’s situated nature within austerity, and coordination’s defeasibility. Through Thévenot’s 
work it highlights the perennial importance of situating work (Chapter 11), and its difficulty 
under austerity’s annual cycles of opening and closing one’s eyes (Chapter 12). The resultant 
situational uncertainty combines with evaluative heterogeneity to create an evaluative 
turbulence in which ascertaining what was ‘good’ becomes challenging (Chapter 13). As 
Thévenot notes, a clear ‘good’ enables effective coordination. 
This reframes austerity management as a search for coordination. Instead of assuming 
organisations calmly strategise their ideal austerity management approach, it takes seriously 
austerity’s contingencies. Austerity management is thus theorised as situated action. This 
conceptualisation emphasises something intuitive but underacknowledged: that people 
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manage austerity under substantial instability. But it also highlights something less expected: 
that those devices normally stabilising situations become counterproductive under austerity. 
These insights provide a more grounded account of austerity management. This should both 
expand the range of questions we ask about austerity and provide new answers to established 
questions. Five sections follow. The first reviews and integrates the theorisation the previous 
three chapters develop. The second considers these insights’ implications for austerity 
management research. The third broadens this focus to consider implications for RE theory. 
The fourth interrogates implications for practitioners. The Chapter concludes by noting the 
further research this thesis’s findings and limitations suggest. 
Engaging with austerity 
Organisations, austerity and engagements 
Chapter 12 emphasises the austere situation’s instability. With austerity’s unpredictable 
spending patterns accentuated by an annual cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes, 
perceiving a stable situation becomes harder. This drives uncertainty about appropriate 
responses thereto, and conflict between those seeing the situation differently. When 
organisations are optimistic, they stretch judgements about what savings are possible, and 
which cohere with prevailing organisational compromises. This situational instability itself has 
profound organisational consequences. 
Yet it also feeds the evaluative turbulence Chapter 13 explores. Uncertainty encourages senior 
actors to seek the guarantees of ever-more evaluative measures. Simultaneously, situational 
uncertainty’s concrete drivers, like restructures, necessitate new measurement devices. The 
resultant complex evaluative landscape can overwhelm organisations, through measurement 
labour and inter-measure variation. Coordination becomes difficult as organisations are torn 
between plural ways of conceptualising their responsibilities. This precipitates the coordinative 
crisis Chapter 13 highlights. 
Just as situational instability feeds evaluative turbulence, so the reverse is true. Financial 
measures not only evaluate organisations, but also describe their situations. As they become 
more plural and changeable, their image of the situation becomes less consistent. And when 
evaluative turbulence undermines coordination, predicting others’ actions becomes harder. 
Evaluative turbulence makes it harder to know the present and the future, fuelling the 

























Figure 14.1 depicts the mutually reinforcing relationship between evaluative turbulence and 
opening and closing one’s eyes. It simplifies and combines Figure 12.3 and Figure 13.2, using 
the basic terminology for core practices common across chapters. This enables comparison 
with Figure 10.4, which Figure 14.1 develops and theorises.  
Earlier chapters have elaborated the relations between the sub-practices composing Figure 
14.1’s core practices. The uncertainty created by repeatedly reconfiguring quality, or the 
instability as different ways of conducting and contesting financial tests alternated were 
substantial. Such instabilities, combined with the core practices’ interdependence, precipitated 
an environment in which little could be relied upon. 
Considering these interdependent engagements highlights a difficulty conventional austerity 
management writing neglects: the challenge of achieving coordination. Many writers treat 
austerity managers as if equipped and disposed to take and implement circumspect, 
rationalistic decisions free from their austere contexts’ instability. Such managers make clear, 
often abstract decisions: cuts or investments-to-save; across-the-board or ‘targeted’ cuts 
(Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015; Raudla et al., 2015). While some recognise that radical 
steps like large funding shifts might problematise coordination (Wildavsky, 1978), even they 
cast this as the consequence of excessive divergence from the devices and approaches 
normally guaranteeing stability. A shared assumption appears: at least if one does nothing too 
rash, coordination can still be taken for granted. 
Austerity management starts with a search for coordination. This is Chapter 13’s explicit 
conclusion and the implication of the instability Chapter 12 characterises. Together they 
provide a detailed model of organisational austerity management founded on the necessity of 
situating work Chapter 11 demonstrates. 
Multilevel engagements 
Yet with organisations frequently situating themselves in wider contexts, Figure 14.1 is 
necessarily incomplete. Chapter 11 highlights the turbulent discursive and policy framework 
which organisations inhabit. A fuller model would encompass the national changes shaping 
organisations’ concrete circumstances and perceived situations. This subsection collates prior 
chapters’ insights into national-level developments’ organisational effects. 
Chapter 7 to Chapter 9 exemplify such organisational effects (e.g. p.160). Organisations 
activated national constructions of situations, possibilities and normative compromises (see 
Chapter 11). In attaining tenuous futures, organisations’ senior hierarchies frequently looked 
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beyond their boundaries to characterise crisis, particularly where suffering less financial strain 
themselves. Nor could organisations avoid staff making similar comparisons. While these 
sometimes assisted official narratives, they sometimes hindered them (p.142). Perceived 
national situations become the backdrop against which staff form perspectives about 
organisational ones. 
National forces shaped organisational views about not only their situations, but also the 
possibilities therein. These effects were both discursive and coercive. Thyme struggled not to 
adopt Carter’s mode of thinking (p.142). This was partly because of how effectively it 
discursively constructed a better future (see Chapter 11), but partly due to regulatory 
requirements to engage with it. Even refuting the specific savings such a model foresees 
involves seeing the world through its analytic lens. National accounts of possible savings may 
shape organisational views, particularly when engagement therewith is coercively required. 
Finally, organisational actors often drew on reconfigurations of quality from national debates. 
Each site featured language prominent in national discussions. The language of ‘unpalatable’ 
savings in Thyme and Dryas echoed similar national euphemisms for quality or access 
reductions (pp.127, 152). Nationally authorised reconfigurations of cost-quality relations 
invoked an established compromise and seemingly limited the uttering manager’s personal 
implication in such awkward balances. Nationally current compromise formulations may thus 
appeal to managers.  
Linkages between national and organisational discourses are observed across attaining 
tenuous futures, constructing possibility and reconfiguring – the three practices Chapter 11 
analyses. That Chapter highlights such national practices’ frequent changes. With 
organisations’ understanding of situations, possibilities and compromises interlaced with 
national discourses, national changes become another source of organisational instability. 
Aside from such direct discursive effects on organisations, such national debates also shape 
how governments and regulators evaluate them (Chapter 11). Chapter 13 emphasises the 
destabilising effects of the rapid changes in how organisations are evaluated. Not only do 
unstable national discourses affect how organisations see their situation, they also drive policy 
changes that promote evaluative turbulence. 
These relations between national government and organisations share much with how parts of 
organisations relate to one another. Dryas’s departments sometimes engaged in reshaping 
engagements to reconcile themselves with senior managers’ requirements. Yet meanwhile 
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those senior managers used the same practice to come to terms with Government demands. 
These parallels stress that it would be artificial to stop considering austerity management – as 
most studies do – at organisations’ formal boundaries. 
Figure 14.2 illustrates these inter-level dynamics. It distinguishes national activity (see Chapter 
11), from organisational work to show the relations between the two. It divides organisational 
activity into two levels to demonstrate the similar relations between organisational units. 
However, the choice of two organisational levels is not significant: the closer one looks, the 
more levels one might find. Indeed, such relations need not be conceptualised as vertical and 
linear: the relations here are between organisational domains, not necessarily between points 
in a hierarchy. 
The illustration of national activity reformulates Figure 11.2 (p.229) to align it with later 
models’ visual style. It adds to the national level the evaluative changes whose organisational 
effects Chapter 13 theorises. Only ‘downward’ effects of the national level on organisations 
are here illustrated, but this implies no disavowal of corresponding ‘upwards’ effects. But this 
study’s data which compares the high-level national story with three detailed organisational 
cases makes national-to-local effects more identifiable than the inverse.  
Figure 14.2’s key insights are threefold. First, not only organisational but also national 
instability makes coordination difficult. Second, the national and organisational cases deployed 
similar practices (notwithstanding that this study does not focus on national evaluative 
practices). Third, despite this similarity, the cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes is solely an 
organisational phenomenon. The key motivating difference appears to be that Government, 
while imposing the STF regime on organisations, is not itself bound by such requirements for 
overoptimistic planning.  
Implications for austerity management research 
This is a different approach to austerity management than the literature otherwise offers. Its 
attempt is not to identify which ‘type’ of savings people make (Bailey et al., 2015; Raudla et al., 
2015); to determine the principle by which they are chosen (Sosin, 2012); or to examine the 
negative impacts (Clayton et al., 2015) of a policy taken as malign (Fuller, 2017). Its effort is 
simpler, and more fundamental: to understand what people are doing when they are 
managing austerity. In identifying austerity management’s core practices, it fulfils that aim, 
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Yet its insights prove powerful for the wider austerity management literature. This literature 
contains a tension between what organisations do and what they ‘should’ do. Normative 
writers repeatedly express puzzlement that organisations fail to exercise the informed 
rationality they demand (e.g. Levine, 1985). Where we recognise that managing austerity is 
tricky, we use concepts like ‘context’ to contain its complex difficulties (Schmidt et al., 2017; 
Hardy, 1987). While such concepts recognise such difficulties, they tend to inhibit our greater 
understanding thereof by externalising them from austerity managers’ activities. This thesis 
analyses those difficulties by examining what austerity managers do. Instead of abstract, 
rationalistic managers of a situation, this reveals austerity managers as people already bound 
up in that situation.  
This offers new answers to the austerity management literature’s key questions: what savings 
are made, why and how (Raudla et al., 2015). It also enables us to exceed these questions to 
consider austerity management’s deeper dynamics. The following sections address these 
issues in turn, elaborating this thesis’s contribution to each. This facilitates more realistic 
normative work, that advises not abstract rationalists, but the situated austerity managers this 
thesis identifies.  
What savings are made? 
One of the literature’s dominant questions asks which savings organisations make. Writers 
characteristically dispute whether ‘across-the-board’ or ‘targeted’ savings are made (e.g. 
Levine, 1985), subdividing ‘targeted’ savings into ‘managerialist’ and ‘strategic’ approaches. 
Alongside these core categories, writers have deployed various savings categories (Dunsire and 
Hood, 1989). Swathes of the literature ask which ‘type’ of savings organisations make. 
Yet this question already simplifies matters. First, because the savings one seeks is a 
temporally charged question. Chapter 12 highlights that organisations pursue different sorts of 
savings at different points in the cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes. Additionally, as 
individual savings are delegated through organisations, and different ways of constructing 
possibilities gain favour, the same savings become differently framed over time.  
This should shape research methods. If savings ‘types’ routinely change, the savings a study 
finds will depend on the point in the financial year that study was conducted. If research is 
conducted around formal budgeting, neat, structured often across-the-board allocations may 
be more likely. Later in the year, those aggregate totals may have been delegated and turned 
into more specific – that is, ‘targeted’ – plans. Growing financial strife may also have 
precipitated initial across-the-board responsibilities being reallocated to fill gaps, creating 
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more ‘targeted’ savings. This is particularly pressing given that so many studies focus 
specifically on budgets and budgetary numbers (e.g. Boyne et al., 2000; Kelly, 1989). These risk 
characterising the savings organisations seek based on one point in a changing cycle. 
Second, Figure 14.1 highlights that people seek different savings sought depending on the 
turbulent evaluative structures faced. Organisations and departments conceptualise their 
savings in ways coherent with the measurement structures they face. Organisations facing 
tight evaluative criteria based around in-year savings probably report their contributions as 
‘managerialist’ efforts. Yet if a longer-term view becomes fashionable, local ‘managerialist’ 
savings may be collated into a cross-cutting ‘strategic’ programme. This may not alter the 
saving itself: such shifts may say more about measurement than savings. Indeed, this thesis 
highlights how organisations’ savings might become overdetermined, characterised differently 
in different evaluative structures. 
These two observations should problematise the distinction between across-the-board, 
strategic and managerialist savings. Savings are reframed mid-year, and individual savings cast 
as across-the-board at one time or organisational level may become targeted at another. 
Meanwhile, the same saving may be reported in ‘managerialist’ style in one month or format 
and reframed within a ‘strategic’ plan in another. The trichotomy between across-the-board, 
strategic and managerialist savings is empirically and conceptually incoherent.  
Instead, it is more productive to conceptualise savings processually, and in terms of the 
evaluative structures organisations face. Considering the former emphasises that individual 
savings ideas change. The latter highlights the evaluative structures determining the savings 
which are rewarded. Where organisations like Aloe face extensive demands for specific, 
demonstrable efficiencies, they may favour clear, simple and discrete savings. These would be 
contextually much more useful categories than the managerialist-strategic dichotomy.  
Why are these savings selected? 
The literature works extensively to discern the principle determining which savings are 
preferred. Answers often treat managerial preferences as constant, acontextual criteria. Were 
this true, such criteria could be elicited through decontextualised surveys (Leider et al., 2014; 
Maher and Deller, 2007). But treating preferences this way fails to explain the variation in 
apparent criteria across settings (p.36). Situated, interactional answers are needed.  
Characteristically, the literature’s interactional answers are based on the interplay of 
competing interests (e.g. Glennerster, 1980). Yet Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 highlight the 
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plural values such decisions involve, and even pursuing comparable values might create 
conflict. The normative ideas and evaluative devices which seem apt in austere organisations 
affect their savings decisions. Reducing these to interests is misleading. 
Instead, the model presented in Figure 14.1 helps investigate the types of savings likely in a 
given context. First, it highlights situating work. How the situation is constructed (attaining and 
possibilities) shapes the values seeming apt and how prevailing normative compromises are 
seen (reconfiguring). These situating movements do not directly pick certain savings over 
others. Yet Figure 14.1 highlights their role in shaping the financial tests evaluating potential 
savings. 
Second, the figure notes the importance of the test infrastructures available (reshaping 
engagements). As Chapter 13 emphasises, these infrastructures both facilitate and deter given 
evaluations. Because they facilitate multiple tests, infrastructure necessary for one test can 
affect how easy it is to conduct and contest other tests. Under evaluative turbulence, they 
change frequently, altering the types of tests most easily conducted and thus the savings 
sought. 
This does not imply such normative ideas are wholly fixed or stable. Indeed, Chapter 11 and 
Chapter 12 noted the changeable meaning of ‘healthcare quality’. Understanding why people 
make given types of savings necessitates not a static account of some principle or other but a 
processual account of how evaluative devices alter over time. The practices this thesis 
identifies characterise how these processes occur and explain why given savings are preferred 
in given situations. 
How are savings made? 
A final strand of the literature emphasises austere organisations’ dynamics. This examines 
organisations’ broad savings approaches (Cepiku et al., 2016), including how making savings 
shapes organisations and their governance (Raudla et al., 2013). 
The level of centralisation is a common question, but one receiving conflicting answers. Strong 
views argue that austere organisations centralise (Raudla et al., 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017) and 
decentralise (e.g. Kickert, 2012). This thesis helps resolve this confusion through Chapter 12’s 
cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes. Over the year, savings seem harder, and anxious 
organisations centralise. As pressure relaxes, controls decrease. This cycle explains both 




Others investigating austere organisations ask how their approaches change over time. The 
most developed model of this draws on the problematic language of ‘across-the-board’, 
‘managerialist’ and ‘strategic’ savings (Beck Jørgensen, cited in Dunsire and Hood, 1989). This 
account suggests linear progress from across-the-board to managerialist then strategic savings 
as returns on each approach diminish.  
This thesis’s empirical data demonstrate this trend is not universal. Consequently, it explores 
other explanations for shifts between what studies describe as different ‘types’ of saving. I 
note above that these differences can be as much about categorisation as substance (p.287). 
Chapter 13 emphasises the difficulty of establishing and maintaining measurement approaches 
under evaluative turbulence. Maintaining a given style of categorisation is inevitably difficult. 
Dryas’s CIP structure proved unable to contain austerity’s full complexity, precipitating a more 
‘strategic’ approach; but the more strategic Transforming Thyme’s hands-off measurement 
style proved incapable of providing the short-term savings demanded, prompting its shift to 
the managerial. Those seeking changes in savings ‘types’ would see these as puzzling 
movements in opposite directions between ‘managerialist’ and ‘strategic’. But seen as 
measurement objects inevitably destabilised by austerity, these changes are more easily 
explained. 
Yet such high-level evaluative changes are only half the story. Smaller changes in evaluative 
devices are common in austere organisations. With such devices hurriedly introduced, 
constant ‘tweaking’ decreases certainty about evaluative standards. Invisible to higher-level 
process studies, such smaller changes’ accretion was central to growing organisational 
instability. 
Beyond the literature 
The above demonstrates this study’s contribution to the literature’s long-asked questions. Yet 
more importantly, it goes beyond them. It highlights a normally neglected element of austerity 
management: the search for coordination. The cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes, macro-
level changes in evaluative structures and the constant tweaking of organisational 
arrangements reduces certainty, inhibiting coordination. 
Something similar is noted by decrementalists and those observing disrupted routines. 
Decrementalists observe that large spending changes can disrupt existing assumptions, 
creating mistrust and inhibiting coordination (Wildavsky, 1978). Others note that scarcity 
disrupts budget allocation routines themselves (Ferlie and Judge, 1981). This thesis agrees, but 
goes further. Even if one sticks closely to the structures normally providing certainty, austerity 
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destabilises those structures themselves. The resultant instability extends beyond budgetary 
routines. 
It is unsurprising that this insight has long eluded a literature reliant on private sector cutback 
management writing. While many note that public organisations differ in having multiple 
objectives (Pandey, 2010), few observe an equally important distinction: public sector 
organisations frequently face strict single-year budgeting rules. A literature based on private 
sector writing does not anticipate the instability this annual cycle creates (Hou et al., 2011). 
Nor are private organisations usually beset by such quickly changing goals. Evaluative 
turbulence and cycles of opening and closing one’s eyes seem public sector phenomena. 
The foregoing chapters demonstrate that such instability leaves organisations negotiating the 
legacies of former practices. Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 highlight how the devices by which 
organisations interpret and evaluate their worlds change, with challenging consequences. New 
formations of budgets faced resistance based on principles which supported previous 
iterations. New evaluative measures seem less enduring when their predecessors proved 
temporary. Austerity’s pace and intensity of change is ideally suited to create such resistance. 
This recognition is itself important but identifies three further novel conclusions. First, when 
coordination is difficult, acrimony can result. Too often, conflict is understood as a 
consequence of people protecting their interests (Schmidt et al., 2017). But this thesis 
highlighted disagreements unexplained by competing interests. Instead, it emphasises that 
people perceive uncertain situations differently, prompting disagreements. Chapter 12 
highlights the differential perceptions of those closer and further from the cycle of opening 
and closing one’s eyes, and consequent dispute and suspicion. Figure 14.2 reinforces that 
those perceiving the situation differently probably see different types of evaluation and 
coordination as appropriate, precipitating Chapter 13’s coordinative failures. Acrimony 
represents not only clashing rationalistic interests, but situational disagreements and 
coordinative failure.  
Second, this partly explains discursive work’s importance under austerity. Attempts to get 
others to see a situation in your terms proved central to austerity management but are 
generally disregarded. Despite isolated normative injunctions to consider the persuasive 
stories one tells subordinates (Behn, 1980), broader austerity management theories neglect 




Third, and because of these earlier observations, this thesis also demonstrates the importance 
of an approach which spans levels from junior to supra-organisational. Its model integrates 
senior, strategic austerity management choices with junior efforts in savings programmes and 
divisions. While some practices are more important in one domain than another, the practices 
identified are not marked for seniority. This highlights correspondences between national and 
organisational discourses and evaluative practices, suggesting linkages therebetween. Vitally, it 
also recognises the work of ground-level staff. Emphasised particularly in reshaping 
engagements (Chapter 13), this is often central to how organisations cope. While others 
highlight staff’s emotional work and coping mechanisms (e.g. Clayton et al., 2015), broader 
austerity management writing neglects such important work. 
When I tell people about this research, they often make a joke. ‘I’m researching how 
healthcare organisations manage austerity’, I say. ‘Well, badly!’, they respond. The wider 
discursive climate and organisations’ outcomes make it easy to assume staff do a bad job. Yet 
this thesis highlights their environment’s uncertainty and instability. Without ignoring 
dysfunctions, we should be equally struck that organisations manage as well as they do. With 
work exceptionally difficult, this study highlights the competencies merely continuing to 
coordinate requires. 
Implications beyond austerity management 
This thesis locates itself within the austerity management literature, deploying RE for that 
purpose. But doing so necessarily develops RE to suit the analysis of austerity’s broad, unstable 
environment. This entails an expanded understanding of the test and infrastructure to theorise 
the relation between several tests within an environment. 
Developing the test 
Understanding individual tests’ turbulence under austerity required an elaborated model of 
the test. Writers generally consider critiques of tests as based on disputes about the criteria by 
which the test differentiates the worthy from the unworthy (Gond, 2017). While these criteria 
are important, they are not the only basis on which tests face critique. Instead, Chapter 13 
highlights test constituents including the tested actor, practical apparatus and the test’s 
pertinence. Each can be contested 
Only by distinguishing between these constituents can this thesis identify their 
interdependencies. This is crucial to Chapter 13’s argument, but also of wider theoretical 
importance. It gives us an extended critical vocabulary with which to analyse how tests are 
critiqued and highlights previously unnoticed forms of contestation. Simultaneously, it 
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indirectly highlights the constituents constituting a successful test, enabling more nuanced 
understanding of such tests even when uncontested. Understanding the constituents required 
for a successful test supports EW/RE more broadly. 
Understanding austerity’s turbulence means understanding how fiercely contested 
circumstances are solidified into approachable situations. This highlighted the discursive work 
shaping the solidified situations on which most RE/EW analyses focus (Chapter 11). 
Understanding this situating work proved vital to understanding some organisational 
challenges under austerity, where it became difficult to solidify fissile, disputed situations 
(Chapter 11, Chapter 12). Yet situating work is not a phenomenon of austerity alone, but of 
situations per se. EW/RE analyses would be well advised to start by critically interrogating their 
situations’ origins. Situating work carries out vital activity before EW generally conceptualises a 
dispute as having started. 
Test sequences and infrastructure 
This thesis also contributes theoretical devices by which to embed tests in their organisational 
contexts. First, it develops Thévenot’s idea of opening and closing one’s eyes by identifying 
why predictable cycles of change develop across multiple tests (Chapter 12). This can thus 
explain how a diversity of tests exhibit similar changes over – in this instance – a financial year. 
This concept thus helps explain temporal patterns affecting multiple tests. 
Second, it highlights the organisational arrangements which support multiple tests, like 
governance structures (Chapter 13). These test infrastructures become visible under austerity 
because they frequently change but are present across organisational contexts. Because they 
support multiple measurement devices, and better suit some than others, these test 
infrastructures alter the relative investment required to implement different tests. Accordingly, 
they can help explain why certain types of tests might co-occur, and analyse changes affecting 
multiple evaluative devices. 
Third, it highlights that the tests and forms Thévenot analyses are processually dependent. 
Both Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 describe scenarios in which prior versions of a measurement 
structure problematise latter ones. This explains why continual changes in situations or 
evaluative devices are difficult: future formulations are relativised by the memory of prior 
incarnations. Such sequences can prompt resistance to oneself over time. Recognising such 
dependences and inhibitions can help analyse sequences of tests. 
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Expanding the regimes of engagement 
These developments significantly elaborate RE. Both deepening our analysis of the test and 
theoretically extending beyond individual tests, they enable better scrutiny of such evaluative 
devices. They share a commitment to analysing tests processually, both in terms of changes 
within and between tests. 
Of course, these developments are particularly useful in circumstances comparable to 
austerity. Yet austerity’s effects here sprang not from financial scarcity per se but from 
attempts to coordinate under extreme constraints. Such constraints prompted the cycle of 
opening and closing one’s eyes, and were embodied by the diverse measures of evaluative 
heterogeneity. Under comparable constraints – like requirements to report certain outcomes 
from budgeting or other measurement regimes – we might anticipate similar outcomes. 
Implications for policy, practice and society 
This thesis gets closer to people’s practices when managing austerity. With little other 
literature adopting this aim, our understanding was insufficiently advanced for this work to 
focus on normative recommendations (Pettigrew, 1987, p.655). Consequently, it aimed to 
chart this territory as a foundation for analyses with more normative intentions. Yet getting 
closer to practice has proved surprisingly revealing of organisations’ and peoples’ challenges. 
This subsection highlights implications for policymakers, organisations and staff. 
Publications disavowing an overtly normative standpoint generally focus on recommendations 
to whole ‘organisations’. Yet, such advice generally turns out to advise senior managers on 
how to achieve their goals. An understandable reaction against so-called ‘critical’ writing’s 
combative stance towards such official actors, this is not ‘neutral’. Rather, it represents a 
perhaps inadvertent normative preference for existing organisational hierarchies. Such a 
normative orientation could certainly be justified: but not by avowing a non-normative 
standpoint. 
To avoid this mistake, the observations that follow address the variety of actors encountered 
in this research, including staff both implementing and opposing austerity measures. This 
avoids the tacit normativity of much so-called ‘neutral’ organisational literature and stimulates 
more rounded thinking about research insights’ practical implications. This section therefore 
addresses six thematic sections, each of which highlights observations of potential value to 
several actors. They address i) uncertainty; ii) ‘ambitious’ budgets; iii) the language of 
existential threat; iv) quality; v) evaluative devices; and vi) coordination. 
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Austerity and uncertainty 
Austerity means far more than financial scarcity. Its profound uncertainty can undermine 
organisations’ operations. Organisations found that austerity limited their planning capability, 
altered the meaning of the normative referents they relied on and prompted a plurality of 
difficult-to-combine measurement standards. 
Too often, policy debates about austerity focus exclusively on whether organisations can cope 
with the financial losses. They should focus more on whether they can cope with the 
uncertainty. Supporters of austerity often frame their arguments in terms of areas of ‘waste’, 
suggesting that organisations can therefore afford austerity reductions (Green, 2010; 
McKinsey and Company, 2009). Opponents often accept this frame, disputing certain areas of 
waste (Grice et al., 2010; Ramesh, 2010a). Considering austerity’s uncertainty and wider 
consequences could produce healthier debate and better policymaking. 
This would particularly counsel against the policy style that sees major organisational changes 
accompany austerity. While major changes can sometimes aid longer-term savings, 
governments too often appear to use major change to justify or distract from austerity, at least 
in the UK (Chapter 11; Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Savage, 2018). While such measures 
might be politically astute, they increase the uncertainty which is one austerity’s central 
problems. Considering austerity as a reduction in both funding and certainty should lead 
governments to more robustly consider its merits. 
While supporting consideration of whether austerity should be done, this thesis should also 
prompt thinking about how to do it. While some uncertainty mentioned above seems 
unavoidable, some was perpetuated by routine changes in evaluative regimes. Existing 
literature encourages governments and organisations alike to seek the right structure and the 
right category of changes. Changes might be merited: devices adequately managing normal 
times become destabilising under austerity. Yet this thesis reveals the cost of regular and 
significant structural, situational and evaluative changes. Governments and organisations 
might be wise to consider their destabilising effects before embarking on them. 
Yet organisations face a bind: between not adapting and remaining poorly designed to manage 
austerity; or adapting so quickly and frequently as to destabilising these arrangements. 
Guidance on managing this tension is necessarily speculative. However, as each change in a 
structure appears destabilising, the optimal path may involve resisting short-term urgency and 




Formal budgets are central to austerity management regimes. Much uncertainty appeared to 
stem from mandates or severe incentives to set unrealistic budgets. The STF regime effectively 
made large amounts of hospitals’ funding conditional on reporting ‘compliant’ budgetary 
plans. This precipitated budgetary reports about whose feasibility senior managers were 
unsure. This prompted the annual cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes that destabilised 
organisations’ understanding of their situations and evaluations of strategic options.  
Policies that pressurise organisations to predict certain financial outcomes make budgets 
diverge from reality. Such documents are unhelpful in planning. Sometimes, they created 
pressures that rippled through organisations, hurting relationships, worsening working lives 
and unsettling quality guarantees. This culminated in revisions to initial budgets or the use of 
reserves to fill gaps. Such organisational damage would be a heavy price to pay for better 
financial outcomes, let alone for more politically palatable financial predictions. 
Governments should be reluctant to create coercive rules around budgetary planning in 
circumstances where achieving compliant budgets might be unfeasible. This is pertinent 
beyond UK healthcare. UK local authorities are legally obliged to report balanced budgets 
(Local Government Act, 1972). Whether such steps are prudent in normal times is debatable. 
But when they create near-impossible requirements, they risk detaching budgets from reality.  
It is difficult to know how to advise organisational actors facing such dilemmas. Complying with 
them when unrealistic jeopardises planning; but so can the financial and regulatory 
consequences of disobedience. Perhaps where senior managers must make strained budgetary 
promises, senior managers should remember this strain and judge divisional efforts leniently. 
Notwithstanding external pressure to meet reported plans, equivalent internal pressure may 
be unconstructive. 
Meanwhile, austerity’s opponents might draw attention to the open eyes with which budgets 
are constructed and the rules requiring this. Opponents might be individual divisional staff 
keen to avoid excessive savings in their division. But they might also be senior managers or 
organisations or representative organisations lobbying nationally. Clear accounts linking the 
budgets demanded to clinical consequences may help limit unrealistic demands (p.224). 
Discursive caution 
Unrealistic budgets and high uncertainty made life difficult in our sites. These organisationally 
unavoidable vicissitudes of austere life were not helped by the sense of existential threat some 
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organisations felt. This sprang both from the national environment and deliberate 
organisational efforts to incite recalcitrant employees to vigorously seek savings. Yet its 
success in this latter aim seemed limited. Instead, it made organisations feel unstable and 
short-termist, undermining coordination. 
Where organisations were tied too closely to the national debate, its uncertain developments 
could destabilise them. Thyme tied itself into national narratives, casting itself as both subject 
to and shaping national trends. Here more than anywhere, staff’s readings of the national 
debate and its many changes seemed to shape their interpretation of Thyme’s situation. 
Whether drawn from the national debate or their own apparently precarious finances, 
organisations shared this sense of instability and urgency. While urgency need not be negative, 
the tone of threat seemed inimical to circumspection. The focus on the short-term, while 
partly motivated by concrete STF obligations was not helped by narratives of ‘sinking’, 
‘survival’ and ‘black holes’. 
It need not be this way. Organisations could reject the language of emergency in favour of an 
atmosphere of circumspect determination. This might be achieved by describing financial risks 
but acknowledging they were not yet immanent. Operationally, this might involve linking 
divisional savings to the ability to afford longer-term developments. Senior staff would need to 
distinguish the more immediate threats they individually faced from longer-term 
organisational threats. This narrative could avoid the desperation contributing to 
organisational short-termism. 
It would also have the advantage of being more plausible and robust. Narratives of threat and 
regulatory ‘henchmen’ seem particularly subject to disbelieving staff’s critiques. Accounts of 
existential threat thus not only risk short-termism, but also acrimony and opposition. More 
circumspect narratives supporting savings are less vulnerable to critique. 
At times poor financial performance will threaten immediate consequences. I make no 
judgement about whether this was so in these sites. But such claims are most plausible when 
only articulated once needed. It would also be helpful to articulate them in the nuanced, 
circumspect manner managers did in interview, highlighting specific potential regulatory 
problems. These were more intuitively plausible and less fuelling of short-termism than 
metaphors of organisational death. Organisations may be well advised to exercise a similar 




Nobody I encountered wanted to reduce what they saw as the fundamentals of healthcare 
quality, and few felt quality should reduce from current levels. However, without being willed 
to, quality and access compromises did arise. Particularly where organisations were strongly 
committed to maintaining quality, suggesting such compromises seemed taboo, however 
difficult avoiding them was. This could mean they occur despite being discussed only 
euphemistically, or not at all. 
Perhaps most unfortunately, it progressively thinned the concept of ‘quality’. As pursuing a 
broad conception of quality became difficult, organisations increasingly targeted a ‘quality’ 
concept rather closer to ‘safety’. Naturally, protecting safety is good. But its increasing 
dominance seemed to reflect a diminishing consideration of other quality factors like 
outcomes and experience. The language of improving ‘quality’ was also increasingly used to 
describe activities likely to improve the quality not of care, but of efficiency-releasing 
processes.  
This observation has different implications depending on organisations’ levels of financial 
stress. Organisations believing they can preserve quality may do well to be more explicit early 
on about what they mean by ‘quality’. This is a delicate balancing act, as being too precise 
about quality and its compromises with other values could surface contradictions and 
undermine those compromises (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). However, where it is believed 
quality can be maintained, a greater specification of the broad domains it includes may be 
helpful. 
In organisations where quality reductions seem inevitable, honesty may be preferable. 
Speaking plainly, and acknowledging reductions in quality or access, may be painful and could 
result in unwanted regulatory or commissioner attention. But it is likely to enable more 
reasoned consideration of trade-offs and better strategic choices. Moreover, impacts on 
quality are likely evident at the frontline. When senior managers speak as if they are not, they 
lose credibility. 
No matter the likely impacts on quality, it seems unlikely that it will be beneficial to separate 
conversations about finance and quality. Isolating QIAs from financial considerations is 
superficially attractive, but difficult to realise. QIA practitioners appeared firmly aware of 
financial context, but others cast QIAs as dealing with quality, freeing them to focus on 
finance. It may be more effective to ensure a single forum at each level was responsible for 




The evaluative turbulence sites encountered made coordination difficult. Life would have been 
considerably easier for organisations had their contexts more closely mirrored early academic 
models thereof. Had the organisational budget truly been the single ultimate objective of 
austerity management, it might have been easier for people to know their aims. However, 
evaluative heterogeneity increased measurement labour, reduced goal clarity and imperilled 
coordination. A more successful approach would avoid augmenting organisations’ uncertainty 
through a more parsimonious measurement landscape. 
Multiple actors could help. Governments could directly reduce the evaluative criteria created 
and avoid multiple measures of one thing. This would require measures organisations could 
replicate internally and consistency about the actors evaluated. Organisations themselves 
could contribute to this parsimony through similar efforts, and by repurposing external 
measures internally where appropriate. 
Meanwhile, opponents of austerity might play on this plurality to emphasise all such 
measures’ relativity. More successful resistance in this study emphasised that things could 
have been measured differently. Rather than simply decrying a given measure, it is more 
promising to highlight the fact that which measure is used is a choice. 
The struggle for coordination 
Considering these observations, organisations should recognise that austerity presents a 
struggle for coordination. Traditional coordination approaches, like standard governance 
structures, or CIP measures premised on financial stability, are unlikely to suffice. While 
considering how to save, organisations should consider also how to retain coordination. 
While uncomfortable, resisting moral separation may be sensible. Openly discussing savings 
and their rationales, accepting critical perspectives even if they seem ‘political’, may make 
genuine coordination more likely. Such debate could better legitimise subsequent plans and 
coordinate across groups which might otherwise withdraw. 
Austere organisations frequently attempt to coordinate through earmarked savings functions. 
This thesis encourages caution in their design. First, it is important to clarify their parameters 
such that their remit clearly includes something, but not everything, important. Both such 
programmes in this study faced boundary difficulties, either given an ever-expanding scope, or 
insufficiently articulating a place for themselves. Second, organisations should be cautious 
when defining such remits around traditional savings initiatives like CIPs which assume broader 
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financial stability. A CIP programme may be effective within its parameters but should not be 
taken as a ‘magic bullet’: equally thorough governance of wider financial outcomes remains 
necessary. 
Finally, organisations seem well advised to ensure intensifying scrutiny does not undermine 
organisational relationships. Based on these cases, it seems likely both that austerity will 
pressurise the relationships which could enable coordination when traditional governance 
fails. Preserving relationships might mean avoiding superficially logical, but harsher, 
governance strategies. Where simply understanding the situation becomes difficult, honest, 
trusting relationships are invaluable. 
Organisations would similarly be wise to attend to staff’s capacities to create ad hoc solutions 
where formal coordination fails. Junior and middle-ranking staff may be vital here. Austerity 
makes ensuring adequate capacity there difficult; but this may be vital if traditional structures 
cannot contain austerity’s vicissitudes. 
These coordinative difficulties are both a weakness which opponents of austerity might 
highlight and a threat they should beware. Opponents might play on coordinative ambiguities, 
including relativising governance systems by highlighting their lability. Yet they should beware 
that coordination failures may increase staff pressure (marrying the inconsistency).  
Indeed, ground-level actors with any perspective should recognise senior managers’ likely 
coordinative difficulties. Whether attempting to implement an austerity programme through a 
PMO, to retain divisional primacy or to mitigate austerity’s effects, staff are more likely to 
succeed if they offer effective coordinative approaches. Senior managers seeking coordinative 
efficacy may see value in a PMO that helps coordinate with divisions; in an ‘improvement’ 
function that unites clinicians and managers; or in operational structures that themselves 
facilitate such coordination. Such units help with their key dilemma: how can work remain 
effectively coordinated under austerity? 
Engaging with austerity: directions and limitations 
The above observations tentatively highlight implications for practitioners. Their tentativeness 
itself is significant. Austerity places practitioners in a bind in which neither stasis nor change 
seems adequate. The evaluation devices, ways of seeing one’s situation and normative 
compromises used in normal times are poorly designed to support coordination under 
austerity. But changing them to fit austerity can further destabilise coordinative arrangements. 
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That austerity management academics must better recognise this bind is this thesis’s key 
conclusion. We cannot describe the austere situation without acknowledging such difficulties. 
Those proffering normative recommendations must advise not fictional rationalists who affect 
austere situations from outside, but the real managers already bound up in austerity’s 
complications. Academics must treat the struggle for coordination as real. 
This central contribution came in three parts. Chapter 11 highlighted the importance of 
situating work across settings, but specifically under austerity. Collating its insights with those 
of other chapters emphasises the national-local dependencies which make it harder for 
organisations to situate themselves. In a complex, discursively contested situation, simply 
knowing where you are is a struggle. 
Chapter 12 elaborates this claim, highlighting the annual cycle of instability austerity’s tight 
financial governance precipitates. By demanding acceptable financial predictions, blame-
avoiding governments (Boin et al., 2009) can worsen organisational uncertainty. Such 
dynamics precipitate cycles of opening and closing one’s eyes that leave organisations’ 
understandings and evaluations of their situations in flux, undermining coordination and 
creating acrimony. 
Developing this, Chapter 13 highlights how such situational instability combines with 
evaluative heterogeneity to create evaluative turbulence. Such turbulence entails difficulties 
settling on clear criteria to evaluate organisational work given the presence of so many 
alternatives. With coordination difficult, organisations frequently alter their test 
infrastructures. Yet these face the same turbulent environment, leading not to newfound 
stability but ongoing change. Actors are left uncertain what to do, with no coordination 
mechanism effective: a triple crisis of coordination occurs. 
Limitations and further research 
This work opens new directions for research in austerity management and RE. Most 
importantly, it reframes austerity management as a situated practice. Where writers have long 
focused on savings’ content, this research demonstrates the necessity of interrogating the 
practices by which those savings are selected, managed are made. It thus advocates a research 
agenda based on austerity management as practice. 
This thesis scratches the surface of this practice-based agenda. Further interrogations of 
austerity management practices could doubtless develop upon the practices identified here. 
Such research might follow this study in investigating austerity management writ large, 
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seeking to confirm, dispute or expand upon the range of practices identified here. Research in 
contrasting settings, like politically-led organisations under high financial strain (e.g. UK 
councils) could be particularly valuable here. 
However, the practices identified here enable an alternative research strategy. They highlight 
distinct areas of austerity management, which could each provide useful focus to subsequent 
investigations. For instance, this study identifies that organisations reconfigure quality. 
Further research could pick up on this to trace changing quality referents during austerity using 
corpus linguistic or discourse-ethnographic methods. The practices identified here could each 
comparably focus further study. 
This practice-based study’s key conclusion is that austerity management constitutes a search 
for coordination. This raises questions about how organisations can succeed therein. Future 
work might ask how those organisations coping best with financial pressure achieve 
coordination. Given some of the main reasons coordination was difficult here originated in 
national policy, such studies may be well advised to compare organisations across sectors or 
states. This could identify not only the organisational but also policy determinants of 
successful coordination. 
These coordinative problems were fuelled by the landscape of change in which austerity 
management occurs. The annual cycles identified here deserve further research. First, such 
research should expand our time horizon beyond the single years investigated here: how do 
such patterns recur and change over several years? Second, what other dynamics are they 
involved in? Austerity management research regularly investigates centralisation, evaluation 
and change management. Investigations of how these change over these annual cycles could 
productively progress those debates. 
Finally, this practice-based research raises questions about what happens next. If austerity 
management has created mutually reinforcing dynamics of destabilisation as this study 
suggests, will the end of austerity mean the end of these dynamics? Or will these established 
practices continue to affect organisational life even when funding returns? Research does not 
interrogate how organisations ‘leave’ austerity periods. Considering the practices established 
during austerity and how they continue or change offers an incisive way of conducting overdue 
research on emergence from austerity. 
The research similarly suggests new avenues for RE by locating it better within organisational 
processes. This highlighted a cycle of opening and closing one’s eyes arising through austerity’s 
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evaluative pressures. Such cycles seem likely in other instances where regulators impose 
requirements of questionable feasibility according to predictable timetables. Patterns of 
opening and closing one’s eyes could be productively investigated in other environments with 
predictable evaluative calendars, like regular inspection regimes or even elections. 
Locating RE within organisational contexts highlighted the cross-cutting test infrastructure 
supporting multiple tests. This highlighted some tests’ interdependence and enabled 
conclusions above the level of the individual tests. While here such arrangements proved 
easily destabilised, one wonders whether they might create mutually reinforcing relationships 
between tests outside austerity. Research in other contexts, like non-austerity PMOs or highly 
regulated environments might investigate how test infrastructures affect the tests they 
facilitate in normal times. 
A final category of RE research this study enables exploits its identification of four components 
of a successful test: criteria, actors, prescience and apparatus. Distinguishing between these 
could better explain why tests succeed or fail, and how attacks on them operate. It seems 
unlikely that which component an attack targets is irrelevant to its success. Research could 
investigate the dynamics and fortunes of attacks on each in public controversies.  
This study is enabled and constrained by its methods. Identifying practices is notoriously 
difficult. Those writing in anthropological or ethnographic sociological traditions might rightly 
be satisfied with the credibility of time in the field. But organisation studies increasingly 
requires detailed, articulable analytic methods. Consequently, this study’s approach to 
identifying practices works from identification of their basic manifestations – like actions and 
situations – up to practices themselves. Practice-based organisational studies could fruitfully 
draw on the same approach regardless their more specific theoretical framing. 
Yet this study was based on less than 12 months’ observation at each site. Detailed cases are 
hard to construct in this time, particularly when the financial year’s rhythms prove vital. This 
disadvantage was mitigated by staggering research across sites, but unavoidably limits this 
study.  
Inevitably, this study’s methods were interpretative, and conducted by a situated, positioned 
researcher. I review above my personal and political perspectives. While not attempting a 
normative study, I was my own research instrument. The detailed coding scheme above 
somewhat limited my influence, and its systematic nature provides guarantees against cherry-
picking. Yet judgements about meaning and relevance are inevitably my own. This is 
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unavoidable, though concerns about my interpretations are partly allayed by checks of my 
narratives with sites and continual engagement with supervisors.  
This study’s data were limited to healthcare sites in a particular time and place. The discursive, 
policy or sectoral exigencies here may not be present in other austere settings. Certain policy 
instruments, like the STF, were important in shaping the outcomes identified. Healthcare 
decisions’ overt moral charges made frankly debating quality trade-offs especially difficult. We 
should be cautious when generalising from these cases, and comparative work in contrasting 
settings is merited. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think similar practices would prevail. The policy and 
discourse identified here sprang from incentives to gain assurance about austerity’s progress 
and politically represent it as successful. Managers and politicians elsewhere likely experience 
similar imperatives. These expectations are coherent with the broader theory used to explain 
the outcomes this study observed, which is itself backed by a wealth of empirical work, 
supporting generalisation from that theory. While perhaps iterated differently, there are good 
reasons to expect similar dynamics in other austere situations.  
Should I conduct a comparable study again, I would maintain the broad design, but amend 
certain methods. When analysing national texts, I would take more advantage of corpus 
analytic methods, including when sampling for qualitative CDA. Having experienced fieldwork, 
I understand better its ability to open researchers to multiple interpretations of their data. I 
would thus be less nervous about being too deductive, and more quickly use categories from 
Thévenot and ‘dictionaries’ of Boltanski & Thévenot’s ‘worlds’ (Patriotta et al., 2011) to 
structure my coding. This would increase its demonstrable theoretical coherence without 
becoming less faithful to my sites. Finally, should time and resources allow, I would gather 
more systematically organisational measurement and prediction devices. Among other 
analyses this could support the annual cycle found by tracing organisations’ changing financial 
predictions over time. 
Concluding remarks 
This conclusion highlights this thesis’s key contribution: a recognition of austerity’s 
coordinative challenge. Based on this, it emphasises managers’ difficulties stabilising their 
situations given evaluative turbulence and cycles of opening and closing their eyes. These two 




RE enabled this by avoiding the austerity management literature’s presumption: that 
coordination is generally possible, and the question is which decisions managers should take. 
Instead, RE depicts coordination as a defeasible achievement, garnered despite a resistant 
world. Austerity renders unreliable previously successful ways of knowing and evaluating 
situations, prompting cycles of implementing, critiquing and replacing new measures. 
From this core conclusion, several further observations spring: i) our traditional means of 
categorising savings are problematic; ii) types of savings, centralisation and acrimony are 
seasonal; iii) savings decisions are inflected by changing, plural normative values; and iv) 
austerity management entails continual, low-level turbulence. These observations each 
significantly contribute to austerity management research. 
Reaching this point necessitated significant developments of RE. First, recognising discursive 
situating work’s importance; second, identifying cycles of opening and closing one’s eyes; third, 
conceptualising test infrastructures. Each enable austerity management analysis, but also 
broader RE research. 
Reading organisational research often leaves the impression that staff are foolhardy or, worse, 
malign. Dysfunction is easier made interesting than function. This study observed scope for 
improved approaches. But its central message is that staff work in circumstances whose 
difficulties austerity management research ill appreciates. Only by recognising that uncertainty 
is rife and coordination far from guaranteed can accurate analyses be developed, or 
meaningful recommendations proffered. Only these will do justice to the complexities oft-




Appendix 1: Typographical and naming conventions 
This thesis adopts a number of conventions in how it names people, organisations, and the 
various analytic and theoretical constructs it deploys. This appendix is designed to clarify these 
for transparency and clarity. 
Individual and organisational names 
To avoid compromising participants’ identities, this thesis avoids naming individuals 
altogether, preferring brief, general descriptors of their organisational role. While I do not on 
principle avoid communicating genders (e.g. where a gender is communicated in speech 
directly quoted from an interviewee), I prefer gender neutral language where possible. 
To enable access and to encourage open and frank conversation, organisational identities are 
also obscured. Research sites and other sub-national organisations are therefore not named 
with their true names, but with pseudonyms. To avoid any implicit reference to the nature of 
the organisation in these pseudonyms, the names given are those of shrubs, chosen at random 
from a list of common such names. To further protect organisations’ identities I sometimes 
replace the name of a programme, meeting or device they use with an altered or genericised 
alternative. To avoid clumsy or distracting reporting, these pseudonymisation steps are not 
remarked upon in the text. 
Practices and theory 
The analytic core of this thesis centres around a coding hierarchy of ‘practices’. The top level of 
this hierarchy consists of five ‘core practices’; the rest are referred to as ‘sub-practices’. To 
clarify what is being referred to at each stage of the document, ‘core practices’ are referred to 
in bold, sub-practices underlined. This leaves italics as a device to pick out technical terms 
drawn from theory or abstracted from this work.  
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Appendix 2: The NHS Context 
This thesis describes four cases of austerity management in and around the UK’s NHS. This 
appendix outlines that system to enable readers unfamiliar with the UK system to understand 
and contextualise these cases. This aim falls significantly short of a full description of the NHS’s 
complexities. For a more detailed account of the NHS’s contemporary structure, see National 
Audit Office (2017); for a political overview see Klein (2010, 2015); and for an analysis of its 
more recent reforms, see Exworthy et al (2016).  
This Appendix therefore consists of three sections: a brief introduction of the NHS, an account 
of key structures and financial flows, and an outline of its recent fortunes in terms of costs and 
outcomes. This last section is brief to avoid duplicating Appendix 3 (pp.322-332), which deals 
explicitly with the NHS’s recent financial troubles and cycles of reform. 
Introducing the NHS 
The NHS is a publicly funded healthcare system. Formed as part of a new post-war 
compromise, it provides every citizen with more-or-less comprehensive healthcare free at the 
point of use (Timmins, 1995). Originally operated through direct state provision coordinated by 
central government and its agencies, it has been subject to repeated cycles of market-based 
reforms (Ferlie et al., 1996). Since the 1980s, a structural division of organisations into 
‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’ has been entrenched, paving the way for the increasing 
involvement of non-NHS providers. 
Today’s NHS is among the world’s largest employers (Nuffield Trust, 2017b). Aside from family 
doctors, 1.2m people work in the NHS. Of these, around 120,000 are doctors; 325,000 nurses; 
36,000 managers; 166,000 other non-clinical support staff; 387,000 clinical support staff; and 
162,000 scientific, therapeutic and technical staff (NHS Digital, 2019b). On top of these are 
222,000 general practice staff (NHS Digital, 2019a). Maintaining this level of staff has recently 
become increasingly difficult, with limited investment in training and the UK’s plan to leave the 
European Union making recruitment increasingly difficult (Health Foundation et al., 2018). 
Together, these staff ‘deal with 1 million patients every 36 hours’ (NHS Confederation, 2017). 
Of these, around 90m per annum are outpatient appointments, 16m inpatient admissions and 
23m visits to Accident and Emergency departments. Historically, the NHS’s care has been 
positively reviewed relative to international comparators (Davis et al., 2014; Schneider et al., 
2017). However, such favourable comparisons have often been based more of the NHS’s 
impressive efficiency and access guarantees than the quality of its healthcare outcomes (Dayan 
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et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the NHS has historically enjoyed very strong support among the 
population (Robertson et al., 2018). 
Structure and financing 
Today’s NHS operates as a highly regulated market for publicly funded healthcare. Since the 
1980s, organisations have been divided by role into ‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’. The idea is 
that the former make decisions about which services should be bought for citizens in their 
area; and the latter provide them (Ferlie et al., 1996). Reforms of the 1990s and 2000s 
reinforced this division, and opened NHS markets to non-NHS providers.  
As much as such reforms can be traced to ‘free’ market ideas, the NHS’s market remains highly 
regulated (Ferlie et al., 1996). Market participants’ care quality and financial affairs are closely 
monitored. Perhaps more fundamentally, transactions themselves are subject to substantial 
regulation, which often determines the price at which given services can be bought and sold. 
Accordingly, understanding the NHS entails understanding not only purchasers and providers, 
but also transactions and regulators. It is with this latter two that this section begins. 
Transactions 
Transactions within the NHS are subject to extensive regulation. The most important element 
of this is the national tariff, which establishes the base prices to be paid for various units of 
healthcare activity. The tariff was introduced gradually during the early 2000s, and today 
determines the base price of most units of hospital care (Appleby et al., 2012). This means 
most care is paid per unit of activity: the idea is to facilitate quality-based ‘competition’ 
between providers by making money follow patients.  
Yet this only tells part of the story. Various modifiers have been applied to the base tariff, such 
as quality incentives, an ‘efficiency factor’ to reduce prices, and reduced payments above 
certain activity levels to encourage reductions in volumes (Appleby et al., 2012). Large 
tranches of activity remain paid for outside the national tariff. Particularly in mental health, 
‘block’ contracts, which do not vary payments with volumes of activity, remain common (NHS 
Providers, 2019).  
Despite such exceptions – and often because of the modifiers added to it – the national tariff 
remains central to NHS finances. Before 2013, responsibility for this key policy lever was 
retained in the DH. Since then, however, responsibility has been handed over to two of the 
NHS’s most important regulatory bodies: NHS England and the financial regulator – then 




NHS England is formally responsible for running the English NHS. It has extensive delegated 
authority from the DH to write the rules according to which the NHS operates (Department of 
Health, 2013b, 2014), including the creation of new organisational structures (Edwards, 2016). 
It produces strategic documents like the Five Year Forward View (NHS England, 2014) and 
operates seven regional offices with coordination and monitoring functions. With other 
regulators, it has intervened in individual organisations deemed to be failing. As the holder of 
overall responsibility for the provision of healthcare in England, NHS England is hugely 
influential. The Health Service Journal (HSJ, 2018), healthcare’s main trade journal has 
consistently ranked Simon Stevens, NHS England’s Chief Executive, as the most influential 
person in today’s NHS, even above Secretaries of State for Health. 
Aside from NHS England, the NHS’s financial regulator has been among the Service’s most 
consistently influential bodies. The HSJ ranks its Chief Executive the third most influential 
person in the NHS, behind only Stevens and Matt Hancock, Secretary of State for Health. In 
2008, the regulator was called Monitor, and was tasked with approving organisations who 
wished to become ‘Foundation Trusts’, and then regulating successful applicants (Health and 
Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act, 2003). Foundation Trusts were a new 
organisational form for healthcare which gave hospitals increased autonomy, particularly in 
terms of their finances. Reforms in 2012 saw Monitor gain further powers and responsibilities 
for the broader financial regulation of the sector (Health and Social Care Act, 2012). 
In 2016, Monitor was merged with a related financial regulator to create NHS Improvement, 
the body which oversees organisations’ finances today. Today, NHSI has wide-ranging 
regulatory powers. It sets tariff prices (Health and Social Care Act, 2012), determines financial 
rules and can intervene in trusts deemed to be ‘failing’. Many such powers it holds in 
collaboration with NHS England. In apparent recognition of this overlap, 2019 will see the two 
‘come together to act as a single organisation’ (NHS England, 2019). 
Alongside this financial regulation stands the CQC, the NHS’s quality regulator. It analyses high-
level data and carries out an inspection regime. Its ratings of organisations are among the 
headline indicators of their overall quality. Where standards are insufficient, they are 
empowered to place organisations into special measures, and closely monitor their activities 




Market reforms created a cadre of organisations dedicated to purchasing healthcare. They 
were supposed to examine the available healthcare providers, assess levels of need and 
contract to purchase the services required from the best available providers (Wenzel, 2017). In 
practice, this ‘commissioning’ can involve changing the services which are and are not funded, 
including through designing new service specifications and inviting bids. Their work also 
involves detailed negotiations with providers about annual contracts. While usually bound by 
the national tariff prices, commissioners do have significant freedoms around the volumes 
they commission, and, at times, the amounts they pay (Health and Social Care Act, 2012). 
Following contracting, commissioners operate as contract and performance managers, and 
often develop close relationships with their providers. 
This ‘commissioning’ happens at both national and local levels. Services commissioned 
nationally are those at both ends of the spectrum of specialisation: highly specialist care not 
practical to commission locally, and primary care services dealt with through national funding 
formulae. The breadth of other services – acute, mental health, ambulance and other 
community services are commissioned locally (King’s Fund, 2017a). 
Commissioning organisations have been a site of recent reform. At the start of the study 
period (2008), local commissioning was done by around 150 Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) (NHS 
Confederation, 2011). They received funding through a ‘weighted capitation’ formula which 
gave them money according to the number of people in their area adjusted by indicators of 
likely need (Appleby, 2008). With this, they were responsible for maintaining and improving 
the health of their local populations. They achieved this through commissioning providers to 
offer services, though many also had a ‘provider arm’ which directly provided community 
services. 
The early 21st Century saw extensive changes to local commissioners. By the start of 2009, the 
DH required PCTs to drop their ‘provider arms’, making them pure commissioning 
organisations (Ford, 2010). But the early years of the 2010 Coalition Government saw further, 
more radical change. As part of Andrew Lansley’s widespread reforms, PCTs were to be 
abolished and replaced by CCGs. 
The Health and Social Care Act (2012) introduced a range of structural reforms to the NHS, but 
central among them was the introduction of CCGs. Notionally, these were to be more clinically 
based organisations, focused on local GPs (family doctors). However, apart from having fewer 
resources, they were comparable to their PCT predecessors. Around 210 CCGs were to be 
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created, meaning they covered similar populations to PCTs (Naylor, 2012). As of 2012, it was 
CCGs who would be responsible for local commissioning. 
Reform also affected the course of national commissioning. In 2013, NHS England was 
established, creating an arms-length agency to manage the NHS outside the DH. Originally 
titled the NHS Commissioning Board, one of NHS England’s key responsibilities was to take on 
specialised commissioning decisions. 
Providers 
NHS England and CCGs fund the provision of healthcare services from various types of 
providers. Health services are traditionally split into ‘primary care’ and ‘secondary care’ 
organisations. The former are family doctors who provide general diagnostic, therapeutic and 
preventative services; most small communities will have primary care services. ‘Secondary 
care’ include services which require more urgent or specialised treatment; one might have to 
travel within a city or region to access secondary care. Some further distinguish tertiary 
services, which offer care so specialised there may be a handful of national centres addressing 
a given treatment or procedure. 
In the UK, primary care has historically been provided not by public organisations, but by 
partnerships of GPs who make profit on the difference between their funding and expenditure 
rather than drawing conventional salaries. While this is changing, with an increase in salaried 
GPs and more traditional private corporations (Virgin Care, n.d.), it remains the predominant 
model of primary care provision.  
The key providers examined in this thesis are secondary care hospitals. NHS hospitals have 
gained increasing autonomy as the internal market has become dominant (Ferlie et al., 1996). 
In 2004, the Foundation Trust structure was introduced (Department of Health, 2005). The aim 
was to give those organisations who could prove their financial viability extra autonomy, 
freeing them to act as market actors. Today, most hospitals are Foundation Trusts (NHS 
Confederation, 2017), though regulatory action and funding constriction has limited much of 
the autonomy they were initially intended to have (Collins, 2016). 
NHS hospitals are organised to provide a range of different services. The ‘district general 
hospital’ characteristically provides care for an immediate local population. By contrast, 
specialist hospitals provide some tertiary services in addition to or instead of these district-
based services. Generally, mental and physical healthcare is provided by different 
organisations. Physical health hospitals – or ‘acute’ hospitals – provide outpatient and 
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inpatient consultations. Mental health hospitals are more outpatient-based, often also 
providing a wide range of community-based services.  
When the NHS’s internal market was initially established, it was truly internal. Within the 
secondary and tertiary care sectors, competition was between NHS providers (Cribb, 2008). 
Reforms under the New Labour Government of 1997-2010 opened the door to the use of 
private sector providers (Timmins, 2005). Lansley’s reforms intensified this with controversial 
plans to allow ‘any willing provider’ to sell services to the NHS should patients choose to use 
them (Walshe and Ham, 2011). While most services continue to be provided by NHS providers, 
there are today 853 private- and third-sector organisations providing NHS care (NHS 
Confederation, 2017). 
It is worth observing that CCGs and providers often exist in a many-to-many relationship. 
Particularly larger providers often cross CCG boundaries, meaning they manage multiple 
contracts with multiple CCGs. Meanwhile, CCGs necessarily contract with a plurality of 
providers. While some mechanisms like ‘lead commissioner’ models attempt to reduce this 
complexity (Camden Clinical Commissioning Group, n.d.), it remains considerable. 
Care, cost and outcomes 
Notwithstanding repeated claims that the NHS could and should be more efficient (McKinsey 
and Company, 2009; Lord Carter of Coles, 2015, 2016; Hunt, 2014), the NHS is highly successful 
in ensuring efficient care and controlling cost relative to international comparators (Davis et 
al., 2014; Schneider et al., 2017). Unlike many systems, the NHS entails a strong primary care 
gatekeeping role: patients cannot simply report to most non-emergency secondary care 
services but require referrals from their GP. This, combined with the broad role GPs fulfil 
appears to effectively limit cost. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, demands to increase NHS productivity by as much as 4% have met 
limited success (Nicholson, 2009). These ‘unprecedented’ achievements have remained 
elusive, and what improvement there has been comparatively modest (Appleby et al., 2014, 
p.15; Bojke et al., 2016). However, funding in the NHS has continued to stagnate as 
populations, costs and needs rise (Lafond et al., 2016).  
Notwithstanding positive comparisons with other countries, the NHS has been characterised as 
performing less well when it comes to healthcare outcomes (Dayan et al., 2018). As funding 
has stagnated, key quality indicators have come under increasing pressure (see p.329). While 
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support for the NHS tends to be high, satisfaction with it has started falling since 2015 
(Robertson et al., 2019). 
Conclusion 
The NHS is a notoriously complex sector. The above structural account cannot and does not 
attempt to do justice to the scope of this complexity. Accordingly, it omits significant elements 
of today’s NHS, like public health, now largely the responsibility of local government; and so-
called Commissioning Support Units which sell to CCGs expertise many PCTs used to have in-
house. That such omissions are necessary to produce a brief account tells us something about 
the sector’s complexity. 
Instead, what this account aims to do is to adequately set the scene for the organisational case 
studies in this thesis. As the foregoing sections demonstrate, providers face a complex 
landscape of influences. Alongside their internal pressures, they face the interest of multiple 
regulators with different briefs, and often several different CCGs who may wish to contract 
different services. This breadth of pressures only intensifies under austerity: this is the story 
which Appendix 3 continues.  
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Appendix 3: Austerity and UK healthcare 
Introduction 
Twenty-first Century public administration so far has been defined by the challenges of 
austerity. Governments committed to contractionary fiscal policies have found existing cost-
saving mechanisms ineffective (Hood and Dixon, 2013) and face growing tensions between 
contractionary economic commitments and political palatability (Clarke and Newman, 2012; 
Pollitt, 2013). Public organisations find austerity threatens service quality and – ironically – 
their ability to make future savings (Fitzgerald and Lupton, 2015; Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et 
al., 2015; Robertson et al., 2017). With governments committed to reducing spending 
(Campbell and Meikle, 2011), solutions to such problems seem distant. 
While relatively typical in its level of vulnerability to the crisis (Lodge and Hood, 2012), the UK 
implemented a particularly stringent austerity regime. The UK was not among the most 
indebted OECD countries before the crisis, but its debt rapidly increased under austerity 
(Schäfer and Streeck, 2013). Despite signs organisations coped during the early years of 
austerity, experts foresaw and demonstrated increasingly severe consequences as austerity 
progressed (Appleby et al., 2014; Bach, 2016; Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015; Watkins et 
al., 2017). 
These impacts have been felt across sectors, including within the NHS, the world’s fifth largest 
employer (Nuffield Trust, 2017b). While ostensibly ‘protected’ from funding reductions (HM 
Treasury, 2010), the NHS experienced significant funding restraint (Lafond et al., 2016). As 
early as 2009, QIPP requested £20bn of savings (House of Commons Health Committee, 2010). 
Such savings demands continued and intensified (Appleby et al., 2014), with a series of new 
incentives encouraging compliance (House of Commons Health Committee, 2012; NHS England 
and NHS Improvement, 2016; Toynbee, 2016). Despite decreasing funding per patient, quality 
targets remained stringent (Smyth, 2017c). Hospitals faced an increasingly challenging task. 
These changes attracted extensive scrutiny and opposition. Government insisted that 
‘efficiencies’ could be made in the NHS without causing harm (Hunt, 2014; Lord Carter of 
Coles, 2016; McKinsey and Company, 2009; Monitor, 2013). Sympathetic media sources 
bolstered this argument by highlighting waste or allegedly avoidable spending (Slack, 2011a; 
Smyth, 2017d). Nevertheless, savings efforts attracted extensive scrutiny, including critical 
National Audit Office reports (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012) and the formation of a 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Long-term Sustainability of the NHS (2017). 
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Criticism notwithstanding, funding contractions continued, and organisational finances 
continued to deteriorate. Organisations providing NHS hospital, ambulance, mental health or 
community care are known as ‘NHS provider trusts’. By the financial year 2015/16, 66% of 
these provider trusts were reporting an overall financial deficit (King’s Fund, 2018b). Financial 
problems had consequences: by mid-2013, indicators strongly suggested that quality was 
deteriorating (Appleby, 2018). This scale of savings requirements represented an exceptionally 
difficult scenario for organisations.  
This appendix provides background material to help the reader contextualise austerity writ 
large, and within the NHS. It therefore comes in two parts: the first provides a general account 
of austerity policies, with particular reference to the United Kingdom. The second zooms in to 
consider the NHS itself: the context within which this thesis’s organisational case studies are 
set. 
Austerity in context 
It is difficult to understand individual organisations’ experience of austerity outside their 
national and international contexts. Yet precisely because this context inflects how we 
understand austerity, it is politicised and disputed (McCann, 2013). This section does not aim 
to settle such disputes. Instead, it attempts first to characterise the contested international 
contexts attributed to national austerity efforts (drawing extensively on Blyth, 2013). Second, 
it zooms in to analyse the UK’s national context.  
International austerity 
During the past decade, austerity has prominent across major industrialised economies. While 
the focus of austerity has differed across states (Lodge and Hood, 2012), it has almost 
universally brought serious political tensions (Pollitt, 2013). Austerity lacks the conceptual 
intrigue of era-defining public management reforms like NPM (Ferlie et al., 1996) or New 
Public Governance (Osborne, 2006); yet to organisations it has felt every bit as epochal a 
change. As services have contracted (Neri, 2017), individuals have faced devastating 
consequences (McKee et al., 2012). At individual, organisational and national levels, austerity 
has been one of the most significant forces in the public sector this century. 
A banking crisis 
Given such stakes, it is unsurprising that austerity’s causes are so heavily disputed. The 
dominant narrative of austerity relates it to the financial crash of 2007-08. For many, this crash 
had its origins in the American banking sector. During the 1980s, banks become increasingly 
‘leveraged’: that is, they increasingly invested money they themselves had borrowed (Blyth, 
2013, p.28). Consequently, they owed their creditors considerably more than they had in liquid 
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capital. As states deregulated their banking sectors during the 1990s, this trend accelerated 
(McKee et al., 2012). While this level of leverage enabled more investment and more profit, it 
left banks vulnerable. If one has borrowed thirty times one’s liquid capital and invested it in a 
given market, small fluctuations in that market can leave one unable to finance one’s debts 
(Blyth, 2013). 
Simultaneously, banks were developing new financial instruments to enable them to increase 
their lending. One such mechanism was ‘securitisation’: the securing of a loan against an asset, 
like a house in a mortgage. Mortgages were regarded as desirable investments for banks, but 
there were limits on how many they could engage in because i) they had a finite amount of 
money to lend; and ii) regulation limited the amount of risk they could hold. However, while 
having lent money as part of a mortgage left banks with less money, it meant they owned the 
mortgage holder’s debt. Consequently, banks began to use this debt as an asset against which 
to borrow. Investors lent them money, and received a regular return; in exchange, they took 
on the risk associated with mortgages. However, as mortgages were seen as highly secure 
investments, they were willing to do so. The ‘mortgage-backed security’ was born. 
This process of ‘securitisation’ enabled a cycle of continual lending. Banks could lend money as 
part of mortgages, then borrow against the debts they now owned. This generated capital and 
removed the risk associated with mortgage lending from banks’ books. Accordingly, they were 
able to lend more money as part of another mortgage, which could in turn be sold on to 
investors purchasing securities. 
Theoretically, this should have been safe. Mortgages were regarded as highly secure 
investments and accorded sought-after AAA risk ratings. Banks took steps to further reduce 
the risk by bundling together mortgages from different regions. As these regions’ housing 
markets were believed to be wholly independent of another (‘uncorrelated’), doing so was 
meant to diversify the investment, much as one might by investing in airlines at the same time 
as agriculture. Mixing mortgages from different markets was designed to reduce levels of risk. 
However, this reasoning turned out to be misguided. First, diversification could handle local 
problems in individual housing markets, but not systemic problems like systematically risky 
lending. As demand for mortgage-backed securities rose, however, banks had strong 
incentives to increase lending and to raise their risk appetite in order to do so. After all, they 
would be able to sell the risk on to those buying their mortgage-backed securities anyway. 
Consequently, the mortgage market became systematically too risky: a cross-cutting problem 
against which diversification could not defend. 
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Second, bundling together mortgages from different markets only reduced risk if those 
markets remained uncorrelated with one another. However, the very act of combining those 
mortgages into securities in effect created an (inter)national market in mortgages. With the 
same purchasers and sellers, the prices of mortgages in different regions were shaped by the 
same forces. Bundling together made correlated these previously independent markets. This 
increased the system’s vulnerability to the systemic risk banks had not anticipated (Blyth, 
2013, pp.31–36). 
This began to come to a head in 2006, when mortgage-backed securities started to lose value 
(Blyth, 2013, p.28). Investors realised that the securities they had bought were less secure than 
they had believed. Consequently, house and security prices fell nationwide. Heavily leveraged 
banks realised they were at risk and attempted to translate assets like mortgage debts into 
cash. However, multiple banks were attempting to sell the same types of assets, and nobody 
was buying. This further bid down the prices of those assets, worsening banks’ equity 
problems. Trust diminished, and, by 2008, banks became reluctant to lend to one another 
(Scharpf, 2013, p.2013). On the seventh of September, 2008, the American Government bailed 
out two Government-sponsored mortgage lenders, putting them under the control of the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (Lockhart, 2008). A week later, Lehman Brothers, America’s 
fourth largest investment bank, filed for bankruptcy (BBC News, 2008), setting off a chain of 
crises and bailouts across the world.  
A macroeconomic crisis 
Without disputing the importance of these banking sector developments, authors emphasise 
the role two international macroeconomic vulnerabilities played. First, the Eurozone was large 
and vulnerable to financial sector problems. The European Central Bank (ECB) was less capable 
than other central banks of stabilising problems in the banking sector. National central banks 
can generally deal with financial sector instability by guaranteeing banks’ solvency, or, in 
extreme cases, bailing out banks that need it. This is possible because the states backing those 
central banks can quickly allocate sufficient funds to cover large national banks’ debts. The ECB 
is different. It oversees a banking sector spanning the Eurozone and is not directly backed by a 
single state’s finances. Any guarantee or bailout would require lengthy negotiation through 
European institutions unlikely to respond quickly enough to address a crisis. No one state 
could reasonably afford to bail out the Eurozone’s large transnational banks. The ECB is poorly 
configured to stabilise the European financial sector (Blyth, 2013). 
Second, there were broader vulnerabilities in the international economy that left states poorly 
equipped to withstand macroeconomic shocks. Since the 1970s, sovereign debt had been 
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growing across OECD states (Schäfer and Streeck, 2013). Initially, this had been masked by high 
levels of inflation, which had progressively devalued debts. As inflation fell, however, these 
problems worsened. Such problems were exacerbated within the Eurozone by the need to set 
a single interest rate across countries with differing needs. When states like Greece, Ireland 
and Spain joined the Euro, they were exposed to German-style low interest rates, and 
relatively cheap domestic labour. This precipitated high imports, and a highly indebted 
domestic public sector. A national central bank might respond to this by raising interest rates – 
but this was not so easy for the ECB, because it had to set one rate to suit both these states 
and the likes of Germany (Scharpf, 2013, pp.120–125). Consequently, a certain set of Eurozone 
states were left with highly indebted, vulnerable economies. 
A state crisis 
Writers dispute extensively the relative responsibility of the banking sector, macroeconomic 
circumstances and government choices in precipitating the 2007-08 crash and subsequent 
government debt. What is clear is that the combination of these factors precipitated severe 
consequences for the international economy. When the banking crisis hit, it did not only affect 
the American banks in which it originated. Instead, the network of interbank lending meant a 
problem in one financial sector quickly spread to others. With Eurozone countries particularly 
poorly configured to respond to it, Europe proved an ideal incubator of the crisis (Scharpf, 
2013, p.108). When European governments eventually responded with bailouts, many did so 
against a backdrop of elevated national debts or vulnerable economies. 
Financial sector crises rapidly had major impacts for national governments. In states like the 
UK, whose tax receipts relied heavily on financial services, the crisis substantially and directly 
reduced government income (Blyth, 2013, p.42). In many states, bank bailouts added to such 
debts. On the 2nd of April 2009, the G20 agreed to a further $5tn international stimulus 
package in an effort to restart economies (BBC News, 2009). What was once a banking crisis 
rapidly become a fiscal crisis of the state (Morgan et al., 2011).  
It was in this context that national governments determined that debt should be reduced. 
Depending on one’s political outlook, governments either felt forced to reduce debts, or used 
doing so as ideological cover to cut back the state (Clarke, 2010). While deficits can be tackled 
either by reducing spending or by increasing taxation, ‘everywhere the diagnosis [was] that 
spending is too high’ (Schäfer and Streeck, 2013, p.10). Austerity policies spread rapidly. 
Yet it was far from clear that such austerity policies achieved their desired objectives. While 
evidence suggests that such ‘consolidations’ can promote growth, those motivated by desires 
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to cut deficits have the opposite effect (Guajardo et al., 2014). Nor did simultaneous 
international austerity efforts succeed in reducing deficits. Because ‘someone has to spend for 
someone else to save’ (Blyth, 2013, p.18), multiple states seeking to cut simultaneously tends 
to simply contract the world economy (Holland and Portes, 2012). Accordingly, Figure A.1 
displays OECD states’ indebtedness before austerity (2008) and based on the latest data 
available (2017). The blue bars show debt at 2008; the orange sections show change since 
then; in all but one case, debt has increased. Figure A.2 shows changes in GDP growth across 
time. Notwithstanding a recovery from the depth of the crash, levels of growth seem yet to 
recover to pre-crash levels. Whether or not one supports the policy, austerity seems not to 
have had the impacts on debt and growth which governments predicted (e.g. HM Treasury, 
2010, pp.23–24). 
 





















































































Figure A.2 – OECD and UK annual growth (OECD, 2019b) 
This context brought severe implications for public organisations. Against a backdrop of 
prolonged austerity, they faced complex strategic choices which could substantially alter 
existing public roles (Cepiku et al., 2016). At times, this meant finding new ways to get by 
(Shaw, 2012), at others it meant increasingly desperate strategies for survival, including 
government bankruptcies (Davidson and Ward, 2013). As an international phenomenon with 
radical organisational implications, austerity should be a prime focus for organisational 
scholars. 
Austerity in the UK 
The UK was among the states which pursued austerity most vigorously. This was not explained 
by its level of debt alone. As Figure A.1 shows, it had a moderate level of indebtedness relative 
to OECD counterparts (McKee et al., 2012); overall, it was moderately ‘vulnerable’ to the crisis 
(Lodge and Hood, 2012). However, following the 2010 General Election, successive 
Conservative-led Governments implemented intense spending reductions. Yet by 2017, the UK 
was among the most indebted OECD states (Schäfer and Streeck, 2013, pp.2–3; and see Figure 
A3.1). As a relatively typical economy which nevertheless implemented austerity with vigour, 
the UK is both comparable to several states, but is also a highly ‘observable’ instance of 
austerity (Pettigrew, 1990, p.275). It bears more detailed consideration. 
Austerity’s challenges 
The UK was among the European states which invested most highly in problematic American 
mortgage-backed securities (Scharpf, 2013, pp.125–127). It was therefore vulnerable to the 
crisis springing from those securities. Warning signs came in September 2007, when Northern 






























obligations (BBC News, 2007). Nevertheless, that November’s Pre-Budget Report identified 
only ‘increased international economic uncertainty’ (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2011). Early in 
2008, the Labour Government nationalised Norther Rock. Later that year, further banks – 
Royal Bank of Scotland, TSB and HBOS – received bailouts of their own. By the 2008 Pre-
Budget Report, an ‘unprecedented global crisis’ was declared (Fairclough and Fairclough, 
2011). 
While Labour responded to the crisis in part by increasing borrowing, this was not to last 
(Darling, 2008). The 2010 General Election returned a Conservative-led Coalition. That year’s 
Budget characterised deficit reduction as ‘the most urgent task facing this country’ (HM 
Treasury, 2010, p.1). It planned a £128bn ‘consolidation’ (18% of annual spending), 77% of 
which was to be accounted for by spending decreases (p.5, 15). The 2013 Spending Round 
entrenched this by reducing borrowing (Osborne, 2013). While such measures received the 
electorate’s ‘grudging consent’ (Clarke, 2010), they required politically challenging trade-offs 
across government (Clarke and Newman, 2012; Pollitt, 2013). 
Accordingly, austerity became a highly disputed policy, and concept. Originally used by David 
Cameron shortly before he became Prime Minister, the term ‘austerity’ appealed to a post-war 
ideal of ‘getting by’ and an attractive anti-consumerism (Bramall, 2013). Yet the term and its 
cultural associations were also repurposed to oppose budgetary reductions (p.21, 108-09). 
Austerity’s advocates characteristically painted it as necessary (Krugman, 2010; O’Neill, 2012): 
there was – in the words of a 2017 General Election Debate – ‘no magic money tree’ (Watts, 
2017). They also moralised austerity, contrasting supposedly profligate spending with hard-
working taxpayers (Lakoff, 2013; L. Morris, 2016). Yet for opponents, austerity was a brutal 
reduction of services on which the poorest relied (Matthews-King, 2017). UK austerity 
remained highly contentious. 
Austerity’s consequences 
Austerity’s espoused purpose was to reduce the UK’s financial deficit. 2010’s Conservative-led 
Government hoped that debt would soon decrease, falling below 70% of GDP by 2014/15 (HM 
Treasury, 2010, p.23). However, an initial post-crisis recovery flattened out shortly after the 
Coalition’s first budget (McKee et al., 2012). As Figure A.3 demonstrates, debt continued rising 
until 2016/17, reaching a high of 86.5% (c.f. Schäfer and Streeck, 2013, pp.2–3). Austerity 




Figure A.3 – UK Government debt (Office for National Statistics, 2018) 
Despite absent or perverse national consequences, austerity’s impact on organisations was 
pronounced. In places, it directly reduced services (Z. Morris, 2016). This was particularly the 
case in local government, which bore the brunt of budget reductions (Bailey et al., 2015; 
Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015; Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015). At times, 
organisations pieced together ways of coping (Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013) or made savings 
that avoided direct impacts on service users. At others, what were intended as back-office 
changes nevertheless damaged services (Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015). Across sectors, 
harm-free savings increasingly seemed a short-term phenomenon. Commentators foresaw 
increasingly direct impacts on services and clients as ‘easy’ savings were used up (Appleby et 
al., 2014; Fitzgerald and Lupton, 2015).  
Such consequences were politically threatening for an already vulnerable Central Government 
(Masters and ‘T Hart, 2012). Characteristically, Government responded to such problems by 
making individual organisations responsible for resolving them (Newman and Clarke, 2014), 
and imposing severe penalties for missing financial targets (Davies and Thompson, 2016). Such 
burdens were also transferred to individuals (Dowling and Harvie, 2014; Fitzgerald and Lupton, 
2015; Turnbull and Wass, 2015). Delegating problems like this damaged staff wellbeing and 
morale, and decayed relationships, as departments and organisations competed for remaining 









































































































































































These consequences eventually affected service users. Budget reductions varied extensively 
across areas of differing deprivation (Meegan et al., 2014). Regrettably, the most deprived 
faced the severest reductions (Bailey et al., 2015). This had demonstrable human impacts. 
McKee et al (2012) identify an increase in suicides over the period of austerity. Watkins et al 
(2017) associate health and social care spending reductions 2010-2014 with 34,530-56,206 
deaths. These were the background– and the stakes – of organisational austerity management 
efforts. 
Austerity in the NHS 
The stakes were highly visible in the case of the NHS (Lafond et al., 2014, 2016). Accordingly, 
this section traces austerity’s dynamics within this policy area. First, it analyses the dynamics of 
NHS finances 2008-18. Second, it examines the organisational implications of those changes, 
including effects on healthcare quality. Finally, drawing on each of these, it highlights the 
dynamics of the NHS austerity debate.  
Retrenchment and reconfiguration 
Developing austerity (2008-10) 
Despite the Labour Government’s decision to increase borrowing to finance their bailout of 
major banks, the financial crash placed pressure on public service budgets. The 2009 Budget 
required the DH to contribute £2.3bn to an overall £5bn 2010/11 efficiency aim (Department 
of Health and NHS Finance, Performance and Operations, 2009). Health services looked set to 
receive more-or-less static real revenue allocations until 2013/14 (Department of Health, 
2009a).  
Labour sought ways to make NHS savings without harming services. In February 2009, they 
hired McKinsey and Company, a prominent management consultancy, to find such savings. 
McKinsey (2009) reported the following month, arguing that there was scope for £15-20bn 
productivity improvements over five years. While Labour chose not to publish the report, 
senior health service figures began referring to this £20bn figure in forewarning of upcoming 
savings obligations (House of Commons Health Committee, 2010; Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 2010, 2012; Charlesworth et al., 2016). 
The 2010 General Election saw the NHS become a major issue. The Conservative Party – 
generally less trusted than its opponents on the NHS (Ashcroft, 2015) – attempted to 
neutralise the issue. ‘I’ll cut the deficit, not the NHS’, promised Cameron (Campbell and 
Meikle, 2011). Consequently, much discussion following the Conservatives election victory 
focused on this pledge to ‘protect’ the NHS from funding decreases. Opponents questioned 
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whether it was being fulfilled given accelerating austerity (HM Treasury, 2010, p.17; House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2010).  
Analysis suggests that this pledge was not quite fulfilled, but that even a small real-terms 
increase in funding would leave the NHS under severe pressure. Adjusting for new transfers 
between budgets, it seemed there was a small real-terms decrease in NHS funding during the 
Coalition’s early years (Nuffield Trust, 2017a). More significantly, however, populations and 
need were growing, and healthcare costs rising faster than inflation. Meanwhile, services on 
which the NHS depended were being radically reduced (Lafond et al., 2016). Regardless 
whether it received a real-terms funding increase in any given year, the NHS faced increasingly 
difficult financial circumstances. 
Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention (2010-15) 
Government sought to implement NHS savings through QIPP (Charlesworth et al., 2016). 
Labour began it; the Coalition maintained, expanded and accelerated it. It operated through 
three principal mechanisms: first, a suite of central programmes designed either to make 
direct savings or produce resources to help organisations do so (Department of Health, 2013a); 
second, a pay freeze for staff earning more than £21,000 per annum (Department of Health 
and NHS Finance, Performance and Operations, 2009); third, reductions in the rate at which 
provider organisations were reimbursed (‘tariff’), designed to encourage them to make 
internal savings (Department of Health and NHS Finance, Performance and Operations, 2010). 
The substantial majority of savings came from the latter two mechanisms (Comptroller and 
Auditor General, 2012; House of Commons Health Committee, 2013). 
Tariff changes affected organisations particularly directly. Before the Election, a 0.5% 
‘efficiency’ requirement had been added to tariffs: providers would be paid 0.5% less per 
procedure or patient than they used to be (Department of Health and NHS Finance, 
Performance and Operations, 2009). After the Election, this was increased to 1.5%, as per the 
increased savings the new government expected (Department of Health and NHS Finance, 
Performance and Operations, 2010). By 2011, a report by Monitor (then healthcare’s financial 
regulator) noted that Foundation Trusts (autonomous healthcare providers) were attempting 
to save an average of 4.4% of operating costs (House of Commons Health Committee, 2012).  
Government came under criticisms for its reliance on pay freezes and tariff reductions as 
opposed to concrete organisational change. The Health Select Committee (2012) criticised 
Government’s presentation of tariff changes as causing savings, emphasising that tariff at best 
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encouraged organisations to do the actual work of making savings. Nor could Government be 
sure that such savings were actually being made.  
Savings requirements severely affected organisatons’ financial stability. Initially, most 
organisations were initially able to make the required savings while breaking even. Yet as early 
as March 2011, most London hospitals were set to refuse to sign off their budgets, with 
finances becoming senior managers’ biggest concern (Lister, 2011). That September, 
representative bodies of NHS organisations like NHS Employers and the NHS Confederation 
signalled anxiety about impending financial problems (Campbell, 2011b, 2011c). By 2012, a 
third of providers were aiming to make for an internationally unprecedented 5% annual 
savings target (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012; Charlesworth et al., 2016, p.55). For a 
similar proportion of senior hospital managers (28%), the financial situation was the ‘worst 
ever experienced’ (House of Commons Health Committee, 2013). A National Audit Office 
report (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012) suggested that most providers and 
commissioners felt savings they had promised were unachievable. 
Such savings were made harder to make by simultaneous demands for massive reorganisation 
(Exworthy and Mannion, 2016). Despite an election campaign promising no ‘top-down 
reorganisation’ of the NHS, Andrew Lansley, Secretary of State for Health quickly introduced a 
white paper proposing the largest NHS reorganisation since its inception. Principal among his 
reforms was the replacement of healthcare’s commissioners – PCTs with new GP-led CCGs; 
and the abolition of the regional tier of NHS management, known as Strategic Health 
Authorities (Department of Health, 2010a). 
Even before this became law in 2012, it substantially destabilised healthcare organisations. 
PCT staff began to leave as structural changes began in anticipation of legislation (Department 
of Health and NHS Finance, Performance and Operations, 2010; Flory, 2012). As early as 
November 2010, David Nicholson, Chief Executive of the NHS, told the Health Select 
Committee (2010) that PCTs were ‘in meltdown’. These reforms required considerable labour, 
and perpetuated uncertainty across the health service. Achieving them alongside significant 
savings only added to the challenge. 
Perhaps surprisingly, talk of large-scale reconfiguration initially played well with health unions 
and professional bodies, who desperately wanted a way savings could be made without job-
losses (Cole, 2010). However the confluence of budget reductions and reforms soon attracted 
their criticism, some worrying that structural changes might be used as ‘cover’ for cuts (Lister 
and Watson, 2011; Siddique, 2016). Lansley’s plan increasingly attracted criticism from his 
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Liberal Democrat coalition partners (Toynbee, 2010) and even his own party (Wollaston, 2010). 
Eventually, the controversy around these reforms grew so great that they could only be passed 
in a somewhat watered-down form following the Prime Minister’s personal intervention and a 
two-month consultation (Cameron, 2011a, 2011b; Health and Social Care Act, 2012; 
Mulholland, 2011). The patterns of disruption and uncertainty this entailed created a 
challenging environment for organisations attempting to plan. 
Sustainability and Transformation? (2015-2018) 
In retrospect, however, these years between 2009/10 and 2012/13 were comparatively simple 
times for savings in the NHS. As early efforts had taken advantage of any ‘easy’ savings, future 
attempts to minimise spending became increasingly challenging. 
The 2015 General Election brought mixed news for NHS organisations. NHS England’s new 
Chief Executive, Simon Stevens, successfully used the NHS’s profile during the Election to 
campaign for more funding. His Five Year Forward View (NHS England, 2014) asked for at least 
£8bn extra funding, which all major parties agreed to pledge. However, it also committed the 
NHS to further ‘efficiency’ savings’, which were becoming increasingly difficult to deliver. 
When the Conservative Party won a small outright majority, they were also freed of their 
Liberal Democrat coalition partners who had provided something of a limitation on 
Conservative austerity ambitions. Consequently, the years following the election saw 
intermittent announcements of new funding (HM Treasury, 2017; NHS England and NHS 
Improvement, 2018; Smyth, 2017b; Wright, 2018) but overall increasing financial pressure. 
Savings pressures on individual organisations thus continued. While QIPP itself had initially 
been intended to realise savings between 2010 and 2015, it was extended to continue past 
2015 (House of Commons Health Committee, 2013). Additionally, Jeremy Hunt, the incoming 
Secretary of State for Health commissioned a review of hospital productivity from Lord Carter 
of Coles. Carter’s eventual reports (2015, 2016) argued that a further £5bn efficiency savings 
were possible. He drew this conclusion from analysis of inter-hospital variation in how much 
was spent on different categories of activity. Areas where a hospital was cheaper than average 
were ignored; but those where it was more expensive were totalled to identify an overall 
‘opportunity’ for that trust. 
This methodology was widely seen as suspect (Dunhill, 2016), but Carter remained influential. 
While Carter did consult with NHS organisations on these findings, he was only able to claim 
that the non-specialist trusts he talked to agreed 60% of his ‘savings’ were achievable. 
Nevertheless, these were rapidly translated into central DH mandates for organisations to 
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make equivalent savings (Hunt, 2015). Trusts were given specific responsibilities to realise 
supposed savings and regulators took a strong interest in trusts’ implementation of Carter’s 
recommendations (NHS Improvement, 2016a). The King’s Fund – a leading healthcare think 
tank – told the Health Select Committee that 85% of NHS finance directors viewed that year’s 
savings proposals as probably unachievable (King’s Fund, 2016a). 
Such individual savings obligations, however, were compounded and complicated by 
Government increasingly emphasising geographical areas’ financial fortunes. By 2016, all 
healthcare providers and commissioners had been grouped into 44 geographical ‘footprints’ 
with named leaders, known as STPs. These were intended to enable greater coordination 
between nearby organisations; and each was asked for a joint five-year plan to manage 
demand and savings (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2018; NHS England, 2017). However, 
this proved far more challenging than anticipated, with STPs fearing a lack of political support 
for the types of changes their funding targets implied (Edwards, 2016). Initial six-month 
timelines for this work almost doubled. 
 
Figure A.4 – Proportion of NHS provider trusts reporting annual surpluses and deficits (King’s Fund, 2018b) 
By 2017, NHS providers were attempting to save an average of 4.3% of their turnover in order 
to meet financial targets (Gainsbury, 2017) – targets with which they increasingly failed to 
keep pace. As spending grew quicker than income, more and more organisations came to 
report year-end deficits (Morse, 2016, p.5). As Figure A.4 demonstrates, the comparative 
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By 2016, NHS Providers – the representative body for the provider sector – was openly 
criticising targets they argued could not be met (Smyth, 2016c). This represented the 
conclusion of a long build-up of pressure. While only 13% of trusts had ended 2011/12 in 
deficit, a third were dipping into their reserves to avoid doing so (Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 2012). 
Government responded to such difficulties by increasing the stringency of their enforcement 
measures. Regions failing to save were incorporated into a new ‘Capped Expenditure Process’, 
which asked them to produce new savings plans in four weeks, and hired management 
consultants to help them do so (Simpson and Barker, 2017). Hunt threatened to fire the Boards 
of individual providers for financial or quality failures (Toynbee, 2016). Such threats seemed to 
be realised when Bob Kerslake, former head of the civil service announced his resignation as 
Chair of King’s College Hospital in a letter which vigorously criticised regulators (Kerslake, 
2017). The next day, the hospital was put into financial ‘special measures’ (NHS Improvement, 
2017). That this took place with such a senior Chair, and a trust which had six years previously 
been regarded as clear of crisis (Bosely, 2011) emphasised how far such central pressure 
reached. As enforcement grew more stringent, so it became more focused on finance. By 
2018, even the CQC’s quality ratings included an evaluation of trust’s ‘use of resources’ (Care 
Quality Commission and NHS Improvement, 2018). 
Complementing such enforcement pressures, Government introduced new funding. In 2015, 
the STF was announced (Department of Health and Social Care, 2015). Initially worth £1.8bn, it 
was intended to be split between funds for service changes (transformation) and achieving 
financial balance (sustainability). However, so significant were immediate financial pressures 
that the vast majority was consumed by transfers to trusts to fund running costs (Comptroller 
and Auditor General, 2018). By 2018, the fund had been renamed the Provider Sustainability 
Fund, and was worth £2.45bn. However, any hope of facilitating long-term ‘transformation’ 
was abandoned. Indeed, it was mandated that all contributions garnered through the fund 
must go directly to hospitals’ bottom lines (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2018). 
These additional funds came with strings attached. To be eligible to receive them, trusts were 
obliged to agree to, and meet, their ‘control totals’. These were new caps on individual 
providers’ year end deficits (or minimum surpluses to achieved) (Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 2018). The effect of this measure was twofold. First, it skewed funding towards those 
already achieving their financial goals, increasing the gap between rich and poor trusts. 
Second, it financially penalised trusts for refusing to state that their control totals were 
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reasonable objectives. Consequently, by February 2018 only 35% of those trusts planning to 
sign up to their control totals told NHS Providers (2018) that they were at least ‘confident’ of 
actually meeting them. It seems that the STF encouraged providers to sign up to totals they 
might otherwise have cast as unrealistic. 
However, the added funds the STF brought into the system did help to improve its headline 
financial position. As Figure A.5 illustrates, the provider sector began to deteriorate severely 
from 2013/14, reaching a deficit of £2.45bn by 2015/16. The uptick between 2015/16 and 
2016/17 can be explained in part by STF funding. However, such one-off transfers served in 
part to mask the underlying financial situation. Adjusting for them, and for ‘non-operational’ 
savings the Nuffield Trust argued that trusts’ underlying overspend in 2016/17 was closer to 
£3.7bn than £0.8bn (Gainsbury, 2017). Even as reported finances improved, the underlying 
positions they represented remained severe. 
 
Figure A.5 – Reported provider sector net surplus. Data from Morse (2016) and Gainsbury (2017) 
This was partly explained by an increasing array of short-term savings measures undertaken by 
Government and provider trusts alike. Government brought forward financial resources from 
future years’ budgets (Campbell, 2016), shifted money intended for capital purchases to fund 
revenue costs (Morse, 2016) and issued increasing interest-bearing loans to trusts 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2018). Between 2013/14 and 2016/17, the proportion of 
trusts’ savings which represented one-off savings rather than lasting reductions in running 
costs increased from 13% to 22% (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2018). It seemed clear 
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Consequences and quality 
Across these periods, the attempt to make financial savings took a toll on organisations and 
the services they provided. Continued pay freezes caused increasing discontent, which became 
focused on a dispute over the establishment of a new contract for junior doctors, during which 
the Government offered little on pay and demanded an increase in out-of-hours working. As 
tensions rose, Hunt threatened to impose the new contract if agreements could not be 
reached, prompting a series of strikes (Campbell and Johnson, 2016; Elgot and Campbell, 
2016). Even after the pay freeze introduced under QIPP, a 1% cap on public sector wage 
increases continued to enforce real-terms cuts on NHS pay (Comptroller and Auditor General, 
2018). It was not until March 2018 that Government relented and offered pay increases to 
nursing, administrative and clerical staff (Groves and Ellicott, 2018). Meanwhile, staff came to 
act as ‘shock absorbers’, protecting patients from the impact of funding retractions (Robertson 
et al., 2017, pp.97–98). Hiring became increasingly difficult across NHS roles, with one in 
twelve positions vacant (NHS Providers, 2018).  
The combination of low morale, difficulty hiring and financial restraint itself was a difficult 
context during which to maintain healthcare quality. Government maintained that it was 
organisations’ responsibility to protect quality despite the savings asked of them. Savings 
associated with QIPP were supposed to be gained through service improvements; or at least 
not through substantive cuts to those services (Department of Health, 2010b). However, it 
appears that DH and NHS leaders doubted that this was the reality, so regularly did they affirm 
to organisations that rationing services (Campbell, 2011a; Easton, 2010), or implementing 
standard-issue CIPs (Easton, 2011; Keogh, 2011) did not constitute legitimate QIPP savings. 
However, Government seemed rapidly to accept that QIPP’s £20bn target was to be achieved 
through CIPs: they issued guidance (Audit Commission and Monitor, 2012) and eventually 
requirements (Charlesworth et al., 2016, pp.51–52) to do so. 
Until around 2013, key formal indicators suggested quality was more-or-less stable (Appleby, 
2018). However, there were warning signs of problems to come. A survey by Unison, a large 
public sector trades union found a third of staff saying efficiency savings had worsened care 
(Ramesh, 2010b). 85% of NHS trusts told the NHS Confederation that financial pressures were 
affecting quality (House of Commons Health Committee, 2012). Even official guidance 
recognised that quality was at risk (Smyth and Lister, 2011). 
As time went on, quality risks became quality problems. The greatest attention was garnered 
by the prospect of rationing or service closures. The Royal College of Surgeons wrote to the 
Public Accounts Committee (2013) criticising financially-driven rationing of operations. Key 
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think tanks warned of potentially ‘brutal’ service reductions (Nuffield Trust, 2016). Newspapers 
and representatives of NHS organisations warned of wholesale closures (Spencer, 2016; 
Stewart and Taylor, 2016), while NHS England and NHSI (2016) spoke somewhat 
euphemistically of ‘reproviding’ or ‘consolidating’ services deemed ‘unsustainable’. 
Yet gradual strains in the services which were maintained were at least as significant as those 
which were closed (King’s Fund, 2016b). By the end of 2014/15, the CQC (2015) rated 68% of 
hospitals ‘requires improvement’ or ‘inadequate’. By 2017, they were describing a system 
‘straining at the seams’ (2017). The same year saw the worst ever recorded waiting times in 
Accident and Emergency departments: one of the NHS’s key targets (Smyth, 2017c), while 
waiting lists reached 3.9 million (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2018). So severe did 
pressures become that the CQC suspended its routine inspections over the winter of 2017-18 
(Behan, 2018). Whether a politically-driven move to avoid uncovering ‘bad news’ or a 
necessary step to avoid the burden of the inspection process putting quality at risk, it said little 
for system’s ability to reliably deliver the quality it aimed for. 
It thus became increasingly clear that healthcare austerity was causing major problems for 
quality. In 2017, the British Medical Journal published a letter signed by 2,000 doctors 
criticising the lack of funding (Spencer, 2017) and a paper attributing to austerity an estimated 
45,000 deaths over five years (Watkins et al., 2017). Around the same time, satisfaction with 
the NHS – normally stable – decreased sharply, with respondents attributing dissatisfaction to 
levels of staffing, funding and government reforms (Robertson et al., 2018). It was in this 
context that the debate over NHS funding took a decisive turn. 
Debate and dénouement 
The above makes clear the fraught, politicised environment in which NHS austerity took place. 
Government’s strategy in this environment centred on an attempt to demonstrate that 
‘efficiency’ savings could be made by simply getting more per unit of expenditure, thus 
enabling spending to fall without affecting quality. To this end, the Coalition brought out 
several documents – including the as-yet unpublished McKinsey (2009) report – which 
provided data to support this argument (Lord Carter of Coles, 2015; Monitor, 2013; NHS Right 
Care, 2010, 2013). Other reports identified so-called ‘low clinical value’ treatments which could 
be avoided on the basis they did not efficiently enough transform financial inputs into clinical 
outputs (Audit Commission, 2011). Neither of these were wholly novel lines of argument; they 
had their origins in pre-crash efficiency (Department of Health, 2007; Gershon, 2004) and 
value-for-money narratives (London Health Observatory, 2007). Nevertheless, the decision to 
make such radical savings made such rationales all-the-more prominent. 
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Right-leaning media sources accentuated such narratives by highlighting areas of spending that 
could be avoided. Apparent ‘waste’ was a frequent target of such efforts (Geddes, 2017; 
Platell, 2011; Smyth, 2017d), as were fraud (Hope, 2011), seemingly frivolous spending like 
communications (Slack and Daniel, 2011) or hospitality (Slack, 2011b) and so-called ‘health 
tourism’ (Martin, 2011). The Daily Mail began a recurring column supposedly offering ‘money-
saving tips for hospitals’ (e.g. 2016). While left-leaning outlets tended to target different 
sources of unnecessary spending – like expenditure on management consultants (Ramesh, 
2010a) – full-throated defences of the importance of NHS spending were rarer. The narrative 
that there were efficiencies to be made was increasingly accepted. 
However, this did not mean that the Government’s handling of the situation went without 
criticism. Initially, criticisms often highlighted uncertainties in the information Government had 
and provided about the situation. They were criticised for ‘misleading’ claims about levels of 
NHS funding (Smyth, 2016b); for having little certainty about what savings were being made 
(HM Treasury, 2013) or their impacts on quality (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012); and 
for unrealistic planning assumptions (Dunhill, 2015). These attacks reflected and contributed 
to a substantial sense of instability.  
As time continued, this instability developed into claims that the NHS was ‘heading for 
disaster’ (Campbell, 2017b; The Guardian, 2016; Meikle, 2016; Smallwood, 2015; Smyth, 
2016a). It became increasingly common to question whether supposed efficiency savings really 
could provide the savings needed (Ham, 2016). Perhaps the greatest sign, however, of doubt 
that savings and quality could be reconciled came in the shape of a meeting of hospital Chief 
Executives at which they were asked to chant ‘we can do this’ in unison (Campbell, 2017a). 
There was a growing sense savings and quality could not coexist at the levels required. 
In this context came a series of calls for increases in NHS funding. These came from both the 
Labour opposition (Groves, 2017) members of the governing Conservatives (Collins, 2018) and 
major healthcare think tanks (Ham et al., 2017). Most strikingly, however, Simon Stevens used 
a speech to the NHS Confederation to declare that the NHS could not meet the targets asked 
of it without more funding. This level of intervention in political decisions was highly unusual, 
particularly given that it came with a request for an extra £4bn immediately in the month 
preceding the Autumn Budget (Ham, 2017). When the Budget allocated a smaller amount, the 
Chair and Medical Director of NHS England stated openly that the funds given were insufficient 
(Smyth, 2017a). This was followed up by NHS England’s Board announcing a list of ‘low-value’ 
treatments no longer to be provided, and warning that targets would be missed (Borland and 
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Ferris, 2017; Smyth, 2017b). With budgetary decisions tied so closely to negative impacts on 
quality, the political costs of austerity became too great. By March 2018, the Government 
announced what became a £20bn increase in NHS spending (Helm, 2018; Stevens and Borland, 
2018). 
Conclusion 
Across countries and sectors, austerity has been one of the most significant issues facing public 
organisations this Century so far. Distinct even from sharp one-off reductions in funding, it has 
been a prolonged period of contraction (Schäfer and Streeck, 2013) generating uncertainty and 
controversy (McCann, 2013). Even where organisations initially ‘survive’ (Shaw, 2012), the 
long-term impacts of reduced budgets, decaying relationships (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, et al., 
2015) and worsening staff morale (Bach, 2016) have been profoundly difficult to negotiate. 
Nowhere has the controversy associated with austerity been clearer than in England’s NHS. 
Across QIPP, STPs, control totals and the myriad other instruments introduced to manage 
austerity, the material strain austerity caused the NHS has become evident (Care Quality 
Commission, 2017; Lafond et al., 2016). While the period started with the Government eager 
to demonstrate it was ‘protecting’ the NHS from austerity (Wintour, 2014), it ended with 
relative clarity that austerity had made maintaining quality next to impossible (Morse, 2016, 
p.9). Accordingly, if Government was initially able manage controversy through ‘efficiency’ 
narratives (McKinsey and Company, 2009), NHS austerity became too controversial to be 
politically sustained. The result has been a progressive, and therefore highly observable 
movement into austerity, culminating in a policy crisis that casts light on the policy tensions 
austerity brings (Pollitt, 2013). 
The policy background above describes an exceptionally turbulent environment for healthcare 
organisations to navigate. They have found themselves attempting to achieve ever-greater 
requirements for efficiency, while also attaining constant quality goals. To do so at the best of 
times is difficult. To do so in a highly politicised environment characterised by profound 
uncertainty about future policy is all-the-more challenging. These tensions are at their clearest 
within the provider sector. Not only did providers reach a cumulative deficit than the entire 
annual budget than the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Gainsbury, 
2017; Institute for Government, 2017), it also hosts the vast majority of the staff austerity 




Appendix 4: Data structure illustration 
Figure A.6 illustrates how data were coded for the manifestations of practices therein, and 
these then used to identify sub-practices and core practices. The practices illustrated were 
selected for their numerical prominence and the clarity with which they could be visualised 
together in a single diagram. This remains reductive of the detailed analysis which underlies 
these results, as extensive coding hierarchies sat beneath both the manifestations and sub-
practices identified here. Consequently, links were often made at a more granular level than 






Figure A.6 – Illustration of data structure 
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Appendix 5: Chronicle extract 
Table A.1 is an extract from the chronicle constructed as part of this study. It has been edited to help it fit legibly onto a page; columns removed included 
those designed to track quantitative data about NHS and organisational finances, and those used to further categorise the events found here to enable 
exploration of multiple overlapping ‘stories’. To avoid compromising confidentiality of organisational sites, the full chronicle has been filtered to include 
only data relevant to the national case. The furthest left column is an arbitrary serial number to differentiate entries. The furthest right pertains to those 
events for which a precise date was not available, but it was reasonably possible to locate the event in time, often because a given month was referred to: 
this notes the level of generality at which such events were located in time. The middle three columns indicate the date, the event in question and the 
document from which this event was identified. As Table A.1’s purpose is illustrative, it includes only the first few entries on the national chronicle. 
Table A.1 – Extract from national chronicle 
Serial 
no. 




637 14/07/2004 Gershon review points to possible efficiencies in public service What is productive time? Month 
971 14/06/2007 London Health Observatory publishes 'save to invest' drawing on earlier 
'Croydon list'. Includes phrase 'potentially cosmetic' 
Save to Invest Month 
978 07/07/2007 Nicholson tells NHS Confederation politicians should support reconfigurations Hospitals must close, NHS chief tells MPs 
 
638 13/12/2007 Operating Framework describes 3% savings requirement from spending 
settlement 
Efficiency appendix to the Operating Framework  
839 28/01/2008 DH responds to Gershon Review with productive time initiative for 
reinvestment 
Efficiency appendix to the Operating Framework 
 
833 14/01/2009 NHS Constitution published NHS 2010-2015 - from good to great. Preventative, people-
centred, productive 
Month 
639 14/02/2009 DH instructs McKinsey to find ways to save the NHS money Achieving world class productivity in the NHS 2009-10 to 
2013-14: detailing the size of the opportunity 
Month 
640 14/03/2009 McKinsey provides slides on how to save the NHS money Achieving world class productivity in the NHS 2009-10 to 
2013-14: detailing the size of the opportunity 
Month 




642 22/04/2009 Budget requires DH to contribute £2.3bn to an overall £5bn 2010/11 efficiency 
aim 
The operating framework 2010-11 Budget 
643 14/05/2009 First announcement of the QIPP/'Nicholson Challenge' £15-20bn target Public expenditure - second report of session 2010-11 Month 
644 14/05/2009 £15-20bn figures partly based on McKinsey's slides Progress in making NHS efficiency savings - department of 
health 
 
645 14/11/2009 Nicholson announces £15-20bn target by 2013-14 Management of NHS hospital productivity - department of 
health 
Month 
646 14/12/2009 Pre-Budget report, which implies flat real revenue allocations in 2011-12 and 
12-13 
The operating framework 2010-11 Month 
832 14/12/2009 Maximum tariff uplift of 0% announced for the next four years NHS 2010-2015 - from good to great. Preventative, people-
centred, productive 
Month 
648 16/12/2009 Following 2009 Budget, 0.5% efficiency requirement added to tariffs The operating framework 2010-11 
 
649 16/12/2009 Operating framework 2010/11 branded 'innovative, productive, high quality, 
preventative' 
The operating framework 2010-11 
 
647 16/12/2009 Operating framework requires 2% of PCT revenue to remain recurrently 
uncommitted 
The operating framework 2010-11  
845 11/03/2010 Publication of The NHS QIPP - an introduction for clinicians The NHS Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention 
challenge - an introduction for clinicians 
 
650 31/03/2010 NHS Trusts (not Foundation Trusts) report annual surplus of £195m The Quarter - quarter 1 2012-13 Financial 
year 
651 01/04/2010 Introduction of 30% marginal emergency tariff for activity above 2009 levels The operating framework 2010-11 Financial 
year 
983 06/05/2010 Cameron's election campaign mantra: 'I'll cut the deficit, not the NHS' Revealed: toll of cuts across NHS services   
652 14/05/2010 DH releases McKinsey slides Achieving world class productivity in the NHS 2009-10 to 
2013-14: detailing the size of the opportunity 
Month 
653 14/05/2010 Government commits to recruiting 4,200 more health visitors by April 2015 The quarter - quarter 1 2011-12 Month 
944 23/06/2010 Unison call the decision to release McKinsey slides as 'unfortunate' from reduced budgets? Andrew Cole outlines the challenges - 
and the options 
  
945 23/06/2010 Unions and professional organizations supportive of transformation narratives from reduced budgets? Andrew Cole outlines the challenges - 
and the options 
  
946 06/07/2010 Liberal Democrats state opposition to some of Lansley reforms Comment: The NHS may not survive this volcano of ideology Article 
654 14/07/2010 DH announces abolition of Strategic Health Authorities and wider 'delayering' Equity and excellence - liberating the NHS   
655 14/07/2010 Liberating the NHS proposes to replace PCTs with CCGs Equity and excellence - liberating the NHS  
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Appendix 6: Processual analysis illustration 
Figure A.7 is an example of the many illustrations created to help identify key periods from multiple forms of data. Here, the graph illustrates the number of 
events identified by chronicling texts as a rough indication of intensity of activity: other instances of such work used the number of texts found in national 
literature searches. The black handwritten text maps onto this, key changes in evaluative devices and (in boxes) sampled texts. The red text identifies 




Figure A.7 – Temporally mapping multiple forms of data
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Appendix 7: Practice theorisation illustration 
The figures in this Appendix illustrate how individual practices were aggregated into the core 
practices reported here, and some of the stages involves in deriving models from these 
practices. Figure A.8 and Figure A.9 illustrate various stages of sketched practice nets. These 
drawings were designed to record and visualise connections between practices to support the 
identification of sets of interrelated practices suitable for clustering together. Figure A.8 shows 
an early stage in the development of what would become reshaping engagements. Figure A.9 
shows a more developed representation of conducting and contesting financial tests, though 
both would continue to be refined as analysis continued. Both draw together sets of related 
practices, but also show how these sets link to other elements of the developing analysis. 
 




Figure A.9 – Practice net involved in constructing conducting and contesting financial tests 
Compared to these, Figure A.10 represents a later model with a wider scope. It represents the 
five core practices and the top-level subpractices within them (though some of the practices 
were differently named at this stage of analysis). This figure was designed to help visualise the 
differences in practices between sites, so subpractices names and surrounding boxes have 
been colour-coded based on the sites in which they were prominent. This visualisation enabled 
me to see at a glance both the whole analytic structure as it stood across cases and the 
differences between cases. It was regularly referred to in creating my overall analysis and 
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